The new South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, has stated that he would reverse his conservative predecessors’ North Korea policy of pressuring and isolating North Korea and return to one that focuses on engagement. In addition to bringing a fresh, new approach to North Korea’s nuclear issue, the Moon administration will refocus their North Korea policy on humanitarian assistance, development aid, economic cooperation (e.g., restarting the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism projects), and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. This policy could potentially create friction with the international community’s approach of prioritizing accountability for the human rights violations in North Korea.1
North Korea Human Rights Policy: New vs Old
Under the conservative administrations of Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye, the North Korean human rights movement2 received a major boost in support. The Park administration in particular was very keen on raising global awareness of North Korean human rights issues ; it supported the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UN COI) and raised North Korean human rights issues in other high-profile international gatherings.3 Domestically, one of the major achievements of the Park administration in improving the North Korean human rights situation was the passage of the 2016 North Korean Human Rights Act, which had been languishing in the National Assembly for more than ten years. The law provides for the establishment of the North Korea Human Rights Foundation that would support research on human rights and humanitarian issues as well as provide grants to civil society organizations. One important feature of the Foundation’s work is the creation of the Human Rights Archive, which is modeled after the Central Registry of State Judicial Administrations in Salzgitter, West Germany. Just like the German model, the Human Rights Archive is designed to help in the identification and prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations in North Korea. The law has also instituionalized the international coordination efforts of the South Korean government through the creation of an ambassadorship specifically for the North Korean human rights issue.
The new progressive administration is likely to maintain the institutions created under the conservative administrations, but it would reassign policy priorities and resources. Under the new, more engagement-oriented administration, the South Korean government will shift its focus from accountability to humanitarian assistance when it comes to improving the human rights situation in North Korea. Moon’s electoral platform concerning North Korean human rights (Vision 2, Section 5)4 states that his administration will work for the “combined” improvement of political and social rights of North Koreans. Given that the North Korean regime’s horrendous treatment of political prisoners and repression of political dissent has been the main focus of the North Korean human rights movement for several decades, suddenly giving equal prominence to social rights could be considered as detracting from the international community's focus on accountability. However, social rights as well as economic and cultural rights are certainly less controversial since they concern collective rights rather than individual rights (e.g., political rights), and their improvement is more amenable to the Moon administration’s policy of increasing humanitarian assistance and development aid to North Korea.
One area that the Moon administration could make a significant impact with its use of humanitarian assistance is the reunion of separated families, since the North Korean regime would likely be more responsive to South Korean requests if the administration is willing to add economic payoffs, such as the construction of health facilities. The humanitarian concern is certainly enormous given the urgency of family reunions due to the advanced age of the applicants. Despite this, only 972 individuals were able to meet their separated kin in the last family reunion that took place in 2015, and in South Korea alone there are still 60,000 persons awaiting their chance to travel to the North and meet their families. Moreover, records show that progressive administrations have been more successful than conservative administrations in this regard. Whereas 12,576 South Koreans were able to meet their Northern kin from 2002 to 2008 (the Roh Moohyun administration), only 3,559 did during the period of the conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.5
Institutionalization of the North Korean Human Rights Issue
The institutionalization of the North Korean human rights issue began in earnest when the international community took notice of the worsening human rights situations in North Korea and China, especially with the outflow of refugees from North Korea after the economic collapse in the 1990s. International actors instituted a series of human rights initiatives on the North Korean issue within the framework of international law. The first action was the UN Human Rights Council’s adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Resolution in 2003. This marked the beginning of the UN’s efforts to shed light on the North Korean regime’s long history of human rights violations. In 2004, the first Special Rapporteur was appointed to look into the human rights situation in North Korea. Other governments also adopted legal measures, such as the United States’ 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, Japan’s 2006 Law on the Abduction Question and Other North Korean Human Rights Problems, and the European Union’s Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007. In 2013, the UN COI was established, and, in 2014, it released its landmark report on the North Korean human rights situation.
The report by the UN COI put mechanism for accountability into motion. The UN COI report found that the North Korean regime had committed crimes against humanity and recommended refferring individuals responsible (i.e., the top leadership) to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This recommendation was overwhelmingly reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2014. The most engaged actor in this regard was the United States, which had incorporated human rights components into its sanctions against the regime in North Korea. Several countries have since condemned North Korea, including Botswana, who cut all diplomatic ties with North Korea after the release of the COI report.6
The international ramifications of the UN COI’s findings and recommendations are still unfolding. Now, there is international attention not only on North Korea’s domestic human rights violations, but also on the regime’s violations beyond its national borders. One particular issue that caught the international community’s attention was the case of North Korean workers posted overseas, which was the perfect example of how the regime’s policy of human rights violations were being used to generate hard currency income.
The North Korean human rights movement regards North Korea’s export of workers overseas as forced labor, which is a form of slavery. This classification is based on ample evidence of severe restrictions on the workers’ freedom of movement: passports are confiscated, and they are forced to live in barrack- like dormitories under the watch of North Korean security agents sent to guard them. There is no formal labor contract, and working conditions are inhumane; their work schedule typically ranges between twelve to fourteen hours of work per day, with only one day off per month.
The international community appealed to destination states to address the situation; the United States and South Korea applied diplomatic pressure, while the international media put a spotlight on the issue.7 As a result, the governments of Qatar, Malta, and Poland expelled some or all North Korean workers deployed to their countries.8
Conclusion and Pending Issues
The case of the North Korean workers overseas is a perfect exmaple of how the international community is addressing the North Korean regime's business in an institutionalized manner. By working together to the issue, South Korean civil society and state actors galvanized the international community around the cause of protecting the human rights of the North Koreans, and they made the issue a robust part of the political changes in key stakeholder countries. As such, this case serves as the template for future actions to address North Korean human rights violations.
What is left pending is how to strengthen the civil society actors that are vulnerable to political changes. Civil society actors play a key role in collecting evidence and helping victims, but their work is not sufficiently supported, especially in South Korea. The South Korean government in particular does not extensively support the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The total size of government funding on North Korean concerns tends to be quite small; for example, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification disbursed only 650 million won (roughly 560,000 US dollars) to twenty-six recipients in 2015. Furthermore, the bulk of the money went to NGOs that help defectors resettle through educational programs, rather than to NGOs that prioritize human rights campaigns. As the focus of the government’s policy shifts towards engagement, finding stable sources of financing can become even more challenging.
One should also consider how to empower North Korean defectors to help them take more prominent leadership roles within the North Korean human rights movement. Their number is likely to pass the 30,000 mark this year, and a growing number of young, South Korean-educated defectors are joining the movement. As activists that carry the moral authority as victims, North Korean defectors have the ample potential to become very effective civil society actors when given proper training and support. However, given their collective political orientation that at present tends towards the conservative opposition, it is likely that they will be less influential in affecting the new administration’s policy of engaging North Korea. This could be addressed by providing them with international platforms to voice their concerns and capacitybuilding opportunities.
The North Korean human rights movement must adapt to the political changes in South Korea b y institutionalizing mechanisms for monitoring and prosecuting North Korean human right abuses, as well as by empowering civil society actors.
In conclusion, the new administration’s policy towards North Korea presents opportunities and challenges in equal measure. Putting aside the debate on the validity of engagement, it is likely that the new administration would be more successful than their conservative predecessors in addressing the urgent humanitarian concern of helping separated families to meet before they pass away. Human rights NGOs, in particular, can raise awareness on this issue and extend their support. On the other hand, the new policy can also divert some attention from the issue of the regime’s systematic violation of human rights. An institutionalized approach to the human rights issues through close coordination between international, state, and civil society actors is key to keeping the North Korean human rights movement effective in the long run.
Go Myong-Hyun is a Research Fellow at the Center for Risk, Information and Social Policy of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
For further information, please contact: Go Myong-Hyun, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 11, Gyeonghuigung 1-ga-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03176 Korea, ph (822) 3701-7311; fax (822) 8254-7573; e-mail: mhgo(a)asninst.org; www.asaninst.org.
Endnotes
1 Human Rights Watch, “UN: New Move on North Korea Crimes Human Rights Council Opens Door to Prosecution Strategies,” www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/24/un-newmove-north-korea-crimes.
2 The “North Korean human rights movement” refers to groups and institutions in South Korea that work on the human rights situation in North Korea.
3 “FM Yun to raise voice against N. Korea's human rights, chemical weapons issues,” Yonhap News, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/02/26/0301000000AEN20170226001251315.html.
4 See document in Korean at http://theminjoo.kr/President/pledgeDetail.do?bd_seq=65856.
5 See Trend on Inter-Korean Family Reuion, www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1696.
6 Kwanwoo Jun, "Botswana Cuts North Korea Ties," The Wall Street Journal, https://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/ 2014/02/20/botswana-cutsnorth-korea-ties/.
7 “North Koreans working as ‘state-sponsored slaves’ in Qatar,” The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2014/nov/07/north-koreans-working-statesponsored-slaves-qatar.
8 See Eunjung Cho, “North Korean Workers in Qatar Fired Over Labor Violations,” Voice of America, 25 August 2015, www.voanews.com/a/northkorean-workers-in-qatar-firedover-labor-violations/2932647.html.