section2

How do you deal with foreigners? When the economy is good, many countries invite people from other countries to come and work for their industries and in some cases homes. When the economy goes down, these same foreigners are told to start packing to go back to their country of origin. In some countries, foreigners are invited to address the critical need of some of their male citizens to have the chance to found a family and have children. At least in Japan, the moment the marriage fails and there is no offspring, the foreigner wives may start packing to go back home. And there are also people who were born, raised and lived in a country of which they are not nationals, and yet they are basically "citizens" of that country as any citizen can be. Their home is really this "other" country.

Foreigners entering another country assume a complicated relationship with the people and society of that country. This relationship is virtually disregarded whenever foreigners are told either to leave the country under archaic immigration laws, or are not given the chance to play a better role in society.

Regardless of the type of "foreignness" of these people, they cannot be treated with less respect for their human rights. They are entitled to the protection and realization of their human rights, and no country should find an excuse to violate them.

I would like to begin by explaining why I use the word “fighting” in the title of my speech today, “Fighting the insecurity of foreign residents.”

It is important that areas like Osaka and the Chubu region in Japan take on progressive roles toward multicultural co- existence. But these areas are just parts of the state, and therefore, the starting point should be the perspective of the state.

The Constitution of Japan was drafted after the Second World War, reflecting Japan’s history of invasion and colonialism. The preamble of the Constitution states that, “the Japanese people...  have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world” and declares that, “[w]e recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.”

The concept of “human security,” advocated in the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Human Security (2003), was developed based on these constitutional ideas. The Japanese government has persistently claimed that “human security” is at the center of its diplomacy or politics. The idea has been emphasized in Japanese diplomacy, but today the right of people in Japan to live in security as human beings, in particular that of foreign residents, is being violated. Efforts to fight this situation, and to eliminate it are seen in many areas. The Chubu region and Osaka, in particular, where many foreign residents reside, are the battlegrounds. Therefore, I would like to examine how the countries of Korea and Japan as well as its people can fight this “insecurity.”

The Reality of Ethnocracy and Overcoming Colonialism

Ethnocracy is democracy that places its own ethnic people at its center. I once gave a speech in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and found that the participants and I could not agree the issue of ethnocentrism because of their Korea-centric ideas. I explained, that although unfortunately the same way of thinking could also be seen sometimes in the Republic of Korea (ROK), that country is moving towards multicultural co-existence. The participants did not really understand my point. This may not be a serious issue in a country with no foreign residents, but that is not the case in reality.

The problem of ethnocracy is serious in Japan. When I was the Vice Rector of the United Nations University during the second half of the 1980s, apartheid was still practiced in South Africa. In a conference at the University, Rodolfo Stavenhagen of Mexico, an expert on the rights of indigenous peoples, stated that “ethnocracy must be eliminated.” I agreed, raising the examples of South Africa and Israel, and said, “we should not think only of our own people.” He laughed and responded that he was amazed at what I said because he believed that Japan was the second country after South Africa that practiced democracy centered on its own people.

Since then, although I recognize that democracy may exist in Japan it is ethnocentric. Elections have been conducted only for the Japanese by the Japanese, with no consideration for foreign residents. I have been working with an NGO named IMADR (International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination), which has been called an anti-Japanese intellectual movement by grassroots conservative NGOs. I half-jokingly and half-seriously tell everybody that there is no one who is more patriotic than me. A patriot must do something to correct his/her country, if it is doing something wrong. Japan is right in placing importance on the right to live in peace, after reflecting on its past invasion and colonization experiences. But it is wrong in protecting the human rights of its own people only.

2010 will be the 100th year since Japan forcefully annexed Korea, and discussions have been ongoing in various organizations on the Japanese-Korean cooperation to protest colonialism. In this context, I believe that fighting the insecurity of foreign residents is fighting a new form of colonialism. In the globalized world today, colonialism takes on new forms, such as intra-state colonization, inter-regional colonization, or discrimination and exploitation of minorities by other residents.

Questioning “Multicultural Co-existence”

A careful examination of migration at the global scale would show that there are families who are unable to live in peace in their own countries unless they migrate. And while voluntary migration that does not fall in this category is probably a good thing, the major motivation for such migration is to decrease the number of mouths to feed, or to improve through foreign remittances the living standards of the families left behind. Creating a world where people do not have to migrate is important in the global fulfillment of the right to live in peace.

There is also the problem of people who were forced to migrate because they could not live in peace and prosperity in their own country and who in some cases ended up as “illegal” migrants in their destination countries. They are sometimes left with their “illegal” status unresolved and the receiving countries not clearly stating why their migration was not recognized. This is a most insecure situation.

Divorce for Japanese husbands and foreign wives can mean deportation from Japan for the latter if they have no children. Thus the Japanese husbands can threaten their foreign wives with divorce if they are not obeyed. The security of foreign wives is not protected because they are immigrants in the country. The same problem probably occurs in ROK as well.

The number of migrants in Japan increased considerably during the ‘bubble’ economy of the 1980s, and people began talking about multicultural co-existence. ROK also saw an increase of migrants in the 1990s, leading to the development of the idea of multiculturalism. Unlike Japan, ROK enacted a number of laws protecting the human rights of migrants. And the efforts of the Korean citizens at the local level formed the basis of this development. Citizens and local governments in Japan are also making efforts to support the rights of the migrants. Teachers in schools try hard to give education to foreign children similar to the one received by Japanese children, though Japanese schools under the current Basic Law on Education are supposed to enable Japanese children to contribute to Japan as Japanese. While the Japanese government desires to give proper education to foreign children for the sake of human security, the Basic Law on Education does not require it. The hard efforts of teachers in educating foreign children despite lack of official requirement for them to do so are a positive aspect of local activities. But this lack of legal support is a negative aspect of the Japanese state.

There is a considerable difference between multicultural co-existence being discussed at the state level and the various multicultural activities going on at the local level. But the practice of multicultural co-existence based on laws such as the Basic Law on Education would mean a worse form of ethnocentric democracy in the guise of “multicultural co-existence.” Having organized in Japan many study meetings on the importance of multicultural co-existence, I ended up presiding in Seoul in a conference on the citizenship of foreign residents (married migrants in particular) a discussion on “tearing off the mask of multiculturalism.”

Multicultural Co-existence and the Migrants’ Identity

When we speak of multicultural co-existence, we should respect as the starting point how the migrants (in some cases, the women who married their Japanese or Korean husbands) want to live in Japan or Korea, and not emphasize our own ideas on how they should live. The subject of multicultural co-existence is the migrant or foreign resident, and we need to examine better co-existence on their terms.

The issue of identity is important in this context. Co- existence can presume that everyone speaks Japanese, understands Japanese culture and adapts to Japan, in short, partly adopt a Japanese identity. This idea is meant to promote multicultural co-existence as a softer version of blatant assimilation, and it seems to be prevalent.

I was in the Philippines recently,^[1] with the mothers of international couples and their supporting organizations, to discuss with the experts the issue of migrants. These mothers wanted to teach Japanese to their children, but also Tagalog. They did not want to lose their original identity, but would also want to become Japanese. They say, however, that in reality, it is difficult to teach Tagalog. Some are caught between desiring to forget about the Philippines and finding themselves unable to blend into the Japanese society. Such situation is similar to that of a stateless person, and it can be painful. In some cases, it may lead to mental instability.

There are also people who do not study Japanese at all, and their husbands and children would only speak in Tagalog or English. They refuse to become Japanese. Their relationship with their husbands and children may suffer because of it. They would have to have some understanding of Japan.

On the other hand, there are people who study Japanese very hard, blend in with the Japanese, do not allow their children to speak Tagalog, and do not speak Tagalog themselves. Two groups of Filipinos in Kasugai City in Aichi Prefecture illustrate this situation. The members in one group talk in Tagalog among themselves, but the members of the other group interact only with Japanese people and not with fellow Filipinos. They may attend the same Catholic church, but they act differently. Japan actually promotes these two forms of practice.

Some migrants stick to their own language and plan to return to their own countries after working for a couple of years in Japan, and so they do not have to blend into the Japanese society. In fact, they should not. There was a move within the then ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to prepare a law for short-term migration. Another group within the LDP, led by Mr. Hidenori Sakanaka, who used to work at the Immigration Bureau, advocates a proposal to have migrants learn the Japanese culture perfectly, and increase their number up to ten percent of the total population in the next fifty years. Since the ruling party changed to the

Democratic Party due to the recent 2009 elections, I do not know what will happen next.

Ultimately, sustainable multicultural co-existence from the point of view of the migrants means respecting the identity of their country of origin, as well as trying to adopt that of the receiving country, a move that can be seen recently among foreign residents.

Networking for the Protection of Human Rights of Resident Koreans and “Newcomers”

The same problem can be seen among resident Koreans. Those affiliated with Soren, an organization related to the DPRK, emphasize their North Korean identity. Those who originally come from ROK try to adapt to the Japanese culture while maintaining their Korean culture and languages, in the form of sustainable multicultural co-existence. I find sustainable multicultural co-existence as most important. In the end, when we engage in activities at the local level we need to cooperate with the foreign residents, particularly women who migrated because of their marriage to local men.

The discussions on the issue of migration, including state policy for migrants, focused on how to get along with the resident Koreans, the so-called “old-comers.” If we manage to overcome the negative aspect of the Japanese history, the colonialism in the Korean peninsula, we may become a country with sustainable multicultural co-existence. We must also physically experience multicultural co-existence, and maintain our respective identities, because mere theoretical discussion of “multiculturalism” will not be of much use. Although not an issue of race, the anti-discrimination efforts of the discriminated buraku people are linked to the migrants’ fight against discrimination while maintaining their identity. Some people in Okinawa argue that they belong to an indigenous people. The people of Ainu are of course indigenous. It is necessary to try and achieve sustainable multicultural co-existence in the real sense involving all minority groups. Sustainable multicultural co- existence can be achieved when recent migrants, the so-called “new comers,” as well as “old comers” create their own communities around themselves, create networks and live side by side. It would not create stateless cosmopolitanism, but a global democracy, in which the identities of each person are valued. I hope that the realization of such a world would be one of the issues in the Japan-Korean cooperation.

Kinhide Mushakoji is the Director of the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership, and Chairperson of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

 * This is the keynote speech delivered by Kinhide Mushakoji during the Korea-Japan Exchange Symposium: "Considering a Region with Foreign Residents" that was held on 24 October 2009 at the International House, Osaka in Osaka City and jointly organized by HURIGHTS OSAKA and the Kansai NPO Alliance. See page 15 for more information on this event.

Endnote

1. The meeting on the migrants issue was held on the occasion of the Asia Pacific NGO Forum on Beijing + 15 “Weaving Wisdom, Confronting Crises, Forging the Future” (21 - 24 October 2009, Miriam College, Quezon City, Philippines).

Brazil experienced one of its worst economic, social and political crises in the 1980s that led to the migration of many Brazilians to other countries. Among them, many Japanese-descent Brazilians decided to work in Japan as dekasseguis or “temporary migrant workers.”^[1]

Opposite to that of Brazil, Japan was experiencing the height of its bubble economy during the 1980s. And it did not have enough workers to fill the increasing need for labor of its industries. To respond to the country's needs, Japan was forced to allow the entry of foreign workers.

In 1990, Japan amended the Immigration Control Law to allow Japanese-descent foreigners (second generation descendants or nisei-jin and third generation descendants or sansei-jin) and their spouses to come to the country to work for a long period of time. Their close ties with Japan and affinity by blood made them acceptable foreign workers in the country. Visa for the fourth generation Japanese descendants (yonsei- jin) was granted only to those who were accompanied by their third-generation Japanese-descent parents.

As of the end of 1998, the number of registered Brazilians in Japan reached 222,217 corresponding to 14.7% of the total registered foreigners in that year. (See Table 1)

Table 1: Registered Foreigners in Japan ? By Nationality

Figures for selected years, taken from the original Japanese-language table (www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710?1/090710?3.pdf)

In 2008, the number of Brazilians in Japan reached 312,582. Brazilians correspond to the third biggest group of immigrants in Japan after the Koreans and the Chinese. The Brazilian community in Japan is the second biggest Brazilian community in a foreign country, and the biggest Portuguese-speaking community in Asia. Most Brazilians are found in the following prefectures: Aichi (Nagoya city), Shizuoka (Hamamatsu, Shizuoka), Gifu (Gifu), Mie, Saitama (Saitama), Gunma (Oizumi) and Kanagawa.^[2]

These Japanese-descent Brazilians, many with university diplomas, came to Japan searching for better income and better life. But they worked in jobs that were generally refused by the Japanese, and required lower educational qualification. Most of their employers were automobile and electronics companies. One report describes the situation as follows:^[3]

Close to one-fifth of the entire Brazilian nikkeijin population now lives in Japan. Well- educated and middle-class in Brazil, most of them work as unskilled laborers in small and medium-size firms in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Still, based on the exchange rate, they earn five to ten times their Brazilian incomes. Like their own forebears, most of them arrive in the new country intending to work for just a couple of years and then quickly return to Brazil with their savings. Consequently, they have also become known as dekasegi, short for dekasegi rodosha, Japanese for "temporary migrant worker." But many have already brought their families to Japan, and the process of long-term immigrant settlement has begun.

The Brazilian Community and Japan's Economic Crisis

In 2008, Brazil and Japan celebrated the passing of one hundred years since Japanese immigration to Brazil started. In contrast, in 2009, the Brazilian community in Japan has nothing to celebrate due to difficulties caused by the economic crisis. The foreign workers, specially the Brazilian community, heavily felt the economic crisis. Many Brazilians are opting (or somehow forced) to leave Japan and return home to find work.^[4] The situation turned very serious for those who stayed despite the economic crisis. One account expresses the situation:^[5]

The crisis shows no signs of improving and because of this there are many Brazilians who used to live here and have returned to Brazil. The ones who stayed, like me, are trying to survive this mad crisis that affects Japan, almost every day I watch the Japanese news reporting on Brazilians living on the streets, people who have nothing to eat and others who live in public shelters, relying on the donations of kind people.

The problems faced by Brazilian nikkei-jin (Japanese-descent Brazilians) start with the fact that they look Japanese. But they are culturally Brazilians, and many of them cannot speak the Japanese language and are treated as foreigners. Their children also suffer difficulty because of the language barrier and a significant number of them leave school. Other children who came to Japan while very young forget the Portuguese language and lose the ability to understand their parents.^[6] Besides this and many other challenges, the Brazilian community is struggling to fit into the Japanese society and stay in Japan.^[7]

Many Brazilians who lost their jobs were forced to return to Brazil. But Mr. Sidival Furuzawa Pereira, 36 years old, and some other Brazilians want to stay in Japan despite the difficult situation. Mr. Pereira lost his job in mid-2009, and did not have the money to pay for house rent. He started to live on the streets of Hamamatsu in Shizuoka prefecture. Since then, he has been surviving by collecting discarded metal and electrical goods to sell at recycling centers. Mr. Pereira earned around 350 Yen (around three US dollars) a day. Instead of buying food, he saved the money until he had the minimum amount to send for his wife and children in Brazil. Seeing the harsh situation of Mr. Pereira and his effort to survive, a Japanese gave him an apartment to live in and eventually received food from a non-governmental organization (NGO).

But not getting enough for his needs, he still had to survive on food he would find in garbage bins. He said that he was very grateful for the help being given to him and he loved Japan. Every time he had the opportunity to call his wife, she would ask him why he would not come back to Brazil. Mr. Pereira would tell her that he was determined to live in Japan because he thought that Brazil had no job available for him, and he found it more feasible to scavenge for recyclable materials and send money to Brazil despite the continuing dire economic situation in Japan.^[8]

Job vacancies became increasingly difficult to find even for Japanese workers, and the situation was worse for Brazilians due to the language barrier. Japanese workers are now competing with Brazilians and other foreigners in getting work in factories that used to employ mostly foreigners.

The Japanese government decided to offer Brazilians a chance to go back home by providing free transportation. This scheme has been criticized for a provision that those who availed of the subsidy cannot return to Japan with the same visa status for the "time being."^[9] Many Brazilians were offended, and protested this scheme. Fifty- five-year-old J.P.H. expresses the sentiment of his fellow Brazilians:

We made a life in this country, we worked hard, we paid our taxes and now, the government instead of offering a hand to help is kicking us out of the country. We are not Japanese, but we are still human beings and we deserve different solutions for this crisis. (Interview by the author)

Some local governments^[10] offer support to foreigners to enable them to integrate into the Japanese society by helping them learn the Japanese language and by giving them information on daily life. The government employment program (Hello Work) has also been providing help for thosewho lost their jobs. Many Hello Work Offices in different parts of Japan have Portuguese- language service.^[11]

Other Problems Faced by the Brazilian Community

The economic difficulties of Japan brought more problems to the members of the Brazilian community. In addition to decreasing number of jobs available to them, Brazilians suffer from a number of problems.

The clustering of Brazilians in particular areas in Japan, attributed partly to special agents who arranged their jobs and accommodation, and their inability to speak the Japanese language lead to the "creation of island communities isolated from the surrounding ones."^[12] Differences in culture likewise created friction between the two communities. There is an expectation from the Japanese that the Brazilians would follow the Japanese culture, which is a problem since the former do not know it in the first place.^[13]

If the Brazilian children cannot attend Brazilian schools,^[14] they have to attend Japanese schools that are generally not prepared to support them. They do not have teachers who can communicate in the Portuguese language much less have teaching and learning materials in that language. As a result, both the Brazilian children and schools suffer. This and the problems faced by Brazilian families likely cause the low rate of enrollment of Brazilian children in schools.^[15]

Brazilians who do not have medical insurance coverage face the problem of getting medical service. This can happen to those who do not have permanent residence visa and do not enroll in the National Health Insurance system, since membership in this system is not obligatory for them.

Brazilians also face discriminatory treatment. Discrimination against foreigners often takes the form of restricted access to housing, education, employment opportunities,^[16] entertainment establishments, and even ordinary shops. In 1998, a Brazilian woman was asked to leave a jewelry shop by the owner in Hamamatsu after he found out that she was a Brazilian. The woman filed a lawsuit against the shop owner and justified her action:^[17]

Actually, my case was just one of many similar incidents that have occurred in this town. But I decided to take legal action because I thought somebody should stand up and let the public know that discrimination does exist in Japan.

The issue of discrimination against foreigners in Japan is highlighted by the comments/ suggestions of the Member-States in the Human Rights Council of the United Nations in the recent Universal Periodic Review:^[18]

[Adopt] national legislation to bring it into line with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. (Slovenia); Consider establishing legislation defining and prohibiting discrimination in all forms (Brazil); Consider introducing a definition of discrimination in its criminal law (Guatemala); Adopt, as a matter of urgency, a national law against racism, discrimination and xenophobia (Islamic Republic of Iran).

Conclusion

The number of Brazilians in Japan has started to decline in certain areas due to the current economic crisis, while the number of people from other countries (such as China, the Philippines and Vietnam) is still growing due to other employment schemes (such as the trainee system).

The future of the Brazilians in Japan is still unclear, and the Japanese government still faces the problem of securing the needed labor force for industries that depend on foreign workers. But foreign workers will not be able to help much if they do not enjoy a stable life in Japan, including respect for their rights as workers. And for those with families in Japan, such as the Brazilian nikkei-jin, it is even more difficult to live as dekasseguis in the country.

Erika Calazans has LL.M in International Law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais - Brazil (2006); worked as a researcher on International Law at Hokkaido University (2007); currently a Ph.D. Candidate at Kobe University (2009) and intern of HURIGHTS OSAKA. For further information please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes

1.Takeyuki Tsuda, "No place to call home: Japanese Brazilians discover they are foreigners in the country of their ancestors," Natural History, Volume 113, Number 3, April 2004, available in http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m i_m1134/I, s_3_113/ai_n5990766/

2.Akio Kamiko explains that the concentration of Brazilians in particular areas in Japan is partly caused by the arrangements made by "specific agents who not only arrange their flights to Japan but also provide them with accommodation and jobs." As a result, some towns have significant number of Brazilians relative to the total town population. Akio Kamiko, Japan's Experiences with Japanese Brazilians, downloaded from http://www.toodoc.com/%E7%AB %8B%E5%91%BD%E9%A4%A8 %E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%A6-eboo k.html , page 4

3.Tsuda, op. cit.

4.Tony McNicol, "Mixed results with foreign influx," The Japan Times, avail able in http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20070116zg.html

5.Paula Goes, "Japan, Brazil: Crisis puts an end to the dream of a better life," Global Voices, 11 March 2009 in http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/03/11/japan-brazil-crisis-puts-an- end-to-the-dream-of-a-better-life/

6.Mariko Yasumoto, "Japanese-Brazilian families face serious challenge in communication," Japan Today (online news and discussion website) in http://www.japantoday.com/category/lifestyle/view/japanese-brazilian-families-face-serious-challenge-in-communication

7.Goes, op. cit.

8. "Atriste historia de um braziliero desempregado," 14 January 2009 in http://igaum.blogspot.com/2009/01/triste-histria-de-um-brasileiro.html

9.Yasushi Iguchi, Impact of Financial Crisis on Migration from the Perspectives of destination for Asian migrant workers in Japan and other OECD countries, presentation made in Bangkok in May 2009.

10.For examples of local government programs, see the Kobe city program in http://www.kicc.jp/e/index.html and Konan city program in http://www.city.konan.shiga.jp/portugues/

11.See the website of Tokyo Employment Service Center for Foreigners for the list of Hello Work Offices with Portuguese and other languages services, www.tfemploy.go.jp/en/coun/cont_2.html

12.Kamiko, op. cit. page 5.

13.Ibid.

14.The number of foreign students attending foreign schools declined by 30-50% as of March 2009. A number of schools for non- Japanese children, including Brazilian schools, closed due to bankruptcy. See Iguchi, op. cit.

15.See Chubu Region Multiculturalism and Gender Equality Research Group, "Open Letter to United Nations Special Rapporteur Doudou Diene: Report on Education Issues of Foreign Children in the Chubu Region," 2007, for a discussion on this issue.

16.See 2008 Human Rights Report: Japan, United States Department of State, available in www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119041.htm

17.Toshi Maeda, "Brazilian files discrimination suit," The Japan Times, in http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19980902a9.html

18.Universal Periodic Review of Japan, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, UNGA, 30 May 2008 A/HRC/8/ 44, page 17.

During the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1993, the ASEAN foreign ministers “agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights” in support of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights.

Based on this ASEAN ministerial declaration, like-minded individuals, spearheaded by members of LAWASIA,^[1] started discussions on pursuing the possibility of having a regional human rights mechanism in Southeast Asia. Thus, the civil society Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism,^[2] or Working Group for short, was established sometime in 1995.

In 1996, the Working Group started meeting with ASEAN through its foreign ministers and, later on, its senior officials. As early as 1999, ASEAN urged the Working Group to present a proposal on what was an appropriate regional human rights mechanism.

After a series of expert meetings and consultations, the Working Group recommended the establishment of a regional human rights commission to ASEAN as the appropriate mechanism. Thus, in 2000, the Working Group submitted a working document entitled Draft Agreement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission (Draft Agreement) for ASEAN’s consideration.

During the meeting with the ASEAN Senior Officials in Thailand in 2000, ASEAN referred the Draft Agreement to its think-tank, the ASEAN-Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) for its comments and suggestions. No further action was taken on that matter since then. It was apparent that ASEAN was not prepared at that time to venture into such kind of regional human rights mechanism.

Since 2001, the Working Group has been undertaking annual workshops on the ASEAN regional human rights mechanism, together with a host ASEAN government and its national human rights commission, if it has one. Each workshop’s conclusions are then submitted and presented to the ASEAN Senior Officials on the occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. These workshops have harvested concrete proposals on progressing towards the establishment of an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism. In fact, some of the human rights provisions in ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Programme are culled verbatim from these workshops such as the “establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children” and the “elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers.”^[3]

Initial ASEAN Move

During the meeting of the Working Group with the ASEAN Senior Officials in Vientiane on 25 July 2005, ASEAN engaged the Working Group to help in the implementation of the following human-rights-related programs in the VAP:

• The establishment of a commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children
• Elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the promotion and protection of the rights of migrant workers
• Promoting education and public awareness on human rights in the region; and
• Networking among existing national human rights institutions in the region.

It also bears noting that all ASEAN countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Pursuant to this mandate given by ASEAN, the Working Group has organized several activities on the human rights program areas, to wit:

• Five Roundtable Discussions among ASEAN governments, national human rights institutions, and civil society groups from 2005 up to the present;
• A “Roundtable Discussion on Engaging ASEAN Governments on Human Rights Education” among ASEAN regional organizations and national human rights institutions in Bangkok in 2006;
• An ongoing research on the elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on migrant workers;
• A research on t he establishment of an ASEAN commission on women and children;
• An experts meeting and a regional consultation to discuss the establishment of the ASEAN commission on women and children have also been separately organized in Bangkok to complement the research on the same topic; and
• Regarding the networking among existing human rights mechanisms, the existing national human rights institutions in ASEAN countries formalized in 2008 their cooperation and identified human rights issues of common concern. They are planning to come up with activities and projects that will address these human rights issues.

In 2008, the ASEAN Member- States ratified the ASEAN Charter, transforming what was once a loose organization into a more rules-based one. One of the more prominent changes that the Charter has introduced is the establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body based on terms of reference (ToR) that was to be adopted by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. This was a significant development considering the cautious stand that the ASEAN Member-States consistently took on human rights matters. But including a provision of such an institution in the Charter is not a walk in the park. In fact, of all the provisions in the Charter, the establishment of a human rights body was the one that was most discussed, debated upon, and even, at times, the source of heated disagreements that even threatened the realization of the Charter itself. In the end, however, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed that the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism was essential in building the credibility of ASEAN as a rules-based organization. As such, the human rights body was even given the status of an “organ” of ASEAN, just to stress the importance of its establishment.

Shortly after the adoption of the Charter, and even before it was ratified by all the ASEAN Member-States, ASEAN created the High Level Panel (HLP) on an ASEAN Human Rights Body which was tasked to draft the terms of reference (ToR) that would establish such a body. After a year of deliberation, the HLP came up with the draft ToR that would establish an ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The ASEAN Foreign Ministers subsequently approved the ToR in July 2009 and the ASEAN Summit formally launched the AICHR in October of the same year.

A Different Type of Mechanism

Compared to regional human rights mechanisms existing in Europe, the Inter-Americas and Africa which are composed of experts, the AICHR is an intergovernmental body whose ten representatives are appointed in behalf of the ASEAN Member-States. Many human rights advocates see this as a challenge given ASEAN’s notoriety in invoking its principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members when it comes to human rights concerns.

Furthermore, the AICHR is a consultative body that will adopt an evolutionary approach in fulfilling its mandate and functions of promoting and protecting human rights in the ASEAN region. And just like the decision-making process in ASEAN, it can only decide on matters through consultation and consensus.

These characteristics of AICHR have been seen as the main stumbling blocks for the operation of the mechanism. Despite these, however, the establishment of the AICHR is itself a step forward. In fact, even ASEAN and its member-states agree that it is a breakthrough.

Some may be discouraged by the manner by which the AICHR will progress. And yet, it still is as an opportunity forhuman rights promotion and protection to develop within ASEAN; and the burden falls on the more human-rights-progressive Member-States to push the other Member-States to allow the AICHR to progress if they want ASEAN to be truly credible and responsive to the times.

Taking an optimistic and advocate’s point of view on the matter, the reality is that there must be a starting point for the AICHR to progress. What that starting point should be is definitely debatable. But what is imperative is that all ASEAN Member-States are onboard and committed to the success of a regional human rights mechanism.

Work for AICHR

The common point towards full protection of human rights in the region is through promotion. Now does that mean that all the AICHR should do is to promote human rights? This, obviously, will be contrary to its very mandate under the ToR and the ASEAN Charter since “protection”　is mentioned in the same breath as promotion. As such, in the evolutionary sense of things, promotion must be seen as a starting point towards protection of human rights.

The AICHR and human rights must be felt by the people. Its visibility must be on top of its priority at the moment. How can we expect the peoples of ASEAN to access the AICHR if they do not even know what it is all about? Worse, we cannot expect the people to actually access the AICHR if they do not know what human rights are all about and which of their rights have been compromised. This is where the civil society groups can help in speeding up the evolution of the AICHR. They must ensure that this new human rights institution of ASEAN is known to the people. They cannot leave this to ASEAN and AICHR itself, lest it proceeds only at a pace that they are comfortable with. For the AICHR’s presence to be felt in the region, there is a need to push for its “visibility” to be a priority in its work plan. And this must be supplemented, if not complemented, by civil society groups that are interested in seeing the development of the AICHR into a more progressive mechanism.

In making sure that the AICHR is visible and felt by the ASEAN peoples, there is a necessity for its Representatives to travel to each ASEAN Member-State. Civil society groups can take this opportunity to organize and get every opportunity for the people to meet with the AICHR Representatives and bring their concerns to them. Although the AICHR does not have investigative functions, it does not discount the fact that it can obtain information on the human rights situation of ASEAN Member-States.

Another possibility for the AICHR is the setting-up of an experts group or sub-body similar to the arrangement before of the now defunct United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Although the Commission was seen as a political body, it established experts groups or bodies which later on developed into special procedures.

The AICHR is a political body. It will set the direction for human rights promotion and protection in Southeast Asia based on the information that it may have. But the AICHR meets only at least twice a year. There is therefore a need to make sure that proper information are gathered and processed for the AICHR’s consideration and action. Setting-up an experts group will ensure the quality and accurateness of the factual information that it may gather. And as mentioned earlier, while country visits and investigation are not mentioned in the ToR of the AICHR, such are not, however, directly proscribed. The ToR allows the gathering of information from member states on the promotion and protection of human rights. And since the AICHR is envisioned to meet, not only in its headquarters, but also in the different ASEAN countries, it will also be an opportunity to meet stakeholders other than governments, still as part of its consultative and dialogue functions.

Furthermore, the AICHR is mandated to conduct “studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN.” There are already accepted common human rights commitments and agreements in ASEAN, more particularly on issues of women and children, for example. A study on these issues will definitely be desirable if only to give a “situational analysis” of its present condition in the region. And such a study, though country data may be needed, is actually not country- specific but thematic. Again, this can best be done, not by the political personalities in ASEAN but by experts who have the capacity to submit credible reports for the AICHR’s consideration.

The human rights experts may also be tapped to help the AICHR “develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to complement the building of the ASEAN Community” and “to develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters of interest to ASEAN.”

There is also a need to have proper and responsive rules of procedure for the AICHR. While its ToR define the structure of the AICHR, the details of implementation are yet to be settled. The ToR of the AICHR must be translated into action through its procedures.

The drafting of an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is another perfect opportunity to push for the concrete evolution of the AICHR into something that will be more meaningful to the ASEAN peoples. There is a need, however, to be vigilant that this opportunity is also not used to espouse cultural relativism. Such must not be so since the core principles of the AICHR itself states that it must “uphold international human rights standards as prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties.”

And lastly, one of the more important avenues for evolution is the Representatives of the AICHR themselves. Although the Representatives are accountable to their respective governments, the ToR itself calls on them to act impartially. And acting impartially means not favoring any individual member-state; rather, the Representatives must think proactively to promote and protect the human rights of all ASEAN peoples. They should be engaged by civil society groups for them to be forward-looking on human rights.

Conclusion

In sum, the creation of a new regional human rights mechanism in the form of the AICHR is not the end all and be all of human rights in ASEAN. There are other different opportunities in ASEAN at the moment, such as the imminent establishment of an ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. As such, we must maximize these opportunities and create an environment for human rights in ASEAN. And the creation of these mechanisms should be seen as aids in creating this environment. In the mean time, the advocacy continues to reap more positive developments in the field of human rights in Southeast Asia.

Ray Paolo J. Santiago is the Program Manager of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.

For further information, please contact: Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, Ateneo Human Rights Center, 20 Rockwell Drive, Rockwell Center, Makati City 1200 Metro Manila, Philippines; ph (632) 8997691 loc. 2109, fax: (632) 8994342; e-mail: rsantiago@aps.ateneo.edu; www.aseanhrmech.org.

Endnotes

1.Lawasia is an “international organisation of lawyers’ associations, individual lawyers, judges, legal academics, and others which focuses on the interests and concerns of the legal profession in the Asia Pacific region.” It has LAWASIA Human Rights Committee and Secretariat that have “overseen a good deal of research into and development of human rights mechanisms, the most notable being the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, which has gone on to develop its own life.” For more information on LAWASIA visit http://lawasia.asn.au

2.The Working Group is a coalition of national working groups from ASEAN states which are composed of representatives of government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, the academe, and NGOs. Visit www.aseanhrmech.org for more information.

3.See 1.1.4, Political Development, Asean Security Community, Vientiane Action Programme, Annex 1 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2004).

ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism

ASEAN Leaders inaugurated on 23 October 2009 in Cha-am Hua Hin the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The AIHRC was established under Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter,^[1] and based on ASEAN’s “commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and also its commitment to “pursue forward-looking strategies to strengthen regional cooperation on human rights.” The AIHRC will operate under the terms of reference (ToR) that was approved by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 2009.

The ASEAN leaders see AICHR as a “historic milestone in ASEAN community-building process, and as a vehicle for progressive social development and justice, the full realization of human dignity and the attainment of a higher quality of life for ASEAN peoples.”  They also recognize that the “TOR of the AICHR shall be reviewed every five years after its entry into force to strengthen the mandate and functions of the AICHR in order to further develop mechanisms on both the protection and promotion of human rights.”^[2] The ASEAN member-states have appointed their respective AIHRC members.

It was also made known that another human rights body focusing on women and children, the ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Women and Children, will be set up next year [2010].^[3] The Prime Minister of Thailand, H.E. Abhisit Vejjajiv, remarked at inaugural ceremony of the AICHR that this "and other regional mechanisms shall be part and parcel of the ASEAN human rights regime under the single umbrella of the AICHR." The work of this Commission "will be in line with the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which, all ASEAN Member States are parties to."

Fifth Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN

The Fifth Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN – Towards an ASEAN Human Rights System: Role of Institutions and Related Activities was held in Bangkok on 15-16 December 2009. The Roundtable was co-organized and co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, and the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group).

The Roundtable was attended
by participants representing governments (the Foreign Ministry and agencies responsible for ASEAN cooperation on the rights of women, children and migrant workers); National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs); and members of the Working Group - from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Also in attendance were Representatives to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) from Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and observers from the United Nations (UN) and funding organizations.

The Roundtable was divided into six sessions covering the following topics: (a) System- Building for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights at the Regional Level; (b) Mandate of the AICHR: Challenges of Implementation in a Contemporary Setting; (c) The Three Pillars of the ASEAN Community: Commitment to the Human Rights Process; (d) Women’s Rights, Children’s Rights and Migrant Workers’ Rights: Alignment with the AICHR as the Overarching Institution; (e) Moving Forward: Lessons for the Future; and (f) Conclusions and Recommendations.

Several recommendations were agreed upon including the following:

23. The Roundtable reiterates that the AICHR has to be seen in the context of the ASEAN Charter. Although the AICHR is the main venue for asserting human rights, stakeholders should make use of other platforms within ASEAN including interaction with ASEAN leaders, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, human rights bodies in ASEAN, relevant sectoral bodies, and the ASEAN Secretariat, for the purpose of human rights promotion and protection. Given the existence of national structures and the international system, the Roundtable recommends strengthening t he complementary role of the AICHR.

24. The Roundtable believes that the drafting of an ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights [should] be given priority as this may be a perfect opportunity to demonstrate the evolution of the AICHR into something more concrete and meaningful to the ASEAN peoples.

Asia Pacific Conference on Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights

The 5th Asia Pacific Conference on Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights (APCRSHR), held from 18 to 20 October 2009 in Beijing, is a follow-up to the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, the World Conference on Women in 1995 and the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000. It provided a space for stakeholders to exchange experiences and discuss strategies in the reproductive health fields in the Asia-Pacific. It was also meant to “further arouse the attention from the international community to reproductive health issues, and facilitate the attainment of MDGs in the Asia and Pacific Region on schedule.”^[4] One of the working themes of the conference was on “Working for Universal Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights: Building on the ICPD PoA and the MDGs.” Under this theme, the participants reviewed the progress of Asia-Pacific countries in implementing the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Program of Action (PoA), and “exchanged experiences thereof, reiterate government commitments, and defined Asia-Pacific regional strategies for achieving “universal access to reproductive health by 2015” together with the existing problems and challenges.” The youth participants issued their Youth Declaration, and stated that “[D]enying young people accessible sexual and reproductive health services and education is a violation of young people's human rights and their right to development, as affirmed by the ICPD and the Beijing Platform for Action.” They also urged the national governments and the civil society to “fulfill sexual and reproductive health and rights, as they are an inalienable aspect of young people's right to health.” The human rights of the youth were also discussed in the other themes of the conference.^[5]

Endnotes

1.Get the full document at www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf

2.Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, available in http://www.15thaseansummit-th.org/outcome_document.php

3.“ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children to be Established,” www. aseansec.org/ 23112.htm#Article-20

4.Conference Background of the 15th APCRSHR, in www.5apcrshr.org/en/detail.aspx? articleid=090609084712591215

5.See the conference themes at www.5apcrshr.org/en/ articlelist.as px?categorycode=2302

Korea-Japan Exchange Symposium: "Considering a Region with Foreign Residents"

Japan and South Korea, with an increasing number of foreign residents due to international marriage and demand for their work, are facing the common challenge of creating a multi- ethnic, multicultural society in the region. Knowing the problems faced by foreign residents in Japan and Korea is a requirement in order to act for the realization of the human rights of the foreign residents.

In both countries, local governments and civil society groups have been making efforts to address this issue creatively but also on a trial-and-error basis. The symposium exchanged lessons learned from the experiences and discussed ways to overcome the challenges together.

The symposium opened with a keynote speech by Professor Kinhide Mushakoji entitled “Fighting the Insecurity of Foreign Residents - Possibilities of Cooperation between Japanese and Korean People.” This was followed by a presentation by Professor Kyung Seok Oh of the Multicultural Research Institute, Hanyang University, in Korea who discussed the different ways of facilitating coexistence with the foreign communities in Ansan City. Associate Professor Yamamoto Kaori of the School of Education and Welfare, Department of Welfare Science, Aichi Prefectural University talked about citizens and residents and the role of foreign policy in the Tokai region. Mr. Hirai Masatsugu, Director for foreign residents policy of theHuman Rights Office of the Osaka City government, talked about local government policies for foreign residents.

The symposium was held on 24 October 2009 at t he International House, Osaka in Osaka City. It was jointly organized by HURIGHTS OSAKA and the Kansai NPO Alliance.

Movie Showing on Migrant Workers: Caregiver

A Philippine movie on the life of a Filipina caregiver in London entitled Caregiver was shown in Osaka on 19 November 2009. The film portrays the story of a schoolteacher who decided to quit her teaching post to join her Filipino husband working in a hospital in London. The film presents the work of Filipino caregivers in a British home for the aged, and the complexity of their personal lives. The movie is one of the series of films on the lives of the so-called Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in recent years.

The movie showing was followed by a presentation of Ms. Sachi Takahata, of Hiroshima Kokusai Gakuin University, on the training of Filipino caregivers and nurses who came to Japan under the Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). The presentation focused on Filipino caregivers and nurses who are undergoing language training before getting assigned to nursing homes and hospitals in Hiroshima area. The Filipino caregivers and nurses comprise the new batch of foreign workers in Japan under the economic partnership agreements with other countries. Indonesian caregivers and nurses have also arrived in Japan under a Japan-Indonesia economic partnership agreement.

The movie showing was jointly organized by HURIGHTS OSAKA, Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai and Center for Multicultural Society (non-governmental organizations working on the rights of migrants). It was held at the DAWN Center, an institution focusing on women and gender issues.

Museums that exhibit the faces and forms of injustice have the heavy responsibility of facilitating not merely remembrance but also empowerment.

The preservation of Tuol Sleng as the "crime scene" of the Khmer Rouge is meant to prove that torture and execution existed and to implant the idea that violators should be held accountable.

The presentation of materials from the perspective of "oppressed people" by LIBERTY OSAKA aims to remind us that human rights violations, as well as realization, occur in the most ordinary situations in our lives.

The honor being given by Bantayog ng mga Bayani to people who made great sacrifices in their struggle for human rights celebrates the fact that their efforts helped make us see the dawn of freedom.

Human rights museums are repositories of memories that tell us to "never again" suffer the injustices of the past. But these museums need not be frozen in time.

Since the faces and forms of injustice change, these museums may adapt to the present contexts, to the new interests of the young, to the new technologies of communication, to societal changes.

Human rights museums are reminders of the injustices that we have to confront now and in the future.

A group of concerned people in Osaka City met in August 1982 to discuss the establishment of an "Osaka Human Rights Historical Museum." They wanted a unique museum that would present a "viewpoint on human rights through the perspective of the history of oppressed people."^[1]

The museum was eventually established as the Osaka Human Rights Museum and popularly known as LIBERTY OSAKA, the first museum on human rights in Japan. It was established in 1985 in Osaka City with the financial support of the governments of the Osaka Prefecture and City, labor unions, civil society organizations, and private corporations. The largest contributor was the Buraku Liberation League (BLL), the national leveler's movement established before World War II that played a leading role in the post-War movement against the discrimination of Japanese known as burakumin (buraku people).^[2]

Museum Location

The school is located in an area, created as Watanabe village (Watanabe mura) in 1706 during the Edo period (1603-1868), where buraku people worked on the traditional major industries of leather tanning and drum manufacturing. The area produced drums that were used in Shitennoji, the major temple in Osaka, as well as in Osaka Castle during the 18th century. According to documents dating from around 1881, most of the 73,000 drums produced in Osaka in a year were made in Watanabe village. This area was also called Kawata village (kawa means leather, or skin) during the Edo period, and later renamed Naniwa ward (Naniwa-ku). Drum-making remains an industry in Naniwa ward at present with four manufacturers using the old drum-making techniques. The area had long been the residence of buraku people, who suffered social discrimination from the time the Watanabe village was established till the present. BLL has been very active in this area. LIBERTY OSAKA's location therefore is very historic in relation to the struggle against discrimination.

Basic Philosophy of the Museum

LI BERTY OSAKA was established to conduct studies and research on human rights including buraku issues, to collect and preserve related materials and cultural goods, and to publicly exhibit them, in order to contribute to the promotion of human rights and the development of a "humanity-rich" culture.

It adheres to four basic principles:
(1) Comprehensive museum focused on human rights

Out of the more than five thousand museums in Japan, few comprehensively cover human rights issues rooted in the history and culture of the Japanese society (such as the buraku history), and aimed at contributing to the promotion of human rights as well as the development of a "humanity- rich" culture. LIBERTY OSAKA, therefore, can be seen as a comprehensive museum on human rights. While based in Osaka, LIBERTY OSAKA sends out the message of respect for human rights across the country and the world.

(2) Museum that responds to the new human rights movement

LIBERTY OSAKA responds to the need to eliminate discrimination by heightening human rights awareness through its unique functions as a museum. Its activities (including exhibitions, meetings and other events, as well as educational programs) provide possible methods and directions for new human rights movements, such as those on human rights learning and awareness- raising.

(3) Museum that promotes the importance of human rights history and culture

In light of the advancement and diversification of the cultural needs of people, LIBERTY OSAKA has taken the new challenge of introducing intangible cultural assets such as performing arts and music that museums have not done before. This approach likewise reflects the use of songs and dances by people suffering from discrimination in expressing anger against, and yearning for liberation from, it. Exhibiting and publicizing these songs and dances are important for the promotion of human rights.

(4) Creative and participatory museum that promotes voluntary activities

LIBERTY OSAKA adopts participatory management as well as creates new ideas, awareness and values that help realize human rights and develop culture using the creativity coming from the grassroots activities of the people. LIBERTY OSAKA aims to gain greater capacity for further development through the combined strengths of the efforts of many private organizations, the cooperation of the local governments, and its status as a foundation.

Exhibits and Projects

Initially, the exhibits of LIBERTY OSAKA were structured around the buraku issue. During the 1995-2005 period, however, LIBERTY OSAKA undertook a substantial renewal of its exhibits by including various forms of discrimination and human rights issues arising from the current complex social conditions in Japan.

The current general exhibition section is based on the theme "How we face discrimination and human rights in Japan," and focuses on the discrimination and human rights issues from the start of the modern period (1868 onward) in Japan, when the structure of discrimination of the feudal ages was reorganized, until today. This section clarifies, from a human rights perspective, the social structure in Japan that created discrimination, the efforts of the discriminated people themselves against discrimination, and the discrimination and human rights situation today. Apart from the general exhibition, two special exhibitions as well as other exhibition projects are organized each year.

The general exhibition section consists of four units. Below is a brief introduction of each of these units.

Unit 1: Human Rights Today
Human rights are rights that all human beings are born with. Yet there are human rights that are violated, and people have to struggle to enjoy them. What roles do the various human rights have in our lives? Using multiple screens, this Unit shows visual materials on human rights in Japan and the world, as well as materials on the right to work (focusing on karoshi [death from overwork]), and the right to education (focusing on the phenomenon of children refusing to go to school).

Unit 2: Our Values and Discrimination
Each person has a different sense of values. These values provide an important basis in people's lives. But there are times when these values may provide a basis for discrimination. This Unit presents an opportunity for visitors to examine how values give people the strength to live, as well as how they relate to discrimination.

This Unit examines issues related to economic, social and physical statuses by looking at ten values, such as "the desire for good academic achievement" and "desire for good job."

Unit 3: The Activism of People who are Discriminated- against
People who suffer discrimination have diverse opinions and claims. This Unit shows their economic industries, the cultures they developed, their diverse views, and their movements against discrimination. The visitors can learn the meaning of these views and activities.

This Unit examines the structure of discrimination in contemporary Japan focusing on twelve issues, including issues regarding Korean residents, Ainu people and buraku people.

Unit 4: Discrimination, Human Rights and You
People suffering from discrimination are not the only ones affected by discrimination and human rights. Each person is involved in discrimination or human rights issues relating to education, work and daily life. Through narrations of different persons, this Unit shows how people can face discrimination and human rights issues. In this Unit, visitors can watch videos of victims of discrimination, or those who are involved in anti-discrimination and human rights activities, narrating their experiences.

Involvement in School Education

The activities of LIBERTY OSAKA place particular importance on working with educational institutions. LIBERTY OSAKA's specialist curators provide information, explain the exhibitions, as well as give advice and guidance on the preparation of visitation programs for students (from all school levels and universities) who visit as part of human rights education. LIBERTY OSAKA staffs also visit schools for human rights education using the learning processes derived from program implementation experiences and on topics relating to objects and materials from the museum. More and more students show interest in LIBERTY OSAKA through these educational activities. There are also volunteer guides who provide explanations to the general visitors, another educational activity that leads to a deeper understanding of the exhibition materials.

Impact

LIBERTY OSAKA's regular museum activities and its work in schools are mutually stimulating and deepen the understanding of how human rights education can be done systematically.

It has collected a significant amount of historical materials, as well as materials on buraku arts, crafts and movements.

In the twenty-four-year operation of LIBERTY OSAKA, it has received 1.22 million visitors. Many students learned about the buraku discrimination for the first time through LIBERTY OSAKA. Some even began to aspire to become teachers after the experience of viewing original objects and materials on display in LIBERTY OSAKA. They realized that they would not have come across this experience in conventional school education.

Future Direction

LIBERTY OSAKA looks forward to welcoming more visitors from other parts of Asia. To achieve this, it is launching in 2010 a continuing renewal program of the general exhibition. It plans to use multiple languages in its exhibit and activity explanations, along with the use of digital information network.

It also plans to introduce exhibitions and workshops using experiential methods that enable children to effectively learn human rights.

Nobutoyo Kojima is the Program Manager of LIBERTY OSAKA, and member of the Advisory Committee of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

For further information, please contact: LIBERTY OSAKA, 3-6-36 Naniwanishi, Naniwa- ku, Osaka City, Japan 556-0028; ph (816) 6561-589; fax (816) 6561-5995; e-mail: n.kojima@liberty.or.jp; www.liberty.or.jp/topfile/ human-top.htm

Endnote

1."Lest We Forget: Osaka Human Rights Museum Planned for 1984," Buraku Liberation News, number 11, October 1982, page 3.

"Bantayog ng mga Bayani" in the Filipino language means "Monument to the Heroes." It is a landscaped memorial center honoring those individuals who lived and died in defiance of the repressive regime that ruled over the Philippines from 1972 to 1986.

A 14-meter Inang Bayan (Mother Philippines) Monument designed by sculptor Eduardo Castrillo stands on the grounds of the memorial center, depicting the self-sacrifice of a fallen figure of a man, held in one hand by the rising figure of a woman who symbolizes the Motherland, while her other hand reaches for the glorious sun of freedom. In the distance stands a Wall of Remembrance, where the names of martyrs are inscribed. The Monument and the Wall of Remembrance were unveiled on 30 November 1992.^[1]

In August 2009, the Bantayog ng mga Bayani Museum (Bantayog Museum) completed the first two years of operation since it opened to the public. Still very much a work in progress, it has managed nevertheless to merit positive comments from the public and the media.

The Inspiration for the Bantayog Museum

After visiting the Philippines immediately after the 1986 People Power Revolution to rejoice over the downfall of an authoritarian regime, Dr. Ruben Mallari, a Filipino-American medical doctor, suggested the establishment of a memorial to honor those martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the cause of freedom and justice but failed to witness the dawn of freedom.

A group of Filipinos responded to this suggestion and organized the Bantayog ng mga Bayani Memorial Foundation. Dr. Ledivina V. Carino, former Dean of the University of the Philippines' College of Public Administration, helped draft the concept paper based on the suggestion of Dr. Mallari. The final concept paper stated the rationale for Bantayog Museum:

Freedom has dawned magnificently upon us brought about by our own will, with the help of Divine Providence. We stood together with linked arms as we proclaimed our unity, our dedication to liberty and democracy, and our commitment to our country. With boundless faith, we broke the chains which enslaved us in a regime of terror, intimidation and fraud. But as we enjoy our liberation, let us not forget those who fell during the night. Let us honor the Filipino patriots who struggled valiantly against the unjust and repressive rule of Ferdinand Marcos. Let us build a memorial to those men and women who offered their lives so that we may all see the dawn.

For as we remember those victims of authoritarian rule, we shall become more vigilant about preserving our freedom, defending our rights, and opposing any attempt by anyone to foist another dictatorship upon us.

In honoring our martyrs, we proclaim our determination to be free forever.

The Bantayog Museum aims to reach out mainly to schoolchildren and college students, hoping to help them understand and learn from the people's struggle against repression. "Never Again!" is a recurring theme of the activities held at the memorial center.

Preserving the Memory

Based on a set of criteria for selecting persons to be honored, families of victims, members of civic organizations, and the general public are invited to send the names and personal circumstances of persons who should be honored. A Research and Documentation Committee verifies the factual bases of each nomination and conducts independent researches and investigations, so that the names of obscure, unknown martyrs in remote places may be brought to light. The Executive Committee of the Foundation reviews the recommendations of the Committee, and the Board of Trustees gives the final approval.^[2]

The names of the first sixty-five martyrs, some of them well- known such as Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. and many others not as well-known, were enshrined in 1992. The following year, after long reflection, the Foundation decided to include as heroes those who gave their all for the sake of freedom, justice, and democracy during the Marcos years but died after the EDSA Revolution.

Since then, hundreds of heroes and martyrs of the martial law dictatorship have been honored by their names being inscribed on the black granite Wall of Remembrance.

Right behind the Wall of Remembrance is the Jovito R. Salonga Building, which is named after a distinguished political leader who fought against the authoritarian regime. Salonga continues to add his powerful voice to the democratic people's movement clamoring for human rights, justice and the rule of law.

The Bantayog Museum occupies more than a hundred square meters of space on the second floor of the Jovito R. Salonga Building. On the same floor is the Ambassador Alfonso T. Yuchengco Auditorium where film showings are presented, and programs are held. It is named after the Foundation's Chairperson, a prominent businessman and philanthropist who has served as the country's ambassador to China and Japan.

A library is now open on the ground floor of the same building. It contains archives and reference materials relating to the same period, and has begun to serve students and scholars wishing to do research.

Awakening a Sense of History

By displaying authentic material objects associated with the heroes and martyrs, as well as with the period of dictatorship, the Bantayog Museum hopes to awaken in its visitors a powerful sense of history as it was actually made by real-life men and women.

While concentrating principally on the period itself of Marcos rule (1972 to 1986), the collection and displays also include the periods immediately before (from 1965) and after (1986-87) in order to place the dictatorship and the corresponding people's resistance in their historical context.

Thus, the pre-martial law section deals with the economic, political and social problems of the 1960s (mass poverty, abusive government officials, violation of civil liberties) that gave rise to popular discontent especially of the youth.

Methods of torture are documented, and the model of a prison cell draws much attention from visitors.

There is a growing collection of memorabilia from the period of resistance, including underground publications, the "mosquito press," reports from the various civil-society groups emerging at the time, and expressions of international solidarity. The families and friends of the heroes and martyrs donate much of the Bantayog Museum's material collections.

Through the years of repression, opposition to the Marcos regime kept growing and broadening until the shocking assassination of the political leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. upon his return to the Philippines from exile in the United States. The ensuing nationwide protests have been well documented, culminating in the world-famous "People Power Revolution" that finally drove the dictator out in February 1986. This event is brought to life in the Bantayog Museum with the scale model of a military tank, stopped in its tracks and covered with flower petals showered by the people gathered to press for the ouster of Marcos.

Meanwhile, a Hall of Remembrance beside the Bantayog Museum is dedicated to the heroes and martyrs, through the capsule biographies and individual photos of each one. This section is meant to inspire love and respect for their sacrifice for the common good, especially in the minds and hearts of young people.

Other activities

Conscious that many other aspects of the martial law period are not yet included in the permanent display, the Bantayog Museum has been mounting special exhibits from time to time. One of these was a special tribute to the late President Corazon Aquino, who assumed the presidency right after the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship, and whose recent demise prompted a massive outpouring of emotions and fresh insights into her legacy of public service. Another special exhibit showed the works of Philippine artists done in the Social Realist style, some of which were painted during the martial law period and others depicting how today's realities mirror those of yesterday.

Concerts and story-telling are among the other activities conducted by the Bantayog Museum. It may be noted that since the Bantayog Memorial Center hosts numerous programs, seminars, etc. by various civil- society groups, the latter are also drawn to visit the Bantayog Museum. It is hoped that with more support from the private sector and the general public, more resources will be generated that will allow t he implementation of so many ideas that cry out to be done.

Volunteers are the backbone of the staff, a unique aspect of the Bantayog Museum and Library. Many of them were part of the people's movement against martial law, and are thus able to impart an unforgettable personal touch as they guide visitors around the exhibits. Others are student volunteers with a particular appreciation of the history of the period. Conscious of the need to equip themselves with the requisite professional and technical skills, they have been taking part in a museology training program consisting of visits, seminars and workshops offered by the country's foremost institutions along this line, led by the National Museum.

Admission to the Bantayog Museum is free, although donations are welcome. Its operations are supported and guided by a Board of Trustees headed by the top businessman Alfonso T. Yuchengco (Chairperson) and the human- rights lawyer Jovito R. Salonga (Chairperson Emeritus), with Quintin S. Doromal as Executive Director.

Making an Impact

Of the more than seven thousand visitors who have come to the Bantayog Memorial Center so far, a good number is composed of ex-activists who are now parents and grandparents themselves Often, they come in groups to relive the time when they put their own lives at stake for the sake of "truth, freedom, justice and democracy" ? the watchwords of Bantayog Museum even today.

However, students at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) make up the majority of visitors. Because Philippine history is part of the academic curriculum, schools organize annual educational tours of which the Bantayog Museum is increasingly a part. It is not an uncommon sight to see tour buses lined up at the entrance to the Bantayog Memorial Center, loaded with hundreds of students and their teachers all waiting for their turn.

It is mainly because of favorable media coverage over the past two years that these schools (and the tour operators) have come to know about the Bantayog Memorial Center. Bloggers have been a good source of information and promotion, as well.

The Philippine press sees the Bantayog Museum as a timely reminder of the dangers of forgetting the past. "At last a museum for rare courage," read one headline.^[3] One columnist said, "...(S)pend a nice Sunday afternoon there, while the breezes blow and the sun shines, looking at the names carved on the Wall of Remembrance, which belong to those who did something heroic for us in more recent times, which claimed many of their lives, and which is why the breezes blow, and the sun shines for us today."^[4] Not a few have commented, though, that this is still a small museum with fewer items than the bigger ones; others have noted the "little shop of horrors" aspect which are perhaps an unpleasant reminder of the martial law period's atrocities.

Future direction

Building up the Bantayog Museum's collections, as well as properly organizing them with a digitized information system, is the focus of work in the short to medium term. At the same time, the work of educating the public about the Bantayog Museum and its chief concerns should be addressed through more special exhibits, lecture series, conferences and such. A very important complementary task is to dig deeper into the sources of information about martial law; an oral history project must be started while participants during the period are still around to remember and to recount.

By the year 2011, when the Bantayog ng mga Bayani Foundation observes its 25th anniversary, the Bantayog Museum (and library) envisions itself to be "a leading organization on the martial law years, or the leading organization."

The words of Senator Salonga sum up what Bantayog Museum will continue to aim at: ^[5]

we shall proclaim our firm resolve to keep faith with our martyrs and heroes and our deepest conviction that this land of the morning, the repository of our hopes and dreams, is worth living for and dying for.

For further information please contact: Bantayog ng mga Bayani Museum, 2nd floor of J.R. Salonga Bldg., Bantayog Memorial Center, Quezon Avenue corner EDSA, Quezon city, Metro Manila, Philippines, ph/fax (632) 434-8343; e-mail: bantayogmuseum@gmail.com; http://bantayog.wordpress.com.

Endnotes

1. Based on The story of Bantayog Foundation: Remembering the martial law martyrs and heroes, available in http://bantayog.wordpress.com/about/.

2. Ibid.

3. Ma. Ceres P. Doyo, "At last, a museum for rare courage," The Philippine Daily Inquirer, available in http://services.inquirer.net/print/ print.php?article_id=20070226-51611.

4. Conrado de Quiros, "Museum," The Philippine Daily Inquirer, available in http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquir eropinion/columns/view/200708 29-85263/Museum.

5. Statement of Senator Jovito Salonga during the 1992 unveiling of the Inang Bayan Monument and Wall of Remembrance, available in http://bantayog.wordpress.com/ keeping-faith/.

Tuol Sleng Museum in Phnom Penh is an unlikely museum. It is where as many as 17,000 or more people were incarcerated, tortured, and then systematically killed during the Khmer Rouge rule from April 1975 to January 1979. The museum's outward appearance was then, and remains today, that of a typical Cambodian school, but it is ominously different as soon as you enter, in its silence, in its foreboding. It was a typical secondary school once, but not any more and never again, not even in a country desperately short of school buildings. Never again will it see crowds of blue and white uniformed school-boys and girls. Nor will it buzz with the familiar chatter of children and their rote-learning chants that once emanated from its eerie classrooms. Instead you are ushered in with the same signs and their stark warning that greeted its many victims such as:

Do nothing! Sit still and wait for my orders. If there are no orders, keep quiet! When I ask you to do something, you must do it right away without protesting.

The Start of a Museum

The travesty of what went on in Tuol Sleng was undoubtedly the product of an extreme Cambodian leadership but its discovery and preservation is due to the Vietnamese whose army, with dissident Cambodian forces, overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Two of their photo- journalists first entered Tuol Sleng. They saw and recorded exactly how it had been abandoned by its erstwhile custodians, including leaving the corpses of its final victims to rot. Vietnamese authorities soon realized the significance of their find and appointed an expert, Mai Lam, to take charge of it and to document its archives.

Tuol Sleng is therefore much more than a museum testifying to a macabre chapter of history. It is to this day a largely intact crime scene with evidence of mass atrocities and much more. It has been the repository of vital evidence carefully conserved first by Mai Lam, and to this day by the Documentation Center of Cambodia and supporting organizations. That evidence is now playing a vital role in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the United Nations-backed special court now sitting to judge those most responsible for the tragedies of Khmer Rouge rule. Tuol Sleng images, the museum's exhibits, are not just historical artifacts, but in mid-2009, they are brought to life again in vivid and startling witness testimony. The evidence comes from no less a figure than the man in charge at the time, with his extraordinary admissions, and by those of the very few survivors of his stewardship. Kaing Guek Eav's (alias Duch) is the first Khmer Rouge leader to face trial. Tuol Sleng, he confesses, with its linked facility ten kilometers away, known as Choeung Ek Killing Fields, was indeed a center of extermination; the top one of hundreds for the Khmer Rouge, not seen since the Nazi death camps of the Holocaust.

Tuol Sleng is now the responsibility of the Government of Cambodia through a Secretary of State at the Council of Ministers responsible for national archives and of its Department of Museums. UNESCO provides important technical support. Although it is clear that Tuol Sleng will be preserved for the foreseeable future, its long-term future in inextricably bound up with the outcome of the Khmer Rouge trial and Cambodia's internal debate about how to deal with this dark chapter of its history. So far Tuol Sleng is largely untouched, remaining in its original simplest form. Even plans to improve some facilities for visitors have brought much resistance, but the Government recognizes that it is in need of some essential repair, which must be done in ways that do not destroy its authenticity. Really a new facility will be needed to be able to conserve artefacts and displays for posterity, but even then, it is unlikely that Tuol Sleng will emulate other museums to attract and entertain visitors. Such peripheral facilities, for visitors to engage "interactively", will not be welcomed in the near future, not until that debate is concluded which may take several more generations. Anything that detracts from the simple chilling images and recollections would be seen as insensitive while people who survived the period live on with their painful memories, nightmares and traumas. One entrepreneur learned this the hard way in 2008. He tried to recreate not far away a Khmer Rouge style canteen, complete with the typical meal of meager gruel, eating implements and attire of the period, as if by now there would be some kind of nostalgia for it. His idea aroused universal revulsion; if the authorities had not ordered it closed, it would have been a commercial failure.

Tuol Sleng does stand on its own as a memorial, the unique symbolic edifice of the Khmer Rouge rule where any detractor likely to pose a threat was purged most mercilessly. A salient feature of Tuol Sleng is that apart from the stories coming from its only six survivors, with the paintings of one, Van Nath, appearing there depicting the horrors, visitors are left to draw their own impressions based on what they see and feel. There are few of the usual narrative descriptions seen in most museums. There are literally no stories at all of the victims; how or why they ended up there, and unlike for example Holocaust sites, there are no personal possessions, no material evidence of lives once lived and finally lost there. Apart from a few clothes, no mementoes were left. Visitors do not need a guide to internalize the experiences, although if one does accompany them, he or she will not only act as an escort but also be able to add his or her personal dimension. Hardly any family in Cambodia escaped unscathed in that time.

The Exhibits

Tuol Sleng, also known as S21 after the district in which it is found, is just a kilometer from central Phnom Penh, near the usual shopping centers, markets, hotels and tourist sites. It is inevitably a "must-see" on the dark tourist trail, with up to five hundred domestic and foreign visitors daily, although their reasons for going are quite different. Foreigners usually feel compelled to exercise a natural morbid fascination. They pay modest admission charges. It is free for Cambodians, for whom it is a solemn pilgrimage visit; often personal and intimate, sometimes a search for an unknown aspect of their identity. Whether foreigner or Cambodian, all visitors are emotionally moved once there. After the somber warning signs are heeded, there are four buildings to visit. Buildings A, B, and C are similar with several storeys, and barbed wire on upper floors put there apparently to prevent inmates from suicide attempts. There are numerous cells, made of brick or wood dividing up the former classrooms. They were used not just for incarceration but also torture. Pictures can be seen of bodies once on the metal beds still standing there. Blood stains on the floor, boxes in the corner for human waste, are still there. In some rooms there are boards displaying photographs of victims, with pictures depicting atrocities such as electrocution, shackles, scorpion stings, and even babies removed from their mother's womb only to be crushed against the walls. Reminders say that many of the "guards" were just teenage children brainwashed and desensitized to the brutality. Building D was the main interrogation center, next to the guard's quarters.^[1]

For Cambodians who find the last trace of their lost relatives in Tuol Sleng, it is the saddest of shrines, knowing that the flesh and blood of their own kith and kin was spilled in very the rooms where they are standing. For that reason, it does make Tuol Sleng one more place in the world where the human race must be reminded of its tragic past. It will never be managed in the same way as for example the Silver Pagoda museum in Phnom Penh that sets out Cambodia's long and at times glorious history, including the famous Angkor Wat era.

Impact of the Museum

Tuol Sleng Museum will stay devoted to the history of one short tragic period, and what happened in one place, but its role in this sense as a place of learning should not be under- estimated.^[2] It cannot, it does not, and will never answer the question that is most often asked; the same question it is hoped that the Khmer Rouge Trials will answer, which is simply ? "Why?" Cambodians want an answer. They need to come to terms with this the darkest of periods in their history. They are beginning to do this.^[3]

However, some Cambodians (who are not considered members of the Khmer Rouge) raise the idea that Tuol Sleng was "invented out of whole cloth by the Vietnamese, so as to blacken the reputation of the Cambodian people and to indict them en masse for genocidal crimes."

To this, David Chandler, a historian on Cambodia, has this response:^[4]

I always replied to them that I believe that their suggestions were mistaken. The effort to invent S-21, I think, would have been far too costly for the Vietnamese, and far too complicated. The Vietnamese did not have the resources, for example, to compose the documents discovered in the S-21 archives (and thousands of others related to S-21, discovered elsewhere in Phnom Penh after the Vietnamese withdrew), to invent the names and backgrounds of workers at the prison, to fake the photographic evidence, and to invent biographies for the survivors and former workers at the facility. Moreover, had they mounted such an operation, it seems likely that someone who participated in it would have talked about it, especially after the Vietnamese withdrew their forces in l989.

Thun Saray, prominent human rights leader in Cambodia and who personally lived through the horrors, says of Tuol Sleng:

For Cambodians, and international visitors as well, this place should be a memorial place. The experience of visiting this place where so many people suffered and died; where photographs of torture, prisons cells, and more should remind people of the horrible times and that things like this will not be forgotten and will not happen again. Tuol Sleng is part of the legacy and gives access to Cambodians to gain knowledge about the real events that happened under the KR.

This year, for the first time, the Khmer Rouge period is to feature in official teaching of history in schools. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)^[5] has led a "Genocide Education Project" initiative with forty-eight Cambodian and international experts and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS). They have trained the first twenty-four senior officials who will go on to train teachers for all children to be taught the subject after 2010. The MoEYS has approved Dy Kham Boly's A History of Democratic Kampuchea as the official history textbook. Youk Chhang, director of DC-Cam says: "Understanding the past, however horrendous, is the first step towards restoring humanity and identity of a nation". The initiative includes active reading, group discussions, guest lectures, theatre arts and field trips. Tuol Sleng will feature in visits for schools from all over the country not just Phnom Penh. Such creative methodology should help teachers overcome the difficulties inherent in conveying lessons to children whose parents and older living relatives not only lived through the horrors, but who are still traumatized by it. Reputable psychosocial research, for example by Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (TPO) shows that not only has trauma stayed with survivors, but also its pervasiveness is manifested in later generations. That cycle must be broken.

Future Direction
If lessons of history are learned and acted upon, then the cause of universal human rights will be advanced. Tuol Sleng shows graphically how Khmer Rouge leaders ruled by fear; fear over the entire population, real fear of knowing what would befall all those whose absolute loyalty could not be assured. Individuality was destroyed. So was trust in the natural inherent goodness that human beings should harbor and show towards each other. Fear dictated that survival, at any cost, became the main determinant of human behavior. No country in the world will ever attain acceptable standards across the full gambit of civic, political, social, economic, and cultural rights until the day comes when leaders cease to use fear and oppression to maintain their control. If Tuol Sleng helps to bring that day to Cambodia, it would at least bestow one most noble final honor on its victims.

John Lowrie, who has worked in Cambodia since 1998 as a senior human rights and development worker with international and local civil society organizations in developing countries, has been working on the promotion of good governance, rights of disabled people and others living with vulnerability including ethnic minorities, and the sustainability of local civil society organizations in developing countries.

For further information, please contact: John Lowrie, New Horizons Society, ph (855-12) 931 301; e-mai l : nhs@cami nt el . com, johnlowrie@wirelessip.com.kh; www.newhorizonsunlimited.org; and see his recent article: www.scribd.com/doc/11621086/ The-Name-of-the-Game-is- Sustainability-but-Does-the-Last- Player-Count-by-John-Lowrie

Endnotes

1.For a more detailed room by room guide, please visit:
<http://www.tokyoreporter.com/2008/10/04/museum-tour-the-tuol-sleng-genocide-museum/>.
For an excellent pictorial guide with comment, read "Hanging in the Past" by Timothy Dylan Wood and Rita Leistner, available in < http: / /www.ideasmag.artsci.utoronto.ca/issue4_1/ ideas_leistner_wood_low.pdf>.

2.For a very useful commentary on Tuol Sleng and how it relates as a museum compared with others such as those of the Holocaust written before the Khmer Rouge trials read Paul Williams, "Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek," Holocaust and Genocide Studies; Fall 2004; 18, 2; available in homepages.nyu.edu/~pw32/Cambodian_genocide.pdf

3. For the Cambodian Government Perspective on Tuol Sleng see "Memory of the World Register: Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum Archive Ref N° 2008-04, available at : http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/ 27488/12200140123TuolSleng_ web.rtf/TuolSleng%2Bweb.rtf

4.David Chandler, "Tuol Sleng and S-21," Searching for the Truth, June 2001.

5.The Documentation Center of Cambodia has an excellent website http://www.dccam.org/ and also posts regular updates of relevant articles including the Khmer Rouge Trials," http:// www.cambodiatribunal.org/

Human rights education and human rights awareness- raising play a vital role in promoting human rights and in eliminating all forms of discrimination including Buraku discrimination.

Eight years have passed since the Law on the Promotion of Human Rights Education and Human Rights Awareness-Raising (LPHREA) was enacted in Japan,^[2] while almost five years have passed since the United Nations started both the World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) and the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (UNDESD) in January 2005.

The Japanese government has been issuing since 2002 its annual White Paper on Human Rights Education and Awareness- Raising that describes various human rights education activities and initiatives undertaken in each year. However, the Japanese local governments have not issued such reports yet. In this context, the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute (BLHRRI) surveyed the local governments regarding the implementation of their commitments under LPHREA, WPHRE and UNDESD. This paper provides a synopsis of the survey findings and a number of proposals for the future.^[3]

Survey Findings

BLHRRI sent a survey questionnaire to each of the 1,870 local governments in Japan in September 2007. 1,450 local governments (77.5% of the total) sent valid responses.

The survey questionnaire covered training programs, and specific plans. For LPHREA, the questionnaire also covered local government supporting structure and reporting of activities undertaken; and for WPHRE and UNDSD, specific plans for Dowa education and awareness-raising.

The responses of the local governments are summarized into the following:
Ａ. Activities and initiatives made by local governments regarding LPHREA

1. Training and publicity activities based on LPHREA

   Almost half (715 or 49.3%) of the responding local governments said that they offered training programs for local government employees, while another half (734 or 50.6%) said 'No'. One local government did not respond to this question.

   Less than half (672 or 46.3%) of the local governments said that they offered training programs for teachers, while a slightly more than half (756 or 52.1%) said 'No.' Four local governments did not respond to this question.

   Slightly more than half (768 or 53.0%) of the local governments said they held public information activities on LPHREA for local residents, and less than half (678 or 46.7%) said 'No.' Four local governments did not respond to this question.

2. Plans based on LPHREA

   This is the most important item among the questions in the survey. Among all local governments that responded, 234 (16.2%) said "Yes, we have a plan based on LPHREA," 192 (13.2%) said "We have a plan which is considered to be based on LPHREA," and 1,021 (70.4%) said "No, we do not have such a plan yet." Five local governments did not respond to this question.

   From among the 426 local governments that responded that they have either a plan based on LPHREA or considered to be based on it, two prefectures (Hyogo Prefecture and Oita Prefecture) said that they have both. From these confused responses of two prefectures, we may conclude that only 424 out of 1,870 local governments (22.7%) have specific plans based on LPHREA.

3. View of local governments without any plans yet

   Among the local governments that do not have such a plan yet, 107 (10.5%) said that they would be formulating a plan based on LPHREA, 298 (29.2%) said that they were currently considering making such a plan, and 608 (59.5%) said that they do not have such an intention. Eight local governments have no response on this point.

4. Government structure to promote the LPHREA-based plan

   The second important aspect in promoting human rights education and awareness-raising by local governments is that they have an official structure or a task force to promote the LPHREA-based plan. Among the local governments that have LPHREA-based plans, 299 (70.4%) have such a task force, while 120 (28.4%) do not have such plan. Five local governments did not respond to this question.

5. Promotion structure including academic experts and representatives of local residents for the implementation of LPHREA- based plans

   Among the local governments that have LPHREA-based plans, 257 (60.5%) have promotion structures that include academics and local residents, while 161 (38.1%) do not include them. Six local governments did not respond to this question.

6. Reports on t he implementation of plans based on LPHREA

   Among the local governments that have LPHREA-based plans, 72 (16.9%) have published reports on the implementation of such plans, while 341 (80.5%) have not done so. Eleven local governments did not respond to this question.

Ｂ. Efforts made by local governments regarding WPHRE

1. Training and publicity on WPHRE

   To the question on whether or not they have offered training programs on the WPHRE for local government employees, 82 local governments (5.7%) said 'Yes,' and 1,322 (91.1%) said 'No.' Forty-six local governments did not respond to this question.

   134 local governments (9.2%) said that they have training program on WPHRE for teachers, while 1,276 (88.0%) said that they have no such training program. Forty local governments did not respond to this question.

   Also, 81 local governments (5.6%) said that they have conducted public information activities on WPHRE for local residents, while 1,349 (93.0%) said that they have not done so. Twenty local governments did not respond to this question.

2. Plans based on WPHRE

   Among the local governments that have responded, 10 (0.7%) said, "we have a plan directly based on WPHRE," 45 (3.1%) said "we have a plan which is considered to be based on WPHRE," and 1,384 (95.4%) said, "we do not have any such plans yet" (eleven local governments did not respond to this question). Thus, only 55 local governments have plans either directly based on or considered to be based on WPHRE.

3. View of local governments without any plans yet

   Among the local governments that said that they do not have such a plan yet, 22 (10.5%) said that they are going to formulate a plan based on WPHRE, 232 (24.0%) said that they were considering adopting such a plan, and 1,023 (73.9%) say that they do not have such an intention. Seven local governments did not respond to this question.

Ｃ. Efforts made by local governments regarding UNDESD

1. Training and publicity on UNDESD

   To the question on whether or not they have offered training programs on the UNDESD for local government employees, 46 local governments (3.2%) said 'Yes,' while 1,373 (94.7%) said 'No', and 31 gave no response. 68 l ocal governments (4.7%) said that they have had training programs on UNDESD for teachers, while 1,339 (92.3%) said that they do not have such a program. Forty-three local governments did not give a response.

   Also, 51 local governments (3.5%) said that they have conducted public information activities on UNDESD for local residents, while 1,372 (94.6%) said that they have not done so. Twenty-seven local governments did not give a response.

2. Plans based on UNDESD

   Among the local governments that have responded, 4 (0.7%) said "we have a plan directly based on UNDESD," 28 (3.1%) said "we have a plan which is considered to be based on UNDESD," 1,393 (95.4%) said "we do not have any such plans yet," with 25 local governments not giving a response to this question. Among t hose local governments that have no such plans yet, 7 (0.5%) said, "we are going to formulate a plan based on UNDESD, 292 (20.9%) said "we are currently considering about such a plan," and 1,082 (77.6%) saidthat they do not have such an intention. Seven local governments did not give a response to this point.

Ｄ. Guidelines and basic plans for Dowa education

As the recommendation from the Area Improvement Measures Council rightly pointed out in May 1996, it is necessary to create and expand human rights education based on the many years of Dowa education experiences. It must be noted also that 1) Buraku discrimination still exists; 2) it is important to study deeply about the Buraku discrimination issue; and 3) Dowa education should be situated as a vital pillar of human rights education in view of the leading role it historically plays for the advancement of human rights education.

From such a viewpoint, we asked whether local governments have basic plans and/or policies for Dowa education. 296 (20.4%) responded 'Yes,' while 1,137 (78.4%) said 'No' and 17 did not respond. Among local governments that have no such plans/policies, 24 (2.1%) are going to formulate such a plan/ policy, 230 (20.2%) are currently considering adopting such a plan, 875 (77.0%) do not have such an intention, and 8 gave no response.

Future Issues

The following issues have to be considered in the call for more commitment and action in the years to come:

1. Local governments should offer training programs for their employees and teachers, and conduct public information activities for local residents on such initiatives as LPHREA, WPHRE and UNDESD so that their significance would be more widely recognized.
2. All local governments should formulate plans based on these initiatives.
3. Local governments that already have plans should publicly report on the status of their implementation on a regular basis.
4. All local governments should establish a task force for the promotion of these plans and actions consisting of the governor/mayor and all section representatives, and which should hold meetings on a regular basis.
5. All local governments should set up an advisory body consisting of academic experts and representatives of local residents (including those representing the discriminated-against). The advisory body should hold meetings regularly to come up with proposals for the formulation and improvement of the plan.
6. The local government plan should include concrete programs for the solution of various human rights issues including the Buraku discrimination issue.
7. The local government plan should include programs for human rights education and awareness-raising in all places including the school, community, home, and the workplace.
8. The local government plan should include human rights training programs for public officials and professionals such as government employees, teachers, police officers, medical and welfare practitioners who are deeply engaged in human rights issues.
9. Local governments should formulate plans and programs for concrete human rights issues such as basic plans/programs for Dowa education and awareness-raising along with human rights education and awareness-raising plans/ programs.
10. Grassroots movements should be built up to promote LPHREA, WPHRE and UNDESC with the participation of wide-ranging organizations, groups and individuals.

Mr. Kenzo Tomonaga, the former Director of the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, is now a member of the Board of Directors of the institute.

For further information, please contact: Mr. Kenzo Tomonaga, c/o Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, 1-6-12, Kuboyoshi, Naniwa-Ku, Osaka City, Japan 556-0028; ph (816) 6568 0905; fax (816) 6568 0714; e-mail: udhr@blhrri.org; www.blhrri.org

Endnotes

1.Professor Yasumasa Hirasawa of Osaka University translated this article from Japanese language into English language.

2.The English translation of LPHREA is available at http://blhrri.org/blhrri_e/news/new117/new11701.html

3.The full report on the survey findings is available in Japanese language at http://blhrri.org/kenkyu/data/survey_on_HRE/index.htm

The 14th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) on Human Rights^[1] discussed a number of issues including human rights and corruption, human rights and religion, and human rights defenders. On the issue of human rights and corruption, the APF members "committed to undertake practical measures to combat corruption using a human rights based approach and to promote awareness of the close linkages between corruption and human rights and the harmful effects of corruption on the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights." On the issue of human rights, religion and belief, the APF members considered the "need for inter and intra faith dialogue [at national, regional and international levels] to promote mutual understanding and the protection and promotion of human rights and the value of using a human rights approach to balance potentially competing rights."^[2] The Jordan National Centre for Human Rights hosted the meeting with the co-sponsorship by the APF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.^[3]

NGO Parallel Conference

A parallel "Arab and Asia-Pacific NGO Workshop on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights" was held on 2 August 2009 in Amman. The workshop discussed the basic roles and functions of national human rights institutions based on the Paris Principles, the challenges facing human rights defenders in the Arab & Asia-Pacific, and the establishment of NHRIs in the Arab & Asian regions. The NGO representatives also discussed the human rights situation in Iran, and Taiwan, and advocacy at the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The workshop had forty-four participants from various countries. The Amman Center for Human Rights Studies in cooperation with Forum Asia, the International Women's Rights Watch-Asia Pacific, the International Services for Human Rights and The Foundation For the Future organized the workshop. ^[4]

Photo contest on CEDAW

The Asia Pacific Regional Coordination Mechanism Thematic Working Group on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, co-chaired by UNESCAP and UNIFEM, is holding a photo contest to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The photos should depict any of the following:

- Women participating in decision-making processes, such as women exercising their right to vote and the right to be elected, taking part in peace negotiations and post -conflict reconstruction processes, holding leadership positions in the government, civil society, community, private sector

- Women participating in post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives

- Women and girls enjoying the same opportunities for education as men and boys

- Women enjoying the same employment opportunities and labor rights as men, and working in sectors that are traditionally dominated by men

- Women having equal access to health care services

- Women and men participating equally in household duties, such as taking care of children or the elderly

- Rural women, indigenous women, HIV positive women, migrant women, refugee women and other often excluded groups of women enjoying these rights.

Seven photos will be chosen as winners and exhibited on 25 November 2009 at the opening of the exhibition "Women CAN: Women's Rights are Human Rights" to be held in Bangkok, and featured on the websites of the UN agencies involved in organizing the contest. Entries should be submitted on 15 October 2009 at the latest. For more information please visit: www.cedawphotocontest.org.

Endnotes

1.The APF has the national human rights institutions (NHRIs) of Jordan, Afghanistan, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor-Leste as members.

2.14th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum, Concluding Statement.

3.Asia Pacific Forum website, http:// www.asiapacificforum.net/about/annual-meetings/14th- jordan-2009/?searchterm=Amman%20meeting

4. Based on report in the Amman Center for Human Rights Studies (ACHRS) website: www.achrs.org/english/index. php? option=com_content&task=view&id=165&Itemid=59

HURIGHTS OSAKA organized, in cooperation with the Kobe Student Youth Center, a study tour to Jeju island in South Korea from 25 to 29 August 2009 to learn about its history of "migration."^[1]

Jeju island is southwest off the Korean peninsula. Jeju island has close historical ties with Osaka where the biggest community of Korean residents in Japan is found. Koreans had been migrating to Osaka since the start of the Japanese colonial period in the early 20th century. Majority of them came from Jeju island partly because of the availability of regular shipping service between Jeju island and Osaka at that time. There are historical records that show that one-fourth of the Jeju population migrated to Japan, particularly to Osaka, to work in factories and other jobs during the colonial period.

The thirty-member study group consisted of NGO activists, academics, students, concerned citizens, and Korean residents in Osaka whose grandparents came to Japan during the Japanese colonial rule.

The group visited a women divers museum, the Jeju April 3 Peace Park,^[2] the Jeju Peace Museum, the former Japanese military facilities (including the underground strongholds and airport), and the Jeju Immigrant Center, a non-governmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the Jeju Migrant Peace Community.

The Haenyeo Museum has many exhibits on the lives of Jeju women divers. Haenyeo is the Korean word for the women who gather marine products by diving more than ten meters deep into the sea. The hard life of these women divers symbolized Jeju island. They migrated to other parts of Korea and to foreign countries (especially to Japan) diving for marine products and their income supported the island's economy. There are also records showing their involvement in the anti-Japanese movement in the 1930s.

At the Jeju Immigrant Center, the group met and talked with the Director, Mr. Kim Jeong Woo, and staff members of various nationalities. The Center provides migrants (both migrants married to Koreans and migrant workers) from China, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, etc, with consultation service, Korean language and culture classes, and emergency shelter.

The group learned that the Jeju Immigrant Center fulfils its aim of making the foreign migrants live together with the Koreans by protecting and promoting their rights through exchange of information and views on the issue.

The Jeju island study tour was the third and final stage of the Korean study tour project of HURIGHTS OSAKA.^[3]

Nobuki Fujimoto is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

For further information, please contact: HURIGHTS OSAKA, PiaNPO, 3F, 2-8-24 Chikko Minato-ku, Osaka 552-0021 Japan; ph (816) 6577-35-78; fax (816) 6577-35-83; e- mail:webmail@hurights.or.jp; www.hurights.or.jp

Endnotes

1. Migration in the context of Jeju island refers to both voluntary and "forced" migrations. Voluntary migration covers both the colonial-era movement of people from Jeju Island to Japan to find work at their own initiative, and the more recent movement of people from other countries (particularly Southeast Asian countries and China) to work in Jeju island. Forced migration on the other hand refers to the compulsory deployment of Korean workers by the Japanese colonial government during the latter part of the second world war. This latter type of migration, however, remains a debatable point among Japanese historians.

2. A summary of the final report of the Korean National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident (available in www.jeju43.go.kr/english/sub05.html) states that the "Jeju April 3 Incident was a series of events in which thousands of islanders were killed as a result of clashes between armed civilian groups and government forces. It took place over the period from March 1, 1947, when the National Police opened fire on protesters, and April 3, 1948, when members of the Jeju branch of the South Korean Labor Party began an uprising to protest against oppression by the National Police and the Northwest Youth and against the South Korean government, until September 21, 1954 when closed areas of the Halla mountain were opened to the public." Then President Roh Tae-woo apologized to the Jeju people for the unfortunate incident.

3. For information on the previous study tours see "2008 Study Tour to South Korea" (www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/053/04.html) and "Korea-Japan Symposiums on "International Marriage" and "Female Migrant Workers"" (www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/050/08.html) in this publication.

Human societies are shaped by people who take leadership roles or who promote ideas about change. These people inspire others to take action or to think of ideas that facilitate change.

Decades before human rights became a global language, there were people who worked for societal change based on ideas that we now consider as human rights. These people pioneered such ideas or led movements to realize them. They have been hailed as heroines/heroes. They have been cited as icons, making them bigger than life figures in history.

But before they were put on the pedestal, they lived lives that portrayed their transformation into personalities that would influence their respective societies. Their personal histories are important, probably equal in significance in some cases to their public lives.

Knowing these icons beyond their public images prevents the temptation of projecting them as perfect human beings. The more they are seen as ordinary mortals, the greater the chance that their ideas and actions will be recognized with critical yet appreciative perspective.

Their contribution to the betterment of human society being already established, it is important to see them not simply with a sense of awe but more importantly with a sense of realism.

On a hot July weekend in 1848, sixty-eight women and forty-two men?all of them American or European? convened in Seneca Falls, New York, as delegates to the first ever women's rights convention. Perhaps it is because of this watershed event paired with lingering colonialism that many Westerners consider women's liberation to be a uniquely Western initiative.

But when these early ripples from Seneca Falls were just beginning to make waves in the West, a beautiful baby girl named Ramabai was born over ten thousand miles away just outside Karkal, India. Equipped with courage, intelligence, and an unshakable Christian faith, Ramabai would eventually become known as Pandita, or "wise person," and the preeminent pioneer of women's rights in India.

This remarkable woman, whose feminist commitment was rivaled only by her ardent conviction for Christ upon her conversion at age 25, changed the lives of countless girls and women. The Mukti Mission she founded reached India's neglected and abused child- widows.

The Gifted Young Student

Pandita Ramabai was born Ramabai Dongre on 23 April 1858, to an intellectual Brahmin family. Her father was a prominent Sanskrit scholar who directed an ashram, a residential religious community and school for boys. Defying social custom, he firmly believed that women, like men, should also be allowed an education?and accordingly took it upon himself to teach Ramabai and her mother. He was probably ostracized by his colleagues for his radical views on women's education and soon after lost the ashram due to financial reasons.

The entire family?Ramabai, her father, mother, and two siblings ?then took off on foot and traveled all over India. Her parents eked out a modest living as Puranikas, wanderers who recited and commented on the Vedas and other sacred Hindu texts. True to their dedication to education, Ramabai's parents spent long hours teaching her during their travels. She proved to be quite a precocious student. Soon, she had learned 18,000 verses of the Bhagavata Purana in their original Sanskrit by heart, in addition to excelling in astronomy, botany, and physiology.

Ramabai's first-class education was incredibly rare. She notes in her book, The High-Caste Hindu Woman, that less than one- quarter of one percent of Indian women at the time were able to read or write. Of these privileged few, many were required to cease their studies at a young age?often at nine- or ten-years-old?when they were married. Early marriage was the norm for young Brahmin girls, and it was often considered dishonorable for a woman to continue her education once wed. Baffling and angering Hindu traditionalists, Ramabai's father further went against the grain by refusing to arrange her marriage.

The Passionate Social Reformer

Tragically, Ramabai's mother, father, and sister died from starvation during the great famine of 1874?76, leaving Ramabai and her older brother hungry and without help. The pair continued to wander India until reaching Calcutta in 1878. After stunning scholars with her extraordinary knowledge of Sanskrit and ancient texts, the 20-year-old Ramabai became an instant celebrity in the city. She was honored with the title Pandita, meaning "wise person," and heralded as a Saraswati, or "goddess of learning." She soon joined the ranks of Calcutta intelligentsia.

In 1880, shortly after her brother's death, Ramabai transgressed social norms yet again by marrying a man of a lower caste. Before long, she gave birth to a daughter named Manorama. Her new baby gave her much joy, if only ephemerally, for her husband died of cholera before their second anniversary. Now a widow, Ramabai was left to raise Manorama on her own.

During this period of severe turmoil in her personal life that her public life really began to thrive. Troubled by the immensity of suffering she had witnessed during her travels and galvanized by the western Indian social reform movement, Ramabai soon established herself as a champion of the oppressed?especially women. She published, lectured, and founded Arya Mahila Sabha in 1881, the very first Indian feminist organization. The group fervently crusaded for female education and a higher marriage age for girls. Ramabai was called to speak before India's Education Commission in 1883, where she made an impassioned case that "it is evident that women, being one half of the people of this country, are oppressed and cruelly treated by the other half."

The Silver Seeker

Stemming from an interest in women's public health, Ramabai left India with daughter Manorama in 1883 to study medicine in England. She was supported by the Anglican Community of St. Mary the Virgin in Wantage. The Sisters gave her a home and allowed her to improve her English and teach Sanskrit in return. Many of her mostly Hindu followers were understandably suspicious of such an arrangement. They didn't trust Christian missionaries; in India, the cross often represented colonialism, not liberation. Before Ramabai left for England, she assured this Hindu faction that "Nothing would induce me to embrace Christianity."

However, when her hosts encouraged Ramabai to read the New Testament, she was deeply touched by the gospel stories of Jesus ministering to the oppressed. The way he treated people like the Samaritan woman made a strong impression on her. Her feminism was freely reconciled with this new faith; she started to realize that Christ could truly "transform and uplift the downtrodden women of India." She wrote later,

One can feel that the teaching of our Lord Jesus comes from the All-Father, who loves not one nation, not one class, or one caste, but bears in His heart every creature of His hand; it would be a blessed day ;for India, if her sons and daughters could see that He is the revelation of the Father.

Ramabai and her daughter Manorama were baptized by the Sisters.

As an Indian woman, Ramabai's new faith met some unique challenges. Despite accepting the religion of Britain, she remained a die-hard Indian patriot and considered herself a cultural Hindu. This dual identity prevented her from completely fitting in with either Hindus or Christians. Ramabai was constantly living on the boundaries?she was accused by Hindus for deserting them, while simultaneously bearing the brunt of colonial British racism and condescension. She was further alienated by refusing to indiscriminately accept all church dogma and doctrine espoused by Anglicans, emphasizing the importance of the Bible above all. She explained,

In this new Faith, there are some things which I cannot take in, and I shall not feel myself bound to do so, until I know them, as far as my poor understanding will carry me. But, I must ever continue to search Scriptures and never stop until I find the lost piece of silver?either in this world or the next.

In 1886, the dean of the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania invited Ramabai to America for the graduation ceremony of one of her distant cousins, Anandibai Joshee, who was the first Indian woman to receive a degree in medicine. Like her rise to success in Calcutta a decade earlier, the 28-year-old became a sensation in Philadelphia. Through invitations to speak at several American women's organizations, Ramabai developed partnerships with feminist leaders like Frances Willard, Susan B. Anthony, and Harriet Tubman. With the help of Willard and her Women's Christian Temperance Union, Ramabai published her second full-length book in 1887, The High-Caste Hindu Woman, the first Indian feminist manifesto.

The Founder of Mukti Mission

The High-Caste Hindu Woman also reflects Ramabai's emerging commitment to minister to India's high-caste child widows. The book delivers a heart-rending?yet culturally sensitive?feminist critique of the plight of these women andgirls. While it is more complex than can adequately be addressed here, Ramabai presents the issue, at its base level, as such: when Brahmin women are married off as children, they usually live with their husband's family. If the husband dies young, the child widow is often blamed for the death and despised by the family, as prescribed by a particular interpretation of Hindu scriptures. In her book, Ramabai documents the widow's plight in detail.

The widow must wear a single coarse garment, white, red, or brown. She must eat only one meal during the twenty-four hours of a day. She must never take part in family feasts and jubilees, with others. She must not show herself to people on auspicious occasions. A man or woman thinks it unlucky to behold a widow's face before seeing any other object in the morning. A man will postpone his journey if his path happens to be crossed by a widow...

Ramabai returned to India in 1889 with a renewed sense of vision and generous financial support from the newly-formed American Ramabai Association. She soon opened the Sharada Sadan, a secular residential school for high-caste child widows. Ramabai made a point to make both Hindu and Christian texts freely available, although she conducted Bible study for those interested. The school operated for several years, until the bubonic plague epidemic of the late 1890s forced Ramabai and her students to flee to the rural village of Kedgaon.

It was in Kedgaon?in an unusual place with unusual circumstances?that Ramabai's Christian feminist vision became fully actualized in the Mukti (Salvation) Mission. Unlike the secular Sharada Sadan, Mukti was overtly Christian and ministered to all in need of help, eventually growing to house and educate over 2,000 girls and women. In addition to high-caste child widows, Mukti opened its doors and provided services for those who suffered from sexual abuse, famine, and disability?of every caste. While presiding over the flourishing Mission until her death in 1922, she continued to write and lecture. Among other achievements, she translated the entire Bible from its original Hebrew and Greek into her native Marathi, and was awarded the government's Kaiser-e-Hind gold medal in 1919.

The Visionary Leader

Pandita Ramabai was a strong leader with a clear vision. Her lifelong refusal to conform to patriarchal norms and resolute commitment to equality and justice are truly inspirational. She clearly deserves a prominent place as one of the movement's heroes.

Her voice rings just as truely today as it did a century ago. While the situation for child widows in India has greatly improved, injustice, inequality, and the mistreatment of women still abound all over the world. Like Jesus, Ramabai still presents a challenge for contemporary women and men. She entreats us to respond to her urgent clarion call for justice, expressed so well in The High-Caste Hindu Woman,

In the name of humanity, in the name of your sacred responsibilities as workers in the cause of humanity, and, above all, in the most holy name of God, I summon you...to bestow your help quickly, regardless of nation, caste, or creed.

Sonia Hazard is an undergraduate student at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn., USA, where she is majoring in Religious Studies.

For further information, please contact: Christians for Biblical Equality, 122 West Franklin Ave, Suite 218, Minneapolis, MN 55404-2451 USA; ph (612) 872-6898; fax (612) 872-6891;
e-mail : cbe@cbeinternational.org; www.cbeinternational.org

Endnote
* This article first appeared in the Autumn 2006 issue of Mutuality Magazine of the Christians for Biblical Equality.

Raden Ajeng Kartini is hailed as Indonesia's first feminist. April 21, the day of her birth, is celebrated as "Hari Ibu Kartini" (Kartini Day). She is seen as the symbol of Indonesian women's emancipation.^[1]

Kartini was born on 21 April 1879, in a village called Mayong in the town of Jepara, North Central Java to an aristocrat family. She is the daughter of Raden Mas Adipati Aryo Sosroningrat, the Regent of Jepara. She went to a primary school, along with her brothers, for the children of Dutch planters and administrators. Other girls from aristocratic families did not receive the same formal education she obtained.^[2] But under the old Javanese tradition of pingit, she was kept in seclusion at home until marriage upon reaching the age of twelve years.

Seclusion from twelve years of age until marriage did not stop Kartini from aspiring for further education. During her period of seclusion she wrote letters to many friends abroad, read magazines and books, and rebelled against the strong tradition of gender discrimination.^[3] Her father gave her books on Javanese culture to "balance her western education and subscribed to a Literary Box, a box of magazines, children's books, modern novels and foreign news, which was changed every week by a local library."^[4] In 1892, when she was twelve years old, Kartini made friends with the wife of the new Dutch officer appointed as Assistant Resident of Jepara, Mevrouw Ovink-Soer. Mevrouw was "highly cultured, had published a number of magazine articles," and later wrote a book entitled Women's Life in a (Javanese) Village. She was also a fervent socialist and fervent feminist.^[5] One account says that the Dutch people who supported her desire to be educated and to search for new kind of education for herself were proponents of the then new colonial policy called "Ethical Policy" that emphasized^[6]

increased education of the Indonesians, fuller participation by them in their own local government as civil servants, efforts to raise the peasants' standard of living through agricultural improvements and the promotion of indigenous handicrafts.

Her father, a Javanese official serving the Dutch colonial government as a local administrative head on the north coast of Java, introduced her and her sisters to the reality of life for the people whom he governed, to the world beyond the then Dutch East Indies, besides exploring the intricacies of their own rich cultural heritage. He took his daughters to meet the villagers during times of crisis and celebration.^[7]

She obtained a scholarship to study in Holland, a desire she worked to achieve for quite some time, but family pressure led her to ultimately reject it. She did not want marry but she consented to be the fourth wife of the Regent of Rembang, Raden Adipati Joyodiningrat, a man twenty-five years her senior. She died on 17 September 1904 after giving birth to a child a year after her marriage. She passed away at the young age of twenty-five. Prior to her death, Kartini founded a school for young girls.

Kartini as a Feminist

In 1903, Kartini obtained permission to open in her own home in Rembang the first ever all-girls school, for daughters of Javanese officials. She created her own syllabus and system of instruction. The school aimed at the "character development of young women, while at the same time providing them with practical vocational training and general education in art, literature and science."^[8] It was also a school that was both Western and Indonesian. By 1904, the school had one hundred twenty students.^[9]

Kartini realized that the education she obtained that widened her choices in life should also be enjoyed as a right by all of her people. Influenced by Dutch feminists, Kartini wrote passionately for the improvement of education, public health, economic welfare, and traditional arts in her country.

She wrote in January 1903 a memorandum about education entitled Give The Javanese Education! addressed to an official of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.^[10] She emphasized the need to educate the women for the development of society. She wrote:

Who could deny that the woman has a great task to perform in the moral development of society? It is she, precisely she, who is the one to do this; she can contribute much, if not most, to ensure the improvement of the moral standards of society. Nature herself has appointed her to this task. As mother, she is the first educator; at her knee the child first learns to feel, to think, to speak; and in most cases, this initial nurturing influences the rest of its life. It is the hand of the mother which first plants the germ of virtue or wickedness in the heart of the individual where it usually remains for the rest of the person's life. Not without reason is it said that a knowledge of right and wrong is imbibed with a mother's milk. But how can Javanese mothers now educate their children if they themselves are uneducated? The education and development of the Javanese people can never adequately advance if women are excluded, if they are not given a role to play in this.

xxx xxx xxx

Really, an important factor in the uplifting of the population will be the progress of the Javanese woman! Therefore it should be the first task of the Government to raise the moral awareness of the Javanese woman, to educate her, to instruct her, to make of her a capable, wise mother and nurturer!

She further wrote about the need for the formal education of the girls of the noble class:

If the nobility knew that the Government desired that its daughters be more highly cultured then, initially, it may not send its daughters from personal conviction, but it would nevertheless send them on their own volition. The nobility must be encouraged in this direction. What does it matter with what motives their daughters are sent to school? The issue is that they are sent to school!

She pointed out that given the resources and the Javanese population of twenty-seven million, educational policy should first be directed to elite women who could then open schools for the rest of the "masses." ^[11] She wrote:

In the meantime provide education, instruction, for the daughters of the nobility; the civilizing influence has to flow from here to the people; develop them into capable, wise, fine mothers and they will vigorously spread enlightenment amongst the people. They will pass on their refinement and education to their children: to their daughters, who in their turn will become mothers; to their sons who will be called upon to help safeguard the welfare of the people. And as persons of intellectual and spiritual enlightenment they will in many different ways be of assistance to their people and to their society.

She also explained that the purpose of formal education is not merely to learn the Dutch language. She argued

that knowledge of the Dutch language by itself does not represent cultural refinement, that being civilized consists of something more than simply speaking Dutch, or superficially adopting Dutch manners, and even less in wearing Dutch clothes. Knowledge of Dutch language is the key which can unlock the treasure houses of Western civilization and knowledge; one has to exert oneself to appropriate some of that treasure for oneself.

She criticized the Javanese culture's hierarchical nature, where younger siblings had to serve older ones and where norms dictated elaborate rituals of hierarchy. ^[12]

She also criticized the nobility by writing thus:

To date more or less the only advantage has been to ensure law and order and the regular receipt of revenue. The State and the nobility have benefited from this but what have the people themselves gained? What benefit have the people had from their highly revered nobles who the Government uses to rule them? To date, nothing, or very little; more likely they have been disadvantaged on those occasions when the nobility has abused its power, which is still not a rare occurrence. This must change, the nobility must earn the reverence of the people, be worthy of it, and this will be of inestimable benefit to the people.

Kartini wrote many letters that were later published in Holland in 1911 in a book entitled Through Darkness into Light, and became a bestseller. It had four editions until 1923.^[13]

She also wrote about her own Javanese society and the suffering of the rural poor, and the practice of polygamy.

Legacy

Overall, she wanted to alter the relations between Indonesians and the Dutch a decade before the flowering of the nationalist movement. Thus, the desire to modernize her country and access the language of knowledge could be interpreted as a "nationalist" move.^[14]

In her preface in the 1960s book Letters of a Javanese Princess, a collection of Kartini's letters, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote:

I am delighted to gain the insight which these letters offer. One little remark in one of the letters is something I think we might all remember. Kartini says: "We feel that the kernel of all religion is good and beautiful. But, O ye peoples, what have you made of it?" Instead of drawing us together, religion has often forced us apart and even this young girl realized that it should be a unifying force. The girl who wrote these letters happened to have a father who, as she says, was liberal and had a tremendous understanding of the longings of the hearts of the young Javanese. He allowed his daughters to go to a foreign school until they were twelve and then they had to return to the cloistered home life, but among themselves there was a freedom of communication and a closeness, which did not exist in many of the Javanese families of the day.

In present-day Indonesia, Hari Ibu Kartini or Kartini Day is seen as an "important event in the school calendar, often providing the setting in which students can explore Indonesian history, the roles of women in society, families and the rich cultural diversity of Indonesia....[and p]erhaps most importantly, it is for educators seeking to nurture the independence and self esteem of children in their care.^[15]

Kartini lived a short life of twenty-five years and yet she left a legacy that supported the rights of Indonesian women in particular, and national identity in general. In the context of the remaining many challenges facing Indonesian women today, Kartini provides an inspiration to the continuing effort to overcome them.

Endnotes

1.Susan J. Natih,"Kartini, her life and letters,"The Jakarta Post, 21 April 2005.

2.Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Limited, 1994), page 141.

3.Bebeth, "Raden Ajeng Kartini, Are We Really Free?," Just About Anything, 21 April 2005,

4.Natih, op. cit.

5.Hilda Geertz, editor, Letters of a Javanese Princess ? Rada Adjeng Kartini (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1964), page 8.

6.Ibid.

7.Natih, op. cit.

8.Geertz, op cit., page 23.

9.Jayawardena, op. cit., page 145.

10.In Letters from Kartini: An Indonesian Feminist 1900-1904, translated by Joost Cote (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1992).

11."Southeast Asian Politics, Non- fiction, Javanese Education," Women in World History, available in www.chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/p/114html

12.Southeast Asian Politics, Non-fiction, Javanese Education, ibid.

13.Geertz, op cit., page 23.

14."Southeast Asian Politics, Non-fiction, Javanese Education," op. cit.

15.Natih, op. cit.

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was born as the fourteenth child of Mahar parents, Ramji and Bhimabai, on 14 April 1891 at Mhow, in present-day State of Madhya Pradesh. The Mahars are considered low- caste and treated as untouchables (Dalits) by higher-caste Hindus. They are mainly found in the State of Maharashtra.

The father and grandfather of Ambedkar served in the army and were of well-to-do family. But the stigma of being members of Mahar community caused their social oppression in a caste-ridden society.

Ambedkar had a bitter taste of discriminatory treatment due his caste at an early age. He and his brother had to carry gunny bags to sit on inside the classroom because they were not allowed to sit on classroom chairs. They were denied drinking water facilities, and excluded from games and mixing with other children. Even teachers would not check their notebooks for fear of "pollution." Thus sowed the seeds of discontentment about the Hindu social system in the life of Ambedkar.

He did his early education in Satara in Maharashtra State and then moved on to Bombay. In 1912, he passed his B. A. examination with distinction from the prestigious Elphinstone College with the scholarship and encouragement from the Maharaja of Baroda State. In 1913, with a condition that he would serve the Baroda State for ten years, he was chosen by Maharaja of Baroda State for higher studies at Columbia University in the USA. This was followed with a trans-Atlantic shift to the United Kingdom where he studied at the University of London. While studying abroad, he mixed with students of various nationalities and races, which was an eye- opener for him.

He joined the Union Cabinet of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru during the 1946-1951 period. He resigned on 27 September 1951 to protest the deferment of the discussion in the parliament of the Hindu Code Bill supposedly due to the coming 1952 elections. Ambedkar saw the Bill as a very important reform of Hindu law, with reform proposals on marriage, divorce, and monogamy.

Despite failing health, he plodded on with his advocacy for the cause of the Dalits. He came to Nagpur in October 1956 for his conversion to Buddhism and a couple of months thereafter on 8 December 1956 breathed his last.

Ambedkar's Movement for Human Rights

During the last decade of the 19th century, many Indian leaders born among the lower castes like Narayan Guru (1854-1928), Jotiba Phule (1827-1890), and Ramaswamy Naicker 1879-1973) launched massive struggles for the dignity of Dalits throughout India. Ambedkar was the most towering figure among these Dalit leaders.

In 1917 he joined the Baroda State Service after returning from his studies in the USA and the United Kingdom, as part of the terms of his scholarship agreement. He worked in the city of Baroda, the place of the ruling family of Gaikwad, which financed his studies abroad. He worked as secretary in the defense office of the Maharaja of Baroda State.

However, despite his foreign education, he had to endure insults while at work due to his low caste origin. He was a victim of the cruel dalit discrimination. He suffered the ignominy of having document files hurled by peons at his face.^[1]

He suffered the humiliating experience of not being served drinking water during official functions. At the officer's club, he had to sit in a corner and keep his distance from the other members belonging to higher castes. He also had difficulties in finding a rented house, as he was not allotted government bungalow. He stayed in an inn owned by Parsis (members of Zoroastrian religion). One morning, as he was getting ready to go to work, a dozen Parsis, allwielding sticks, rushed up to his room screaming that he had polluted the inn and insisted on his immediate departure. He begged them to let him stay for a week longer since he hoped to get his government bungalow by then. But they were obdurate. If they found him at the inn that evening, they said God help him. After spending much of the day in a public garden, Ambedkar, in utter frustration and disgust, left for Bombay by the 9 pm train.

These scorching incidents goaded Ambedkar to work for the protection of dalit rights and upliftment of the status of the Dalits. In 1924, he started legal practice in Bombay and founded the Bahishkrit Hitkarni Sabha (Depressed Class Institute) to uplift the Dalits. Henceforth, he started his movement and took the cause of the Dalits. He roused the dalit consciousness to fight for the eradication of dalit discrimination; to claim equality of treatment, status and opportunity; to equally enjoy all rights ? civil, political, social and economic ? and respect for the dignity of persons. He was considered a crusader for the human rights of the Dalits in India.^[2]

The Hindu religious belief that "All human beings are not born equal" creates caste-based discrimination against the Dalits that leads to various forms of violence against them including public humiliation, torture, rape, beating and killing. Reacting to the values of Hinduism, Rabindranath Gore wrote,

We do not value Hinduism, we value human dignity... We want equal rights in the society. We will achieve them as far as possible while remaining within the Hindu fold or if necessary by kicking away this worthless Hindu identity.^[3]

Ambedkar was a great supporter of women's liberation. He blamed the verna system, which has not only subjugated Dalits but also women. He questioned Manu Smriti (Laws of Manu), the law book (Dharam-Shastra) of Brahminic Hinduism and attributed to Manu, the legendary first man and lawgiver. Manu Smriti prescribed the Dharma of each Hindu, stating the obligations attached to his or her social class and stage of life. It was hostile to the interest of lower caste people and women. It prohibited re-marriage of widows. He felt that Manu Smriti was solely responsible for the downfall of Hindu women. He encouraged the Dalits to embrace Buddhism to liberate their own selves from Hindu subjugation. Hence he fought for the right to choose ones' faith. After embracing Buddhism, Ambedkar said, "[U]nfortunately for me I was born a Hindu Untouchable... I solemnly assure you I will not die as a Hindu." He practiced what he advocated and became a Buddhist in 1956.

He also wrote about the French revolution ideas of fraternity, liberty and equality. He thought that the French and Russian revolutions failed to realize all three ideas. He believed that they could not all be realized except through the way of the Buddha.^[4]

Means and Ends for Struggle

He adopted various means to safeguard dalit rights. Ambedkar launched a movement against dalit discrimination by creating public opinion through his writings in several periodicals such as Mook Nayak, Vahishkrit Bharat, and Equality Janta, which he started for the protection of dalit rights.

He also launched numerous movements. One of the memorable struggles of the Dalits was the Vaikkom Satyagraha in Travancore in Maharashtra,^[5] which asserted the right of the Dalits to worship in Hindu temples without hindrance. Another very significant movement was Mahad March^[6] to assert the rights of Dalits to take water from public watering places. Ambedkar organized the Dalit rally to assert their legal right to take water from the Chowdar tank. The Chowdar tank of Mahad was made a public tank in 1869. In 1923, the Bombay Legislative Council passed a resolution to the effect that the Dalits be allowed to use all public watering places. The Mahad Municipality passed a resolution on 5 January 1927 to the effect that the Municipality had no objection to allowing the Dalits to use the tank. But the higher castes were hesitant in allowing the Dalits to use the tank. Soon after this resolution was passed a conference of the Dalits of the Colaba district was held for two days. Ambedkar also convened a conference on 18-20 March 1927 on this issue. On 20 March 1927, the conference exhorted the Dalits to go to the Chowdar Tank and exercise their right to take water from it. The Hindus who had exhorted them to be bold instantly realized that this was a bombshell and immediately ran away. But the electrified Dalits led by Ambedkar marched in a procession through the main streets and for the first time drank the water from Chowdar tank.

Another temple entry movement took place at the Kalaram temple at Nasik in Maharashtra State. On 13 October 1935, at a conference convened on the issue, Ambedkar recounted the experience of the depressed classes and the immense sacrifices made by them to secure minimum human rights under the aegis of Hinduism.^[7]

Ambedkar fought for the rights of workers and peasants. In the late 1920s and especially in the 1930s when he had formed his Independent Labour Party, he took up the cause of tenants (from both the dalit Mahars and the caste Hindu Kunbis) in the Konkan region of Maharashtra. With the support of radicals then in the Congress Socialist Party, the Independent Labour Party organized a huge march of 20,000 peasants to Mumbai in 1938, the largest pre-independence peasant mobilization in the region. In the same year, Ambedkar joined with the Communists to organize a strike of Mumbai textile workers in protest against a bill about to be introduced by the British Government to curve labor strikes.^[8] Ambedkar took the lead in condemning the bill in the assembly and argued that the right to strike was simply another name for the right to freedom of assembly.

British Raj and Protection for Dalits

The demand for safeguards and protection of Scheduled Castes (earlier called Depressed Class) has a long history dating to Montague-Chelmsford Reform of 1919 during the British Raj period. Ambedkar had been closely involved in the struggle to give Scheduled Caste people solid statutory safeguard. He was a delegate at the Round Table Conference in London, where he asked for separate electorate for the Dalits. It is not a surprise that subsequently Ambedkar saw to it that the welfare of the Scheduled Caste people were guaranteed in the 1949 Constitution of India in the form of reservation in legislative, employment and educational fields.

Ambedkar was a great champion of the dalit cause because he succeeded in turning the depressed class movement into a revolutionary movement throughout India. Today India has witnessed the oppressed classes walking on the streets of cities and villages with confidence and poise, of course many despicable acts of discrimination and violence against the dalits still occur. Yet the juggernaut of equality is rolling on remorselessly and forcefully.

Conclusion

Ambedkar is India's foremost human rights activist during the 20th century. He is an emancipator, scholar, extraordinary social reformer and a true champion of human rights.^[9] It can be said that he is one of the highly regarded Indians whose emancipation and empowering role for oppressed groups that cut against the gender divide has inspired subaltern groups all over the world. All should try to take inspiration from Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's life and work for the creation of a just and gender-neutral world.

Joseph Benjamin, PhD, is the head of the Department of Political Science, St. Francis de Sales' College, Nagpur, Maharashtra, India.

For further information, please contact: Joseph Benjamin, PhD, Department of Political Science, St. Francis de Sales' College, Seminary Hills, Nagpur, Maharashtra, India, ph (91-712-2511354-) e-mail: jppj@sify.net.in

Endnotes

1.Shyam Lal and K. S. Saxena, editors, Ambedkar and Nation Building (Delhi: Rawat Publication, 1998), page 254.

2.Yogendra Makwana, "Ambedkar-A crusader," in Yogendra Makwana, editor, Ambedkar and Social Justice (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India), 1992, page 68.

3.M. S. Gore, The Social Context of an Ideology (Delhi: Sage Publication, 1993), pages 91-97.

4.Vasant Moon, editor, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, volume 3 (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1987), page 462, cited in Gail Omvedt, Ambedkar As A Human Rights Leader, available in www.ambedkar.org/gail/AmbedkarAs.htm

5.Shyam Lal and K. S. Saxena, op. cit., page 255.

6.Babasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, Vol. 5 (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1990), pages 248-252.

7.A K Majunder and Bhanwar Singh, editors, Ambedkar and Social Justice (New Delhi: Radha Publications, 1997), pages 159-165.

8.Gail Omvedt, op. cit.

9.Dhananjay Keer, Ambedkar: Life and Mission (Bombay: Popular Publication, 1962).

Matsumoto Jiichiro (1867-1966) was one of, if not the, most important human rights activist in Japan in the twentieth century. His main contribution to that movement was as leader of the Buraku liberation movement. He was born and brought up within a household in a Buraku community located to the east of Fukuoka and he retained links with that community throughout his life. After experiencing discrimination at upper primary school he moved to continue his education first in Kyoto and then Tokyo but returned to Fukuoka to attend the medical prior to conscription. He was not required for military service and instead left Japan soon after his twenty-first birthday to spend three years in north China. Returning from there in 1910 he started to work in a building business that had been set up by his brothers. This was turned into a legal corporation in 1916 and it was to grow into a major construction company over the next decades generating profits that would support not only organized opposition to discrimination but also other causes of the socialist left.

Anti-discrimination Movement

Activists founded the Suiheisha (National Leveler's Association) to encourage the Burakumin to overcome discrimination 'by our own efforts'. It was initially based in the Kansai region but when the leadership sought to establish a branch in Kyushu it was Matsumoto to whom they turned for support. Soon after the Kyushu Suiheisha was created Matsumoto was selected as chairman of the national organization and he continued in that role until the movement was forced to disband in 1942. When the movement was re-constructed in the post war era, known as the Buraku Liberation League (BLL) from 1955, he was its unchallenged leader until his death. In practically all of the speeches that he made in the post war period, whether in Japan or overseas, he would talk of the need to oppose discrimination against Burakumin within Japan and seek to establish broad respect for human rights there and across the world.

However this was not his only contribution to the development of progressive causes in Japan. In 1936 he was elected to the Japanese parliament where he continued to serve throughout the war years until 1945. His construction company prospered through the war years and into the occupation. He was a founding member of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in November 1945 and following his election in 1947 he became deputy speaker of the House of Councillors until his removal from politics by a purge order in 1949. Nevertheless he resumed his political career in 1953 and was re-elected three times, on each occasion increasing his number of votes.

Meanwhile in 1953 he visited Beijing for the first time and on his return was elected as chairman of the Japan China Friendship Association (Nitchu Kyokai) another role that he continued to perform until his death. All of this is relatively well known and documented in the various biographies and memoires about his life. However in this short article I want to comment on another dimension of his activity that has attracted rather less attention: his involvement in the international peace movement.

International Peace Movement

His purge from politics in 1949 was said to be because of his links with the wartime regime in the early 1940s but a more likely explanation is that it was because he was a prominent and vociferous critic of the emperor and emperor system. In May 1952, about nine months after the purge order was lifted, he was invited to Beijing to attend a preparatory meeting to organize the Asia Pacific Peace conference. However the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) refused to give him a passport. Preparations continued in Japan to send representatives and a delegation of sixty was selected with Matsumoto as its leader. Once again the MFA refused to allow him to go despite him launching a legal appeal against their decision. He nevertheless sent a message to the conference held in October 1952 which was broadcast by radio back to Japan and he was selected one of the eleven vice presidents of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asia Pacific region. In October 1952 Jean Lafitte of the World Peace Council invited him to a conference in Vienna ? another event he was not allowed to attend.

He was allowed to attend a meeting of Asian socialists in Rangoon in January 1953 representing the Left Wing of the Japan Socialist Party. After this he went on to India, Europe ? meeting Jean Lafitte in Prague ? and finally ending up in Beijing at the end of February 1953. In most of the countries he visited on this trip he contacted local representatives of the peace movement. The following year he visited China again, this time to attend the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and while he was there he met Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India spending a night at the theatre with him. From there he went on to visit Moscow, Helsinki and finally Stockholm where he was one of the four Japanese delegates at a meeting of the World Peace Council. He made a speech there in which he talked of the campaigns against nuclear weapons in Japan, protests about Buraku discrimination and the need to promote friendship with China.

In 1954 Nehru and Zhou En-lai announced their Five Principles of Co-existence as Nehru led India from a position of western oriented neutralism to one independent of both Cold War blocs. The development of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was further consolidated at the Bandung conference held in April 1955 that Matsumoto attended as an observer. It is clear from the speeches he made at this time that he would have liked Japan to become an active member of the NAM even if, or perhaps precisely because, this would have meant Japan would have had to break its links with the USA.

Later, in June that year, Matsumoto was a delegate at the World Assembly for Peace in Stockholm that heard speeches from leaders of the European peace movement including Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre. He was a member of a 'sub-commission' on Asia that welcomed the news about 'the growing efforts of the Japanese people to get their country to conduct an independent policy of peace and re-establish relations with all countries.' This should, they concluded 'be held as a positive contribution to peaceful coexistence.'

Japanese Peace Movement

In September 1955 Matsumoto became a member of the Japanese committee of the movement to abolish nuclear weapons (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyogikai) and in April the following year he spoke at the movement's conference. This probably explains the invitation that came in 1957 for him to visit Australia to attend a National Conference for Peace and to make a series of speeches in various cities there in support of the campaign against nuclear weapons. After spending a month in Australia he went on to New Zealand to talk at a number of meetings organized by the peace movement there. Just as he was leaving he was interviewed for a newspaper article. He took this opportunity to re-affirm his republicanism, 'there is a prospect within our time of the end of the Emperor system', of his, and the Japanese people's opposition to the development of nuclear weapons. He warns about the current Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke, who was about to visit the country saying that, 'He is not a suitable leader to improve relations with New Zealand and Australia.'

As it turned out this was the last contribution he made to the international peace movement although he continued to give it his support within Japan becoming a member of the Japan Peace Council in July 1959. By this point he was 73 and suffering from high blood pressure. His doctors advised him against foreign travel. Nevertheless he gave his full endorsement to the campaigns against the renewal of the Security Treaty with the USA and the presence of US bases on Japanese soil.

Meanwhile the BLL in the 1950s had embarked on campaigns against instances of discrimination against Burakumin trying to link these protests to demands that the state accept its responsibility for the poverty in which most Buraku families lived. These demands were backed by the JSP but only in 1960 did the government concede that they should investigate to see what might be done. A report based on these investigations was published in 1965 and suggested that the state not only intervene to improve the physical environment of the Burakumin but also provide assistance to enable them to develop their living and education standards. While Matsumoto broadly welcomed the report's recommendations he was worried that the improvement schemes might undermine the Buraku communities' self-reliance that the Suiheisha had sought to encourage.

Two Concluding Questions

We know quite a lot about the contribution that Matsumoto made to the Buraku liberation movement thanks to the extensive coverage of most aspects of his life in publications produced by the BLL. There is however relatively little about his involvement in the peace movement despite that fact that he was a member of several of the key committees within Japan and seemsto have played a relatively high profile role in international conferences in the mid 1950s. I wonder if there is more detailed evidence about what he did sleeping in the archives of the Australian or Japanese peace movement?

Another aspect of his life that remains unexplored is the period between 1942 and 1945 when he continued to be active as a politician and took part in the government of wartime Japan both at the national and local levels. He never talked about this time frankly or transparently. This is understandable. He tried to re-invent himself in the 1950s as an advocate of peace and critic of government both at home and abroad. It would have undermined his credentials if he had been too open about what he did in the war. What is perhaps less easy to understand is why in the twenty-first century there remains so little written about this period in his life. Matsumoto was, like all of us a complicated person, and one who lived in difficult and confusing times. Would it not add to our understanding of both the period and the person if more light were shone on those aspects of his life that create difficulties for those of us who would praise him?

Ian Neary is Professor in the Politics of Japan at Oxford University and is completing a biography of Matsumoto Jiichiro that will be published by Routledge by the end of 2009.

For further information, please contact: Professor Ian Neary, Nissan Institute, 27 Winchester Rd, Oxford OX2 6NA, e-mail ian.neary@nissan.ox.ac.uk

Compromises in addressing human rights violations committed during the past regime in Aceh are based on a hoped-for "new future" perspective, rather than on the principle of accountability. Compromises are allowed as long as the human rights violations victims are not left out and human rights violations are not justified. In human rights terms, this is known as transitional justice.

Ruti Teitel (2004) explains that transitional justice is basically a normative change that rearranges the social system and the legal and political structures at the same time. Therefore, transitional justice should include constitutional change (governing norms), legal sanctions, reparation for victims, restoration of reputation, and reconstruction of history. The change in legal norms aims to encourage political or power management change. Old mechanisms are usually being reformed to achieve justice. Truth-telling as a tool to achieve justice and to show the responsibility of the state (government) for violence that happened in the past is a form of this new mechanism.

In the light of this theory, transitional justice is not merely about meting out punishment to individuals found responsible for the violence, but more on finding and revealing the sources of fear, sense of insecurity, and injustice.

The 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (Helsinki MoU) and the Law No. 11 Year 2006 on Aceh Governance (UU PA) are forms of normative legal changes that provide the basis for the political authority in Aceh to encourage further normative changes to achieve justice for the Acehnese. The establishment of a Human Rights Court and a Truth Commission are initial measures in the search for the sources of fear and sense of insecurity, and also sources of normative basis for restoring reputations and providing reparation to the victims.

Defining the Truth: Understanding History

To understand the truth about the past human rights violations in Aceh, one has to analyze the situation of Aceh as a Military Operation District (daerah operasi militer or DOM). During the DOM era, the government of Aceh became an extension of the military establishment. This turned the DOM regime into an institution with dual character: political and military. Its political character consisted of being an institution under the control of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) that made political decisions, while in implementing these political decisions it assumed a military character. ABRI was the main political force in Aceh during the DOM era, and human rights violations did not constitute mere abuses but the means by which to maintain the DOM regime itself.

Under this situation, how much negative impact did the militarization of Aceh during the DOM era cause? Only by understanding these negative impacts that the healing and the rearrangement of political and cultural structures in Aceh can be mapped out. Without understanding these negative impacts, the rehabilitation programs being carried out by provincial government (Badan Pelaksana Harian Reintegrasi- Damai Aceh or BRA) become artificial in the context of the still remaining militarized social structure of Aceh.

Therefore, understanding the truth about the human rights violations during the DOM era means understanding how the military regime worked in Aceh. It also means showing how the Acehnese people were organized and shaped by the political system of the military regime. The change of the political system in Aceh by virtue of the Helsinki MoU and UU PA is aimed at reducing the negative impacts of the military regime and creating possibilities for a new and demilitarized Acehnese society.

Roles of Religious Leaders in the Transition

Major General Supiadin AS, the Chief of the Aceh Military Command (KODAM), asked the ulamas to take an active role in urging the children of the victims of conflict not to remain vengeful. Major General Supiadin AS asked the ulamas to use "religious activities such as Koran readings, religious lectures and preaching" (Serambi Indonesia, 9 May 2007) to prevent vengeance from breeding.

Unfortunately this appeal retained the ulamas' traditional role during the conflict as political messengers of the military. Politically, the political messengers are called collaborators, agents who always support government policies. (Tim Kell, 1995) This role was confirmed when the ulamas organized the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI) in 1975, which was seen "as a means of mobilizing Muslim support for the government's development policies" or as described by the Religious Minister at that time, the function of the ulamas was "to translate government policy into a language that the ummah (Muslim community) understands." One author sees the MUI performing a security role in the 1980s by "assisting the army in its counterinsurgency campaign against Achenese rebels."

In late 1990s, the standardization of the village governance structure and the devolution of power down to the village level resulted in the loss of the social legitimacy of the ulamas.

In order for Major General Supiadin's appeal to become meaningful and productive, all ulamas throughout Aceh should transform themselves from their traditional role as collaborators to that of reformers. And to assume this latter role, the ulamas have to keep distance from government power, become guardians and agents of truth, and fight for the social, economic, civil and political rights of the victims of past violence. This will eventually restore the social legitimacy of the ulamas.

Truth and Justice

The Helsinki MoU (Chapter 2, Article 3) and UU PA (Chapter 229) provide for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to find out the truth about the violence of the past through the testimonies of affected people and the gathering of other information. Will this commission be able to bring out the truth and lead to reconciliation among, and justice for, the parties concerned? Will vengeance among the aggrieved disappear?

Martha Minow (1998) argues that vengeance melts away if there is a process of "restoring dignity to victims" and not merely by having "prosecutions and amnesties." Some steps are needed such as the following:

Commission of inquiry into the facts; opening access to secret police files; removing prior political and military officials and civil servants from theirs post and from the rolls for public benefits; publicizing the names of offenders and names of victims; securing reparations and apologies for victims; devising and making available appropriate therapeutic services for any person affected by the horrors, devising art and memorials to mark what happened to honor the victims and to communicate the aspiration of "never again"; and advancing public educational programs to convey what happened and to strengthen participatory democracy and human rights.

Based on these requirements, truth means acknowledgment of all the bitter experiences faced by the victims through a clear and proven mechanism. Acknowledging the truth about the victims' experiences becomes the foremost step toward restoring the dignity of the victims and their families.

Another author suggests the "survivors' justice approach" which focuses on reconciliation to remove vengeance. (Mahmood Mamdani, 2001) Reconciliation means those who survived the armed conflict and violence strive to build themselves up along with other groups. The blame is not on individuals but on the system that opens the possibility for inhuman wrongdoings to occur. The key steps are the acknowledgment of all the victims' experiences and immediate changes to all institutions that contributed to the past violence. These steps are aimed at preventing the bad experiences of the past from happening again.

The problem of post-conflict vengeance is indeed a collective problem, not a problem of the individual. Violence in a conflict is a collective experience that accumulates over time. There should be no space for forgetting, rather a space for remembering and transforming the memory into something productive - a space for healing. Healing in the context of collective memory surely cannot be achieved through religious activities such as Quran reading or moral preaching, but through materialization of justice. Al-Quran provides a principle: "O ye who believe! Be ye staunch in Justice, witness for Allah, even though against yourself" (QS al-Nisa 4:135).This principle should become the guide in healing the wounds of the victims to regain their dignity.

Conclusion

The normalization of Aceh will hit a dead end if truth-telling is not done soon. Prolonging the abnormal condition will only give room for instability to appear within each party involved. The worst impacts of this prolonged abnormality are: first, a crystallization of the apathy and skepticism of the people toward the new elites and government; second, provision of legitimacy to the growth of the anti-peace forces that will manipulate the situation and agitate the people towards violence.

Amiruddin al Rahab is a Member of Aceh Working Group, and Political and Human Rights Analyst of ELSAM.

For further information, please contact: Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), Jl. Siaga II No. 31, Pejaten Barat, Jakarta 12510, INDONESIA; ph (62-21) 7972662,
79192564; fax (62-21) 79192519; e-mail: office@elsam.or.id, advokasi@indosat.net.id; www.elsam.or.id

Endnote

*This article was originally written by the author in Bahasa Indonesia and translated into English by Dhyta Catura. The first part of this article appeared in the March 2009 issue of this publication. Other endnotes omitted due to space limitation.

HURIGHTS OSAKA has published the 2009 edition of the annual publication Asia-Pacific Human Rights Review (in Japanese language). This edition has the theme "Cross-border Marriage from Women's Human Rights Perspective," focusing on marriages between men from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan with women from developing countries, including China, the Philippines and Vietnam. Academics researching the issues of cross-border marriage and migration, and NGO workers working on the rights of female migrants wrote the articles. The second part of the publication contains articles related to the recent developments in human rights activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

This motto of the Disabled Persons International presents a huge challenge to governments and peoples. Discrimination against persons with disabilities is deeply ingrained in peoples' consciousness and reflected in the existing domestic political, social, economic and cultural systems. While governments in the Asia-Pacific have initiated efforts to address the problems faced by persons with disabilities, the full realization of these efforts is hindered to a large extent by the inadequate appreciation of the issues involved by the government officials and the general public.

The active participation of the persons with disabilities themselves in the planning and implementation of measures addressing the issues is a crucial element. In addition to recognizing the rights of persons with disabilities, the appropriate policies and mechanisms for their active participation have to be in place and effectively implemented.

This idea however is not an easy task. Persons with disabilities have to empower and organize themselves to be able to undertake the role. While some persons with disabilities could easily become active participants in the planning and implementation of measures addressing their issues without problems, others need much support to do so.

Governments and peoples have to provide the facilities as much as opportunities for persons with disabilities to exercise their capacities and develop their potentials in order to fulfill the motto "Nothing About Us Without Us."

Almost 60 per cent of the world's 650 million persons with disabilities live in Asia and the Pacific according to the United Nations (UN) estimates.^[1] This translates into some four hundred million persons with disabilities in the region who need support in realizing their human rights. But these figures are all estimates at present. Differences in definitions of disability, methods of data collection as well as capacity of data collecting professionals prevent a more definitive accounting of the number of persons with disabilities in the Asia-Pacific, and in the rest of the world.^[2] There are also problems in some countries of low priority and exclusion from official statistics of the data on persons with disabilities.

Data from the country profiles collected by the Asia- Pacific Development Center on Disability (APCD)^[3] provide an approximated number of persons with disabilities (PWDs) in some of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region:

Table1

Available data reveal wide disparities in the proportion of persons with disabilities in the region, ranging from 0.7 per cent (Cook Islands) to 20 per cent (Australia).^[5]

The UN, through the Economic and Social Commission for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP), reports that in many cases in developing countries disability is caused by inadequate maternal and childhood nutrition, infection and disease, lack of clean water, accidents, armed conflict, terrorism and antipersonnel landmines. Seventeen per cent of Afghans developed disabilities as a direct result of the armed conflict. In Cambodia, 18 per cent of the persons with disabilities are amputees likely caused by antipersonnel landmines.^[6]

In countries that are experiencing fast-paced globalization with the consequent tougher competition and higher level of stress, the number of persons with psychosocial disabilities is on the rise. Conflicts and natural disasters have also contributed to the increase.

Poverty and marginalization characterize the situation of majority of the persons with disabilities in the region. ESCAP considers them to be "among the poorest of the poor and the most marginalized in the society." Living mostly in the rural areas, they have difficulty accessing whatever facilities for them are available because these facilities are usually located in the cities. They generally have limited access to education, employment, housing, transportation, health services and recreation, leading to their economic and social exclusion. The International Labour Organization (ILO) states that the unemployment rate among persons with disabilities is usually double that of the general population and often as high as 80 per cent. They frequently face various barriers such as negative attitudes of employers, lack of accessible facilities, and lack of vocational and technical training.

Women and girls with disabilities in developing countries face triple discrimination due to their status as females, persons with disabilities and their over representation among the poor. They are two to three times more likely to be victims of physical and sexual abuse at home or in institutions for persons with disabilities. Few victims ever talk or file a grievance due to lack of confidence and knowledge of where or whom to turn to for help.

Children with disabilities are largely excluded from educational opportunities. It is estimated that for the majority of countries in the region less than 10 per cent of children with disabilities are enrolled in school. The ESCAP Survey in 2004 indicates for example that the school enrolment rate of children with disabilities is 2 per cent in the Philippines and 4 per cent in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Regional response

The UN World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons^[7] provided a framework for addressing the disability issue. The World Programme entails "long-term strategies integrated into national policies for socio-economic development, preventive activities that would include development and use of technology for the prevention of disabilities, and legislation eliminating discrimination regarding access to facilities, social security, education and employment."^[8] ESCAP followed this up with the first regional decade on the issue, "The Asia Pacific Decade of Persons with Disabilities, 1993-2002."^[9] The Decade was aimed at strengthening the regional support for the implementation of the World Programme in the Asia Pacific region beyond 1992, and to strengthen regional cooperation to resolve issues affecting the achievement of the goals of the World Programme, especially those concerning the full participation and equality of persons with disabilities.

An Agenda for Action adopted to implement the Decade requests all members and associate members to support its national implementation through public awareness activities, appropriate policies and other measures, and the allocation of resources; invites all governments, donor agencies and the private sector to contribute to the trust fund for the Decade to ensure the successful implementation of the Agenda for Action; also invites the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and other concerned United Nations bodies and agencies, in close cooperation with ESCAP, to strengthen their support for the building of national capabilities for effective implementation of the Agenda for Action.

Two regional meetings in 1999, held in close collaboration with stakeholders in the disability- related concerns, developed practical guidelines for advancing equal access by persons with disabilities to mainstream development opportunities on the following areas: 1) education and technology for the specific needs of children and youth with disabilities; and 2) implementation of the United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities and fulfillment of the Decade targets.

ESCAP extended^[10] in May 2002 the Decade for another ten years from 2003 to 2012, and started a number of initiatives under the extended Decade. In October 2002, the high-level intergovernmental meeting held in Otsu, Shiga, Japan adopted as guideline for action the "Biwako Millennium Framework for Action towards an Inclusive, Barrier-free and Rights-based Society for Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific" (BMF). The BMF promotes a paradigm shift from a charity-based to a rights-based approach to disability. It promotes a barrier-free, inclusive and rights-based society, which embraces the diversity of human beings. Further, it enables and advances the socioeconomic contribution of its members and ensures the realization of those rights by persons with disabilities. It identifies seven priority areas, four major strategic areas, with twenty-one targets and seventeen strategies.

The BMF has five key strategies:

1. Reinforcing a rights-based approach to disability issues;
2. Promoting an enabling environment and strengthening effective mechanisms for policy formulation and implementation;
3. Improving the availability and quality of data and other information on disabilities for policy formulation and implementation;
4. Promoting disability-inclusive development;
5. Strengthening comprehensive community- based approaches to disability issues for the prevention of the causes of disability and for the rehabilitation and empowerment of persons with disabilities.

One of the most significant developments during the first five years of the extended Decade was the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD) and its Optional Protocol.^[11] This marked the beginning of a new era in the global efforts to promote and safeguard the civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of persons with disabilities, and to promote disability-inclusive development and international cooperation. In Asia- Pacific, fourteen countries as of March 2009^[12] have ratified the CRPD (Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, India, Jordan, New Zealand, Oman, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkmenistan and Vanuatu).

Implementing the BMF

The midterm review of the implementation of the BMF reveals some major developments:^[13]

1. Institutional arrangements on disability ? at least twenty-seven governments reported having national mechanisms on disability. Twenty governments reported that their national coordination mechanisms had representatives from more than one ministry and disabled people's organizations. But some governments still lack the financial and human resources as well as the technical capacity to engage in policy development and implementation using these mechanisms.
2. Disability provisions in the legal system - the Constitutions in at least twenty governments have disability provisions that are either of the two major types: (a) the obligation of the State to provide welfare, prevention and rehabilitation programs; and (b) the obligation of equal protection under the law and protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. At least fourteen governments have a comprehensive disability law. Comprehensive laws in nine governments cover the seven priority areas of the BMF. Seven governments reported having a disability-specific anti-discrimination law.
3. National action plan, policies and decision-making processes on disability - At least twenty-one governments have such action plan, with eleven of them having developed it during the last five years. At least thirteen governments have policies to support the development of self-help organizations of persons with disabilities (SHOs). And at least fifteen governments have measures to ensure the inclusion of persons with disabilities in decision-making processes.
4. Anti-discrimination measures - At least ten governments have anti-discrimination measures to safeguard the rights of women with disabilities. Over the last five years, governments and non- governmental organizations have organized a number of workshops and seminars focusing on the theme of women with disabilities. In at least fifteen governments, the participation and equal representation of women with disabilities has been promoted by either law or SHO policy. In addition, fifteen governments reported that their women's associations included women with disabilities in their membership.
5. Primary education for persons with disabilities ? a total of eighteen governments reported that children and youth with disabilities form an integral part of their measures to attain Millenium Development Goal 2 on achieving universal primary education. But the report observes that while "the general assessment on the attainment of Millennium Development Goal 2 was positive with most countries in the region having a primary enrolment rate above 80 per cent, the majority of data available indicate lower rates for children and youth with disabilities."
6. Community-based mechanism - At least thirteen governments have taken measures to provide community-based early intervention services and training programs. Nineteen governments provide services for the early detection of disability in infants and young children.

The review also provides a set of challenges that have to be overcome during the next five years of the BMF implementation. The review states that^[14]

Urgent action should be taken to reduce poverty and improve educational and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. Similarly, measures to ensure that disabled persons have access to information, in particular, the use of sign language, and access to ICT have to be taken. Disability-specific data collection systems as well as the mainstreaming of the disability perspective into existing censuses, regular labour, education and health surveys, and poverty mapping should be further promoted. Enhanced support for women with disabilities, persons with disabilities in rural and remote areas, deaf-blind persons, persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with psychosocial disabilities is required. Disaster-resilient accessible communities have to be built and disability-inclusive disaster preparedness has to be promoted.

CRPD: Challenges and Opportunities

Most countries in the Asia-Pacific are contemporary societies that have adopted new ideas such as those related to persons with disabilities. But the persistence of traditional thinking that oppose new ideas (such as the rights of persons with disabilities) poses a question on how a Barrier-free Society can be achieved. An inadequately informed general public and an ineffective system of monitoring the implementation of relevant laws on disability reveal an interesting interaction between social attitude and the legal system. This situation leads to persons with disabilities being confined at home and unable to avail of the protection and benefits that the laws are meant to provide. The existence of the CPRD provides challenges and opportunities for the promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities among the general public, such as through the following activities:

1. Public debates^[15] ? They can facilitate the understanding on the way language use, attitudes, and people's view of disability impact on how societies handle disability issues, and on the paradigm shift about persons with disabilities.
2. Cultural representations ? They can properly convey to the society the appropriate messages, images and ideas about persons with disabilities.
3. Review of disability portrayal in literature ? The encounter of old images of persons with disabilities in literature (novels and other forms) and the contemporary ideas provides the opportunity for reviewing how persons with disabilities want the society to think about them, and how society think about disability issues.
4. Use of legislative forums ? A greater understanding of disability and the needs of persons with disabilities should be highlighted in policymaking processes and legislative forums to address the gap between international standards and national systems.

Nothing about us without us

The Disabled Peoples' International (DPI) adopted the motto "Nothing about Us without Us" at its founding in 1981. The motto has been particularly effective in capturing a key idea of the struggle for human rights ? self-determination is essential for achieving true equality. This is clearly acknowledged in the 1993 UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities. Rule 18 says,

States should recognize the rights of persons with disabilities to represent persons with disabilities at national, regional and local levels. States should also recognize the advisory role of organizations of persons with disabilities in decision-making on disability matters.

The ideas of self-determination and human rights developed and fought for by persons with disabilities through their international disability movement and encapsulated in "Nothing about Us without Us" motto are also at the very heart of CRPD. It recognizes that "disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others." (Preamble, CRPD)

Conclusion

The Disabled Peoples Organizations (DPOs) are working hard to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities and related concerns within existing inter-governmental and regional non-governmental mechanisms in Asia-Pacific. They would like the rights of persons with disabilities to be explicitly stated in policy documents and program guidelines as well as respected at all stages of program implementation (including the stages of engagement, country analysis, strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation). The direct participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations in the current discussion on human rights in ASEAN through the non-governmental networks (such as the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy) is an example of such mainstreaming efforts.

Networking and collaboration among civil society organizations, government agencies, international development agencies, and multilateral and bilateral agencies are key requirements in the implementation of CRPD and other human rights instruments that incorporate the rights of persons with disabilities in their development agenda.

Social mechanisms are crucial in enabling the participation of persons with disabilities in processes that would reduce the gap in implementing CRPD, BMF and other related programs. The persons with disabilities are the most qualified and best-equipped people to support, inform and advocate for their rights. Consequently, when including disability issues in any development plan, the participation of persons with disabilities is vital. Without the participation of the persons with disabilities in the process, especially in the decision-making one, it is unlikely to meet the needs of persons with disabilities. The DPI motto 'Nothing about Us without Us' proves true in many cases.

Saowalak Thongkuay is the Regional Development Officer in the Regional Development Office, Disabled Peoples' International Asia Pacific (DPI/ AP).

For further information, please contact: Regional Development Office, Disabled Peoples' International Asia Pacific (DPI/AP), 29/486 Moo 9, Soi 12, Muang Thong Thani, Bangpood Sub-district, Pakkred District Nonthaburi Province 11120, ph (66-2) 503-4268, fax (66-2) 503-4269, e-mail: saowalak@dpiap.org; www.dpiap.org

Endnotes

1. ESCAP Fact Sheet, page 11, available in http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/FactSheets.pdf

2. See Fifth quinquennial review and appraisal of the World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons, Report of the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly, A/63/183, 28 July 2008.

3. Country Profile, http://apcdproject.org/countryprofile/

4. Based on Ryosuke Matsui, "Employment Measures for Persons with Disabilities in Japan," in FOCUS Asia-Pacific, volume 54, page 8.

5. ESCAP, op.cit.

6. See Cambodia country profile, http://apcdproject.org/countryprofile/cambodia/cambodia.html

7. United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/52, 3 December 1982.

8. History of United Nations and Persons with Disabilities - The World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, UNEnable, www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=131

9. http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/Disability/bmf/APDDP2_2E.pdf

10. ESCAP resolution 58/4 of 22 May 2002.

11. This optional protocol provides the Committee of Rights of Persons with Disability the authority to accept communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention.

12. UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? src=TREATY&id=1&chapter=4&lang=en

13. Review of Progress Made and Challenges Faced in the Implementation of the Biwako Millennium Framework for Action Towards an Inclusive, Barrier-Free and Rights- Based Society for Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific, 2003-2012, High-level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Midpoint Review of the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons, 2003-2012, Report of ESCAP to the ECOSOC (E/ESCAP/APDDP(2)/1, 22 August 2007).

14. Ibid., page 20.

15. Based on Antika Sawadsri, "Toward access legislations in practice: Experience from field work study," School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle (United Kingdom), 27 February 2008.

Bangladesh is not only one of the most densely populated countries in the world (with 926 persons per square kilometer) but also located in the world's largest delta, facing the Himalayas in the North, bordering India in the West, North and East, Myanmar in the Southeast, and the Bay of Bengal in the South. Its geographical position makes the country highly prone to natural disasters. Crisscrossed by two hundred thirty recognized rivers, each year about 30 per cent of the net cultivable land is flooded, while during severe floods, which occur every four to seven years, as much as 60 per cent of the country's net cultivable land is affected. Moreover, since the Bay of Bengal records the world's most pronounced storm surge disasters, the densely populated coastal regions of Bangladesh are subject to damaging cyclones almost every year. These are further compounded by tornadoes that affect the plains almost every year leaving a trail of death and disability. Economically, Bangladesh has one of the lowest annual per capita incomes in the world (under 450 US dollars). Even though agriculture is the premium bread earner of the common person and the nation, it also has the highest percentage of people living in poverty where the poorest 10 per cent and the middle 75 per cent of the population are acutely and chronically malnourished respectively. The majority of the population is Muslim and almost all citizens speak one language, Bangla. A country with a population close to 150 million people, it has a large human resource base. This is compounded with some natural resources, and a potential field for tourism that can raise the profile of the country many folds.

Disability scenario in Bangladesh

No comprehensive empirical study has been conducted at present to determine the incidence and prevalence of disabilities in Bangladesh. The few studies that have been conducted reflect a medical rather than a social model of disability, and they are also limited in geographical coverage. While no reliable national data exist, anecdotal information and a number of micro studies generally suggest a disability prevalence rate of between 5 to 12 per cent. This is close to the WHO estimate, which states that 10 per cent of any given population can be considered to have some or other form of disability.

Ignorance and wrong beliefs surrounding disability, compounded with a negative and derogatory attitude of the community (including family members) have contributed to the marginal development in the disability sector in Bangladesh.

Disability-related legislations and policy framework

The National Constitution^[1] of Bangladesh has numerous provisions that obligate the government to protect the rights and dignity of all citizens of the country equally and without any bias whatsoever. It also allows room for additional and/or supplementary provisions that will ensure that citizens who do not have access to all the public amenities are able to obtain such services. This has given the government ample opportunities to adopt legislative and policy frameworks for the development of the full potentials of persons with disabilities in the country.

In accordance with all national and international commitments/obligations, and under the purview of the National Constitution, the Bangladeshi government developed a National Policy on Disability in 1995. This policy embodies the first official recognition by the government of the issue of disability as part of development agenda. This policy was given legislative support when the National Parliament enacted the Disability Welfare Act on 4 April 2001. This law provides the first ever national definition and classification of disability.

To implement the National Policy on Disability and the Disability Welfare Act, the government formulated a National Action Plan on 24 September 2006. The Action Plan is very comprehensive, involving forty-six Ministries and divisions of the government to undertake specific activities for persons with disabilities. The government has also appointed a focal person in every division of the Ministries (forty-six focal persons) who can provide the persons with disabilities the opportunity to get services from the government easily. Bangladesh signed and ratified in 2007 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In May 2008 the government signed the CRPD's Optional Protocol.

The Ministry of Social Welfare, the Department of Social Services and the National Foundation for Development of the Disabled Persons are the three government bodies that cater to the needs of persons with disabilities.

Prevention

As Bangladesh makes progress in implementing its health policies on infant mortality rate, immunization coverage, and general health care, there is likely a lowering of incidence of disabilities. However, the gains due to improved health care can be outweighed by the triple effects of increased number of surviving children with disabilities, increased number of people incurring disabilities due to old age (e.g., cataracts and arthritis), and widespread malnutrition. Disabilities due to natural calamities and road traffic accidents imply that the prevalence of people having disabilities in Bangladesh is likely to continually rise over-time, although the nature and distribution of disabilities are also likely to change considerably.

Education

Access to education of children with disabilities is extremely limited. An un-equal educational system, a rigid and unfriendly school curriculum, ignorance and lack of awareness of parents, compounded with the inadequate knowledge of teachers and the unfriendly school environment are obstacles to promoting the education of children with disabilities in Bangladesh. Under the government system of Bangladesh, the education of persons with disabilities is under the Ministry of Social Welfare not under the Ministry of Education. This has created a big barrier to persons with disabilities to be included into mainstream education. It is estimated that only about 5 per cent of children with disabilities are enrolled in existing educational institutions.

Recently, the government has been promoting inclusive education for children with mild disabilities. This may create a space for the enrollment of more children with disabilities in the mainstream educational institutions. Another positive step is the program of providing stipend to students with disabilities. But this stipend is not for all students with disabilities. Only 12,000 students with disabilities are getting the stipend while 1.6 million children with disabilities are waiting at home to be enrolled in educational institutions.

Employment

The government had declared about two decades back a 10 per cent employment quota for persons with disabilities and orphans. But this quota has never been properly implemented due to the lack of sensitivity of employers about the potentialities of persons with disabilities, contradictory employment policies, loopholes in the system, and a lack of proper monitoring system. A few years back, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh declared a 1 per cent employment quota for persons with disabilities in all cadre service (government) jobs.

The Centre for Services and Information on Disability, a non-governmental organization (NGO), study found that only 5 per cent of the respondents were in government jobs, 17 per cent in NGOs and 66 per cent were self-employed. Only 22 per cent had been able to find a source of financial credit (or micro-credit) support.

Bangladesh has a thriving corporate sector, which is the principal job provider after the government. It is also the largest backbone of the national economy, after agriculture. Jute and tea used to be the prime export items, however, readymade garments (RMG), handicrafts and leather export has gradually taken over as the larger export-oriented industries. Cosmetics and medicines produced in this country are also gradually gaining popularity in the export market. But in this large corporate structure, employment or job creation opportunities for the people with disabilities had never really taken off.

Communications and accessibility

Bangladesh has a building code that clearly demarcates accessibility options for all people including persons with disabilities. Yet again loopholes in the system, the lack of proper monitoring, and a lack of system to penalize violators prevent accessibility for persons with disabilities. Public and private offices, educational institutions, public transportation, utility infrastructures, recreation and tourist spots, market places ? almost all are inaccessible to persons with disabilities. The government has decided to require the establishment of separate ticket counters and reserved seats for persons with disabilities in public transports. But this decision has not been implemented since the public transports themselves lack general accessibility facilities.

Isolated NGO development program

Bangladesh has a plethora of NGOs (around 40,000) sharing the development work in the country alongside the government. In a background of such a large number of NGOs, who are mostly dependent on external funding, international NGOs, finance institutions and donors play a major role in the development scenario in Bangladesh.

Unfortunately, among the existing NGOs only four hundred are working for persons with disabilities. This has greatly isolated the work for the persons with disabilities from the mainstream NGO development work. Some of the active NGOs are presented below.

The National Forum of Organizations Working with the Disabled (NFOWD) is the apex federating body of NGOs working in the field of Disability in Bangladesh with a vision of an inclusive society where all persons with disabilities are visible and contribute equitably in the nation-building process. NFOWD works in three areas: (a) coordination among its members, (b) raising national level awareness and sensitization on disability issues, and (c) policy advocacy and lobbying work, and its principal working relationship is with the government of Bangladesh. As such, over the years it has gained the reputation and recognition within the country as an example of a perfect interface between the government and the NGOs in this field. Government committee, taskforce, working group, etc. on disability issues includes NFOWD as a member by default. This is upheld either by law, policy or an administrative decision. At the Asian regional level, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP) has recognized this linkage as one of the 'best practices' in the area of 'GO-NGO Collaboration' in the region.

Following the internationally acclaimed spirit of "Nothing About Us Without Us" and a more recent target set in the Biwako Millennium Framework (BMF) on self-help initiatives, a large number of Disabled People's Organizations (DPOs) are coming up all over Bangladesh, mostly being supported by two large NGOs ? Action on Disability and Development (ADD) and the Bangladesh Protibondhi Kallyan Shomity (BPKS).

Bangladesh has a very active and well-informed civil society, which also plays a major role in the national development. A few civil society organizations are also gradually addressing disability issues. The Rotary Clubs, the Lions Clubs and their affiliates have long been involved in health camps and eye camps for decades in this country, contributing much in the area of control and prevention of blindness. The Rotary Clubs have, during the last three years, donated over eight hundred wheelchairs to poor persons with disabilities.

Conclusion

Disability will always remain in Bangladeshi society, with the entire social stigma attached to it. But in the backdrop of all the problems involved, the silver lining is that the government is showing an increasing interest on persons with disabilities, and a keen interest to work hand-in-hand with the non- governmental sector. But to make real progress in this field in a developing country like Bangladesh, an all-out effort from all quarters is mandatory. The persons with disabilities themselves, their organizations, other organizations working in this field, and all the advocacy platforms need to increase their awareness campaigns for the prevention of disability and for the recognition of the rights and privileges of persons with disabilities as equalcitizens of this country.

Khandaker Jahurul Alam is the Chairperson of the Asia Pacific Disability Forum (APDF), President of the National Disability Forum (NFOWD) and Executive Director of the Centre for Services and Information on Disability (CSID), Bangladesh.

For further information, please contact: Centre for Services and Information on Disability (CSID), House# 715, Road # 10, Baitul Aman Housing Society, Adabor, Dhaka-12107, Bangladesh; ph (880-2) 8125669, 9129727, 8143882, e-mail: csid@bdmail.net; www.csidnetwork.org.

Endnote

1. These provisions are contained in Articles 10, 11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, and 36 of the Constitution.

The absence of acknowledgment and accountability for the thousands of victims of violence during the period of armed conflict in Aceh makes the current peace settlement merely symbolic. For the Acehnese, the only change that the peace settlement brought was the change of people who hold power, or the ranks of the elite. The political situation in Aceh today and predictably even for the next five years remains to be an 'abnormality,' and if ignored for too long will destroy the peace investment.^[2] Hence, steps to normalize Aceh have to be taken.

The main step towards the normalization of the political situation in Aceh is truth-telling. This article explains why this step is important and what requirements should be fulfilled to make truth-telling possible.

Symptoms of abnormality

The symptoms of the abnormal situation in Aceh are seen in a number of incidents and situations that occur in the area. The presence of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) military wing and other militia groups that perpetrate terror and armed robbery is one example. Within the last few months, armed groups were involved in robbery in several areas around East and Central Aceh.

Another example is the lack of coordination within the bureaucracy between the Governor, the executive head, and the Regents who all belong to GAM. The lack of coordination between them led to the many complaints from the people about the slow process of change in the local governments.

The mobilization of support for the creation of new provinces in Central, Western and Southern Aceh constitutes another symptom of abnormality. The people behind this effort argue that the new provinces would provide prosperity to the interior and western coastal areas, and stop dependence on the provincial government of Banda Aceh that does not really pay attention to their situation. But dividing the Aceh province into several provinces does not necessarily mean obtaining better economic condition since the natural resources and public facilities are not evenly spread in the province. Members of the Indonesian provincial elite still believe this idea, which actually "betrays" the ideals of the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding and the Free Aceh Movement.

The most obvious symptom of 'abnormality' is the implementation of the Islamic Laws (Syariat Islam). While the Islamic Laws address the particularity of the situation in Aceh, they have also become means for political negotiation. The Islamic Laws are tools to "threaten" the National Government to agree to demands of those in power in Aceh by making the Aceh provincial government adopt strict Islamic regulations that in turn become example for other Indonesian provinces with majority Muslim population to follow. The National Government does not want this to happen, as this will cause disruption of the national unity and stability. This also traps the elites and the Acehnese society as a whole since the Acehnese identity becomes strictly Muslim. This means that those who were born and lived in Aceh all their lives cannot declare themselves non-Muslim in order to be identified as Acehnese. Finally, this has become the source of confusion in the attempt of people to institute political reforms.

Why do these symptoms of abnormality happen? The lack of standard guidelines in understanding, as well as the absence of a wide acknowledgment, of the bitter experiences of the Acehnese people in the past would explain these symptoms. All new political regulations and the coming of new elites in the political arena merely function as short-term transactions. This implies that the Acehnese society faces difficulty in identifying substantial difference in the characters and systems of the ruling governments in the past and at the present. The only identified difference refers to the different personalities among the elite.^[3]

Suffering of the past and expected change

In 1989, the National Government established the Military Operation District (DOM) in Aceh in support of its military response to the Aceh issue. In 1998, the DOM ended and a State of Emergency (DO) was instituted instead. During the DOM and DO periods, the armed conflict raged and thousands of Acehnese suffered from human rights violations.

With the high cost of the armed conflict situation in terms of lives lost and properties destroyed and other problems, the National Government and the armed opposition group (GAM) started peace negotiations through the mediation of Finland.

The peace process raised the expectation of a real change in the situation of Aceh. But change turned out to be merely symbolic.

This symbolic change started right after the leaders of GAM and the delegates of the government of the Indonesian Republic (RI) signed the Memorandum of Understanding (Helsinki MoU) on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland. The treaty was formally legalized when the National Government passed Law No. 11 Year 2006 on Aceh Governance (UU PA). From that time onward, the existence of peace in Aceh hinged very much on the fulfillment of the mandates under the Helsinki MoU. The three major mandates are the following:^[4]

1. Autonomous governance of Aceh - "Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration..." ? Article 1.1.2^[5] UU PA has established the autonomous Aceh government.
2. Resolution of human rights issues - "The government of Indonesia will adhere to the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;" establish a Human Rights Court; and establish a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation that will formulate and determine reconciliation measures..." ? Article 2.
3. Amnesty and reintegration of former combatants into the society - The National Government, in accordance with constitutional procedures, will grant amnesty to all persons who participated in GAM activities as soon as possible but not later than fifteen days from the signing of the MoU; unconditionally release all political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict; restore to those who received amnesty and freed from prison and detention all political, economic and social rights as well as the right to participate freely in the political process both in Aceh and at the national level ? Article 3.2.

Peace in Aceh therefore is very much determined by the implementation of these Helsinki MoU mandates.

However, there is an old wound that cannot be healed instantly. That wound is the collective memory of the past atrocities that affect the whole body of the people of Aceh, especially the victims of violence during the long-winding conflict in the past. That collective memory has become a trauma that spreads beneath the surface without getting noticed.

This wound (collective memory) should be cured otherwise the process towards a peaceful Aceh would be hard to achieve. This is a big problem when talking about Aceh, a problem that weighs heavily in discussing its future.

In general, the problems that are related to the collective memory of violence and human rights violations that happened in Aceh can be categorized into two: first, violence and human rights violations that happened during the DOM era (1980 ? 1998); second, violence and human rights violations that happened post-DOM era.

Aceh in transition

The armed conflict situation in Aceh resulted from two major problems that the Aceh people faced. The first was the loss of opportunities for the Aceh people to prosper under the centralized government system (with Jakarta as the center). The second was the brutal system of the dual-function military establishment that claimed thousands of lives.^[6]

To address these root causes of the armed conflict, the Helsinki MoU called for the establishment of an autonomous government in Aceh in the context of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). An autonomous government started to operate in Aceh by 2007 under the 2006 UU PA.

To solve the problems related to the brutality of the security apparatus and other armed forces, a Human Rights Court and a Truth Commission should be established as soon as possible. The establishment of these two institutions will open a "gate of peace" that will help Aceh normalize the social life of its people as they recognize the dark past through truth-telling and by upholding the sense of justice of the society. The process of solving the main causes of armed conflict until a normal condition is achieved takes a long time. The process from the initial peace to the normal situation is called transitional process.

The transition time is an interval^[7] from the end of the armed conflict to the process towards a new political system. This interval is politically seen as the most critical as it is the period when the moral legitimacy of the old order is lost, while the new order has yet to be wholly established. In this kind of situation, political compromises automatically ensue. Parties to the peace process enter into these compromises so that they will not risk their respective positions or cause the peace process to fall back to zero.^[8]

The political transition currently happening in Aceh is a "transplacement" process or a compromise, using Huntington's theoretical framework on democratization.^[9] This transitional process is characterized by an opposition or resistance having concluded that it could not win the battle against the government, and the latter having realized that it would not be capable of completely suppressing the former. Another characteristic is the fragility of the situation that can turn bad if the resistance force continues resisting, bringing back the conflict and risking the positions that have been secured. Or, on the other hand, the situation can turn bad if the government continues to suppress the opposition and brings about the dilemma of either losing the international legitimacy of the government or the current ruling group losing power to a more conservative group.^[10]

A closer examination of the process of Helsinki negotiations that produced the MoU and of making it legal through UU PA shows the "transplacement" characteristics. Conservative groups within the nationalist faction of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) and retired Army generals put pressure on the government of Jakarta to review the present status of Aceh province based on the Helsinki MoU and, if possible, revoke the special status and autonomy that the Aceh Province has been enjoying. This is due to their centralistic governance viewpoint. They also do not want an Islamic province within a secular State.^[11] The National Government that has the support of Golkar and PDIP factions continues the negotiation to show that the ultranationalist groups could not dictate upon it and to keep its international legitimacy. Meanwhile, GAM itself is facing problems as it starts to lose its legitimacy before the international community and the people of Aceh. Other than that, GAM also faces a shortage of personnel and weapons. In that situation both parties were not capable of taking any offensive anymore, hence they resorted to negotiation as a lose-lose solution.

Lose-lose solution as a political democratization step in Aceh is marked with the shift of the demand for independence to a form of autonomous government. To reach this demand, GAM should surrender its weapons, which means that they have to dissolve its armed forces too. On the government end, it gave amnesty by dropping all criminal charges against the members of GAM. GAM also gained a political opportunity to form a political party and compete in the Provincial Elections (Pilkada) within the national political system.

By characterizing the political transition in Aceh as a "transplacement" (compromise) transition the efforts on dealing with problems of human rights violations during the armed conflict (DOM era) come within the political compromise domain. The question is, what are being compromised in solving the human rights violations?

Amiruddin al Rahab is a member of Aceh Working Group, Political and Human Rights Analyst of ELSAM, Jakarta.

For further information, please contact: Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), Jl. Siaga II No. 31, Pejaten Barat, Jakarta 12510, INDONESIA; ph (62-21) 7972662, 79192564; fax (62-21) 79192519; e-mail: office@elsam.or.id, advokasi@indosat.net.id; www.elsam.or.id

Endnotes

1. Written in Bahasa Indonesia by the author, Dhyta Catura translated the article into English. This is the first of two-part series of articles on Aceh peace process.

2. The opening of political democratic space for GAM exponents that allowed them to enter the formal political arena is the most important investment, of which the elements can now be seen from the election of Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar (known as IRNA), the presence of six local parties in the elections, and the victory of personalities who were associated with GAM in some municipal elections. Another important investment is the space for freedom for the people of Aceh.

3. During the DOM regime, the elites in Aceh were dominated by members of Golkar and supported by the Armed Forces (ABRI), but now the elites are associated with GAM. The method of governance and the programs are similar but the budget for the MoU regime is bigger.

4. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement. An Indonesian-version of the MoU has been agreed upon by the delegates of both sides.

5. The power of autonomous governance does not extend to matters relating to foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal affairs, justice and freedom of religion. (Article 1.1.2 of the Helsinki MoU).

6. Tim Kell, The Root of Acehnese Rebellions, 1989-1992, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project No. 74 (Ithaca, New York: 1995).

7. Theoretically, "interval time" is marked by the uncertainty of rules in the political process. This uncertainty occurs because of the ongoing changes and the decision-making process being employed in the conflict arena by the parties involved. See further, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions and Uncertain Democracies, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1993, pages 6-8.

8. The most obvious compromise was the willingness of GAM to change its name, from GAM Party to Independent Aceh Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Aceh Mandiri) and finally to Party of Aceh. The latest clarification by the General Elections Commission (KPU/KIP) finally confirmed the name as Party of Aceh (PA).

9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1995), page 146. Theoretically, Huntington explains that there are three forms of transition - transformation, replacement, and transplacement. Transformation (reformation) is marked with the willingness of the old ruling political regimes and elites to initiate change. It means that political changes are conceived and initiated by the old regime itself. Replacement is marked by the success of opposition forces or resistance to overthrow or replace the old political regime and elites. Transplacement means the change towards a new political system is achieved through compromises between the opposition or resistance forces and the old political regime.

10. Ibid, page 192.

11. PDIP was the faction of the ruling party that declared the State of Emergency in Aceh in 2003. PDIP was also against the peace negotiation process in Helsinki and opposed the UU PA.

A symposium entitled "Multicultural Families and the Local Community - Examining Co-existence in Japan, Korea and Taiwan" explored the necessary governmental policies and programs (central and local) to address the plight of foreign immigrants and migrants in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The symposium also discussed the experiences in these countries on securing the human rights of foreign immigrants and migrants, and promoting the idea of "multicultural families."

The symposium focused on the situation of foreign immigrant women married to Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese husbands and who raised families in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan respectively. Kim Hyun Mee of Yonsei University (South Korea) gave a presentation entitled "Current Situation and Challenges in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan - Integration for Whom?: Married Migrant Women Policies in South Korea and Patriarchal Imagination." She pointed out that those cross-border or international marriages constituted 11.1 percent of the total marriages in South Korea in 2007. 88 percent of these marriages involve Korean men marrying foreign women. And among the foreign wives, Korean-Chinese women constitute 53.4 percent. Other nationalities constitute the rest: Vietnamese (19.8 percent), Japanese (4.9 percent), Filipino (4.5 percent) and Mongolian (1.9 percent) women. International marriages have been a "boom" since 2000 with the support of matchmaking enterprises. She stressed that the Korean government under its 2006 "Transition to a Multicultural, Multiethnic Society" policy saw international marriage as an answer to a number of issues in the current Korean society: low birth rate, high divorce rate, the imbalance of the sex ratio in marriage market, etc. Laws were enacted to address the increasing number of fraudulent marriages as well as to implement the integration policy. Matchmaking enterprises treated international marriages as "consumer-broker-product/service" matter, while scam marriages and marriages with false information arose. The integration policy was criticized for pursuing the assimilation of the foreign wives into the Korean society and the lack of respect for their own cultures. It was also criticized for promoting the objective of international marriages of forming, maintaining and reproducing the 'family'. As a result, the foreign wives dropped their cultural identity in order to adjust to the expected gender roles in Korean society and suffered from the problems of negotiating the adjustment process. She posed the challenge of uniting the Korean and foreign women into a single cause and recognizing the foreign women as the "new citizens" of Korea.

Hsiao-Chuan Hsia of Shih Hsin University (Taiwan) gave a presentation entitled "The Development of Immigrant Movement in Taiwan ? the Case of Alliance of Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants." She explained that according to the Ministry of Interior of Taiwan, as of the end of 2006, there were 384,000 foreign spouses, 65.1 percent of whom were from Mainland China and 34.9 percent from other countries (mostly Southeast Asian countries). A study by the Ministry of Interior showed that between 1987 to August 2003, there were 240,837 foreign spouses, including those from Southeast Asia (42.2 percent) and Mainland China (57.8 percent). Ninety-three percent of these foreign spouses were women. Among the women from Southeast Asia, 57.5 percent were from Vietnam, 23.2 percent from Indonesia, 5.3 percent from Thailand and another 5.3 percent from the Philippines. She said that foreign wives in Taiwan suffered from economic difficulties, isolation, and discrimination due to public perception that they acquired "fake marriages," that they (and their children) have low social status (low "quality") image, and that they were wasting social welfare resources. She also mentioned that foreign wives have difficulty getting Taiwanese citizenship due to legal constraints (particularly on financial requirement), which led to non-enjoyment of legal rights. These problems increased the barrier between the foreign wives and the mainstream Taiwanese society. Hsiao explained the response of the non- governmental organization community to this problem by forming the Alliance of Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM). The AHRLIM wanted to make the public become aware of the situation of foreign wives and other foreign immigrants and migrants in Taiwan; promote the ideas of human rights, multi-culturalism and democracy; create public empathy to the plight of the foreign wives and other foreign immigrants and migrants; and demonstrate the subjectivity of the immigrant women. She stressed the need for the foreign women to participate in the campaigns, a multi-sectoral movement on immigrant women issues, and networking with other institutions outside Taiwan.

Emiko Miki a lawyer and the President of the non- governmental organization House for Women "Saalaa," gave a presentation entitled "Current Situation and Challenges of International Marriages and Multicultural Families in Japan ? Women of Foreign Nationality who have Chosen to Live in Japan and their Children." She spoke about the history of foreign migration to Japan that led to trafficking and also international marriages. She pointed out that by the 1990s there were many children born of foreign mothers and Japanese fathers, as well as foreign parents who either have special permanent residence visa or lapsed visa.

She said that after 2000, many problems arose such as the problem of migrant foreign children adjusting to life in Japan, the aging of foreign women themselves, the adoption of regulations on human trafficking and their effects, the relationship between foreign children and the Japanese society, the declining birth rate, and the aging population in Japan. She also mentioned that many junior and senior secondary-level foreign students are struggling to survive in the Japanese society.

Maria Hiramatsu, a Filipina married to a Japanese for about ten years and a part-time staff of Toyonaka Association for International Activities and Communication, pointed out that since the situations in Japan and in the Philippines were very different, it was necessary for Filipinas to see such differences through social interactions with the Japanese. But there should be occasions for social interactions for the Filipinas to participate in, and for the Japanese to learn about the Philippines (its various languages, religion, etc.). She also expressed the importance of the foreigners being able to empower themselves, and being able to say "no." They should be able to decide by themselves on what to do, instead of simply accepting the advise of the Japanese supporters.

Mariko Kawabata of Toyonaka Center for Gender Equality spoke on the problems of foreign wives in Japan. She also stressed the importance of helping the foreign wives and migrants in empowering themselves. She agreed with Maria Hiramatsu about the need to address the issue of proper communication to government officials of the problems and sentiments of the foreign wives. She also supported the need for government officials to explore other effective options, instead of strictly sticking to one solution to the problems presented to them. They should also be knowledgeable of other countries, in addition to knowing foreign languages.

Most symposium participants from the local communities in Japan did not know the current situation of foreigners living in Korea and Taiwan. The symposium made them realize the similarity of issues regarding foreign immigrant women in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and understood that the civil movements' lobby with the government to improve the situation of foreign immigrant and migrant women was much ahead in South Korea and Taiwan.

HURIGHTS OSAKA co-organized with the Toyonaka Gender Equality Foundation and the Toyonaka Association for International Activities and Communication the symposium that was held on 18 October 2008 in Toyonaka city, Osaka prefecture. The Women's Studies Center of the Osaka Prefecture University and the Asian Center for Women Studies of the Ewha University (South Korea) cooperated in holding the symposium.

Koonae Park and Nobuki Fujimoto are staff members of HURIGHTS OSAKA.
For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

HURIGHTS OSAKA (in cooperation with the Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development in Mahidol University) has published the full research report of the United Nations World Programme for Human Rights Education ・Asia Project in February 2009. The report is entitled Human Rights Education in the School Systems in Southeast Asia - Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on its website that "around 300 patients, accompanied by 18 ICRC staff, fled Puthukkudiyiruppu Hospital in northern Sri Lanka after it was shelled repeatedly." Neither the shelling of a hospital in time of war nor the forced stranding of thousands of civilians in a place where fighting is taking place can ever be justified.

Another human tragedy is unfolding right before the eyes of the whole world. So far, there is no ceasefire in this current Sri Lankan fighting, even for the sake of getting helpless civilians out to a safe zone. The same story has been happening in other places of armed conflict; Mindanao is an example.

Behind this tragedy, and many other armed conflict situations in Asia, is a long history of discrimination and other forms of human rights violations. In such situations, the use of violence became the means to gain justice despite the high costs in terms of loss of life and damage to property.

To obtain peace, there must be respect for human rights. To respect human rights, there must be peace. Otherwise, the undesired resort to violence remains an option for those whose rights have been trampled upon.

The current armed conflict in Mindanao reflects the recurring call for the fulfillment of the right to self-determination of the Muslim population in the Philippines in order to obtain sustainable peace.

With almost forty years of on and off fighting between Muslim armed opposition groups and the Philippine military forces, and the resulting high toll on human lives, the search for sustainable peace and full respect for human rights remains a big challenge.

The current armed conflict started in late 1960s, when a Muslim armed group (Moro National Liberation Front or MNLF) started to advocate for a “Moro homeland.” The Philippine government responded through military means, resulting in numerous deaths among, and displacement of, the civilian population (Muslims as well as Christians). In the 1970s, the Philippine government initiated peace talks and obtained a peace agreement with the then main Muslim armed opposition group (MNLF) to stop the conflict and address the problems. But armed confrontations broke out every now and then, between the Philippine military and the MNLF and also with another Muslim armed opposition group (Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF). For every break out of armed hostilities, thousands of non- combatants are caught in the crossfire, and suffer displacement and other human rights violations.

To emphasize their deep sense of independence as a people, many Muslims in Mindanao collectively call themselves “Moro,” the word used by the colonial Spanish government to refer to the Muslim people. This extends to the use of the word “Bangsamoro” (Moro Nation) to indicate a people separate from the rest of the Philippine population.

Roots of the conflict

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (2005 PHDR) lists the following major historical and contemporary roots of the conflict in Mindanao:^[1]

1. The forcible/illegal annexation of Moroland to the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris in 1898;^[2]
2. Military pacification by the American colonial government;
3. Imposition of confiscatory land laws;
4. “Indionization” (or Filipinization) of public administration in Moroland and the destruction of traditional political institutions;
5. Government financed/induced land settlement and migration to Moroland;^[3]
6. Land-grabbing/conflicts;
7. Cultural inroads against the Moros;
8. The Jabidah Massacre in 1968 (killing of Muslim army recruits by their superiors);^[4]
9. Ilaga (Christian vigilante) and military atrocities in 1970-72; and
10. Government neglect and inaction on Moro protests and grievances.

The 2005 PHDR states that the declaration of martial law on 21 September 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos was a triggering event of the contemporary Moro armed struggle.

The migration of Filipinos from the northern and central regions of the Philippines to Mindanao led to conflicts. As the 2005 PHDR explains:

The Muslims resented the loss of their lands, including those idle but which formed part of their traditional community. This resentment grew as Muslims witnessed the usurpation by Christian settlers of vast tract of prime lands. This ignited disputes between them and the Christian settlers. The question on land ownership and land disputes between Muslims and Christians was crucial during the post-war period. ^[5]

Peace initiatives

The resulting armed conflict from the early 1970s created a major crisis in Mindanao, and in the Philippines as a whole. In December 1976, the Philippine government signed an agreement with the MNLF through the intercession of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). This agreement, known as the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao and Palawan (covering thirteen provinces), and the establishment of an autonomous government, judicial system (for Sharia law), and special security forces.

In 1977, President Marcos and the Batasang Pambansa (legislature) came out with a series of laws to implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement that resulted in the creation of “Sangguniang Pampook [Regional Council] in each of Regions IX and XII” in Mindanao.^[6] This solution was rejected by the MNLF.^[7]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution brought in a new legal basis for a Muslim autonomous government in Mindanao. It has a provision (Article X) for an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, whose creation is dependent on acceptance in a plebiscite by the people in the affected provinces. Consequently, in 1989, a
law^[8] was enacted that led to a plebiscite for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 1990, ARMM was established covering the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Shariff Kabunsuan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, whose respective populations voted in a plebiscite for inclusion into the new region.

But peace was still elusive. Formal peace talks between the government and MNLF had to start again in 1993 through the mediation of OIC and the Indonesian government. The Philippine government and the MNLF signed the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) to complete the implementation of the "1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)." The 1996 agreement called for the establishment of a “Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly,” and the merging of the MNLF forces with the Philippine military, among other provisions. The agreement also called for an amendment to the law that created the ARMM. In 2001, the law was the amended^[9] that led to a plebiscite in other provinces with predominant Muslim population regarding their inclusion in the ARMM. One province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) joined the ARMM as a result.

By winning in the 1996 elections for the ARMM posts, the MNLF virtually took power since 1996 over six provinces and one city with predominant Muslim population. But the autonomous region formula was not a complete solution toward peace in Mindanao. Another Muslim armed opposition group, the MILF, demanded an independent Islamic state. The Philippine government had to deal with MILF separately for a negotiated settlement of its demands.

The 2005 PHDR states that by early 2000s, “three tracks had emerged, parallel though sometimes converging, which now constitute the current evolution of the Moro conflict: (1) the implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement; (2) the GRP-MILF peace negotiations; and (3) Post-9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism on the Moro front.”^[10]

The Philippine government (GRP) and the MILF started peace talks toward a negotiated political settlement in 1996. Support for the peace talks by Malaysia, Indonesia and Libya led to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. The Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 was signed on 7 May 2002 in Putrajaya, Malaysia. To maintain the ceasefire, three mechanisms were adopted 1) Joint Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities, 2) the International Monitoring Team (composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Libya), and 3) the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group.

The continuing peace negotiations between the GRP and MILF resulted in a 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA-AD). The MOA-AD provides for the delineation of the Bangsamoro homeland, similar to the delineation of the ancestral domain of indigenous Filipinos.^[11] It provides for the establishment of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), which is the legal body that will govern the Bangsamoro homeland. Both GRP and MILF saw the MOA-AD as a necessary step to a final peace agreement.

But before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD on 5 August 2008 in Kuala Lumpur was held, its legality was questioned before the Philippine Supreme Court. The Philippine government decided not to sign the agreement in view of the opposition raised by some Christian local government leaders in Mindanao and other political personalities. The court declared the unsigned MOA-AD unconstitutional in October 2008.^[12] The court viewed the BJE, provided for in the MOA-AD, as “more of a state than an autonomous region” allowed by the 1987 Constitution for the ARMM governing body.

Human rights and the peace agreements

Did the agreements between the Philippine government and the MILF consider the human rights dimension of the issues at hand? Some say the MOA- AD ignored human rights due to the unlimited power given to the BJE.^[13]

As one author pointed out,14 the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the discussion of the MOA-AD, the General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF (GFAI) dated 27 August 1998, the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF (AGFRPT) dated 24 March 2001, and the Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the GRP and the MILF (TAP) dated 22 June 2001 all refer to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and mention the principles of justice, freedom and respect for the identity and culture of the Moro people. The TOR also includes the “ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN [United Nations] Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous Peoples.”

Even the Philippine Supreme Court referred to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  in discussing the appropriateness of the MOA-AD provision on the right of the Moros to a homeland.

Way forward

The failure of the Philippine government to sign the MOA-AD led to a new round of armed hostilities in late 2008 causing death to a number of people and displacing thousands more.

Nevertheless, the MOA-AD is just one step on the long road to peace in Mindanao. The peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF will continue and eventually deal with the existing legal structures brought about by the agreements with the MNLF.

Whatever final peace settlement is reached by all parties (the Philippine government, the MNLF, and the MILF), the international human rights standards should form a crucial part of both the process and content of achieving it. Peace without human rights is not a final peace settlement.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes

1.. Human Development Network, 2005 Philippine Development Report (Manila: Human Development Network, 2005), page 66, citing Macapado Abaton Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative (Marawi City: Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University, 1994).

2. This is the peace treaty between the US and Spain that ceded the Philippines to the US for 20 million US dollars.

3. The government colonization program led to the migration to Mindanao of Filipinos from the northern and central regions of the Philippines prior to the Second World War.

4. This refers to the killing of members of a special military force who were being trained on guerrilla tactics in preparation for "Operation Merdeka,” a secret plan to invade Sabah. See Jocelyn Uy, “Lone survivor recalls Jabidah Massacre, “ Philippine Daily Inquirer, in http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080318-125522/Lone-survivor-recalls-Jabidah-Massacre

5. Busran-Lao, Y., 2005, “Human Development, Economic and Social Costs and Spillovers of Conflict: The Case of the Province of Lanao del Sur” cited in Human Development Network, op. cit., page 67.

6. See Presidential Decree No. 1618, Implementing the Organization of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook in Region IX And Region XII and for Other Purposes.

7. Human Development Network, op. cit., page 71.

8.Republic Act No. 6734, An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

9. Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734.

10. Human Development Network, op. cit., page 66. The third track covers the Abu Sayyaf Group, which became notorious for its kidnapping activities in early 2000s.

11. The delineation of ancestral domain of the indigenous communities is provided for under the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), Republic Act No. 8371.

12. G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al., October 14, 2008.

13. Soliman M. Santos, GRP-MILF peace agreements and human rights, Action for Economic Reforms, in www.aer.ph/index.php ? option=com_content&task=view&id=747&Itemid=88

14.Ibid.

The parents of 16-year-old Saadudin Ampuan recall the morning of 21 September 2008, when they told him to go to their farm, one and a half kilometers away from their house. Aware of the danger, they said they would be following right behind him. Thirty minutes later, the parents saw him in the custody of soldiers. Saadudin saw his parents and called to them. The parents tried to get near him but was fired upon by the soldiers. The following day they saw his dead body in a shallow grave – both his ears were cut off, both his legs had seven deep cuts each, and his sex organ was mutilated. This Moro family’s farm is located in Lanao del Norte province, which is heavily affected by the ongoing offensive by government soldiers against Moro rebels.

Basilan Kamidon, in an evacuation camp in the province of Maguindanao, recounts how he and all the Moros in his village in the adjoining North Cotabato province had to scamper for safety in early August 2008 after fighting between soldiers and rebels erupted. They walked and waded the whole day through the swamps to find safety in a secluded area of the Liguasan Marsh. The elderly and children had to be carried on the back of some of the adults. The next day, they walked again till the afternoon to reach a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the town of Datu Piang, Maguindanao province. They joined one hundred thousand other IDPs who have to put up with inadequate food aid, diseases, hot and crowded makeshift shelters, and the longing to go back home. Basilan says some of his fellow villagers tried to go back but were shot at and driven away by soldiers and Christian militia members. At the moment, he and the others see no hope of going back.

Events leading to the war

Mindanao has seen major outbreaks of fighting between Moro rebels waging an armed struggle for their right to self-determination against the Philippine Republic. The latest outbreak between the forces of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) began in early August 2008. Ironically, the two sides were supposed to sign an interim peace agreement (2008 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 [MOA-AD]) in the same month.

As expected, both sides pin the responsibility on the other side for the breakdown of the ceasefire which has been holding for the previous five years. However, members of local civilian ceasefire monitors point to local Christian politicians in North Cotabato as engaging in attempts to incite or spark a big war between the government and the rebels as early as July 2008. According to these local monitors, the International-Monitoring-Team-brokered emergency agreement between the ceasefire committees of both sides to prevent a major breakdown of the ceasefire was sabotaged by civilian militias beholden to these politicians. The rebels were already pulling-out pursuant to that agreement when the militias fired at them, prompting the former to stay put. This provided an excuse for the military to launch an offensive against them.

Meanwhile, these politicians in tandem with their conservative but powerful counterparts in the nation’s capital were successful in scuttling the peace process through a well-coordinated disinformation campaign against the interim peace agreement. By pandering to Filipinos’ ultra-nationalist sentiments, they were able to generate widespread opposition among Christians against the agreement, forcing the government to abandon the product of eleven years of negotiations with the MILF.

Within a week after fighting broke out in early August 2008, there were almost one hundred thirty thousand IDPs. The military offensive carried on through the fasting month of Ramadhan and onwards such that by early October, the number of IDPs ballooned to almost four hundred thousand.  Although the frequency of encounters between the government and rebel forces has decreased, IDPs still number more than three hundred thousand individuals as of 27 January 2009. The bulk of these IDPs are in the Moro communities in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, and North Cotabato.

Pattern of violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws

International human rights and humanitarian laws that protect non-combatants in armed conflict situations from such acts as food blockades, summary killings, use of civilian communities as human shields have little impact in protecting the IDPs of Mindanao.

Vilma Mandi recalls how on the morning of 8 September 2008 her husband and five of her children died after their boat was fired upon by a plane of the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The boat was part of a convoy of boats carrying civilians who hurriedly left their village upon seeing planes hovering over it. A few hundred meters before reaching a safe area, a rocket from one of the planes hit the boat. The military claimed that the victims were combatants who fired at the planes, but five of the victims were only two to seventeen years old. Civilians, including the village chief, who saw the incident along the highway that morning belied the military claim.

Numerous village officials and residents of several Moro towns in Maguindanao say that houses (except those along the highway) have been torched by government soldiers. This problem occurred in Barangay (Community) Muslim in Guindulungan town, Barangay Pamalian in Datu Unsay town, Barangays Pusao and Tukanalipao in Mamasapano town, and Barangays Tapikan and Lapok in Sharif Aguak town, among other places. However, in the village of Pagatin, at least ten houses along the highway were torched allegedly by government soldiers during the Eid’l Fitr celebrations commemorating the Islamic Holy Month of Ramadhan. In Pamalian, where residents say three hundred of the four hundred houses were torched, even the rice mill was set afire by placing burning tires under the machinery. Residents and village officials say civilians are victims of retaliation as the burning of civilian properties usually occur whenever soldiers suffer casualties in the hands of the rebels.

The IDPs could not go back to their farms to forage for whatever was left of their crops due to continuing aerial and artillery bombings. For instance, on 10 December 2009, IDPs from Barangays Balanakan, Liong, and Alonganan in Datu Piang town trooped back to their villages upon the military’s assurance that there would no longer be any bombardment. But before they could even complete their return, those villages were bombed again forcing the IDPs to hurry back to the IDP camp. In another village in another municipality, IDPs trying to get back to their farms were simply shot at similar to what happened in Barangay Tapikan in Sharif Aguak town.

Further, the IDP camps are not always safe because they can get hit by artillery. They can be exposed to rebel attacks when soldiers, with their military vehicles and tanks, roam places where IDP shelters are located as in the towns of Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang and Piagapo. Residents note that soldiers move in among them when their detachments become vulnerable to attacks by rebels. They theorize that soldiers are using the civilians, some of whom are related to the rebels by family ties, as shields to deter the rebels from attacking. In case of attack, the civilians will be caught in the cross-fire.

Inefficient aid delivery adds suffering

IDP camps are mainly constructed by the IDPs themselves using light materials such as plastic sheets and coconut leaves. These makeshift tents expose them to unbearable heat and rain.

The available food aid (twenty-five kilos of rice per family per month) has not been able to sufficiently serve the needs of the IDPs. In January 2009, a man who set up a tent for his family along the road in Datu Saudi Ampatuan burned his tent out of frustration for failing to receive any food for months from humanitarian organizations. The system of delivering food has also caused the exclusion of some IDPs from receiving food. This happened in the case of an international humanitarian organization whose strict system of distributing food using food stamps excluded IDPs who could not get the stamps. Also, a faulty system of determining who deserve to receive the food stamps has been seen as a cause of this problem. In one documented case, one group of IDPs received food, while another group who were present during the food distribution failed to get any due to lack of food stamp. While in another case, some IDPs were considered fake IDPs and thus disqualified from receiving aid.

Crowded and ill-prepared camps are places for diseases to spread quickly. Without proper medical support, IDPs especially children suffer from the diseases. Journalists, in a fact-finding mission in five conflict affected areas in Mindanao in October 2008, noted the high number of deaths at the IDP camps due to treatable diseases. In Lanao del Norte town, eleven children have died since August 2008 due to diarrhoea. Yet this situation has not been noticed by an international humanitarian organization (International Committee of the Red Cross) operating in the camp, whose staff likely saw dead children being brought out to the burial grounds.

Recommendations

On the whole, disease, hunger, and death would have been a much bigger problem at the IDP camps if the international aid organizations had not given support. But there are serious issues on their services to address, as the IDPs clearly say. The following suggestions are thus offered to the international aid organizations :

1. Engage as partners in aid delivery the local NGOs with proven track records, which can provide appropriate information on the conditions on the ground.
2. Hold periodic validation of the number and location of the IDPs in view of the changing situation over time.
3. Hold direct consultation with the IDPs themselves for purposes of identifying gaps in aid delivery, complementing the coordination with the local social, political and administrative structures.
4. Organize the IDPs by camps and inform them of the grievance mechanism regarding aid abuse. The government guideline (NDCC Circular No. 18, Series of 2008) says that any complaint, injustice, wrongdoing, accusations, or criticisms relating to humanitarian efforts may be addressed to the Regional Disaster Response Coordination Desk.

The human rights situation of the IDPs require more intense efforts, and the following are suggested:

1. The international community should remind the government and rebel forces of their agreement to comply with international human rights and humanitarian law standards. Under the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, both parties obligated themselves to be bound by such standards.
2. The local and foreign civil society organizations should likewise call upon both parties to respect international human rights and humanitarian law standards.
3. The Philippine Commission on Human Rights should provide adequate resources for the investigation and legal aid work of its offices in the conflict affected areas.
4. Aid organizations should abandon their reluctance to fund human rights monitoring and legal aid services to victims.

In view of the bias of the international media in covering the situation of Christian IDPs in Mindanao (as in the case of IDPs in Kauswagan and Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte province), local and foreign aid organizations should pressure, or at least remind, the media outfits of their responsibility to be fair and to give sufficient attention to the plight of the Muslim IDPs in Mindanao. Lack of media coverage deprives the Muslim IDPs of the opportunity to generate public pressure against the continuation of the war.

These suggestions are merely remedial. A true long lasting and sustainable protection for the victims of the conflict is a successful peace process between the government and the rebels. A ceasefire will only offer temporary respite. Only by addressing the demands for the full respect for the human rights (i.e., self-determination) of Moro people can the people of Mindanao reasonably look forward to living in an environment of peace.

Zainudin S. Malang is currently an adviser to an international non-governmental organization providing medical aid to internally displaced persons in Mindanao.

For further information, please communicate with Mr. Malang through morolaw@yahoo.com.

There are more than seven million persons with disabilities in Japan. This is almost 6 percent of the total population, a much lower rate than that of the USA and European Union countries due to the difference in the definition of disability. Those with disabilities in Japan consist of three and a half million persons with physical disabilities, more than five hundred thousand persons with intellectual disabilities, and more than three million persons with mental disabilities. The number of persons with physical disabilities living at home increased from three million in 1996 to three and a half million in 2006, an increase of 18.6 percent while those who are 65 years old and over increased from more than one and half million in 1996 to more than two million in 2006, an increase of 39.3 percent reflecting the rapid aging of the Japanese population.

23.4 percent of persons with intellectual disabilities are in institutions and 11.7% of persons with mental disabilities are in mental hospitals while only 2.4% of persons with physical disabilities are in institutions. Based on the Basic Disability Plan (2003 – 2012), the government has been trying to promote the transfer of those in institutions and mental hospitals to communities by encouraging local governments and voluntary agencies to increase the number of care homes as well as attendant and personal care services in the communities.

But both central and local governments cannot afford to drastically increase funding to secure enough care services and care homes for all persons with disabilities who are ready to move from institutions/hospitals into the communities.

The government is now reviewing the current national laws and regulations for persons with disabilities in order 鍍o promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities,・and prepare for the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Employment of persons with disabilities

According to the most recent government statistics, out of a total number of 1.26 million persons with disabilities in Japan who are working, 240,000 are employed at sheltered or small-scale workshops (Table 1). And out of a total of around 1 million persons with physical and intellectual disabilities who are working, nearly half of them are employed at private enterprises or public sector while another half are self-employed or employed at family businesses (Table 2).

Table 1. Total number of persons with disabilities and employment rate of those who are working (2004) (in ten thousands)

Table 2 shows that around 93 percent of the total employees with disabilities are employed by private enterprises while only 7 percent are employed by the public sector. And among those employed by private enterprises about three out of four are employed by private enterprises with fifty-six or more employees, under the employment quota system.

And among employees with disabilities about one out of three have severe disabilities. This means that the employment quota system plays a key role in the employment of persons with disabilities, including those with severe disabilities in Japan.

Table 2. Number of persons with physical or intellectual disabilities who are employed at private enterprises and public sector (2003) (in ten thousands)

Legal measures

Japan started enacting a series of laws regarding persons with disabilities after the Second World War (Table 3).

Table 3. Japanese laws on persons with disabilities

The government aims to increase regular employment for persons with disabilities by leading them away from sheltered employment. There are two programs currently being implemented by the government: a) regular employment programs established under the Law Concerning the Employment Promotion, etc. for Persons with Disabilities, and the b) sheltered employment programs established under the welfare laws for persons with physical, intellectual and mental disabilities.

The central features of the government program for the regular employment of persons with disabilities are the a) employment quota system, b) levy and grant system for the employment of persons with disabilities, and c) vocational rehabilitation programs.

Employment quota system

The law governing the employment quota system penalizes employers who fail to meet the quota. Both private enterprises and public institutions (national and local governments) are required to comply with this employment quota system. Private enterprises that fail to meet the quota are required to submit a plan to employ persons with disabilities within a three-year period. Failing to submit the plan is penalized by a fine (200,000 Yen maximum), while neglecting to implement the plan is penalized by the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare who would expose this neglect to the mass media. Table 4 provides information on the situation of the employment quota system.

Table 4. Status of implementation of the employment quota system

As of 1 June 2008, private enterprises covered by the employment quota system maintain 1.59 percent, 0.21 point below the required legal quota, employment rate. Comparing the rates among private enterprises, large size private enterprises with at least one thousand employees have been making more efforts in the employment of persons with disabilities in recent years than the small size private enterprises, which used to employ higher percentage of persons with disabilities. Large size enterprises establish special subsidiary companies for the employment of persons with disabilities. As of 1 June 2008, two hundred forty-two special subsidiary companies employ around 7,700 persons with disabilities with more than 40 percent being persons with intellectual disabilities. While the special subsidiary companies increased the number of employees with intellectual disabilities, this system avoids their employment in regular company operations and can be criticized as against the concept of inclusion or mainstreaming.

Levy and grant system

The levy and grant system is intended to improve the level/rate of employment of persons with disabilities by collecting levies from those enterprises which fail to satisfy the employment quota and use the collected levies to financially assist (in various forms of grants) those who employ persons with disabilities. This is meant to support the economic burden accompanying the employment of persons with disabilities that requires the remodeling of the work facilities/equipments, special employment management, assignment of workplace attendants, and skill development. It should be noted that an employer who pays the levy is not exempt from the obligation to comply with the employment quota system.

Employers who employ persons with physical or intellectual disabilities beyond the legally required quota are entitled to adjustment allowances or rewards taken from the collected levies.

Vocational rehabilitation programs

Vocational rehabilitation services are provided to persons with disabilities by the Public Employment Security Offices (PESOs), the vocational rehabilitation networks operated by Japan Organization for Employment of the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities (JEED) and various other relevant organizations. Table 5 provides information on the services being provided.

Table 5. Institutions providing vocational rehabilitation services

The recent trend of vocational rehabilitation programs in Japan is the move from center-based group training program to community-based individual training program. From 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 over eight hundred job coaches provided vocational support services to around five thousand persons with intellectual or mental disabilities. This resulted in a success rate of over 80 percent of those who received such services keeping their jobs for six months or more.

Sheltered employment measures

There are two kinds of authorized work facilities, namely, the sheltered workshops established according to the Welfare Law for Persons with Physical Disabilities and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, and the welfare factories established according to the Law concerning Health and Welfare of Persons with Mental Disabilities. In addition, there are community-based, small-scale workshops established by voluntary organizations, including organizations of parents who have children with disabilities.

Table 6. Information on institutions involved in sheltered employment measures

As of October 2003, 2,425 sheltered workshops have been serving around 88,400 persons with disabilities. As of August 2004, 6,025 community-based small-scale workshops have been providing training and work opportunities to nearly 84,000 persons with disabilities.

With only about one percent of persons with disabilities finding employment in the open labor market annually, the sheltered workshops became employment places (instead of training facilities) for these people with an average wage in 2006 of about twelve thousand yen per month or less than one tenth of the minimum wage. The government intends to reorganize these facilities into time-limited transitional training programs with emphasis on placement in the open labor market, and non-competitive employment programs that cover those with and without employment contracts. Labor laws do not protect those without employment contracts, regardless of the period of work involved.

Conclusion

The current measures are laudable but still do not yet fully satisfy the needs of persons with disabilities who want and have the capacity to work. To facilitate higher employment rate, the following are recommended tasks that should be considered:

1. Promotion of various forms of employment and work friendly to persons with disabilities;
2. Development of the necessary support and environment to increase the opportunities for short-time work and work at home for persons whose capacities and types of disabilities suit these kinds of work;
3. Provision of support for the utilization of information and communication technology (ITC) for those working at home, taking into consideration the needs of persons with disabilities who have difficulty in commuting to the workplace;
4. Provision of support for persons with disabilities in creating or running new businesses. Likewise, provision of necessary measures (including facilitating financing start-up funding as well as marketing support) for persons with disabilities who are willing to create or run new businesses;
5. Promotion of human resources development for persons with disabilities, including the development of systems for their admission into general human resource development programs, ensuring that the programs consider the trends in employment needs relating to the development of service economy and information society, and ensuring accessibility to facilities where the programs are administered;
6. Promotion of commissioned training by various human resources development institutions, including private-sector institutions (enterprises and non-profit organizations, etc.) and other organizations; and
7. Provision of labor protection and income supportfor those who are working on a long-term basis at non-competitive employment facilities so that they can work and live in their communities as equal members.

These recommendations can be incorporated in the programs of the local governments for all categories of persons with disabilities, particularly through their “Municipal Government Basic Program for Persons with Disabilities,” that were supposed to have been adopted from 2007.

They can also be considered in the revision of the Japanese laws and regulations to comply with the principle of “reasonable accommodation” and Article 27 of the CRPD. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) has to prepare recommendations on how to adopt “reasonable accommodation,” defined as “necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Study of the American and British laws that already incorporate the “reasonable accommodation” principle, and consultation with organizations of persons with disabilities would be the important tasks of the MHLW in this regard.

Ryosuke Matsui is the Vice-President of the Japanese Society for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities.

For further information please contact: Japanese Society for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, 1-22-1, Toyama, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0052 Japan; ph (81-3) 5273-0796; fax (81-3) 5273-0615; e-mail: matsuir@m3.dion.ne.jp; www.dinf.ne.jp.

The Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute (BLHRRI) organized a two-day International Workshop on Current Buraku Issues on 31 July ? 1 August 2008 in Osaka city to"compare the historical experiences of Buraku people with similar experiences of other social minority groups in other cultures" that will"undoubtedly bring about important recognition of key issues surrounding the life of Buraku and other minority populations."

Presentations

The presentations were divided into four panels. The panel on “Social Mechanisms that Produce Minorities” dwelt on the Buraku discrimination, the caste discrimination in India, and the racial discrimination in the United States. Midori Kurokawa of Shizuoka University explained that the Buraku discrimination evolved as the Japanese society modernized, despite its legal prohibition as early as 1871. The persistence of Buraku discrimination, she asserted, was due to the drawing of an “innate line” between people who discriminate and the discriminated. The Buraku people assumed such “innate characteristics,” while people who were free of such characteristics were safe from discrimination “for the rest of their lives.” The Indian caste discrimination, according to Motilal Mahamallik of the Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, was based on people’s “affiliation to a certain community.” They were discriminated against certain types of access and opportunities in the society. He said that the Indian affirmative action or reservation policy has helped address discrimination and exclusion of Dalits in different spheres. John Davis Jr. of Michigan State University reported that the United States situation offered paradoxes. While the inclusion of an African-American, a woman and a Latino as nominees for the Democratic Party candidate for President was historical, it hid realities of continuing discrimination based on race and gender in American society. He, therefore, asserted that the suggestion of a post-racial or post-gender America was premature.

In the panel on “Changing Identities of Minorities,” Christopher Bondy of De Pauw University (U.S.) presented a case study of a small town where Buraku youth were helped in openly identifying themselves as Buraku. He said that his study showed how the Buraku youth learn toshare their identity openly within the confines of their “protective cocoon” - the home, school and the community. He also said that outside this area the Buraku students had to struggle to openly share their Buraku identity. Without trust being established, these youth hesitated to reveal their identity as Buraku. A study of Yugo Tomonaga, Ryo Yano and Maya Mori dealt with several case studies on Buraku communities and the Aborigines in Australia. They asserted that the Buraku existence had diverse characteristics, and its relationship with the non-Buraku community contributed to the diversity and uniqueness within the Buraku community.

The panel on “The Role of the Minority Middle Class” discussed the case of the anti-discrimination movement in Korea by the paekjong, a group similarly discriminated as the Buraku, in the 1920s.  Kim Joong-Seop of Gyeongsang National University (South Korea) reported that the successful campaign of the paekjong against discrimination was due in part to the role played by the middle class and the intellectuals in the paekjong community. The educated middle class intellectuals from the paekjong community led the movement’s efforts to abolish discriminatory customs, regain their communitarian fellowship, and lift their social status. Lee Kayoung presented the role of the middle class in a local community anti-discrimination group. He narrated the initial aloofness of the Buraku middle class to the group and the problems of the poorer Buraku members in Hinode community. But this gradually changed when the group began to take up middle class concerns such as tax and business alongside the poorer people’s concerns on education, employment and housing. The middle class in Hinode community began to take active part in the group. But with the government special measures alleviating the condition of the Buraku communities and creating new middle class, the middle class began leaving the community to have private homes instead of the public housing facilities. The community was left with the poorer members that somehow led to a stagnated anti-discrimination movement.

The last panel on other important issues related to Buraku discrimination discussed the problem facing women, and multi-culturalism in Japanese society. Nehema Misola of Western Visayas College of Science and Technology (Philippines) presented the case of a Buraku woman who was struggling to realize social equality for Buraku women. She reported that the woman was confronted with the traditional roles assigned to women at home and at work. But the woman continued to increase her capacity to pursue social equality for women by studying human rights. Risa Kumamoto of Kinki University presented the situation of women in the Buraku liberation movement. She pointed out that the discussion of women concerns within the movement does not relate to the “universal” problem of discrimination but to the peculiar problem of women. They are debated only within the Women’s Division of the movement. Because of this, she observed that the gender structure in the Buraku community could also be reinforced by Buraku discrimination. Buraku women are being “othered” by the Buraku movement, which is a male-centric structure, by confining them to the role of “mother” and to supporting roles in the movement. In this context, she observed that fighting for a more women-centered system within the movement’s structure could be considered a betrayal of the cause of the movement. Joseph Hankins, PhD candidate in Chicago University, studied the change in the way the Buraku issue was presented in the English literature and the funding support for Buraku studies. He noted the shift from the previous presentation of the Buraku issue as a “stand-alone issue to an issue that fits squarely in with other minority populations in Japan,” namely discussing the Buraku issue as part of the “otherness” concept in Japanese society. He also studied the record of the Japan Foundation regarding financial support for the study of the Buraku issue. He noted that in its thirty-six years of operation, only one grant on a graduate research on the Buraku issue had been given. A few previous research grants might have considered the Buraku issue as a component of the subjects of research (such as the concept of pollution in medieval Japan, multicultural education, and city planning). These grants were all given during the last five years. He observed that the Japan Foundation probably saw the discussion of the Buraku issue within the framework of multiculturalism as the proper way of “presenting” Japan. Finally, he studied a Buraku activist organization and also noted a shift from focusing on Buraku issue alone to using multiculturalism to relate to other minority groups in Japan and to using human rights as a basis for common action with other minority groups. All these contributed to the effort of debunking the view about the homogeneity of Japan.

For further information, please contact: The Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, 1-6-12, Kuboyoshi, Naniwa-Ku, Osaka City, Japan; ph (816) 6568 0905; fax (816) 6568 0714; e-mail: udhr@blhrri.org; www.blhrri.org.

A project supported by UNESCO and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under the first phase plan of action (2005-2009) of the United Nations World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) assessed the state of human rights education in the school systems of four countries in Southeast Asia.

Initially planned for five Southeast Asian countries, the project eventually covered Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand. The project implementation started, after more than a year of delay, with the establishment of national teams on human rights education (NTHREs) in each of the four countries and the meeting between the NTHREs and the Regional Project Team (composed of staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA and the Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development of the Faculty of Graduate Studies of Mahidol University).

The NTHREs were tasked to assess the state of policy support for human rights education in the school system and the extent of the policy implementation. This exercise was meant to lead to planning on improved human rights education within the school systems in the four countries involved.

Achievements

The full report^[1] on the project provides a summary of the results of the assessment of human rights education in the school systems in the four Southeast Asian countries. Some of the highlights of the summary are presented below.

A highlighted issue is on the role of the ratified international human rights instruments in the initiatives to teach human rights within the formal education system. The four countries involved have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). While Lao PDR has signed, the others have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Lao PDR and Indonesia have institutions (commissions/committees) that took direct action on human rights education as part of compliance with state obligation under the ratified international human rights instruments. As the report states

In Indonesia, the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) is using CEDAW in its Kurikulum Pendidikan HAM Ber perspektif Keadilan Jender (Human Rights Curriculum from a Gender Perspective).  xxx  xxx  In Lao PDR, the National Committee for Human Rights (which is tasked with implementing the state obligations under the ICCPR and ICESCR) has requested the MOE [Ministry of Education] to develop a supplementary curriculum and teaching-learning materials on human rights and child rights.

The ratified international human rights instruments were also included in either school curriculum or teaching materials. The report states that^[2]

In Cambodia, the Policy for Curriculum Development 2005・009 and the 2009 school curriculum have human rights content referring to UDHR, CRC and CEDAW. The Science and Social Studies learning areas discuss child rights (and human rights in general).

In Lao PDR, the MOE supported the “development of textbooks, implementation of a child-friendly school system, and teacher training, that focus on child rights under the CRC.” It also produced textbooks for primary and secondary levels that contain the provisions of ICESCR and ICCPR, teacher guides (Basic Knowledge of Human Rights, student textbook for Grades 4-6 and 8 for primary level, and Grades 9-11 for secondary level) that include discussion on ICESCR and ICCPR, and training manuals and children’s book focusing on child rights (Our Rights).^[3]

In Indonesia, the Ministry of National Education

... has promoted the provisions of CRC in several teaching materials (Panduan Pendidikan Hak Asasi Manusia Untuk Guru SD & MI, or The Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Elementary School and Islamic Elementary School) that were developed with the support of UNESCO.

Another government office in Indonesia, the Directorate General on Human Rights of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, produced the Pengantar HAM – 1, 2, 3 (Introduction to Human Rights – 1, 2, 3) that refer to the “ICESCR, ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW along with UDHR in discussing human rights issues (discrimination, social security, marriage, etc.).” It also produced “twelve human rights embedded religious education textbooks for pilot study of human rights education through the Islamic Education subject lessons for primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary schools and their equivalent level in the madrasahs.”^[4]

Human rights education has been integrated into the Moral-Civic education subject under the Social Studies learning area of the Policy for Curriculum Development 2005–2009 and the 2009 school curriculum in Cambodia, and the Citizenship education subject in the Standard of Educational Content of Indonesia. In Thailand, human rights are considered part of the objectives of education and thus to be integrated into Social, Religious and Cultural Subject Area, and in teaching methods.^[5] In Lao PDR, human rights are integrated in several subjects in primary and secondary curriculums in the General Knowledge subject (Lesson 46 for Grade 4 and Lesson 39 for Grade 5).

Supporting factors

Human rights education in the school systems of the four countries has the support of a number of factors:

1. National action plan on human rights ? this is the case of Indonesia that has adopted such plan since 2004 with provisions on human rights education.
2. National human rights institutions ? to some extent, the existence of national human rights institutions in Indonesia and Thailand has helped their respective Ministries of Education in integrating human rights into the school curriculum and in producing training and teaching materials on human rights
3. Support from international organizations and aid agencies ? the initiatives in Lao PDR, Cambodia and Indonesia have benefited from the support of UNESCO, international non-governmental organizations and the international aid agencies (Australian Aid for Lao PDR) particularly in developing teaching materials and implementing teacher training programs
4. Support from the local non-governmental organizations ? the human rights education initiatives in Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia have been strongly supported by their local non-governmental organizations.

Challenges

However, the four countries face challenges in ensuring the continuation of the human rights education initiatives as well as in making the current initiatives widely and effectively implemented nationwide.

1. Large classes that affect employment of appropriate pedagogies by teachers who have had training on these pedagogies
2. Limited training opportunities to cover all teachers in the country
3. Limited printed materials about human rights
4. Limitation of project implementation to a particular level or number of schools.

There are also institutional challenges that affect:

1. Consistent and sustained policy implementation
2. Provision of adequate supporting resources
3. Review and assessment mechanism.

The results of this project provide substantial bases for the governments of Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand in continuing the review of the current initiatives in order to develop a new national plan or program that can address the current limitations and challenges, and as further step in their achievements.

For further information, please contact: HURIGHTS OSAKA, PiaNPO, 3F, 2-8-24 Chikko Minato-ku, Osaka 552-0021 Japan; ph (816) 6577-35-78; fax (816) 6577-35-83; e-mail: webmail@hurights.or.jp; www.hurights.or.jp

Endnotes

1. Human Rights Education in the School Systems in Southeast Asia – Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand, 2009, published by the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center in cooperation with the Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development of the Faculty of Graduate Studies of Mahidol University.

2. Chin Yahan, “National Report on Human Rights Education in the School System of Cambodia,” in Human Rights Education in the School System in Southeast Asia, ibid.

3. Yangxia Lee and Somthavinh Nanthavong, “National Report on Human Rights Education in the School System of the Lao PDR.” in Human Rights Education in the School Systems in Southeast Asia, ibid.

4. Agung Purwadi, Philip Suprastowo, and Iskandar Agung, “National Report on Human Rights Education in the School System of Indonesia,” in Human Rights Education in the School System in Southeast Asia, ibid.

5. Suwitra Wongvaree, “Human Rights Education in the School System of Thailand,” in Human Rights Education in the School System in Southeast Asia, ibid.

Having ten countries in Southeast Asia working together in one organization is a feat, considering the history of failed efforts to unite. Security was the reason for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), while similarity of language and culture among the Malay peoples in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia was the pre-eminent justification for MAPHILINDO. But they both failed to continue. The idea of having another Southeast Asian organization of states arose with the Cold War at its height, the consciousness of freedom from the then world powers being promoted (particularly by Indonesia and Malaysia of the Non-Aligned Movement), and the need for the economic development of the subregion finding much support. Countries that had governments with authoritarian character, seen more particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, founded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Repression of political dissent and suppression of legitimate complaints by communities that suffered from "development projects" had been justified by national security and national development considerations. To its credit, ASEAN has started to discuss human rights during the early 1990s, and more than a decade later adopted human rights-related declarations and a Charter that provided for the creation of a human rights body. But in fulfilling this new interest in human rights ASEAN faces the hard realities of human rights violations affecting all countries of Southeast Asia at present. Hopefully, the forty-one-year experience as an organization has brought maturity to ASEAN in facing the human rights violations that deserve the resolve seen in its pursuit of economic development.

*Jefferson R. Plantilla is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deserves both commendation and rebuke for its work during the past four decades. In terms of human rights, ASEAN has much to be criticized for.

A newspaper editorial evaluates the forty-one-year existence of ASEAN in this way:^[1]

In a region laced with rivalry, a history of disputes, long standing suspicion and with no tradition of cooperation, ASEAN contributed to the maintenance of peace and the fostering of a regional framework.

As mutual trust grew, so did economic synergy in an area encompassing some 4.5 million square kilometers.

The combined gross domestic product of southeast Asia now reaches US$ 1,100 billion, with total trade valued at around US$ 1,400 billion.

In that respect, ASEAN has fulfilled its two primary purposes as stated in its declaration: To accelerate economic growth and promote regional peace and stability.

Cooperation in economic development underpinned most of the activities of ASEAN since its inauguration in 1967. It established from the very beginning numerous committees on different economic issues such as food and agriculture, civil air transportation, communication/air traffic services, meteorology, shipping, commerce and industry, finance, and tourism. At present, economic development is dealt with by a number of high-level officials through the Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers, ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, Senior Economic Officials Meeting, ASEAN Senior Finance Officials Meeting, and by numerous committees as implementing mechanisms.

Southeast Asia today still faces the challenge of overcoming poverty that affects a significant portion of its almost 600 million people and that exists side-by-side with the prosperity of its cities and in Singapore. As the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) reports:^[2]

Despite good economic growth in the ASEAN region, large disparities in development outcomes between countries remain. Especially stark are the differences in health, economic and IT [information technology] connectivity achievements. The child and maternal mortality rates of Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar, for example, are between 11 and 47 times higher than those of Singapore. Similarly, the GDP per capita and labour productivity of Singapore is on par with developed countries, and three times as high as that of the next ranking ASEAN country on these scores, Malaysia. The GDP per capita and labour productivity of the poorer countries, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam, is a mere tenth or less of Singapore's levels. The per capita use of mobile phones and the Internet in Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic is just one-hundredth of Singapore's use.

ASEAN Foreign Ministers refer to this situation as development gap among the countries in ASEAN, which they would like addressed through cooperation and integration.^[3]

In sum, there is still much to do in the economic development of ASEAN member-states despite decades of cooperation among the governments, their collective partners,4and the private sector. In order to "accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region" as the 1967 ASEAN Declaration states, UNESCAP argues for a change in the ASEAN system - from cooperation to integration. It believes that

[T]rue regional integration will require all countries to achieve minimum standards of economic and social development, guided by international[ly] agreed development goals and principles, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The benefits of social and economic development by ASEAN countries therein need to be shared. Similarly, the ability of future generations to meet their needs should not be compromised.

An integrated system is deemed feasible on issues such as investment and financial flows, trade integration, management of international migration flows, control of communicable diseases and their spread across the borders, energy security, information infrastructure, and transportation infrastructure.

On governance, UNESCAP observes a bleaker picture:

All ASEAN countries, for example, rank amongst the bottom half of all countries of the world on the ability of their citizens to select their government and to engage in freedom of expression and association. Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic rank amongst the bottom quintile of all countries on the effectiveness of their governments, rule of law and the control of corruption; the Lao People's Democratic Republic also does so on the quality of its policies and regulations. Myanmar, in the meanwhile, ranks among the bottom five per cent of all countries on all these dimensions; it is even last on "voice and accountability".

As the newspaper editorial further declares, ASEAN has not met the "fresh aspirations" of the current generation for "[B]older goals and more exacting standards" and which make "ASEAN now seem increasingly antiquated." It further states that the noble goal of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration of "ensuring social justice cannot be secured without deference to the social and political rights of all ASEAN citizens."

ASEAN integration has started with the agreement to implement a number of measures:^[5]

1.Signing of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007

2. Establishment of a Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN composed of Ambassador-level representatives to be based in ASEAN secretariat from January 2009

3.Creation of the High Level Panel on an ASEAN human rights body

4. Creation of High Level Legal Experts' Group on Follow Up to the ASEAN Charter (which will discuss the legal personality of ASEAN, dispute settlement mechanisms and other legal issues).

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers expected the convening of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers before November 2008.^[6]

The human rights situation in Southeast Asia presents a major challenge to the fulfillment of ASEAN's human rights plans.

Human rights issues in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia suffers from human rights violations that occur within states and across the border. Some of the problems relate to the colonial legal framework of the 1930s-1950s period and to the national security ideology of the 1960s-1970s period. And some remain in the current legal system as shown in the case of Malaysia. Laws in Malaysia restrict the exercise of constitutionally supported human rights with The Internal Security Act of 1960 as an example of a potent legal tool for suppressing dissent. Similarly in Singapore there are legal measures that restrict fundamental liberties as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Legal Restrictions on Human Liberties and Freedom^[7]

In the context of the significant extent of poverty in Southeast Asia, women suffer more than men due to limited access to health services, education, housing, financial services, and information. Discrimination and violence against women also figure prominently among poor women. The situation is more acute for rural women, including those who belong to ethnic minority groups.^[9]

Trafficking has accompanied the migration of people to countries within Southeast Asia. Poverty and also a host of other reasons (including problems within the family, attraction to life in the city, restrictions in the local communities) are the usual reasons for migration, which traffickers exploit. Trafficking of children, men and women has affected Southeast Asia quite extensively for a long period of time. A recent report describes the situation as follows: ^[10]

Within the ASEAN region, Cambodian children are trafficked to Vietnam and Thailand to work as street beggars, Indonesian women are trafficked to Malaysia to work as domestic workers, Laotian men are trafficked onto Thai fishing boats, Vietnamese women are trafficked through false marriages into numerous commercial sex industries, Burmese women are trafficked to Thailand to work as domestic workers.

Migrant domestic workers in Singapore and Malaysia who come from the Philippines and Indonesia report many cases of abuse at the hands of their employers.^[11]
Southeast Asia has a great number of child workers working at home as domestic help, in factories and other commercial establishments. They may migrate from rural areas to the urban centers, or cross the border to the neighboring country. These children suffer from^[12]

* Working in isolation and/or being confined to the premises of the employer;
* Long working hours; open-ended and ill-defined working hours; being "on stand-by" 24 hours a day;
* No regular break times or rest days;
* Limited or no opportunities for education;
* Vulnerable to ill health due to physical and mental exhaustion, emotional trauma, etc.;
* Trafficking into domestic labour;
* [Not] [b]eing allowed ... or limited contact with out- siders and their own families; no channels to discuss or alert others to their problems; and
* Denied their rights as children to special protection and care.

People living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIVs) in Southeast Asia suffer from discrimination. They are discriminated in the society, groups, and within their own family.^[13]Discrimination occurs most frequently within the context of health service. One survey of PLHIVs in Thailand and the Philippines shows the high rate of discrimination in the health sector at the point of testing, before they "knew they [were] HIV- positive . . . "^[14]The health personnel, without the prior consent of the PLHIVs, leaked out information on the positive test result. Some of the PLHIVs were forced or tricked into testing, and many were not given appropriate explanation on the test to be done. Discrimination continues during the treatment phase.

Press freedom remains under threat in Southeast Asia. While there are positive developments supporting "political and media reform towards a more open society ...the fight to protect and promote press freedom in this part of the world is far from won." As the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) reports:^[15]

the passage of laws on "national security" and Internet-related crimes in Thailand was a familiar theme in 2007 to all countries in Southeast Asia, from Vietnam to the Philippines and Malaysia to Laos. All carry implications for free expression and press freedom, particularly in the realm of new media where, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, many flashpoints on free expression are taking place. All highlight the uncertainties the Southeast Asian press will continue to face in the days, months, and years ahead.

Internal armed conflicts in the Philippines, and in southern Thailand, have resulted in humanitarian crises that spilled over to the neighboring country, Malaysia. Internally displaced people in the Philippines suffer as much as those who crossed the border to Malaysia, especially when the latter decides to repatriate these people who escaped from the fighting between the government forces and the rebel groups in southern Philippines. Similarly, the refugees from Burma/Myanmar along the Thai-Burma
border, and the Lao refugees along the Thai-Lao border, still face uncertainty and hardship.

The Burma/Myanmar situation remains a very grave issue in Southeast Asia.

There is also a serious problem of holding human rights violators accountable for their action. Inaction of government officials creates an environment of impunity. The slowness of the judicial systems coupled with weak political will of the governments to resolve human rights problems are serious impediments to the full respect for human rights.

ASEAN, as an organization, has hardly been seen as actively working on many of these issues.

Human rights standards

If ASEAN seriously considers addressing these human rights issues, there must be clear standards on which to base its actions. These standards are set internationally and should be applied to the Southeast Asian situation. There should not be ASEAN human rights standards, unless they are superior to the international human rights standards.

Such international human rights standards already exist, to a certain extent, in Southeast Asia. ASEAN member-states are parties to some of the core international human rights treaties. But out of eight core international instruments, only two have been ratified by all ASEAN member-states - the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Table 2 shows the status of ratification by the ASEAN member-states of the United Nations core international human rights instruments.

Table 2. Ratification of core international human rights treaties^[16]

Table 3. Ratification of major ILO conventions^[17]

Some ASEAN member-states have also ratified the major International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions as shown in Table 3. It is notable however that one convention (Convention 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948) has not been ratified by five ASEAN member-states, while Convention 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949) and Convention 111 (Discrimination [Employment and Occupation] Convention, 1958) have not been ratified by four member-states each. Only three members-states ratified all these major ILO conventions, while one member-state ratified only two conventions.

The 2000 Joint Communiqu・of the ASEAN Labour Ministers declares the ILO conventions as standards in protecting labor rights:^[18]

16.The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote working conditions in an environment of freedom and equality. On the worst forms of child labour, the Ministers reiterated their position that child labour should be eliminated as soon as possible but were of the view that the solution to the fundamental problem should be through education, technical assistance and other promotional activities. On the promotion of labour standards, the Ministers stressed that it should not be linked to trade issues and registered their concern that labour standards could be used for protectionist or other purposes which are not relevant to the objectives of the ILO. In this regard, the Ministers urged the ILO to assure that the promotion of labour standards should be carried out within the purview of the ILO and for the benefit of the workers, employers and governments of the Member States.

Workers rights, being human rights, are a proper concern of ASEAN in line with its economic development focus. The ILO conventions are significant standards in protecting workers rights in Southeast Asia.

Any action on human rights issues should be based on internationally agreed human rights standards. ASEAN has declared its adherence to the Charter of the United Nations as guiding principle in its operations, and has stated in its ASEAN Charter the principle of "upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States."^[19] The rules in a "rules-based ASEAN" should include international human rights standards.

The use of international standards is not alien to ASEAN. ASEAN's action in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and in 2004 on the Burma/Myanmar issue were based on the need to allow the people to decide on the political leadership in government as required by international law. Also, ASEAN "encouraged all concerned parties in Myanmar to continue their efforts to effect a smooth transition to democracy."^[20]

Multi-level human rights approach

ASEAN member-states have national institutions/committees/offices/agencies whose functions range from monitoring the realization or protection of particular rights to provision of services to human rights violations victims. Many of them have the mandate to implement state obligations under the ratified international human rights instruments.

While national human rights institutions have largely been highlighted in discussing national human rights mechanisms, the other off ices/agencies that should be given equal attention. In Southeast Asia, there are government offices that deal with the two major human rights instruments ratified by all ASEAN member-states (i.e., CRC and CEDAW). There are likewise judicial entities and "truth commissions" that address the issue of documenting human rights violations and providing a basis for holding the violators accountable.

These national mechanisms, with their limitations and weaknesses,^[21]should be supported or pressured into playing their part in human rights promotion, protection and realization. In the case of defunct bodies such as those related to the human rights violations in Timor-Leste by members of the Indonesian military and its Timorese allies, there are serious lessons to learn from a study of the laws that created them and their performance.^[22] Table 4 provides a list of such institutions, offices and judicial bodies that address different human rights issues.

Table 4. National institutions, offices and bodies with human rights functions

In addition to these existing mechanisms, there are a number of initiatives at the Southeast Asian level regarding particular issues (such as education, trafficking, child labor, HIV/AIDS, migrant workers) that involve ASEAN governments, non-governmental organizations and international organizations (such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, and UNESCAP). The ASEAN human rights structures should build on these experiences and be able to link and coordinate these initiatives to ensure the appropriate participation of the ASEAN governments.

Human rights mechanisms

The resolution of human rights violations, particularly those involving significant number of victims of violations perpetrated by the security forces and/or government agencies, require complicated and time consuming processes. Their resolution is best achieve at the national level where victims and perpetrators are found. Thus the national human rights mechanisms should be able to provide the means to hold human rights violators accountable and the victims protected, compensated or provided with other relief measures. In the same manner, these national human rights mechanisms should support measures that realize or fulfill the human rights of the vulnerable, disadvantaged and marginalized sections of society.

But when the national human rights mechanisms are ineffective or unable to provide the services expected of them, the victims should have recourse beyond the national borders. The ASEAN human rights body is one extra-territorial recourse, in addition to the United Nations human rights mechanisms. But the functions and powers, composition of members, and the corresponding secretariat and logistical resources to be provided to the ASEAN human rights body are still unclear.

The current activities among the existing national institutions, offices and bodies at the Southeast Asian level should continue and improve even more. Their initiatives on issues affecting children, women, and other vulnerable groups deserve full support. The involvement of the different government agencies in these Southeast Asian level initiatives (such as those on trafficking, child labor, migration, etc.) should be sustained and become more intensive over time.

Political will of the governments

The effective implementation of all ASEAN initiatives on human rights depends on the political will of its member-states. There are doubts on the political will of some ASEAN member-states when it comes to human rights issues. But this problem should not hinder the human rights initiatives within Southeast Asia. The ratification of the ASEAN Charter by all ASEAN member-states, and the adoption of several human-rights-related declarations should provide the legal bases for a serious approach to addressing human rights issues.

In this case, the support/pressure from the human rights community as well as other sectors is crucial in keeping the human rights mechanisms (at national and Southeast Asian levels) agenda on the ASEAN table.

ASEAN peoples and human rights

The first clause of the ASEAN Charter that states "WE, THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)" has a very significant meaning. It brings to the fore the primary object and subject of the document. This is almost an affirmation of the idea of "ASEAN citizens."

Will an integrated Southeast Asia also lead to a united people - the ASEAN citizens - who equally enjoy not merely economic prosperity but also social security and human rights?

Human rights are affected by the cultural, economic, political and social structures in any society. There are human rights issues in economic development measures that the ASEAN member-states undertake individually and as ASEAN. Many human rights violations occur in the context (and in a number of cases because) of economic development programs and projects. Many human rights violations occur due to undemocratic political systems. Equally notable are the social and cultural structures that traditionally lead to discrimination of sections of society.

"THE PEOPLES" of ASEAN have to have the power to take action to resolve these issues through, among others, the human-rights-rules-based structures that ASEAN should create.

For further information, please contact: HURIGHTS OSAKA, piaNPO, 3F, 2-8-24 Chikko Minato-ku Osaka 552-0021 Japan; ph (816)6577-3578; fax (816) 6577- 3583; e-mail: webmail@hurights.or. j p ; www.hurights.or.jp

Endnotes

1."ASEAN at 41," editorial, The Jakarta Post, 8 July 2008, in www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/07/editorial-asean-41.html

2.Ten As One: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN Integration, Bangkok: UNESCAP, 2007.

3."One ASEAN at the Heart of Dynamic Asia," Joint Communique'of the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 21 July 2008.

4. ASEAN has Dialogue Partners with whom it enters into agreements on a number of economic development projects. These Dialogue Partners are Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the United Nations Development Programme.

5.Joint Communique',op. cit.

6. Joint Communique',op. cit.

7. Based on Think Centre, "Singapore: Constitutional Rights" in http://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=2486

8. See Maria Socorro Diokno, "Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions in the Philippines, 2001-2006" in issue number 48 of this newsletter for more discussion on this issue. This article is also available in www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/048/05.html

9. See Report on ASEAN + 3 Human Security Symposium on Women and Poverty Eradication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Association for Human Rights of Women (Osaka: Association for Human Rights of Women, 2007), for more information on the situation of women in Southeast Asia.

10. Trafficking and Related Labour Exploitation in the ASEAN Region(Utrecht: International Council on Social Welfare, 2007) page 22.

11. See the Call For Regional Standard-Setting on the Human Rights of Migrants in An Irregular Situation and Migrant Domestic Workers - Appeal to the Asia-Pacific Forum issued by the Jakarta Process on 31 July 2008 in Kuala Lumpur about the need for standards on the human rights of migrants in an irregular situation and migrant domestic workers, available in www.komnasperempuan.or.id/metadot/index.pl?id=2927

12.Ayaka Matsuno and Jonathan Blagbrough, Child Domestic Labour in South-East and East Asia: Emerging Good Practices to Combat It(Bangkok: ILO-SRO Bangkok, 2005), page 34.

13. For a survey of the stigma and discrimination suffered by PLHIVs in the Mekong region see Baseline Survey of GIPA and stigma and discrimination in the Greater Mekong Region(Bangkok: POLICY Project and APN+, 2005).

14. AIDS Discrimination in Asia(Bangkok: Asia-Pacific Network of People with HIV/AIDS, 2004), page

15.15. Slipping and Sliding - The State of the Press in Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 2008), page 3.

16.The information in this table on the status of ratification of the human rights instruments is based on the information found in the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (www.ohchr.org). The international instruments shown in Table 2 are the following: ICERD - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR - International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights CRC - Convention on the Rights of the Child CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CAT - Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ICRMW - International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families CPD - Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

17. The information in this table on the status of ratification of ILO conventions is taken from ILO website (http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/lang-en/index.htm) accessed on October 2008.

18.See Joint Communique' of The Fourteenth ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting, 11-12 May 2000, Manila, Philippines, available in www.aseansec.org/8652.htm.

19.Article 2j, Principles, ASEAN Charter.

20. See Joint Communique' of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 29-30 June 2004, available in www.aseansec.org/16192.htm.

21.For an assessment of the Southeast Asian national human rights institutions see 2008 Report on the Performance and Establishment of National Human Rights Institutions in Asia(Bangkok: FORUM Asia), and available at www.forum-asia.org.

22.For a review of the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor see ELSAM's (Institute For Policy Research and Advocacy) Final Report: The Failure of Leipzig Repeated in Jakarta, as well as the Monitoring Reports for the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor in Jakarta, Indonesia by U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center and Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) in http://warcrimescenter.berkeley.edu. For the Indonesia-Timor Leste Joint Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) see the "Joint NGO Statement on the Handover of the Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship" (July 15, 2008). Also see TAPOL, http://tapol.gn.apc.org/statements/st080724.html.

A body that addresses the human rights issues in Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam poses a big challenge to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There are differences in the human rights situation among its member-states, and there is no common approach to human rights promotion and protection at the national level.

ASEAN Charter

The ASEAN Charter, now ratified by all ASEAN member-states, provides the following:

1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. (Article 14)

One can argue that the ASEAN Charter's broad principle of promoting and protecting human rights (Article 2 [2i]) should relate to the other principles that impact on human rights. The other principles in the ASEAN Charter provide at least the appropriate environment for human rights promotion and protection. Two principles are particularly related:

(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government;
xxx      xxx      xxx
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, which is tasked to determine the terms of reference for the operation of this body, faces the challenge of finding the appropriate mechanism that effectively serves human rights.

But what is an effective human rights body?

Proposals from the civil society

The civil society in Southeast Asia is made up of different formations and categories. ASEAN's roster of affiliated civil society organizations (CSOs) consists mainly of business groups and organizations on particular fields (various professions, and industries [shipping, furniture-making, tourism, mining, etc.]).^[1] These organizations are hardly heard on human rights issues. A few CSOs in the ASEAN roster have the capacity and likely mandate to raise human rights concerns such as the ASEAN Law Association (ALA), ASEAN Law Students Association (ALSA), Southeast Asia Regional Institute for Community and Education (SEARICE), Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP) Foundation, and ASEAN Confederation of Women's Organisations (ACWO). But they do not seem to have any involvement in human rights issues so far. One ASEAN - affiliated CSO (the Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia [AsiaDHRRA]), however, has been active in one network of NGOs lobbying the ASEAN on human rights issues.

At the moment, civil society proposals on the powers and functions of an ASEAN human rights body mainly come from three main CSO activity and groups: The ASEAN People's Assembly (APA ) , the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group), and the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN (WG on ASEAN).

The APA is supported by a network of strategic studies institutes in Southeast Asia (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies or ASEAN-ISIS) and is "among a number of non- governmental activities intended to enable the ASEAN peoples from various sectors in and out of government to discuss common concerns, to generate responses and solutions to these concerns, to build trust and confidence among the participants, to raise knowledge and awareness about ASEAN and its activities, and to contribute to community building in ASEAN." It has been holding its assembly since 2000.^[2]

The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism or Working Group, established in 1995, has the primary goal of having an intergovernmental human rights commission for ASEAN. It is a coalition of national working groups from ASEAN member-states that are composed of representatives of government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, the academe, and NGOs. The Working Group follows a step-by-step, constructive and consultative approach when it engages governments and other key players in the region. It submitted to the ASEAN senior officials in 2000 a Draft Agreement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission.^[3]

The SAPA WG on ASEAN, established in 2006, is a "common platform for collective action on ASEAN advocacy." It "respects and promotes the multiplicity of perspectives, strategies and forms employed by its individual members, even as it strives for specific unities in ASEAN-related advocacy and action.".^[4] It has a Task Force on an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism that serves as a "forum for Members to strategize on a human rights agenda for ASEAN, and to complement the work of the WG on an ASEAN HR Mechanism and national human rights institutions in ASEAN, etc."

The activities of APA, Working Group and SAPA are not exclusive to their respective "members." Their members attend each other's meetings. Collectively, they cover NGOs, the academe, government agencies (particularly the Ministries of Foreign Affairs), and national human rights institutions in Southeast Asia.

SAPA Working Group on ASEAN

The SAPA Working Group on ASEAN held its Second Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights on 3-5 August 2008 in Jakarta. The main agenda of the consultation was the collation of the results of national consultations regarding the terms of reference of the ASEAN human rights body.

The Jakarta consultation resulted in a submission to the High Level Panel on the establishment of the ASEAN human rights body. The submission proposes that the ASEAN human rights body:

1. Not only promotes and protects human rights but also fulfils them
2. Be guided by international human rights standards as well as by international labor standards and international humanitarian laws
3. Perform a number of functions such as
   1. Human rights education covering the officials/members of the "judiciary, police, military," government agencies, parliaments, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions, schools, universities, faith-based organizations, vulnerable groups and communities
   2. Provide advise on "national and regional policies and legislations in order to ensure synchronisation, harmonisation and compliance with international human rights laws and standards"
   3. Encourage reporting to United Nations human rights treaty bodies, and the ratification of international human rights instruments (including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)
   4. Promote the implementation of the ASEAN human rights-related declarations
   5. Assist ASEAN member-states in establishing national human rights institutions
   6. Initiate discussions on the establishment of an ASEAN human rights court
   7. Inquire on complaints of human rights violations cases in ASEAN member-states and urgently communicate its findings and recommendations to concerned ASEAN member-states for their action within a specified period
   8. Assess and review the general human rights situation in the ASEAN region
   9. In cases of widespread and systematic human rights violations, refer them to the ASEAN Summit as a serious breach of the ASEAN Charter under article 27(2) on non-compliance
   10. Request the suspension of the application of any legislative and executive steps that have created or may create blatant human rights violations such as the Internal Security Act or National Security Act
   11. Create mechanisms for the protection of human rights defenders based on the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders
4. Promote its work and mandate through civil society organizations, other relevant non-state institutions, and the media
5. Be constituted as a "Commission" and operate as an independent body similar to the mandate-holders of the United Nations special procedures and following the Paris Principles
6. Create sub-commissions on children, migrant workers, women, indigenous peoples, and others
7. Have members who have the integrity, impartiality, professionalism, commitment and competence in human rights. Representatives from civil society sectors, based on geographical and gender balance, shall be duly considered. The members shall act as independent experts, not representing any government
8. Serve as an overarching mechanism for all matters and conduct of the three ASEAN community councils.

High Level Panel

A High Level Panel (HLP), created by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, is currently in the process of consulting people in the different ASEAN member-states on the "powers and functions" of this human rights body. It has held meetings with members of the civil society and other sectors in Singapore (July 2008), Thailand (August 2008), and the Philippines (September 2008). The next monthly meetings will be held in the other ASEAN member-states.

The ten-member HLP is composed of representatives of the ASEAN member-states.

The SAPA submission requests that the HLP ensures that the "consultative process is meaningful and effective through appropriate procedures" and reaches out to the "widest sections and largest groups of peoples of society as much as possible at the national level through creative forms of communication that enable concerned peoples not otherwise able to participate directly in the process to register their views."

The Chairperson of HLP, Mr. Bilahari Kausikan, described the discussion among the HLP members during its first meeting:^[5]

Our discussions were held in a cordial and cooperative spirit. We aim to achieve a result that is realistic, balanced and credible, and which would be in the best collective interest of ASEAN. We all agreed that we are not starting on a blank page. ASEAN has a history of discussing human rights and the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on the ASEAN Charter had already achieved a fair degree of consensus on several issues. We will build upon the work of the HLTF, as well as ASEAN's previous agreements and declarations on human rights.

The core job of the HLP should be to propose a set of terms of reference of the ASEAN human rights body that apply the international human rights standards (even though many ASEAN member-states have not ratified most of the core international human rights instruments) to the Southeast Asian context. The extent of powers and functions to be proposed for such body remains to be seen. But the need for an effective ASEAN human rights body exists without doubt.

For further information, please contact: HURIGHTS OSAKA, piaNPO, 3F, 2-8-24 Chikko Minato-ku, Osaka 552-0021 Japan; ph (816) 6577-3577; fax (816) 6577-3583; e-mail: webmail@hurights.or.jp; www.hurights.or.jp

Endnotes

1. See www.aseansec.org/4986.htm

2. See www.asean-isis-aseanpeoplesassembly.net/about.htm

3. See www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html

4. See www.asiasapa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=76

5. Press Comments by the Chairman of the High Level Panel (HLP) on the Establishment of an
ASEAN      Human      Rights      Body     in
www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/press_room/press_releases/press_comments_
by_the_chairman_of_the_high_level_panel_hlp_on_the_establishment_of_an_asean_human_
rights_body

* Nobuki Fujimoto is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

HURIGHTS OSAKA organized a study tour to South Korea from 19 to 24 August 2008 to learn about the human rights situation of migrant women in that country and the initiatives of non- governmental organizations (NGOs) toward establishing multicultural co-existence in Korean society. The first HURIGHTS OSAKA study tour to South Korea was held in August 2007 with the same purpose, and included visits to government offices and NGOs in Seoul. For the 2008 study tour, the group visited two provinces and a city near Seoul.

As part of the tour program, the group participated in a symposium entitled "Asian Women and Family Change in the Era of Migration," organized by the Asian Center for Women's Study (Ewha Womans University) and in collaboration with HURIGHTS OSAKA and the Women's Study Center, Osaka Prefecture University.

Professor LEE Bae Yong, president of Ewha Womans University, gave the opening address at the symposium, while eight academics from Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Sri Lanka (all sending countries of migrant women), Korea and Japan (both receiving countries of migrant women) gave presentations on migrant women issues.

Ms. LEE Jae Kyung, Professor of Ewha Womans University and Ms. OISHI Nana, Associate Professor of International Christian University (Japan), gave the keynote addresses entitled "Love Goes to the Market?: The Meaning of Love and Intimacy in Migrant Marriage" and "Family Without Borders?: Asian Women in Migration and the Transformation of Family Lives" respectively.

The group went to a community in Ansan City, known as Borderless Village, which is considered to have the highest concentration of foreign migrants in South Korea. The group visited the Ansan Migrant Community Service Center, man- aged by the city government, and the Ansan Immigrant Center, a church-based NGO. The group learned from the two organizations about the involvement of local governments and many NGOs in the activities aimed at creating a society where ethnic and religious groups are able to live together in harmony.

The group also went to the provinces of Jeollanam-do and Jeollabuk-do to visit the Yeongkwang Women's Hot Line and Kunsan Women's Hot Line respectively, two of the twenty-six branches of Korea Women's Hot Line (KWHL). KWHL, as a women's rights activist group, tries to protect women from all kinds of violence, advance the women's social position as well as establish gender equality in the spheres of family, work, and society. Its program includes support for married migrant women and victims of domestic violence.

The staff members of the Kunsan Women's Hot Line brought the group to the ruins of former brothels where fires broke out in 2000 and 2002. The two fires killed nineteen women who were confined and forced to engage in prostitution by the brothel owners. The incidents ignited the anger of the women's groups and led to a lobby movement for the enactment of laws on sex trade. In 2004, the lobby led to the enactment of the Act on the Punishment for Intermediation in Sex Trade and Associated Acts, and the Act on the Prevention of Sex Trade and Protection of Victims Thereof.

For further information, please contact: HURIGHTS OSAKA, PiaNPO, 3F, 2-8-24 Chikko Minato-ku, Osaka 552-0021 Japan; ph (816) 6577-35-78; fax (816) 6577-35-83; e-mail:webmail@hurights.or.jp; www.hurights.or.jp

Minorities are usually defined as groups of people whose ethnic, linguistic or religious identity differs from the "majority" members of society. There are several such groups of minorities in Japan who have a history of being discriminated against in various forms.

Measures have been implemented to address the discrimination suffered by these minorities. Korean residents who arrived in Japan before the second World War and their descendants who were born and raised in Japan are given special visa status. Education about different cultures has been introduced in schools and public activities. "Ethnic" schools are also allowed, though they are not yet fully supported by the government.

The "Dowa Measures" were implemented to improve the physical condition of the Buraku communities.

New groups of minorities are becoming increasingly visible, particularly those based on sexual orientation and religion, which brings a new set of issues.

Whether old or new, the discrimination minorities face can be persistent; for minorities, the problem lies with the attitude of the majority.

Some members of minority groups may decide to avoid discrimination by simply refusing to be identified as a minority; others see the need to take pride in belonging to their respective minority group, which deserve the respect and protection of society as a whole.

There is still much to do to fully address the plight of minorities in Japan.

* This is a shorter and edited version of the article entitled "How We Perceive Present-Day Discrimination in Japan" that appeared in the Buraku Liberation News, 3rd quarter 2007, no. 145, pages 3-6.

**Kenzo Tomonaga is the Director of the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute.

There is a conventional belief about the Buraku problem in Japan; discrimination based on social class was practiced in pre-modern society, not in modern times. If such a problem exists in modern times, it is a mere legacy of the past and should have disappeared with the passing of time.

Pre-modern discrimination based on social class certainly does not exist anymore, as social practices have changed and the Japanese Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination.

However, discriminatory attitudes have not been eliminated. Discrimination continues to manifest itself in various spheres of daily life, including marriage. Despite improvements made through various measures, the reality of discrimination can still be seen in social life, education and employment in present-day Japan.

Presently, there is an even more serious problem of discrimination against the Buraku people in view of the following:

1. In 2002, the ending of the 1969 special measures to help alleviate the condition of the Buraku people
2. The current widening gap between the rich and the poor in the country
3. The stronger tendency among the people to support state power and maintain an anti-human rights opinion
4. The media's strong projection against the anti-discrimination movement and the Buraku people.

Persistence of Buraku discrimination

A series of scandals in 2006 surrounding the Buraku liberation movement and the administration of government programs on human rights/Dowa led to an unprecedented large-scale coverage by the mass-media of the Buraku problem. Most of the news coverages provided unreasonable generalizations that amplified the negative perceptions of the Buraku people, the Buraku liberation movement and administrative services for Dowa and human rights issues.

Recent studies by several local governments show that the Buraku people still face many problems regarding living conditions, education and employment. The general attitude of the public towards Buraku people has become more negative. There are malicious discriminatory incidents that continue to occur, such as:
- discovery of new Buraku List^[1] versions, including an electronic version
- propaganda and incitement to Buraku discrimination on the Internet (several perpetrators have been convicted of defamation in 　Aichi and Hyogo prefectures)
- cases of avoidance of the Buraku communities in the purchase of property and reorganization of school districts.

There is a shortsighted opinion that increasing inter- marriage between Buraku and non-Buraku people in recent years aided the resolution of Buraku discrimi- nation. What is missing in this opinion is the fact that behind this trend are many cases of engagements being cancelled and married couples facing strong opposition or rejection from relatives of non-Buraku spouses, for example through refusal to attend the wedding ceremonies. Furthermore, some couples have been prevented from associating with the relatives of non-Buraku spouses for many years even after having children.

There is also a problematic view that Buraku discrimination is being resolved with the move of non-Buraku people into public housing facilities in recent years (due to cheaper rent)^[2]< while some Buraku people with relatively stable income leave these facilities. This view fails to consider the fact that there is no assurance that those people who leave the Buraku community will not be subjected to Buraku discrimination. Private investigative agencies can be hired to check the personal backgrounds of people by illegally accessing the family registers to uncover whether or not they originate from a Buraku area. Also, some of those who have moved into Buraku communities move out when they discover that they are in a Buraku community. There is also the fear that, with the aging of the Buraku population, Buraku communities may attract increasing number of people with financial difficulties, causing further discriminatory attitudes towards Buraku residents from neighboring communities.

Discrimination against designated places

A survey conducted by the Osaka prefectural government of residents of the prefecture on their human rights awareness and attitudes reveals that more than 90% are aware of the Buraku problem. To the question regarding how people in general identify a person as Buraku, most respondents answered, "If a person lives in a Buraku area," "his/her relatives live in a Buraku area," or "his/her family record is registered in a Buraku area." These answers indicate that Buraku discrimination today takes the form of discrimination against designated places or districts that affect both the current residents and those with Buraku backgrounds who have transferred elsewhere. This explains the continuing illegal acquisition of family registers to check people's personal background.

Resolving the Buraku problem

The ways to resolve the Buraku problem are generally divided into two methods.

One method is to make the Buraku districts physically disappear and does away with teachings about the Buraku problem. The other method allows the Buraku districts to continue to exist and eliminates the discrimination against Buraku people (even if they openly identify themselves as having Buraku origin).

These methods parallel those prescribed to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities. In the first method, discrimination against people with disabilities can be resolved by getting rid of the disabilities themselves. This requires monitoring fetuses to detect disorders and subsequently aborting those found with disorders.

The second method does not aim at freeing people from disabilities, but at changing discriminatory attitudes against sabilities. It aims at removing all barriers in education, employment and daily living that restrict people with disabilities.

The first method aims to resolve the Buraku problem by stopping the Buraku liberation movement, dispersing Buraku districts, and imposing silence about the problem. However, the genuine solution to the Buraku problem rests with the second method, i.e., creating a society where nobody faces discrimination due to their Buraku origin even if Buraku areas still exist and people openly identify themselves as having Buraku origin. Indeed, this is the position taken by the Declaration of the Levelers' Association in 1922.^[3]

The first method conflicts with a number of factors:

1. Historical facts can never be erased, such as people who were called eta (extreme filth) and hinin (non-human) existed during the pre-modern period, the National Levelers' Association was founded and their Declaration was adopted in March 1922, the Cabinet Dowa Measures Council made its report in August 1965 and the Law on Special Measures for Dowa Projects was enacted in July 1969, followed by various projects taken under the law.
2. Although residents in a community change, the Buraku districts themselves do not disappear.
3. The Japanese traditions of returning home during the New Year holiday and visiting ancestors' graves during the bon festival are still strongly followed. Thus people's own communities have to continue existing.

The individual's decision on this issue must be respected. Therefore, a person's commitment to his/her Buraku identity must be respected, just as a person's decision not to identify with his/her Buraku origin must also be respected.

Requirements for future eff o rts towards the solution of the Buraku problem:

Based on the provisions of the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), there are five requirements for the future efforts to resolve the Buraku problem.

1. Prohibition of discrimination by law
   Discrimination is a cruel and antisocial action that can drive people to commit suicide. Marriage discrimination in particular has led to the suicide of many young Buraku people. Many people have also suffered mentally. Buraku discrimination must therefore be prohibited by law, as there is currently no law prohibiting discriminatory behavior and acts against the Buraku, Japan must urgently ban discrimination by law with reference to ICERD and related laws of other states.
2. Effective compensation for victims of discrimination
   Discrimination causes significant damage to those subjected to it. Compensation to the victims of discrimination is therefore required. While the court is the ultimate institution that can award such compensation, resorting to any court process requires money and a long period of waiting for the judgment. Also, those who file complaints in court suffer again as they testify on the damage they suffered as a result of discrimination. These factors mean that many people would not go to court to seek redress, and instead bear the discrimination in silence. An independent and expert human rights commission is therefore required to allow victims of discrimination to seek compensation through means other than court proceedings. Japan does not have such an institution. A law prescribing compensation for damages caused by human rights violations and creating a human rights commission is urgently needed.
3. Improvement of the poor living conditions through special measures
   Buraku areas traditionally suffered from very poor conditions that affected their capacity to get employment - very few jobs were offered and were not regular jobs. Due to poverty, many people found it difficult to give their children the basic education (primary and junior secondary education) they needed. This was the result of discrimination against the Buraku people that was not resolved under the then ordinary or general measures of the government. This situation was the reason for the implementation of a series of special measures under the special measures law of 1969. These special measures were necessary to eliminate discrimination. However, the special measures were not limitless, and the law lapsed as soon as its objectives were achieved. The special measures for the Buraku areas ended in March 2002. Subsequent improvement of the actual conditions of discrimination should be made under the general measures of the government.
4. Elimination of discriminatory ideas through education
   Discriminatory ideas do not disappear by themselves. Such ideas are transmitted from person to person as part of people's daily routine. Because of this, efforts are required to wipe out such ideas through education and awareness-raising. These efforts should take advantage of the United Nations World Programme for Human Rights Education (launched in January 2005) at the international level, and the 2000 Japanese Law Concerning the Promotion of Human Rights Education and Awareness-Raising. Human rights education and awareness-raising must be promoted in Japan.
5. Harmonious living with mutual respect for identity
   Apartheid, which once existed in South Africa, was an overt form of discrimination. The assimilation policies that pre-war Japan imposed on the Korean population during its colonial rule (for example, the enforced use of Japanese language and visits to Shinto shrines) also constituted clear discrimination. In efforts to eliminate discrimination, each group must respect other groups' identities (such as their history and culture) and live in harmony and solidarity. To this end, initiatives for community building involving Buraku districts and neighboring communities are essential for the full realization of the human rights of all people.

For further information, please contact: The Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, 1-6- 12, Kuboyoshi, Naniwa-Ku, Osaka City, Japan; ph (816) 6568 0905; fax (816) 6568 0714; e-mail: udhr@blhrri.org; www.blhrri.org.

Endnotes

1. The Buraku Lists refer to lists of Buraku communities and their residents, which were used by private companies in checking the personal background of job applicants.
The purpose of the lists was to help the private companies avoid hiring Buraku people.

2. The expiration of the Dowa Special Measures Law in 2002 led to the adoption of public housing regulations that only those with low income can occupy public apartments. The new system requires rent for the apartment to be determined according to household income.

3. This is the Suiheisha Declarationof 1922, visit http://blhrri.org/blhrri_e/blhrri/ebooks001.htm for the full text of the declaration.

*Mr. Sam Shoushi is an incoming senior in Middlebury College (USA) and 2008 summer intern in HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Hikage(meaning shadow) is one of the words used in describing the situation of sexual minorities^[1] in Japan. Compared to other countries, Japan is more accepting of its sexual minorities. Nevertheless, they face many issues that remain in the hikage, largely ignored by the mainstream society and even by the sexual minorities themselves.

Sexual minorities in Japan

A Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community exists, and continues to grow, in Japan. "Gay Areas" are found in various parts of the country with Shinjuku ni-chome in Tokyo, and Doyama in Osaka as the most well known. "Gay Groups" such as the Japan Association for the Lesbian and Gay Movement (popularly known as Occur) and MASH (Men And Sexual Health), an HIV information center with a community space called dista, exist along with other groups that support sexual minorities. Members of the sexual minorities and other individuals who do not necessarily belong to the community support Pride Parades, Film Festivals and other events held every now and then.

Interviews with members of the community and people who visit the areas and join the events reveal the absence of serious issues facing sexual minorities in Japan.^[2] Several people who were interviewed said that they were more or less satisfied with their lives at the moment and that there were "no major difficulties in being gay in Japan."

Japanese culture and the major religions in Japan do not have a history of hostility towards LGBT people. Japan is not usually described as "homophobic" (or anti-gay/homosexual).^[3] "Pre-modern" Japan (till mid-19th century) has a history of tolerance towards same-sex sexual conduct and relationships (mainly between males).^[4]

The political and social reform of the Meiji period (1868-1912) started the prejudice and discrimination against LGBT people. Thoughts and structures introduced, encouraged, and standardized through modernization made the male-female (heterosexual) model for families and relationships a norm in Japanese society.^[5]

Origin of LGBT Discrimination in Japan

Futsuu in Japanese means normal. And a futsuu lifestyle usually means that one settles down by getting married and having children. In general, sexual minorities do not (and often cannot) follow this lifestyle; they often do not have heterosexual relationships, they are not privileged with the right to marry their same-sex partner, and most couples do not have children. Not belonging to the futsuu (normal) lifestyle makes one futsuujyanai (abnormal) - a word usually used by the mainstream Japanese society to describe sexual minorities. Other expressions such as okama (literally means pot, but used as derogative word for male homosexuals), kimochiwa rui (uncomfortable/disgusting), and seidouitsuseishougai (an official medical and legal term for Gender Identity Disorder but considered controversial when used in some situations, particularly when generalizing all LGBT members) are also used in society when referring to sexual minorities.^[6]

Some LGBT people choose to live the "normal" lifestyle but eventually find themselves living two "lifestyles" at the same time. Actually, it is said that a lot of LGBT people in Japan are "heterosexually" married but secretly, some openly, go to "Gay Areas" or have same-sex partners outside their marriage. This rigid social system creates a problem because it can force people to live double lifestyles; the normal lifestyle expected by society, and the homosexual one, usually kept discreet in the hikage to avoid discrimination from society.

The Japanese government notes the problem posed by the concept of futsuu when it states that Since homosexual and bisexual people are of a minority there is a tendency for them not to be considered normal and they may even be forced out of their workplaces. Although discrimination based on such sexual preferences is acknowledged as unjust these days, prejudice and discrimination have still been taking place, and, therefore, it is necessary to carry out human rights promotion activities to protect the rights of homosexuals and bisexuals.^[7]

Discrimination against LGBT People

A person identified as abnormal in society is usually discriminated against. The portrayal of LGBT people in Japan as abnormal is perpetuated through the ignorant and derogatory comments used in the mainstream Japanese society and reinforced by the mainstream Japanese media. Different Japanese television programs and shows present, or rather misrepresent, sexual minorities. Most of these representations are limited to cross-dressers who are shown for the irony and the laughs. Although efforts to diversify LGBT representation in the Japanese media exist, many of the characters being showcased still misrepresent and offend many members of the sexual minorities community.^[8]

Discrimination at school and work are also present in Japan. Although people interviewed for this article are not the main victims of such discrimination, there are anecdotes of LGBT people being bullied at school or experiencing tension at work. Moreover, many LGBT people, including the ones interviewed, are not "out" at their school or workplace; some are afraid of discrimination, and others are simply unwilling to bring aspects of their personal lives to such environments. This decision to "stay inside the closet" or decide not to reveal sexual identity reflects the common experience among minorities in Japan who have the possibility of "passing off" as "mainstream Japanese", such as the Korean residents and members of Buraku communities, in order to live as members of the majority.

Accommodation is another issue for sexual minorities in Japan. Although there are no discriminatory policies toward LGBT people seeking accommodation, individual landlords might discriminate against them. A famous example is the Fuchuu Youth Hostel case in 1997. The Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education, which manages the hostel, argued that it was against their policy to allow LGBT groups to use the facility. Occur, the gay and lesbian group, sued the Board and won the case.^[9] Since then, this example has been used to signify change in discriminatory attitude towards LGBT people seeking accommodation. But this changed attitude has yet to spread in the different parts of the Japanese society.

Inheritance is another issue mainly concerning same- sex couples. Since same-sex marriages are not permitted in Japan, homosexual couples are deprived of legal rights and protection provided to their heterosexual counterparts. Some members of the LGBT community have dealt with this issue through the adult adoption system that permits an older person to adopt a younger one who is over twenty years old. Although this method grants inheritance rights to the couples, this option nevertheless implies a form of discrimination against sexual minorities in Japanese society.

Issues inside the LGBT community

Several issues arise from within the LGBT community itself. This occurs when people attempt to define the community. Who represents the sexual minority community and who does not? What are the community's rights and obligations? What should or shouldn't it be active in, etc. In between asking the questions and answering them, voices of some groups and individuals are lost. Another hikage veils people within the sexual minority in Japan who are ignored and marginalized in their own community.

Those who express satisfaction in living their life as LGBT have the means to do so. Socially, they are able to break through the heterosexual social structure and enjoy their life as LGBT. They have access to places where most of the members of the community gather and hold their activities. They also have the financial means to meet the groups, participate in the events and activities, and obtain relevant information. This situation does not cover those who have less economic means and social connections to enjoy life as LGBT, and whose plight is ignored whenever the more visible members of the community express the view that there are no difficulties in being gay in Japan.

Most of the gay-oriented areas, groups, and activities in Japan cater to the male members of the community. This situation marginalizes the women members of the community, especially since they are generally economically disadvantaged compared to their male counterparts. Worse, while men's groups often receive funding from the government for HIV research and sexual health services, women sexual minorities are disqualified from receiving such subsidies and financial aid because they are not considered the main victims in this matter.^[10]

Bisexuals and Transgenders constitute other groups that are ignored in the discussions about sexual minorities. While the growing gay rights movement in Japan has been a driving force in promoting sexual minority rights and awareness, it is often criticized forexcluding bisexuals and transgenders. The "Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade" title was criticized for ignoring sexual minorities who are neither lesbian nor gay. Thus it was changed in 2007 to "Tokyo Pride Parade.^[11] The use of binary categories also excludes those who do not belong to any of the categories. Thus the change of the "male or female" category into "homosexual or heterosexual," "gay or lesbian" marginalizes and ignores sexual minorities who do not belong to these categories.

The activists for sexual minority rights are a minority inside the minority. Not all LGBT people fully appreciate the efforts of the activists. In fact, most of the objections to sexual minority rights activism come from within the LGBT community. This happened when members of the sexual minority community objected to holding the Kansai Rainbow Parade in Osaka.^[12] Many consider LGBT activism, which presents the community and its issues to the public, as aggressive and unappealing. Moreover, many in the community, especially people who feel comfortable with being a sexual minority in Japan, believe that the efforts of activists are not only unnecessary, but also harmful, causing more discrimination against, and segregation of, the community.

LGBT issues as national concern

Legal provisions on non-discrimination (from the Constitution, to national laws and local ordinances) in Japan do not yet explicitly cover sexual orientation issues. On the other hand, the court (at least in one case) ^[13] and the government, on the other hand, recognize the right against discrimination of people with a certain sexual orientation.^[14]

Measures of the Japanese government regarding education against discrimination (which include education on sexual minority issues^[15]) have hardly been seriously implemented. And the conservative perspective within the Japanese educational system prevents discussion of the rights of sexual minorities.^[16]

Moreover, there are several issues such as sexism, heterosexism, and the gender binary system that have rarely been dealt with by the government. These issues affect not only sexual minorities, but also people (especially women) who live "alternative" lifestyles (such as opting to live together without getting married or opting not to have children). The issues faced by the LGBT people in Japan should not only concern members of the sexual minority and those who have "alternative lifestyles," but of the Japanese society as a whole.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

Endnotes

1. In this article, 'sexual minorities' encompass Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) people.

2. On 25 March 2008, the author interviewed sixteen people, eight of whom consider themselves as members of the LGBT community.

3. Interview with Hibino Makoto, one of the organizers of the Kansai Queer Film Festival (website: http://kansai-qff.org/)

4. Dean Poland, "The Beautiful Way" in Kansai Time Out, February 2008, Osaka.

5. Ibid. Gay studies use the word "heteronormative" to describe a society which upholds the belief that there are only two sexes - male and female, and that a certain set of behaviors and expectations follow from one's sex. See Derek Leschas, Heteronormativity, in http://io.uwinnipeg.ca/~taylor/Heteronormativity.htm

6. Refer to note 2.

7. See Ministry of Justice, Human Rights Bureau in www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/HB/hb-03.html#3-13

8. Mark McLelland, "Male Homosexuality and Popular Culture in Modern Japan", Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian ContextIssue 12, January 2006.

9. Interview with Shingo Iizuka, Occur staff member. (www.occur.or.jp/)

10. Mark McLelland, Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age, Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2005.

11. See http://parade.tokyo-pride.org/6th/english/

12. Interview with Akeyoshi, one of the organizers of the Kansai Ranbow Parade (www.kansaiparade.org/)

13. See Hiroyuki Tanaguchi, "The Legal Situation Facing Sexual Minorities in Japan", Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context Issue 12, January 2006 in
http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue12/taniguchi.html

14. See note 7. Japan's White Paper for Human Rights Education and Awareness Raising(2007) mentions educational measures regarding sexuality and sexual minority.

15. See the 2002 Basic Plan for Human Rights Education and Awareness Raising of the Japanese government, and reported by the Ministry of Justice in its annual white paper on human rights education (note 14).

16. Interview with Kagida Izumi ("Bubu"), a staff member of dista community space (www.dista.be/)

*Christeena Song is an incoming third year student at Emory University (USA) and 2008 summer intern in HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Muslims in Japan have widely retained their sense of religious and cultural identity and have generally been established as members of Japanese society; however, the Japanese public must continue to accept these religious and cultural differences in order to maintain a functional society in which the rights of all people are protected.

Muslims in Japan

There are an estimated 70,000 Muslims in Japan, out of which 90% are male resident foreigners coming mainly from Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran and Bangladesh, and 10% are Japanese.

Many of the Japanese Muslims are women who converted to Islam through their marriage to Muslim men.^[1]Muslims in Japan often encounter the problem of findinghalalfood products that are permissible according to Islamic law. These products usually exclude pork, alcoholic beverages, and also refer to the method used in animal meat preparation. Women, both foreign Muslims and Japanese Muslims, also face the issue of wearing the hijab, a cloth cover that covers different amounts and areas of the woman depending on individual interpretation, teachings, cultural backgrounds, etc.^[2] Though there have been several instances of harassment towards Muslims in Japan,^[3] it appears that these incidents are gradually decreasing through time.

Mosques and the Media

As mosques are the only places that are exclusively for Muslims, mosques in Japan play a vital, multi-purposed role. A hundred years ago, there were only two mosques in Japan, now there are around forty. As both land and construction is expensive in Japan, many office and residential buildings are converted into mosques, usually with a separate place reserved for women and children.^[4]Mosques are used not only for congressional prayers, but also for social gatherings.

During Ramadan, the month of fasting, many Muslims come to the mosques in order to celebrate with their fellow Muslims. Mosques are also used to hold Islamic study sessions and weddings, with space for offices and places for relaxation. Mosques are places where Muslims can gather, worship, and socialize, though not all Muslims go to mosques. Other than information distributed by mosques and Muslim Associations,^[5] the majority of information on the Islamic world the Japanese public receives is through the mass media. After the September 11th tragedy, which killed twenty-four Japanese citizens, the relatively indifferent Japanese perception on Islam has become tinged with fear.^[6] More than ever before, it is imperative to separate the media's cloudy political influence from real experiences of the human heart.

Going Mainstream

Muslims in Japanese society face no particular mal- treatment, as all foreigners in Japan must deal with similar forms of discrimination. As it is with many societies, those who adapt to a new society's way of life are far more likely to be accepted. Japan is no exception; most Japanese people do not have a particular discriminating attitude towards Muslims. However, those who openly bring their religion to not only the public, but also their work place, may be faced with cultural barriers. Though these incidents are rare, they still present a problem for practicing Muslims. Especially in the work place, devout Muslims who pray five times a day for ten-minute intervals will find it difficult to fit into a culture in which constant hard work is expected and highly valued.^[7] Though this may be a source of discomfort for some, many Muslims have found ways to compromise by making up prayers after work that may have been missed during work hours. Liza, an Indonesian Muslim studying at Kyoto University, says that many practicing Muslims can "collect" prayers that have been missed during certain parts of the day or night. In this way, many Muslims have managed to adhere to both Japanese and Muslim lifestyles.

Many Japanese Muslim converts may find it difficult to conform to strong cultural expectations while simultaneously fulfilling their religious duties and rules. The Islamic faith prohibits the consumption of alcohol and pork which conflicts with behavioral expectation at Japanese welcoming parties or end of the year festivals. Many Muslims state that when given an explanation, their colleagues politely accept this refusal of alcohol.^[8] However, there are wide ranges of individual experiences regarding religious rules; some Muslims have met with understanding, others have met with criticism. The Japanese public must accept these differences in order to create an understanding society which functions with little friction between diverse groups. Generally, it appears that these problems are becoming less severe and may eventually be obliterated all together. Ali, a college student at Tenri University, has met with largely positive responses regarding his religious duties. His friends at Tenri University respect his reasons for refusing alcohol and even point out certain Japanese foods that arehalal so that Ali may know which foods are safe.

Adapting Inside and Out

Though Islam is not the predominate faith in Japan, there are many restaurants, grocers, food servers, and catering services which serve both imported and local halal food. There are several websites that list the location, contact information, and the owners of specific areas where Muslims may find halal food suppliers. Through this growing availability of halal food, Japanese society is showing an adaptation to Islamic laws and what society has not yet managed to provide, individuals have made their own adaptations. Khalida, a Japanese woman who married a Muslim and converted to Islam, personally feels that there are no problems within her new lifestyle, finding it easy and enjoyable. Khalida packs a halal obento for her children, as public schools do not yet provide halal lunches. In the near future, it is probable that Japanese schools will begin to see the need to adjust to this growing demand for religiously acceptable food and eventually supply this demand. It is important to understand that many Muslims are flexible; Ali feels that it is acceptable to buy meat from local supermarkets, as there are a limited amount of halal shops and none in his area. Ali says his own blessing for his food and by doing so, still adheres to his religious beliefs. Muslims who live in convenient locations can purchase food from halalshops and Muslim Associations scattered around Japan that also supply halal food . The degree of adaptation differs for each individual. Liza wears her hijab wherever she goes, even at the hotel where she used to work, and has met with very few unfriendly encounters. Other Muslim women pre- fer to wear their hijab only during prayers at their respective mosques; these differences in adaptation and interpretation are what make Islam a diverse, accepting, and accommodating faith.

Obstacles in Daily Life

It is difficult to surmise experiences of the entire "Muslim Community" in Japan, as there are several ethnic groups, nationalities, religious divisions, sects, languages, and economic backgrounds, among others within this community, with no major, leading group.^[9] However, throughout the diverse range of community characteristics, there are issues and barriers that many Muslims have encountered and may continue to face in the future. The direction and implication of Japan's treatment of foreigners rests in the hands of today's students, parents, workers, and all those who consider themselves a part of the fabric of Japanese society.

Imam Mohsen Shaker Bayoumy who came to Japan after studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo in order to be the Imam of the Kobe Muslim Mosque, pointed out the severe issue of graveyards. Japan has two Muslim graveyards, one in Kobe and one in Tokyo. The Tokyo graveyard is a private graveyard, belonging to the Japanese Muslim Association. The graveyard in Kobe was given to Muslims by the government under the agreement that only Muslims from Kobe may be buried there. As the population grows and becomes older, burial is becoming a greater issue, as Islamic law decrees that Muslims must be buried in a certain way, which is vastly different from the traditional Japanese burial. Other than the problem of burial, the Imam feels that there are few problems living in Japan as a foreign Muslim and encourages Muslims not to isolate themselves from society in an effort to integrate themselves into whatever culture they find themselves in. The Imam feels that it is important for Muslims to become strong members of the community so that they may feel less lonely in a country where they are the minority.

Other Muslims in Japan face far more direct problems; Iman, a woman of impeccable grace and dignity, says that anyone can be a Muslim anywhere, in any society; however, she has met with difficulties in the work place. As a devout Muslim, Iman wears her hijab everywhere. Though she has every right to wear her hijab, it has caused her difficulty in finding a job; there have been situations where she found a satisfactory occupation, but was not hired merely because of her hijab. However, Iman's troubles at work have not deterred her from her faith. Iman explains that many Japanese women who have Muslim boyfriends, fianc駸, or husbands come to the Kobe Muslim Mosque in order to receive advice and guidance. Iman is a pillar for these women, giving them advice on how to have a fulfilling relationship or supporting them through their problems and troubled times. Members of any community are welcome at Kobe Muslim Mosque; those who feel that they can no longer face their difficulties alone may come to the mosque in order to receive support, aid, and strength. Iman cherishes a hope that one day, her fellow Muslim sisters will be able to choose to wear their hijab to work without fear of rejection or judgment. Wearing the hijab is not so much considered a religious duty, but rather a personal choice, an aspect of freedom, and a right as a human being.

Conclusion

Though there are few Muslims in Japan, today's Japanese public has generally accepted them as members of Japanese society. For the most part, Japanese people have accepted their cultural differences as colorful aspects of the world and have understood that these cultures are actually not very different from their own. Mothers such as Khan, a Japanese woman who married a Muslim, lived in Pakistan for several years, and has three children, are not very different from the other Japanese mothers. Khan is very fashionable, with her flowery pink and white hijab and long, dangly earrings; people who have met Khan enjoy her energetic company and embrace the life that she has chosen. It is this understanding, this openness, and this innate compassion that is essential in fighting for the rights of all people and the preservation of human dignity.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes

1.Sakurai, Keiko,  "Muslims in Contemporary Japan" in Asia Policy, 5, 2008, 69-87.

2.Hopfe, Lewis M. and Woodward, Mark R., Religions of the World, 10th edition (Prentice Hall PTR: 2006).

3.Penn, Michael, "Islam in Japan: Adversity and Diversity" in Harvard Asia Quarterly, 10/1, 2006.

4.Ibid.

5.See for example the website of Yasuragi (www.yasuragiweb.com/about_eng.htm), a monthly Islamic magazine in Japan that provides information on Islamic faith in Japanese language.

6.Penn, Michael "Public Faces and Private Spaces: Islam in the Japanese Context" in Asia Policy, 5, 2008, 89-104.

7.Ibid.

8.Interviews with Muslims living in Japan, 11 June 2008.

9.Nakhleh, Emile A. "Introduction" in Asia Policy, 5, 2008, 62-67.

Anti-discrimination education in Japan, civic education in Mongolia and Hong Kong, law-related education in Taiwan, and the recent human rights education program in South Korea comprise the major features of the Northeast Asian experiences in human rights education in the school system.^[1] However, a number of factors, provide a mixed picture of the situation. Educational policies in Japan, Mongolia and Taiwan provide support to human rights education, but a proposed law on human rights education did not pass the legislature in South Korea, while a working group on human rights education in Hong Kong was disbanded. The mere existence of educational policy supporting human rights education does not ensure proper teaching of human rights where there are problems in definition of human rights and/or human rights education, or where the government does not have the political will to implement the policy.

A review of the situation in Northeast Asia revealed a number of challenges, opportunities and measures to support the development of human rights education in the subregion's school systems.

Challenges

The full development of human rights education in Northeast Asian schools is affected by a number of issues. At the macro-level, the following are some of the major issues:

1. Globalization and localization
   The current wave of globalization raises the problem of the loss of national (or local) identity while at the same time paving the way for multiple identities (particularly identities of nationals who were born and raised in other countries, and non-nationals who reside in the different countries in the subregion). Concern for the negative effects of globalization (such as the pervasive influence of modern lifestyle among the youth which seemingly aims at promoting individualism, selfishness and crass materialism) prevents the appreciation of ideas (such as human rights) that are part of the global discourse.
2. Fear of human rights as a Western imperial idea Human Rights is still seen as an European and Northern
   American idea, which promote imperialist domination of the peoples in the subregion. This relates to the idea that "Asian values" differ from those in Europe and America, and human rights are mainly European and American values (that is, human rights are seen as conflicting with traditional values such as Confucianism).
3. Managing change among powerholders
   Since human rights relate to powerholders in society, particularly those in the government, there is resistance to make the powerholders accountable for human rights violations as well as to change systems towards respect for human rights.
4. Lack of resources to support human rights education
   There remains the challenge of providing educators in the subregion appropriate teaching materials, textbooks, standards for human rights education, and funds. This situation indicates the poor implementation of human rights education policies of the governments.
5. Problematic policies on human rights education
   Existing educational policies tend to support a "weak" version of human rights education. The policies interpret human rights education as part of such "educations" as moral education, values education and life education, resulting in the loss of focus on international human rights standards.
6. Unclear differentiation between morality and human rights
   There is a certain degree of confusion about the concept of human rights among people in the government (particularly in the Ministry of Education) and in the schools. They equate human rights with morality.
   
   At the micro level, human rights education faces the major challenge of the indifference of students, parents, and teachers, or people in general.
   
   Students fail to appreciate human rights in relation to their daily life, and are more concerned with the competitive nature of the education systems in the subregion. Teachers resist human rights education due to lack of knowledge and training of human rights, and also due to the lack of appreciation of the value of changing power relations inside the classroom. Some people resist the idea of equality and regard human rights as benefiting only the minorities such as sexual minorities, criminals, etc.
   
   Human rights are often depoliticized such that only social, economic, and cultural rights are addressed while civil and political rights are neglected.

Opportunities

On the other hand, there are opportunities for an appropriate development of human rights education in the Northeast Asian school systems.

Parallel to the lingering view that human rights are Western ideas, there is a noticeable increase in the awareness of people about their human rights. This human rights awareness can be tapped to provide better support for human rights education.

There are initiatives to reinterpret traditional ideas and values to explore how traditional values overlap with human rights values. The traditional Chinese thinking of "respecting the teachers, respecting ideas," for example, can be used to examine ideas that do not seem "traditional" and find out how they relate to the current situation or to understand how they differ from "traditional" ideas. This reinterpretation of a traditional thinking supports the teaching and learning of the idea of human rights.

There are human rights education initiatives that use different approaches, such as the collaboration between schools and civil society, or the use of resources within the local community to teach human rights.

There are institutions in society that support human rights education, such as national human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations, teacher training institutes, and government agencies that help develop human rights education initiatives or improve existing ones.

Feasible responses to the challenges and opportunities

In response to some of the challenges and opportunities in Northeast Asia on human rights education, several ideas were raised that reflect the current initiatives in the subregion:

1. On globalization:
   - Promote the idea that globalization and localization enrich each other, that there is a need to respect/appreciate/celebrate different identities with- in an embracing global identity as human beings with undeniable human dignity and human rights
   - Use globalization in a positive sense through the use of modern technology to understand the situation and people in other countries in the subregion
   - Promote globalization as a positive influence in people, adding new and useful ideas to what they already have in a mutually enriching process.
2. On conflict between human rights and other values including traditional ideas/values:
   - Dialogue with postmodernists to review their stance against international principles
   - Promote an interdisciplinary perspective on human rights
   - Root human rights in local thinking and cultures to counter the perception that human rights are merely Western ideas.
3. On competitive education, redefine the idea of education based on human rights principles. Education as defined in human rights instruments is meant to facilitate the full development of human potentials and learn respect for human rights. In this sense, education cannot be limited to obtaining high marks in order to pass examinations for higher levels of education at the expense of developing other potentials of the students and engaging them in other pursuits (such as participating in community activities that promote human rights).
4. On educational policies, study the "weak versions" of human rights education in educational policies to identify their strengths and weaknesses. For good educational policies, create a system to monitor their implementation. In case there is no educational policy on human rights education, seek government support for its adoption.
5. On teachers' role in human rights education:
   - Develop materials that are useful for teachers and crucial in making them teach human rights
   - Raise teachers' issues in addition to other human rights issues in schools
   - Motivate teachers.
6. On relationship between schools and the authorities in society:
   - Disseminate challenging experiences that deal with issues such as power/authority
   - Promote the use of issue-based approach - using experiences of resolving real problems in schools by finding a balance between rights and power.

In relation to different players in society:
- Non-governmental organizations - promote the continuation of their programs on teacher training for human rights education
- Teachers groups/unions - support their effort to promote human rights education, make them become aware of the idea that the school is part of civil society, enhance their participation in the initiatives of the civil society on upholding human rights
- Business community - in getting its support for human rights education, promote corporate social responsibility under the Global Compact scheme of the United Nations, use the 3Ps (planet, people, profit) framework as an entry point for promoting human rights, and promote existing fair trade systems.

Possible steps

As possible steps to promote human rights education in Northeast Asia, the following are suggested:
- Introduce good national human rights educationframeworks to counter the "weak versions" of human rights education in educational policies
- Collect human rights education examples (experiences) and analyze them in terms of strengths and weaknesses to be able to develop
* reference standards
* examples of adaptation of materials produced in
*their countries/regions
* human rights syllabus for each (compulsory) subject in the school curriculum (using integration approach)
- Promote the use of the United Nations' World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) first phase plan of action as an over-all framework in analyzing the current national/local human rights education initiatives
- Create a mailing list to continue the exchange of information among educators engaged in human rights education; provide internet-based interaction among students
- Provide avenues to demonstrate good human rights education experiences by students
- Support evaluation study on impact of human rights education programs on both students and teachers
- Develop a network that collects/puts together materials and other information on human rights education programs to facilitate exchange/collaboration among countries
- Organize training activity(s) for the subregion on particular area(s) of human rights education
- Showcase a few good (such as Taiwan and Mongolia) and bad human rights education experiences through subregional activities (such as country visits) to know them more in-depth
- Advocate for a human rights education policy development - subregional campaign by the institutions involved - and link with individuals who are involved in policy development
- Continue the dialogue on universal values (human rights) and particular values in order to identify core values on diversities within unities
- Seek United Nations (OHCHR, UNESCO, UNICEF) support for activities in

Experienced educators from South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Mongolia undertook the review of the situation in Northeast Asia. They met in a meeting organized by HURIGHTS OSAKA on 11- 13 March 2008 in Osaka city. This meeting was a follow-up to the 2006 "Osaka Conference on Human Rights Education - Dialogue Among Asian Educators," organized under the aegis of the United Nations' World Programme for Human Rights Education. The 2006 conference brought together educators from various countries in South, Southeast and Northeast Asia, who discussed the need to support the development of human rights education through various means including the sharing of ideas and experiences within and among countries.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

Endnotes

1. This Northeast Asian situation is qualified by the lack of discussion on the situation of human rights education in the school systems of the People's Republic of China as well as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. An invited participant from the People's Republic of China was not able to attend the meeting.

With a new Prefectural Governor, the policy of the Osaka prefectural government on human rights and other issues changed drastically. The newly-elected Governor Toru Hashimoto, acting on a campaign promise before the February 2008 elections, went on with the drive to slash financial support for programs and institutions that he did not consider relevant to the daily life of the people in the prefecture.^[1]

The beginning

The establishment of HURIGHTS OSAKA reflected the wish of a Japanese United Nations officer^[2] who, in 1982, urged the establishment of a human rights information center based on the strength of the "people and the local governing bodies."

Both the prefectural and city governments in Osaka sponsored the establishment of HURIGHTS OSAKA, making it the third member of local-government-supported institutions - LIBERTY OSAKA (a human rights museum) and PEACE OSAKA (a peace museum) - that bear the name "OSAKA" to indicate its location. Another city in the prefecture (Sakai city) later also provided support to HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The civil society composed of human rights organizations, labor unions and religious groups that support human rights provided counterpart fund for the trust fund of HURIGHTS OSAKA. The corporate sector also contributed to the trust fund.

The financial issue

While the financial problem of the Osaka prefectural and city governments has been well-known for several years now, there was no expectation that a solution to this problem would consist of sudden withdrawal of financial support to institutions that were working on human rights and other fields (culture, education and sports).

The identification of institutions to be subjected to withdrawal of financial support came out unexpectedly and seemed to have been decided during the elections campaign period.

There was no proper process of discussing the merit of the institutions that would suffer financial problems, nor serious consideration of their existing programs and activities.

The Osaka Gender Equality Foundation (popularly known as DAWN Center^[3], which enjoys the support of many women's organizations in Osaka, may have to stop much of its programs with the withdrawal of financial support. Thousands of local supporters signed petition-letters asking Governor Hashimoto to spare the DAWN Center from a possible closure.

HURIGHTS OSAKA is much in the same situation. As a much smaller institution, it cannot match the number of local supporters of DAWN Center but it has nevertheless the support of many individuals and organizations in Japan and other countries.

The final decision

The final decision of the prefectural government on the fate of financial support for human rights institutions in Osaka will be made when the prefectural legislative assembly adopts the final financial plan of Governor Hashimoto within the year.

The prefectural government has already adopted a plan to reduce the annual financial support for the human rights institutions from the second half of the current fiscal year (August 2008-March 2009 period).

The future

The almost certain cessation of annual financial subsidy from the Osaka local governments provides a new chapter in the life of HURIGHTS OSAKA. The Board of Trustees of HURIGHTS OSAKA decided on 25 June 2008 to use its trust fund for the center's operations starting in April 2009, subject to its approval of a new budget plan before the start of the next fiscal year and the amendment for this purpose of HURIGHTS OSAKA charter as a foundation. In this context, HURIGHTS OSAKA faces the challenge of continuing to achieve its objectives under a new system.

Endnotes

1. For a media account of the issue see Eric Jonhston, "Hashimoto's cost-cutting plans under fire," The Japan Times in http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080328f1.html

2.He is the late Yo Kubota who died on a United Nations mission in Africa in 1989.

3.The Osaka Gender Equality Foundation manages the facility owned by the Dawn Center.

Human rights practice requires an appropriate mindset. Human rights, being part of modern ideas, are bound to clash with some of the traditions and customs in any society.

Traditional and customary practices that keep women, minorities, and other marginalized sections of society subject to violence, discrimination and oppression do not deserve protection. Human rights are meant to address these problems.

Traditions and customs inevitably change however. In the present context such change is largely driven by modern practices that have already affected most societies in terms of livelihoods, daily needs (food, clothing, housing, medical care), systems of governance, and technologies. Human rights provide a guide to this inevitable change by maintaining that all human beings, as individuals and as members of the family and community, should enjoy the fruits of modernity as a matter of right.

Human rights likewise ensure that traditions and customs that protect the human being, individually and collectively, are sustained and enhanced.

Human rights practice works within the traditions and customs in any society. It helps maintain (or promote in many cases) a society that is just, democratic and protective of its weakest members. Traditions and customs that appear at odds with the idea of human rights deserve a careful review in a manner that leads to a change of mindset, and eventually practice.

*Vanessa Heleta is the Assistant Legal Rights Training Officer of the Legal Literacy Project in Tonga

Local 'prophets' prophesied 2008 to be a very big political year for Tonga. They are being proven right, so far.

The election of People's and Noble's Representatives in the Parliament took place in the first week of May 2008. Certain candidates, during the campaign period, said that they wanted change to take place in 2008, a move against the Standing Order of Tonga's Parliament that once a bill was passed, it could not be discussed again. The Parliament passed last year a law providing for political reforms to take place in 2010.

The election results came out last week with not even half of the registered voters voting. There are three thousand new voters registered since the last general election of 2005 but the voting dropped from fifty per cent at the last election to forty-eight per cent this time around.

Who is being represented in this recent election then? More than half of the population of Tonga is younger than thirty-five years. So whose rights are being represented and whose rights will not be fulfilled? What about the rights and voices of women and children?

Interviews with male candidates before the election revealed that issues about the rights of women and children (considered as marginal rights) were in the backburner. Candidates said that "...there are other more pressing issues like the political reform, economic development, and women and children issues will follow."

2008 is also the election year with the highest number of women-candidates. But why is it that not a single woman-candidate got elected? Even though some of the women-candidates are highly educated and capable, the social and cultural attitudes are still very much rooted in the traditions of the tiny kingdom.

The reign of her late Majesty, Queen Salote Tupou III, was a significant period because she amended the Constitution in 1951 to grant women the right to vote and stand as candidates. From the time the women were given this opportunity, only four women had been voted into Parliament as People's Representatives. This was started by Princess Si'ilikutapu (1975 -1977), followed by Papiloa Foliaki (1978-1980), 'Ofa Fusitu'a (1993-1995) and Lepolo Taunisila (2005-2007). It was only in 2006 that a woman was appointed for the first time as Cabinet Minister, 'Alisi Taumoepeau as Minister of Justice

Mele 'Amanaki, Secretary for the Public Servant Association was one of the eight women-candidates who stood for the recent election. She believes that the election results show that people think that political reform is the most important issue, which she herself campaigned for as her major issue. "The voting results indicate the decisionmaking power within the family. The majority of women voted for whoever their husbands vote for. The husbands make the decision on who the members of the family are going to vote for," she said.

'Alisi Pone, a retired teacher who ran for election for the second time, said that

The reason why a woman did not get elected was the women themselves. Firstly, women are in denial. They don't believe in themselves and [were] always putting each other down. Secondly, it's because of discrimination. Many women compare us with men and think that we are not good enough or not capable of becoming a politician. But I go in not as a female; I don't care about my womanhood. I go in as a human being and I believe in equal entitlement

The former Director of Friendly Island Human Rights and Pro-Democracy Movement, 'Akanete Lauti, who also stood for election thinks that the seventy-one candidates competing for nine seats is far too many. The results showed that people trust the candidates to push for political reform. She said:

I also have a personal hunch that there is discrimination against women in Tonga. I believe Tonga is not ready to embrace women in the political arena and I hope one day we will [be able to] jump [over] that hurdle. The saddest thing is women themselves are not supportive of us

The Electoral Supervisor Officer, Pita Vuki from the Prime Minister's Office, stated that women candidates should review their campaign strategy in order to increase the votes they get.

The second woman former Member of Parliament (1978-80), Papiloa Foliaki, observed that based on the results of the 2008 election there was a need to educate the Tongan women. She said, "I think we need to analyze why there is no woman in Parliament. The role of mothers needs to be heard in the house." She believed that women who were prepared to stand for election should be capable to cope with the pressure, have confidence and be competent. "I don't believe that we should get a woman to represent women but to represent [the] family, every member as a whole," she said.

Tonga is one of the three Pacific countries yet to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Some Members of Parliament (MPs) attribute the very slow process of ratification to "Tongan women already [having] a high rank (fahu system) in the society." But how many women enjoy the privileges brought by this high rank? Due to the shift to a more commercially-driven society the fahu system is no longer as strong an institution as it was in the past. MPs need to be educated that these privileges are only honorific not a right in itself!

The composition of the new Parliament is also worrying lots of people.

In the last Parliament, seven members of the people's representatives were from the pro-democracy movement with only two outside of it. After last week's election, the pro-democracy movement lost two seats. A new member was with the movement before the election but it is still unknown whether he will stay with the movement or not. Why is this worrying lots of people? Will a loss of two pro-democracy members have that much effect?

The agenda put out by the pro-democracy movement before the election somehow now looks shaky as far as the support of fellow People's Representatives and the unknown support of Nobles' Representatives (who returned six of the incumbent members) are concerned. The Speaker of the House lost his seat.

A noted failure in this election is the loss of a female Representative of the People from the northernmost islands group of the Niuas. Lepolo Taunisila, the only female representative of the area in the last Parliament, lost her seat. "I think the people still do not understand the importance of having a female inside Parliament. There are some issues that only women can push like CEDAW. It's a pity that people overlook the qualities of a woman and tend to focus on her personal life. This is one of the major problems - people have higher [standard for judging] women than for men," she said.

This is followed by the view of the elected male candidates to leave women's and children's rights in the backburner "until later."

The dilemma is whether or not the reform, or "change" as the pro-democracy movement calls it, will take place this year or in 2010.

Even though Tonga is getting closer to democracy, the rights of women are still ignored to a large extent. This is due to negative social and cultural attitudes toward women's participation in politics and decision-making processes.

The government's lack of political will to address this issue largely contributes to the slow progress of women's participation in politics and decision-making processes as a whole. A clear evidence is the under-represented level of women in the decision-making levels of the public sector.

Women in Tonga are so inexperienced in politics that the majority of registered women-voters do not vote for other women. The question is: why do women act in this way towards other women? The survey conducted by 'Ofa Gutteinbeil Likiliki of the Advance Women's Political Representation in Forum Island Countries among two hundred fifty women shows that women are more judgmental of other women when it comes to promotion at work, allocating positions in the community and churches, and even at the secondary school where female students compete with other female students.

During our Voters Education Program community meetings before the election some women said that they do not vote for a woman-candidate because they do not want another woman to be above them. This clearly shows that women are their worst enemies. This is an attitude that has slowed down the progress in of women in Tonga towards equality.

It is a wonder if we are trying to eliminate discrimination against women in a male-dominated society, or working to eliminate discrimination among women themselves? Some men said that "only women can sort out the problem themselves and it's a woman thing."

The eradication of these negative social and cultural attitudes toward women in politics can only happen by working together. As Papiloa Foliaki said "There is still a lot of work to be done - more education to change our attitude among us women."

For further information please contact: Legal Literacy Project, Salote Road, Fasi Nuku'alofa, Tonga; ph/fax (676) 25 991.

Additional Information on Tonga
People

Tonga's population lives on forty of its one hundred sixty-nine islands. More than half (64,000) of the people live on the main island of Tongatapu and half of these (34,000) live in the capital Nuku'alofa. Education and work attracted many Tongans to live overseas. Over 40,000 Tongans live in New Zealand, and more than 10,000 in Australia and many in the United States and Canada.

Culture and identity

Tonga has a complex social structure broken into three tiers: the king, the nobles, and the commoners. Each group has obligations and responsibilities to the other groups. Status and rank play a powerful role in personal relationships, even within families.

Economy

As Tonga becomes more connected to the world the traditional patterns of social security are challenged and landlessness and unemployment are major problems, especially among young people. A substantial part of the country's income is from foreign aid and money sent home by Tongans employed overseas.

Government

Tonga has a hereditary constitutional monarchy.

Source: Global Education Website,
http://globaleducation.edna.edu.au/

* Elwin Talo is a Youth Community Paralegal and Carol Pitisopa is a Legal Rights Training Officer at Live and Learn Solomon Islands.

Youth^[1] in the Solomon Islands make up about twenty-nine per cent of the total population.^[2]

They consist of thirty-six per cent of the urban population and about twenty-seven per cent of the population in rural areas.^[3] Youth in the Solomon Islands face a lot of issues. But this article focuses on two main issues: the commercial sexual exploitation of children, and youth and decision-making.

Issues

1.Commercial sexual exploitation of children

An emerging issue in the Solomon Islands is the commercial sexual exploitation of children. A report^[4] carried out by the Christian Care Centre (CCC) of the Church of Melanesia in the Arosi Region of Makira Province, Solomon Islands, found cases of commercial sexual exploitation of children in an area where logging activities took place. Such exploitation included child prostitution with those between the ages of eleven and nineteen. According to the findings in that study young girls were taken to the logging camps, some to work, and later lured into sexual relations and early marriages with those working in the camps.

The findings in this study are not new. They are similar to an earlier study^[5] undertaken by the CCC with assistance from the Regional Rights Resource Team in 2004.

The findings in these reports highlight a human rights issue that affects the rights of these young girls.

2.Decision making

In a society where the leadership structure is based on seniority, youth in the Solomon Islands face a lot of challenges when trying to voice their concerns or when participating in decision-making processes.

The Youth in Parliament Pilot Project 2006 is an example of the push by youth to participate at national level politics. The implementer of the project, the Solomon Islands Youth for Change Team (SIYC Team), is made up of young people with a "youth for change concept" that reinforces inclusive, youth- friendly, informal, and non-bureaucratic approach to youth development.^[6] The rationale for the project included the need for the young generation to be represented in important decision-making levels seeing that the Solomon Islands population is young. Further, the Constitution provides that Solomon Islanders from the age of twenty-one may stand for elections.^[7]

The aims of the project are the following: to empower young people in the social-economic and political paradigm of all levels of the state; to recognize the contribution of suppressed and marginalized population particularly women and youth in the political scene; to ensure that youth issues are adequately and properly addressed through a young voice in the national parliament; and to raise the issue that young people's issues should not be taken lightly.

The candidate who represented the youth contested in the 2006 elections. Out of twenty contestants the SIYC candidate polled 10th place with two hundred two votes. Despite this, the SIYC gained recognition by youth stakeholders, were consulted by the Electoral Commission in the 2006 National General Election Assessment, and the idea of a home grown youth parliament gained momentum.^[8]

One of the challenges faced by youth during the lead up to the election was the competition against senior political figures. Other challenges included criticisms and mockery from the public in a society where leadership is based traditionally on seniority; inexperience; the perception by others that the move by youth was a political move engineered by some politicians and organizations; the perception that it was a form of youth rebellion; and that it was a short-sighted undertaking by young people which was unacceptable to the society.

Despite these, the SIYC remains committed to young people and its members aspire to lobby political parties to include a youth wing, and to lobby for legislative reform to allow for the direct representation of women and youth in the national parliament.

3.Other issues

A study^[9] carried out in 2003 showed that the main areas of need as highlighted by youth and communities were learning opportunities, livelihoods and income generation, community participation, youth activities and sports, and reproductive health.^[10] The study also found that many issues that affect youth such as education opportunities, unemployment, and youth participation in the community were those that had been identified previously,^[11] but were still faced by youth even today. This implies that youth needs are not being addressed, or not adequately addressed by the relevant authorities.

Government policy on youth

It should be noted that the policy goal for youth of the current Solomon Islands government, the Coalition for National Unity and Rural Advancement Government (CNURA), is to:

To uphold and promote the rights of...young people...through effective partnership and strong commitment, thereby creating equal opportunities for all to advance the wellbeing of this nation.^[12]

Based on this policy statement the CNURA government's expected outcomes include a "synthesized national and international policy development and policy initiatives for women, youth and children, ensuring suitability, adaptability and streamlining of these synergies to our local needs and situation"^[13] and "conditions enabling young people to actively participate in all aspects of nation building and development, including decision-making at all levels."^[14]

Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Solomon Islands acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1995. The CRC's definition of a child overlaps with the national definition of youth. This overlap makes the CRC provision on a human rights approach to young people and decision-making very relevant to the Solomon Islands context.

Article 12 of the CRC states:

States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

It is hoped that the Solomon Islands government would take actions that fulfil its policy goal and statements and its obligations under CRC so that the needs and rights of youth are recognized, promoted and protected.

Conclusion

As identified in the Youth Report^[15], the needs of the youth include being given the opportunity to engage in income generating activities and other activities to keep them occupied. They should be given the opportunity for better education and employment. They would also like to be engaged in decision-making processes on various issues, at all levels.

Despite being a party to various international human rights conventions, the government still has a long way to go in implementing and realizing the rights instituted in those conventions. It is hoped that the present government will implement its policy of creating an enabling environment for the active participation of youth in nation-building, development and decision-making. After all, as the SIYC theme goes "Youth of Today, Leaders for Today."

For further information, please contact: Live and Learn Environmental Education (Solomon Islands), DSE Building, Honiara, Solomon Islands; ph (677) 23697; fax (677) 24454; e-mail: livelearn@solomon.com.sb; website: livelearn.org

*With assistance from Hugo Hebala

Endnotes

1. In the Solomon Islands youth are generally referred to as those between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine years old and for the purposes of this article this age group is used when discussing youth.

2. Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/6: National Report, Solomon Islands Statistics Office , Department of Finance and Treasury, Honiara, September 2006

3. See above.

4. Tania Herbert, 2007, Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Solomon Islands: A Report Focusing on the Presence of the Logging Industry in a Remote Region, Honiara, Solomon Islands, Solomon Islands: Christian Care Centre, Church of Melanesia.

5. Christian Care Centre of the Church of Melanesia and Regional Rights Resource Team (2004), Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Sexual Abuse in the Solomon Islands. Unpublished report. Suva, Fiji: United Nations Children's Fund, Pacific Office.

6. Elwin Talo, "Youth in Parliament Pilot Project 2006" summary of activities

7. Clause 48, Constitution of Solomon Islands 1978.

8. The youth parliament concept is now in its initial stages with a reference group working with the Youth Division of the Ministry of Women, Youth and Children's Affairs to establish a Youth Parliament in the country

9. Hassall and Associates International, 2003, Youth in Solomon Islands: A Participatory Study of Issues, Needs and Priorities, Final Report.

10. See above, page 53

11. See above, page 36.

12. Policy Goal 24 of the Coalition for National Unity and Rural Advancement Government Policy Statements (CNURA), January 2008. CNURA Translation and Implementation Framework, February 2008

13. Expected Outcome 24.1, CNURA Policy Statement.

14. Expected Outcome 24.3, CNURA Policy Statement

15. Hassall, op. cit.

Additional Information on Solomon Islands
People

The population of Solomon Islands is predominantly Melanesian (about 95%) although there are smaller Polynesian, Micronesian, Chinese and European communities. The Solomon Islanders live in small villages scattered over three hundred forty-seven of its nine hundred twenty-two islands. About 30,000 people live in Honiara, the capital city. There is great variation between the people in each settlement and there is a complex communal customary ownership of the land.

Culture and identity

The social structure is extremely diverse and complex and varies from island to island. Different customs - codes of behavior, systems of land tenure, leadership rules, blends of traditional and world religions, marriage rules and so on - exist throughout the nation. Most communities recognize strong kinship links and obligations with the broad language group.

Government

The Solomon Islands have a parliamentary democracy.
Source: Global Education Website,
http://globaleducation.edna.edu.au/

* Chisato Mano is the Marshall Project Coordinator, Asia Volunteer Center.

For the people of Marshall Islands, the ocean and islands are life itself. The people lived their daily lives, traveling to and from islands in small boats and canoes, and taking the fruits of the ocean and islands.

Viewed from above, the Marshall Islands, consisting of twenty-nine atolls in the center of the Pacific Ocean between Guam and Hawaii, are small islands floating on the bright cobalt blue and emerald green sea. Each atoll has over ten islands, and Marshall Islands as a whole has over 1,200 of them. The total land area of all the islands is only one hundred eighty one square kilometer, but the ocean spreads endlessly. In this vast and remote, even by Pacific standards, ocean state, there are currently about 60,000 people.

Looming environmental crisis

The survival of Marshall Islands is under threat. This issue has been raised by non-governmental organizations over the years. In their December 1997 statement issued on the occasion of the 3rd Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 3) held in Kyoto, they asserted that "80% of the Marshall Islands will be underwater in the 21st Century."

In recent years, significant changes in the shorelines and the bleaching of the corals in Marshall Islands have become noticeable. The islanders talk about the changes in the environment, saying, "the corals no longer shine" or "you can't catch fish in the lagoons."

Frequent drought, water shortage and high waves that cause damage in Micronesia (of which Marshall Islands form a part) are attributed to abnormal weather. With only two meters above sea level on the average, the Marshall Islands are vulnerable to changes in tide levels.

An area on the ocean side of Majuro Atoll, the current capital, emits a strange smell. It comes from the only waste dumpsite on the island. Wastes, collected from all over the island in large containers, are simply dumped in this site. Concrete shore-protection walls are there as stopgap measure to prevent the wastes from flowing into the sea, but the pollution of the land and sea as well as damage to the health of the inhabitants are serious.

The sad state of the island filled with non-degradable waste represents the rapid life-style change in the Marshall Islands in the last half century.

The environmental crisis closing in from outside and within the islands is undermining the traditional way of maximizing the limited resources.

Generations of Marshall Islanders have lived in self- sufficiency gathering the fruits of the land (such as coconuts, breadfruits and pandan) as well as that of the sea. But scarred from the unfortunate history of being at the mercy of foreign powers, life on the islands even today remains complex and difficult from pressures beyond their control.

Years under successive foreign powers

While the Pacific islands as a whole share the same experience of suffering, the Marshall Islands in particular suffered from a varied past. It was originally "discovered" by Spain in 1528 during the Age of Great Voyages. Germany acquired the Islands in 1885 and made it its protectorate. Then, after a period of occupation by the Japanese, it came under U. S. rule. In the final days of the Pacific War, while it was under the military occupation of the then Japanese Forces, many islanders came under fire and lost their lives.

Remains of military hardware, dating back from the Pacific war (second World War), litter areas on the islands. On the Imiej Island in the Jaluit atoll, Japanese military airplanes and vehicles are left untouched in over one hundred battle sites.

From 1946 to 1958, sixty-seven nuclear tests were conducted by the United States in the Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The Bravo hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954 caused volumes of radioactive fallout on the islands and irrevocable environmental pollution. These effects displaced the people of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls for half a century.^[1]

Marshall Islands stand on the frontlines of arms development.

Recovering the shattered harmony

One of the concrete main roads of Majuro is jammed with cars everyday. The capital has many fine buildings made of corals and cement. It also has a large population of people from other islands looking for education, medical care and work. Many of them suffer from alcoholism, while some commit suicide with no apparent reason.^[2] The inhabitants are forced to make a uniform effort in adapting to the image of the "south sea island" that tourists' demand, for the benefit of visiting divers who come looking for beautiful corals.

Some people in the Marshall Islands are trying to rediscover the abundant sea and islands, and their sense of community. They try to recall their myths and history to be passed on to the next generation. They would like to understand the history that led to the shattering of community harmony in the islands. Victims of nuclear tests try to orally pass on to their children and grandchildren the story of their suffering. Every year, the memory of 1 March 1954 nuclear test is recalled on the islands.

Integrity of the environment and peace for the people of the Marshall Islands are not raised in international conferences, neither the "picturesque" images of the islands that reflect the challenges of the human race. But the Marshall Islands people make the effort to recover their own dignity and celebrate their origins in the midst of looming waves of development, to pursue their simple yet strong wish to pass on the beautiful sea and the islands to the next generation. The message from the Marshallese nuclear test victims (called hibakusha in Japan) is strong. "We are concerned about the health of our children and grandchildren. Of course it is important that all islands in the Marshall Islands become a safe place. But the world becoming a completely weapons-free place is more important."

In the Marshall Islands and in Japan, we hope to work to recover the wisdom and pride that do not get caught in the chain of development, by each one of us rediscovering our own lives and trying to connect ourselves and the world.

For further information please contact: Asia Volunteer Center, 2-30, Chayamachi, Kita-ku, Osaka City, Japan 530-0013; ph (816) 6376-3545; fax (816) 6376-3548; e-mail: peace@avc.or.jp; http://avc.or.jp/

Endnotes

1. The Nuclear Claims Tribunal awarded compensation to the people of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in 2001 and 2000 decisions respectively. The Tribunal noted the loss of use of their land as well as the suffering they endured in resettlement areas that could not provide the conditions similar to their previous life in Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. See the website of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal for the full text of their decisions: www. nuclearclaimstribunal.com/

2. A study of youth suicide in Micronesia over three decades shows the high rate of suicide in Marshall Islands, see Donald H. Rubinstein, "Youth Suicide and Social Change in Micronesia," Occasional Papers (December 2002), Kagoshima University Research Center of the Pacific Islands. Also, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has identified youth suicide as one of the serious problems in Marshall Islands, see "Priorities of the People: Hardship in the Marshall Islands" in www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Priorities_Poor/RMI/rmi0500.asp?p=ctryrmi

* Neil Lawrence is a writer and editor with The Irrawaddy, a news magazine published in Thailand by Burmese journalists.

Human rights violations are an endemic feature of Burmese life. Although the most blatant and highly publicized violations are those committed against adversaries of the country's ruling junta - particularly the National League for Democracy (NLD) and a host of ethnic resistance groups, as well as student activists and members of the Buddhist monastic community - there is scarcely a sector of society or an area of life which is not adversely affected by the regime's disregard for fundamental human rights.

Last year's crackdown on monk-led protests and an attack on supporters of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi nearly five years ago left many dead and many more in detention. However, it is commonplace among Burmese dissidents to refer to their entire country as a prison, which many have been forced to flee to preserve their freedom and their lives. But the reality they are describing is not merely their own personal circumstances. For ordinary people, too, material and spiritual survival in Burma is a daunting struggle.

The country's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) exerts almost total control over social institutions and the economy, and is obsessive in its efforts to circumscribe expressions of cultural values. Its involvement in each of these spheres - social, economic and cultural - has served only to strengthen its hold on power, and has been deleterious both to the lives of individual citizens and to the country as a whole.

Social Rights in Burma

There are few social institutions in Burma which are not subject to some degree of control by the military. Even ordinary interaction in such venues as teashops is affected by the presence of low-level informers to the SPDC's military intelligence apparatus, whose role, apart from collecting information, is to instill in the minds of Burmese a habit of extreme circumspection about overt expressions of political sentiment.

In formal institutions, such as schools and hospitals, the degree of control is nearly absolute. Educational institutions, insofar as they are available and affordable, are especially subject to severe restrictions, as they are regarded by the regime as potential hotbeds of dissent because of the historical role of students in the country's independence and pro-democracy movements. Consequently, teachers are required to join the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a junta-backed mass-based organization which has been implicated in violent attacks on opposition figures.^[1]

The curriculum at public schools is confined to areas which are regarded as non-threatening to the SPDC's agenda of promoting a narrowly interpreted notion of national unity. However, many students do not receive even this rudimentary form of education, due to poverty or isolation in underdeveloped rural areas, as well as to government budgets which typically spend a vastly larger portion of the nation's wealth on the military than on education.^[2]

When it is not able to control students, the regime does not hesitate to shut down educational institutions. Throughout most of the 1990s, almost all of Burma's universities were closed to prevent student protests.^[3] Since then, new campuses have been designed to isolate students from each other and from urban centers.^[4] Despite the reopening of universities, however, graduates face limited opportunities for employment, forcing many to seek a subsistence income through self-employment or to go abroad, often to work illegally in other countries in the region.

The lack of adequate healthcare has had even more far-reaching effects than the limited access to education. Here, again, neglect is coupled with an overarching preoccupation with control to produce results which have been devastating to the country. Spending on healthcare as a percentage of the total budget is among the lowest in the world.^[5] The strain this places on the healthcare system is barely mitigated by privately funded facilities, which often operate on a charitable basis, or by international aid.

International aid to Burma is problematic for a number of reasons. One is that the democratic opposition has called on the international community to refrain from offering means of support to the ruling junta, although this position has been softened in recent years in regards to efforts to address the country's health care crisis.^[6] But the problem most often cited by relief agencies is the lack of cooperation, or outright interference, from the SPDC.^[7] The result has been that efforts to contain diseases such as HIV/AIDS have met with limited success. In a country where poverty has fueled a thriving sex trade and widespread intravenous drug use, the overall impact of a failing health care system on the well-being of the country and its people has been inestimable.^[8]

Economic Rights in Burma

The current regime seized power in the wake of massive nationwide protests that were triggered, in part, by a failing economy which grew drastically worse due to a sudden demonetization of large denominations of the national currency, the kyat, in 1987. Similarly, twenty years later, the SPDC raised the price of fuels, in some cases fivefold, without regard for the impact of their decision on the general population. This is relevant because it demonstrates that, despite the supposed liberalization of the country's formerly socialist economy, the military remains very much in control of Burma's national assets. And it also shows that the vicious cycle of economic mismanagement leading to hardship and protests, which in turn lead to brutal crackdowns and further consolidation of military control, is far from broken twenty years after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising.

Burma's economy operates on several very different planes. In terms of natural resources, the country possesses wealth that is the envy of the region. Thus extractive industries, such as gem mining, logging and the exploitation of offshore natural gas fields are firmly in the hands of the military and the cronies of top leaders, and, to a lesser extent, armed ceasefire groups which have been granted limited economic concessions in exchange for "joining the legal fold."^[9]

In many cases, these activities have been directly linked to specific human rights abuses. For instance, the construction of pipelines used to transport natural gas to Thailand from the Yadana and Yetagun natural gas fields has involved forced labor and forced relocation of local villagers (although the regime's international business partners, including Total of France and the US energy giant Unocal, have denied direct responsibility for the actions of the Burmese military in these areas).^[10] Investors from China - the regime's most important international ally - dominate the trade in gems and teak, in close partnership with regional military commanders.^[11] Logging, which has resulted in massive deforestation, is carried out without any attempt to limit the environmental impact on surrounding populations.^[12] Meanwhile, the exploitation of labor in the gem mining industry is closely associated with intravenous drug use, which is fueled by the nearby cultivation and trade of opium.^[13]

The poor are not the only victims of the SPDC's control-oriented approach to economic management. Entrepreneurs who do not enjoy high-level military connections - or whose military connections have been purged in occasional attempts by the top generals to consolidate their dominance - have also been subject to the junta's arbitrary approach to economic management. In 1998, for instance, Yaung Chi Oo Trading, a Singapore-based company owned by a Burmese national, lost its US $6.3 million investment in the Mandalay Beer Co., Ltd. after the company was abruptly nationalized.^[14] Many smaller investors have reported similar experiences, which are often prompted by the desire of powerful figures to eliminate competition or simply seize control of profitable businesses.^[15]

Cultural Rights in Burma

As noted above, some ethnic ceasefire groups have enjoyed a degree of economic autonomy in their areas of influence in exchange for ending hostilities with the regime. However, cultural autonomy for non-Burman ethnic minorities remains anathema to the country's nationalistic military leaders, who recognize only cosmetic differences among Burma's multitude of ethnic nationalities.

Education, which is woefully under-funded throughout the country, is in a particularly poor state in areas where most students belong to ethnic minorities. Children are not permitted to study in their native language, even when there are no Burmese-language schools provided by the government. In Mon State, for instance, there has been a concerted campaign to close Mon-language schools since a ceasefire agreement between the regime and the New Mon State Army was signed in 1995.^[16]In areas where hostilities have not ceased, efforts to eradicate any evidence of a distinct ethnic identity regularly escalate to the level of atrocity, as in the Karen and Shan States, where villagers suspected of harboring sympathies towards ethnic insurgent armies are routinely subjected to rape, summary execution, and use as forced porters and human minesweepers by the Burmese Army.^[17]

The denial of basic cultural rights is not confined to ethnic minorities. In urban areas, where there is a higher rate of literacy, access to information is severely restricted. All non-state publications are heavily censored, and are required to publish propaganda attacking the democratic opposition.^[18] Journalists and academics are frequently given lengthy prison sentences for disclosing information regarded as damaging to the state.^[19]

Conclusion

The situation described here would seem to indicate that there is an almost total absence of basic human rights in Burma. Indeed, some argue that the country's cultural values preclude a rights-based political orientation. However, there is abundant evidence that Burmese people are deeply aware of their rights. For instance, since the International Labour Organisation was permitted to open a liaison office in Rangoon in February 2007, it has received numerous complaints of forced labor and abduction of children for the purpose of military recruitment, despite the threat of reprisal by the authorities.^[20]

Last year's crackdown on monk-led protests has demonstrated that, despite its self-appointed quasi-monarchical role as defender of the Buddhist faith, the SPDC has acted almost exclusively in its own interests. Geopolitical factors - chiefly, the ability of the regime to rely on the economic and military support of China and other regional neighbors which have little interest in protecting human rights at home, much less in Burma - explain the country's current situation far better than any supposed cultural predisposition to authoritarianism. Although human rights can scarcely be said to exist in Burma today, the continuing insistence of its citizens on a more equitable and accountable form of governance serves as evidence that the current situation is not the country's natural condition.

For further information please contact: Irrawady Publishing Group, P. O. Box 242, CMU Post Office Chiang Mai 50202m Thailand; ph (66 53) 273 ext. 303;fax (66 53) 273 986 ; e-mail:neil lawrence@irrawaddy.org ; www.irrawaddy.org.

Endnotes

1. "The USDA now has a reported 23 million members nationwide. Public servants, local officials and even university students have been coerced into joining the organization." See Human Rights Watch, "Burma: Violent Attacks on Rights Activists" (24 April 2007).

2."Analysts have estimated that about 50% of the central government's budget has been spent on defense since 1988." See Asia Times Online, "Myanmar's junta fears US invasion " (28 April 2006).

3. For much of the past decade, Burma's universities and high schools have been silent." See BBC News On-line, "Burma's Lost Generation" (14 August 1998).

4. "[Campuses] had been shifted from the capital to paddy-field locations and next to army bases to prevent them from becoming hotbeds of resistance." See The Straits Times (Singapore), "Myanmar university re-openings "a sham" (available in "Burma Related News --Aug 23, 2000").

5. "Burma's government spends least [in the world on health care], at 0.5 percent of GDP." See Progressive Policy Institute, "Almost Half of All World Health Spending is in the United States" (17 January 2007)

6. "The position of the National League for Democracy (NLD) on humanitarian aid has been described by some analysts as remaining ambiguous." See Refugees International, "Ending the Waiting Game: The Aid Dilemma" (2004)

7. "[NGO] project staff is so limited that they must be accompanied by at least [one] responsible official of the government." See Burma Issues Weekly, "Burma to create a body in charge for NGO's" (16 February 2006).

8. "[Decades] of repressive rule, civil war and poor governance in [Burma] have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other infectious diseases there." See UC Berkeley News, "Burma junta faulted for rampant diseases."

9."[Many ceasefire] groups [have been] co-opted by State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime (formerly SLORC) through offer of economic (e.g. timber) concessions." See International Crisis Group, "Conflict history: Myanmar/Burma" (updated 22 September 2004).

10. "In 2000, a United States federal judge found there was clear evidence that Unocal knew that the military government held a poor human rights record prior to joining the energy project." See EarthRights International, "Another Yadana: The Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline Project" (27 August 2004)

11. "'For local people, it just gets more difficult,' said a community leader in Kachin state, in Northeastern Burma, bordering China, where Chinese logging has stripped mountains bare. ... 'The commanders sell our natural resources and our local people get nothing.'" See The Washington Post, "Corruption Stains the Timber Trade " (1 April 2007).

12. "Forests that for centuries provided the livelihood and cultural milieu for many ethnic minority peoples are being destroyed at an alarming rate exceeding that of Amazonian rainforests." See Burma Project, Open Society Institute, "Country in Crisis: Environment" (updated October 2005).

13. "The 2003 UNAIDS epidemic update says intravenous drug use and commercial sex are responsible for most HIV/ AIDS infections [in Burma]. It says migrant workers, especially gem miners and loggers, are becoming a major conduit for the spread of the virus." See ADB (Asian Development Bank) Review, "Fatal Attraction" (May-June 2004).

14. "The SPDC forcibly took over the business with all its assets and ejected all personnel, with no compensation. Yaung Chi Oo's bank accounts were frozen and the owner was threatened with arrest." See Burma Lawyers' Council, Legal Issues on Burma Journal No. 9 (August 2001)

15. "Around 1994-95, the car import market in Burma grew dramatically because of an increased demand fueled by a mini-economic boom. And this growth sector caught the attention of many generals and their relatives. " See The Irrawaddy, "Used Car Salesman" (1 January 2001).

16. "[Since] 1998 there have been reports of government and military officials forbidding even Mon community schools from using the Mon language as a medium of instruction, despite the NMSP's initial successful efforts in building up this system of private schools." See Minority Rights Group International, "Myanmar/Burma: Mon"

17. "There were new reports of 'atrocity demining,' with civilians used as human minesweepers in front of Army troops." See Landmine Monitor, "Burma (Myanmar)" (2004)

18. "The military government has constantly hounded Burma's journalists during the three months that have gone by since 27 September, the day that Japanese video reporter Kenji Nagai was murdered by a soldier in Rangoon." See Reporters sans Frontieres, "Three months of quiet repression, arrests, censorship and propaganda" (26 December 2007).

19. "[Journalist U Win Tin] has been sentenced three times since 1989, each time while imprisoned. U Win Tin was most recently sentenced in March 1996 to seven years imprisonment. He was penalized for communicating with the United Nations." See Amnesty International, "Human Rights Defender Turns 75 in Prison."

20. "Till last September, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) office in military-ruled Burma had received few complaints about children being forced to join the army. But that is no longer the case." See Inter Press Service, "RIGHTS-BURMA: Back to Child Recruitments " (18 March 2008).

Additional Information on Burma
People

Most observers estimate the total population to be around fifty million persons. There are eight major ethnic groups in Burma, each comprising part of the total population. Karen and Shan groups comprise about 10% each of the total population, while Akha, Chin, Danu, Indian, Kachin, Karenni, Kayan, Kokang, Lahu, Mon, and Naga groups comprise the rest.

Economy

The economy is dominated by agriculture, which accounts for over fifty-nine percent of the gross domestic product and employs about two-thirds of the labor force. Rice is the main product. Production declined after independence but increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s because of the introduction of high-yielding varieties, fertilizer, and irrigation. Since that time, production has barely kept pace with population growth, and Burma, once the world's leading exporter of rice, is barely able to meet the subsistence needs of its own population. It continues to export some rice to earn foreign exchange. The production of narcotics from poppies and other sources is widespread in the northern highlands, and Burma is the world's leading supplier of opiates. Foreign investment is concentrated in "extractive" industries - US$142.6 million in oil and gas out of a total of $158.3 mil- lion in 2004/2005, compared to $35 million in 2005/2006 out of a total $35.7 million.

Government

A military junta has been ruling the country despite general elections in 1990.

Source: US Campaign for Burma,
http://uscampaignforburma.org/aboutburma/facts- figures.html; ALTSEAN-Burma, http://www.altsean.org;
http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/Burma.html

HURIGHTS OSAKA participated in the 2008 One World Festival held on 2-3 February 2008 at the International House Osaka. The One World Festival is a "Festival of international cooperation connected with the world to feel, to touch, and to help each other"^[1] with the participation of major non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government institutions related to Japanese official development assistance (ODA) programs, United Nations agencies, educational institutions, and private companies in the Kansai region. It is held annually in Osaka city.

One World Festival includes various "programs related to international understanding or cooperation ... presented through exhibitions, symposiums, an ODA town meeting, field reports, discussions on international understanding and development education, an environmental experience corner and much more."^[2]

HURIGHTS OSAKA organized a panel discussion on Burma. The panel discussion, entitled "Democratization in Burma and its Relation with Us" was held on 3 February 2008 in cooperation with Burmese Relief Center-Japan (BRCJ).

The panelists included Mr. Yuzo Uda, a photojournalist who has been working in Burma for many years, M r. Tetu Hakoda, Co-Director of BurmaInfo.org, Toshihiro Kudo, Director, South Asian Studies Group II, Area Studies Center of the Institute of Developing Economies.

Mr. Uda reported on the background and the incidents of use of force by the Burmese authorities in cracking down on peaceful demonstrators in the summer of 2007. He based his presentation on his field research and on videos showed by the Al Jazeera television news network.

Mr. Hakoda gave a presentation entitled "Background of the 2007 Democratization Uprising and the Task for Us." He criticized the indecisiveness of the Japanese government in responding to the situation in Burma at that time. He said that the government did not send a strong message to the Burmese junta after it used force on the peaceful protesters. He also said that the Japanese government has an obscure aid policy, and has not provided aid to Burma refugees living in Japan.

Mr. Kudo's presentation entitled "2007 Myanmar Turmoil - Economic Background and Perspective for the Future," explained the economic background of the peaceful protest demonstrations, the economic base of the Burmese Junta, and the U.S. economic sanctions against Burma and their effect.

The participants, on the other hand, raised several questions relating to the possibilities of a tripartite political dialogue (between the pro-democracy movement, ethnic minority groups, and the Burmese Junta), the expected Japanese aid to Burma, and how can Japan be active involved in the country.

In collaboration with the Asia Volunteer Center (AVC), HURIGHTS OSAKA also organized a concert featuring Ms. Yuko Arakaki from Okinawa who played sanshin, a traditional Okinawan string instrument, and sang several Okinawan songs. Okinawa is a prefecture composed of the southernmost islands in Japan where most U.S. military facilities are concentrated.

For further information about the panel discussion and other activities, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes

1. See One World Festival, in International House Osaka website,
http://www.ih-osaka.or.jp/i.house/english/010/one-world-festival-2007.html
2. Ibid.

Peasants/subsistence farmers comprise one of the most marginalized sections of society.

Though their plight has long been recognized, their situation has largely remained unchanged. Their poverty has not been addressed and their human rights hardly respected. They do not only suffer from poverty, they also get harassed, arrested, or worse killed in trying to get out of it.

Measures designed to address their situation seem to be failing. Agrarian reform programs have not improved their situation. Private corporations are preferred over them on the use of land. Support services including infrastructures such as irrigation systems and farm-to-market roads do not reach their areas.

Government administrative and judicial processes are too slow and too late in bringing relief to their suffering. National economic policies tend to go against their interests. And so on ...

Governments have to be reminded of the state obligation to "...undertake steps ...especially economic and technical, to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of ...[the human] rights..." of the peasants. Programs that helped the peasants (such as the agrarian reform experience in Japan immediately after the second world war ended) show that government resolve is essential to make things work.

Peasants/subsistence farmers are capable of improving their own situation if only the systems in society are not against them.

* Sarath Fernando is the Moderator of the Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform (MONLAR), a network of farmer organizations, non-governmental organizations, and people's organizations in other sectors in Sri Lanka.

Seventy per cent of the nineteen million population of Sri Lanka still live in rural areas with livelihood largely related to peasant farming. With about 1.8 million small farmer families (averaging five members per family), there are about nine million small farmers in the country. About one million of them are small-scale paddy farmers, cultivating an average land area of less than half a hectare.^[1] About 1.2 million families have received land from the government since the introduction of the Land Development Ordinance in 1935^[2] with restriction against selling the land outside the family.

A brief history

Sri Lanka is considered to have over 2,500-year-old system of small scale, domestic food-producing agriculture. Throughout this history the rulers supported and encouraged small-scale agriculture through irrigation development and relatively easy access to land for new settlements. Village communities were permitted to build their own small-scale irrigation reservoirs and settle down as and when village expansion was necessary.

Before the British rule introduced legislations such as the Waste Lands Ordinance in early 1800s, all lands were considered owned or under the custody of the king and the regional feudal leaders. However, people were free to settle down and develop their own forms of cultivation on any available land. The British colonial rulers introduced private ownership of land as a means to acquire land for plantations (coffee and later tea plantations in the hill country, rubber and coconut plantations in the mid-country and the plains).

The ancient food-producing agricultural and irrigation systems were ecological and adopted a systemic approach that made the best use of the natural conditions, the gifts of nature, in a manner that did not destroy the regenerative capacity of nature's resources.^[3]

Three phases on f destructio

The problems facing agriculture and domestic food production and the emerging situation of food insecurity among people, including the small scale rural farmers, were brought about by three important interventions.

Plantation agriculture completely denuded the forests in the central hills. These hills have the highest rate of rainfall in the country and the starting point of all major and many smaller rivers that provide irrigation to the rest of the country.^[4] Over one hundred fifty years of erosion and agrochemical pollution caused serious damage to the land. Although tea, rubber and coconut plantations were the main income earners for the country for nearly one hundred fifty years, the plantation workers have remained the most exploited and deprived people in the country. Even today they are compelled to work under conditions of near slavery, receiving wages of only Rs. 170 (around one and half US dollars) per day when agricultural labor in other sectors receives a daily wage of about Rs. 350 (a little over three US dollars).

Green Revolution, introduced throughout the country since mid-1960s and helped increase production in the early periods, contributed to the destruction of the natural fertility of the soil and made agriculture heavily dependent on external inputs. The combined impact of plantation system and Green Revolution led to serious destruction of the regenerative ability of nature's resources. The government admitted that heavy dependence on imported agrochemicals (such as fertilizers) and food was an unaffordable burden on the national economy.^[5]

The third intervention that further worsened the situation of small farmers was the introduction of "free and open market" policies, under the guidance of the World Bank (WB) and other international financial institutions (IFIs) since 1977.^[6]

The policies adopted by all governments since 1977 aimed at economic transformation based on an export-oriented growth model. All government support services, helpful interventions and protection given to small-scale farming and domestic food production were withdrawn, largely on the recommendations and dictates of the WB and other IFIs. This situation resulted in a near complete breakdown in the agricultural livelihoods of the small farmers and caused the unbearable increase in food prices for the relatively poor consumers.

Consequences and problems faced by farmers and the poor in general

The thirty-year application of the neo-liberal economic model in Sri Lanka made the situation of small farmers extremely difficult.

Rural poverty increased very rapidly over this period. In the early 1990s, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) identified Sri Lanka as having the sharpest increase in　rural poverty among 114 countries surveyed.^[7] The WB's own recent studies confirm the continuation of this trend. WB's Country Director said in August 2007 that "even if real per capita GDP in Sri Lanka grew at a healthy rate of 3.1 percent, it is still lower than" those of China, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. These countries also are "much more successful in terms of poverty reduction than Sri Lanka." She further observed that "a key factor behind the low growth [in provinces other than the Western province] is the stag- nation in the rural economy-both the farm and non-farm economy-over the past decade."^[8]

Rural poverty and large income disparities were some of the main contributory factors to the armed uprisings by the youth. Armed youth uprising in 1971 resulted in 10,000 deaths and repeated youth uprisings during 1987-1990 period led to thousands of disappearances of youths.^[9] A report by the United Nations' Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances noted that the number of cases of disappearances recorded by it in 1991 was the highest figure ever for a single country.^[10] Farmer indebtedness kept increasing, resulting in suicides that continued from 2004 till the present. About a million paddy farmers had to sell their paddy at prices considerably less than the cost of production. Studies done by the Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform (MONLAR)^[11] over the last few years in the five major rice producing districts show that farmers spending over Rs 12 or 13 (about a quarter of a US dollar) to produce a kilogram of paddy have been compelled to sell between Rs 11 to 13 per kilogram.

Although the present government has promised to buy paddy at Rs 16.50 - Rs 17.50 per kilogram the amount of money allocated for the purpose every season is sufficient only to buy less than five per cent of the produce. Monopoly traders buy and stockpile imported rice and keep the rice market prices very high, putting consumers in very difficult situation.

The WB has been proposing to the government since 1996 the issuance of freehold titles to all farmers to encourage them to sell their land and move out of agriculture.^[12] The 2003 economic strategy plan of the Government (adopted in collaboration with the WB) expected the decrease of rural population from seventy per cent to fifty per cent by year 2015.^[13] This in fact is the planned strategy of the WB to create a free land market by making rural small-scale farmers leave their villages. The urban areas, however, do not provide new opportunities for such a large migrant population. Thus this strategy can only result in creating a much larger population of landless, unemployed destitute.

Farmer resistance

While a strong and consistent farmer's movement does not yet exist, the farmers have strongly resisted tendencies to invite foreign companies to take control of land and agriculture. They have also been fighting for higher prices for their produce and for supportive government intervention in marketing and agricultural subsidies. These struggles have been suppressed from time to time. While the government made promises to adopt supportive policies, the promises have not been seriously kept due to pressures from the WB and other lending institutions as well as big domestic traders who have a great influence on whoever political leaders were elected.^[14]

Proposed solution

It is clear that the only way out of this crisis is to strengthen rural agricultural economy, adopting approaches that would make it possible for the rural small-scale farmers to continue their agricultural livelihood. This requires adjusting agricultural methodologies to suit the situation of farmers and make them viable. Domestic food availability at affordable cost is essential. This can easily be done by promoting ecological agriculture, making the best use of the helpful natural conditions and the knowledge and experience that Sri Lanka has in such low cost, ecological agriculture.^[15]

This should be planned with a vision of restoring the regenerative capacity of nature's resources that are available as free gift of nature. This approach has the potential for giving better livelihoods and better food sovereignty to the plantation workers,^[16] the urban poor and also to the rest of the low income earning population in the country.

In September 2007, the government declared a new agricultural policy that gives higher emphasis to domestic food production and also declared a program of growing domestic food throughout the country, utilizing the capacity of small-scale farmers, and adopting home gardens. This is an admission by the government that the export-oriented growth model has failed to reduce poverty and hunger. However, the commitment of the government to implement this approach, facing the pressures of the international lending institutions and proponents of neo liberal economic policy, is still to be seen.

The farmer's movement in the country has to take the task of supporting the new policy. It has to main-stream the growing trend among rural people to move into affordable and viable agricultural approaches.

For further information, please contact: MONLAR, 1151/58A, 4th Lane, Kotte Road, Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka; ph (94) 11 2865534, 4407663; fax (94) 11 4407663; e-mail: monlar@sltnet.lk; sarafdo@sltnet.lk; www.monlar.org.

Endnotes

1. "Official Poverty Line for Sri Lanka," The Department of Census and Statistics Bulletin, June 2004, in www.statistics.gov.lk/poverty/OfficialPovertyLineBuletin. pdf

2. See Government of Sri Lanka, Regaining Sri Lanka: Vision and Strategy for Accelerated Development, Colombo, 2002.

3. See Siran Deraniyagala, "A Note on Man and Water in Sri Lanka: From Prehistory to History" in Mendis, D.L.O, Water Heritage of Sri Lanka, Colombo: Sri Lanka Pugwash Group, 2002.

4. See Mendis, D.L.O., "Ancient Water and Soil Conservation Ecosystems of Sri Lanka" in Mendis, ibid.

5. See Declaration of New Agriculture Policy, Ministry of Agriculture Development and Agrarian Services, Colombo, 2007.

6. World Bank, Sri Lanka: Non Plantation Crop Sector Policy Alternatives, World Bank Report, March 20, 1996 in www-w ds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&amp;piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000009265_3961019111321&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679.

7. See Jazairy, Idriss and Stanier, John, State of World Rural Poverty: An Inquiry into its Causes and Consequences. New York: Published for International Fund For Agricultural Development by New York University Press, 1993.

8. See keynote address of Ms. Naoko Ishii, World Bank Country Director for Sri Lanka, before the Sri Lanka Economics Association in August 2007 in www.monlar.org/toplink/archives/sessionwb/

9. There is still no confirmed total number of disappeared through the years. Estimates range from official count of more than 20,000 cases to unofficial count of around 60,000 cases. See footnote 3, pages 11-12 in Romesh Silva, Britto Fernando and Vasuki Nesiah, Clarifying the Past and Commemorating Sri Lanka's Disappeared: A Descriptive Analysis of Enforced Disappearances Documented by Families of the Disappeare d, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Families of the Disappeared (FoD) and the International Center for Transitional Justice in www.hrdag.org/about/sri_lanka.shtml.

10. Paragraph 192, Report on visit to Sri Lanka of three members of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (7-18 October 1991), E/CN.4/1992/18/Add.1 (8 January 1992).

11. See MONLAR, "Solving the paddy crisis, fighting the World Bank..." in www.geocities.com/monlarslk/news/rice_campaign.htm.

12. World Bank, op. cit

13. See Government of Sri Lanka, op. cit.

14. See MONLAR, Regaining Sri Lanka and PRSP: Compelling the poor to subsidize the rich, 2003 in www.geocities.com/monlarslk/publications/publications.htm

15. See MONLAR, Proposals of People's Organisations for Another Development: Observations And Alternatives on the Sri Lanka Budget 2005 in www.geocities.com/monlarslk/publications/publications.htm.

16. See MONLAR, Socio-Economic Conditions and Unproductive Lands in the Plantation Sector in Sri Lanka in www.geocities.com/monlarslk/publications/publications.htm.

On 4 August 2007 thousands of poor farmers started occupying part of the Chengara Harrison Malayalam estate (also called as Laha estate and operated by Harrison Malayalam Plantations Ltd.) in Chengara, Pathnamtitta district, Kerala state in India. The poor farmers are composed of landless Dalits and Adivasis as well as scores of families from other marginalized communities, Muslim communities, etc. from all parts of Kerala. They are seeking ownership of cultivable land for five thousand poor families (with more than twenty thousand family members). They aim to re-claim ownership of the land that has been part of a long-standing promise of the State government for land distribution.

They would like to become permanent owners of the land since the company's possession of the estate has become illegal when its lease agreement lapsed in 1996. They also allege that the company possesses much more area than what is included in the lease agreement, and they (poor farmers) occupy the land in excess of the area leased.^[1]

Since the start of the land occupation, arrests and illegal detentions have become common in the areas near the estate. The occupying poor farmers have been facing threats from the local communist party (Marxist) members as well as workers of the estate. The party members and estate workers are claiming that the occupation of the land by the farmers has been affecting plantation activities, yet the rubber trees in the estate are already too old for tapping.

A Kerala High Court issued, in favor of the plantation company, an order to evict the poor farmers from the estate.

The broader context

Kerala is not known for land struggles until the historic land agreement in October 2001 signed between protesting Dalits and Adivasis of Kerala and the State government. The agreement, among others, committed the State government of Kerala to distribute fertile land to Dalits and Adivasis. This "immediate measure" along with other provisions of the agreement were unjustifiably delayed for years. At the same time, state lands were being alienated to private parties and their inhabitants forcefully displaced.

Since then, Dalit and Adivasi land struggles in Kerala attained a new order of practice. For the first time ever, a large-scale mass occupation of land happened in Muthanga. But it was met with violence like in other states in India. Many other places where the people have tilled the lands for generations also suffered from state violence. The poor farmers in the Chengara estate pledged to fight for their right to land without using violence.^[2]

The Kerala State government enacted a Land Reform Act in 1963. But its implementation was delayed for fifteen years. And the law only covers tenants, which therefore excludes Dalits and Adivasis who in "Kerala's context the caste and cultural hierarchy, with strong oppressive segregation of these communities, did not allow them to be tenants."^[3]
The lead organization of the land struggle, Sadhu Jana Vimochana Samyuktha Vedi (SJVSV), has opted for the land occupation as the strategy, remembering the tradition of the great leader Ayyankali, the militant dalit leader whose mission was to ensure the liberation of dalits from various forms of slavery, and ensure their right to agricultural land as well as right to education in Kerala. SJVSV sees the Chengara struggle as an example of government double standards in favor of big private corporations.^[4]

According to SJVSV there are 12,500 dalit colonies and 4,083 adivasi colonies where tens of thousands of families live in extreme lack of basic amenities facing civil, political, economic and cultural rights violations.

(This article is mainly based on Peoples' Movements Solidarity Team, A Report on Chengara Land Struggle in Kerala, c/o ADVOCACY-Indian Social Institute, November 29, 2007 advocacy@isidelhi.org.in. Other sources provided additional information, see Endnotes.)

Endnotes

1. P. N. Venugopal, "Kerala's landless dalits battle for Chengara" in InfoChange News & Feature s, November 2007, http://justsamachar.com/local/keralas-landless-dalits-battle-for-chengara/?r=http://www.infochangeindia.org /features461.jsp

2. Chengara Pledge in Peoples' Movements Solidarity Team, A Report on Chengara Land Struggle in Kerala, c/o ADVOCACY-Indian Social Institute, November 29, 2007, advocacy@isidelhi.org.in

3. "Chengara Land Struggle in Kerala" in The South Asian, 2 December 2007, www.thesouthasian.org/archives/2007/chengara_land_struggle_in_kera.html

4. KA SHAJI, The Meek Shall Inherit The Earth?, Tehelka Magazine, Vol 4, Issue 47, 8 December 2007, www.tehel-ka.com/story_main36. asp?filename=Ne081207THE_MEEK.asp

*PAKISAMA is a national confederation of peasant organizations in the Philippines.

The Higaonons are indigenous people of southern Philippines. Their ancestral land stretches across the valley of Sayawan and Palaopao mountains in Bukidnon province. But people who did not belong to their community obtained the legal ownership of the land. In the 1930s, there were forcibly evicted from their balaang yuta(holy land). They returned as farm workers to the land that had become a cattle ranch.

The legally registered owners of the cattle ranch changed through the years, and subsequent owners divided the land into smaller pieces. In 1984, one hundred forty-four hectares of the land owned by the Quisumbing family and located in Sumilao town were leased to Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) for ten years. The adjacent other portion of the land became the estate of the Carlos family.

With the advent of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988 (CARP), the one-hundred-forty- four-hectare ancestral land in Sumilao town was declared in 1990 as subject to the agrarian reform program. One hundred thirty-seven Mapadayonong Panaghiusa sa mga Lumad Alang sa Damlag (MAPALAD) farmers (later known as Sumilao farmers), all of Higaonon lineage, were declared beneficiaries of the program. The government issued in 1995 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in their names. For the first time in decades, the Higaonons regained their lost ancestral land.

Struggle continues

The registered landowner (Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation or NQS- RMDC) opposed the government move of putting the land under the agrarian reform program from the very beginning. With a series of legal actions, NQSRMDC was able to suspend the actual distribution of the land to the Sumilao farmers in 1992.

The municipal and provincial governments, on the other hand, approved in 1993 the conversion of the status of the land from agricultural to agro-industrial. Within the same year, NQSRMDC applied for the permission to convert the use of land into agro-industrial purpose, and thus exempt it from the agrarian reform program. NQSRMDC justified the land conversion application with promises of economic development consisting of the establishment of a Development Academy of Mindanao, a cultural center, Institute for Livelihood Science, a museum, a library, a golf course, a Mindanao Sports Development Complex, a Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park, Forest Development and Support Facilities including the construction ofa 360-room hotel, restaurant and housing projects, among others.

But the Philippine Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) denied in 1994 the land conversion application on the ground that agrarian rules do not allow such conversion of prime agricultural land.^[1] The land title of NQSRMDC was cancelled and DAR awarded to the Sumilao farmers their certificates of land ownership in 1995. NQSRMDC filed a court petition to nullify this decision of DAR. At the same time, it appealed the DAR decision to the Office of the President. The then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued in 1996 the infamous "Torres Decision" approving the application for conversion, and nullifying in effect the certificates of land ownership of the Sumilao farmers. The "Torres Decision" considered the Sumilao farmers as "outsiders" who have no right to the land. NQSRMDC then moved for the judicial cancellation of the certificates of landownership issued to them.

In response, the Sumilao farmers went into a hunger strike for twenty-eight days in 1997 in front of the DAR offices in the cities of Quezon and Cagayan de Oro. Their peaceful protest caught the interest of the public, including national personalities such as a Cardinal of the Catholic Church (Jaime Sin), and the then candidates for the election of the President, Senators, members of the House of Representatives and local legislative bodies.

Due to huge public pressure, then President Fidel V. Ramos overturned the "Torres Decision" and issued the so-called "Win-win Resolution" by providing for one hundred hectares of the land to the Sumilao farmers and forty-four hectares to NQSRMDC. It was a pleasant victory for the Sumilao farmers and the whole peasant sector. However, their victory was short lived.

NQSRMDC filed a petition against it before the Supreme Court. MAPALAD, representing the farmer-beneficiaries, filed an intervention to raise novel questions such as the validity of conversion of a prime agricultural land for other purposes, the power of local governments to reclassify lands in relation to DAR's authority to approve conversions, and the validity of the comprehensive agrarian reform law itself.

Unexpectedly, the Supreme Court decided against the Sumilao farmers. It refused to answer the constitution- al issues and focused its decision on DAR's failure to question the "Torres Resolution" on time.^[2] It thus skirted the substantial issues of the case and limited its attention to technical questions. The "Torres Decision" was reinstated while the "Win-win Resolution" was invalidated.  Worst, it denied MAPALAD's intervention by equivocally saying that being merely "recommendee farmer-beneficiaries", the MAPALAD members have no real interest over the land. MAPALAD's dream of regaining the ancestral land vanished in an instant. That was in 1998.

Idle land and endless appeals

Several years passed and the land remained idle. Not one of the proposed projects of NQSRMDC ever materialized. The "promises" of economic vitality, employment and increased income remained promises. NQSRMDC sold the land instead in 2002 to San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI), the biggest conglomerate in the country, which planned to put up a piggery farm.

Meanwhile, in 2003, the adjacent Carlos estate was distributed to some of the Sumilao farmers under the agrarian reform program with the full agreement of the registered landowner, the Carlos family. The farmers received their land ownership certificates.

With the conditions for land conversion remaining unfulfilled in violation of rules,^[3] the Sumilao farmers filed a petition in 2004 to cancel the conversion order, and to award the land to them. They also argued that the planned piggery farm was not one of the agro- industries proposed by NQSRMDC in its land conversion application. In 2006, the DAR dismissed their petition.

The Sumilao farmers appealed to the Office of the President to reverse the DAR decision. On 18 December 2007, the Office of the President issued an order granting the petition to cancel the land conversion order.^[4] Now a new process of legally distributing the land to the Sumilao farmers has to begin.

Ending of funding for CARP

The agrarian reform program continues until its "original scope and mandate" has been completed.^[5] But by 2008, the law that allotted funds for its implementation will expire.^[6] Without a new law providing the funds, the implementation of the program will virtually stop. In this case, while private agricultural lands will still be subject to agrarian reform, a more tedious process of judicial expropriation will have to be employed.

But there is much to be done under the agrarian reform program. One report states the following unfinished tasks under the program:^[7]

According to DAR estimates, there will still be some 1,077,538 hectares of private agricultural lands and 581,813 hectares of public alienable and disposable lands that will still have to be distributed after 2008. These do not include the areas also still to be covered under leasehold and the differential between the DAR targets from 10.3M hectares in 1988 to 8.1M hectares in 1996.

The DAR also estimates that there will still be some 132,620 agrarian cases pending after 2008.

The recent moves of the government under President Gloria M. Arroyo and the Philippine legislature (House of Representatives) indicate that the implementation of CARP may come to a halt. The lumping of agrarian reform with other "asset reform programs" of the government such as on urban land and ancestral domain instead of the usual separate chapter in therecent Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), the reduction of target for land acquisition and distribution (LAD) of private agricultural lands to only 100,000 hectares per year, the legislative proposals to exempt big prawn farms, fish ponds and aquaculture areas from CARP coverage, foreign investors' leasing of private lands for up to seventy-five years, and the proposed twenty-five-year moratorium on CARP implementation in theMindanao region are all veering away from the duty of the government to fully implement the constitutional mandate on agrarian reform (Section 4, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution). 

No clear land use policy

Massive land conversions all over the country led to establishment of industrial zones and residential areas on agricultural lands. Such land conversions pose a serious problem in light of growing population, perennial problem of food security, and threat to the ecology.

The absence of national land use policy complemented by inconsistent land reform policies, inefficient land administration bureaucracy, a highly politicized land tax system, and inefficient agrarian reform and housing development programs affect the efficiency of land markets, and thus the country's economic growth potential and equity.

The future of the Sumilao farmers

The Sumilao farmers were robbed of their ancestral land through the current system of land ownership. They tried various ways to recover it. They suffered forced eviction, violent actions by the police, and harassment by security staff of the landowners. Some of them died in the process.

They marched during October-December 2007 period from Mindanao to Manila (1,700 kilometer distance) to make their plea to the government once more. They demanded that their right to land be respected. The government finally cancelled its own decision allowing the conversion of their land for agro-industrial purpose. But the legal process of distributing the land to them is still to be undertaken.

The one-hundred-forty-four-hectare ancestral land in Sumilao remains fertile.  Its rich soil awaits cultivation. Mt. Sayawan and Mt. Palaopao still protect the land from unwanted weather conditions and the Culaman river runs through the land providing water. The Sumilao farmers may finally return to their ancestral land.

For further information, please contact: PAKISAMA, Room 201, 2nd floor, Partnership Center, 59 C. Salvador Street, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Metro Manila, Philippines; ph (632) 4342079; e-mail: pakisama_pilipinas@yahoo.com; www.pakisama.org

Endnotes

1. The rules provide that lands already covered by the agrarian reform program, or with irrigation facilities, among others, are prime agricultural lands that cannot be converted to other uses. The Sumilao land has been certified in 1994 as having irrigation system by Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), the Provincial Agricultural Officer and the National Irrigation Authority (NIA).

2. Carlos O. Fortich, et al. vs. Renato C. Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624 in www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/apr1998/131457.htm

3. DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990 in relation to DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1990, DAR Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1994 (Consolidated and Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2002.

4. Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, "Palace restores Sumilao land to agricultural use," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 December 2007, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=107507

5. See Department of Justice Opinion No. 9, series of 1997.

6. Republic Act 8532, which amended Republic Act 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), provided additional 50 billion Philippine pesos (roughly 1.2 billion US dollars) to the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF).

7. Why CARP "Extension With Reforms" in 2008?, primer of the AR Now!, PESANTech and PhilDHRRA, 2007, in http://asianfarmers.org/?p=322.

* Aliansi Petani Indonesia (API) is a national organization of peasant federations in Indonesia.

The peasants are the backbone of the agrarian sector in Indonesia. They have that status since the colonial period till the present. And yet since colonial period, they have largely been deprived of freedom - freedom from oppression and poverty. While they produce the food for the people, they have not been recognized as heroes/heroines who could share the prestige of the country before the global community. Rather than allow them to suffer in poverty, their prosperity should be considered a national priority.

The Indonesian peasants today are struggling, much like in the past. The Indonesian military inflict violence on them regarding land disputes. Indonesian agri-business companies patent their seeds and force them to respect it. They face legal prosecution for breeding their own seeds.^[1]

Just like other countries that were former colonies, agrarian reform was used as the means to address the plight of the peasants. But their situation has not changed.

Land disputes

Agrarian conflicts occur in the country to the prejudice of the peasants. With a law on agrarian reform largely unimplemented, the lands tilled by peasants are not protected from take-overs by agricultural plantation companies.

In one case in Lengkong district, West Java province, peasants suffered from violence inflicted by company security forces and members of the military. They were arrested, detained, intimidated, forced to leave their homes, and their farms destroyed.

The company has been enjoying the protection of the law on plantations (Law No. 18, 2004). This law became an easy tool for big private companies to intimidate and remove the peasants from the land in order to establish agricultural plantations. The Indonesian peasants rightly denounce this law for being biased against them.

The law's provisions on lease agreements are proof of the support that the government gives to plantation companies, at the expense of the peasants who become victims of human rights violations. Peasants likewise suffer from the increasing number of conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural purposes. These land conversions affect agricultural production to the point that Indonesia may face food crisis in the next decade.^[2] The alarming rate of conversion of paddy fields into non-agricultural use affects not only rice production but production of sec- ondary crops (peanuts, soybeans, corn, and vegetables) that farmers produce during dry season.^[3]

With the liberalization of the agricultural market, Indonesia became a big rice importer. It also has to import corn, soya, sugar, orange, shallot, cattle and many other commodities because the agricultural sector could not meet the demand. If the conversion of agricultural lands to other purposes continues, agriculture and its produce will become history.

But the peasants know that their survival entirely depends on their own efforts.

Peasants tilled the land of Pasir Randu in Cianjur town, West Java province until a Dutch company controlled the area during the Dutch colonial period. While the Second World War disrupted the operation of the company, it returned to the area after the war ended. In 1965, another company (PTPN VIII Pasir Nangka) entered the area and established a clove plantation with the peasants as workers. With low price for cloves, the company did not do well, and the clove trees were subsequently abandoned and workers laid-off. Twenty people were left working in the plantation in the 1980s. In the 1990s it was down to four people. The area has turned into a forest as a result. The company clearly failed to fulfill its obligation to turn the land it was leasing into commercial use. In 1997 the peasants decided to reclaim the two-hundred-ninety-hectare land and to till it for their livelihood.

Through their own organization, the peasants petitioned the government to recognize their right to the land. They argued that since the company was no longer in a position to operate a plantation, its lease agreement should be cancelled and the land given to them.

Because the government was taking time to decide on their petition, and with the approval of the plantation company the peasants improved the facilities on the land (irrigation system and roads) using their own resources and started to till it.

While their right to the land had not yet been recognized by the government, the peasants knew that if they did not take action their situation would be even worse. They now benefit from tilling the land again.

Causes of the problems

Land disputes arise because long-term land leases unjustifiably displace peasants who till the land. The law on foreign capital investments (Law No. 25, 2007) allows multinational companies to use agricultural land to the prejudice of the peasants. Agricultural plantation companies compete with the peasants on unequal terms.

The government resorts to importation to satisfy the demand for agricultural products in the domestic market instead of optimizing the use of good agricultural system. It prioritizes the importation of agricultural products rather than aim at increasing the income of the peasants by helping them improve agricultural production, supporting their training in agricultural skills and new technology, and repairing/building agricultural infrastructures.

This situation leads to a number of human rights violations, namely:

1.Obligation to respect
The government tolerated the intimidation, expulsion, torture and other human rights violations suffered by Indonesian peasants. This government stance violates the human rights law (Law No. 39, 1999) particularly the provision on  the obligation of the government to protect the right of people to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
It likewise violates the obligations of the state of Indonesia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2.Obligation to protect
The government failed to protect the peasants from being deprived of water and other publicly-owned natural resources by big plantation companies. The government violated the human rights law as well as its obligation under the ratified international human rights treaties to promote, protect and realize human rights through legislative and other measures.

3. Obligation to fullfill
The government failed to fullfill the rights of the peas- ants to work and to live humane lives under the human rights law and the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It also failed to fulfill the right of the peasants to own agricultural land individually or collectively under the agrarian reform law.

The alternative solutions
It is important for peasants to strengthen their organization to be able to push for genuine agrarian reform. Such reform must fulfil the economic, social, political and cultural rights of the peasants, and support rural women to become active participants in the power structure of rural societies.

Importation of agricultural products (rice, sugar, corn and soy) should stop in order to prevent its negative impact on the Indonesian peasants. Coordination with civil society organizations in other countries is needed for an international campaign with the World Trade Organization to protect the peasants from being driven out of the agricultural industry.

Agriculture is an important component of developing countries and thus should be valued beyond economic terms. Governments and the international community should recognize the rights of the peasants to the land as well as to their culture, and that no law should be enacted allowing the appropriation of natural resources away from public ownership.

For further information, please contact: API, l. Saleh Abud No. 18-19, Otto Iskandardinata, Jakarta 13330, Indonesia; ph (6221) 819 9749; 851 9611; fax (62 21) 850 0052; e-mail: api_bumie@yahoo.co.id; www.api tentang.blogspot.com

Endnotes

1. Hira Jhamtani and Dey Patria,Indonesian farmers prosecuted for breeding their own seeds, in http://asian-farmers.org/?p=208#more-208.

2. See "Indonesia may face food crisis in next 10 years: Minister," The Jakarta Post, 12 December 2007, in www.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20071211.A04&irec=3.

3. See Fahmuddin Agus and Irawan, "Agricultural Land Conversion as a Threat to Food Security and Environmental Quality," Jurnal Litbang Pertanian, 25(3) 2006.

4.For more details on the Pasir Randu experience, see Land Reclaiming Experience of Indonesian Farmers in http://asianfarmers.org/?p=211.

* Kimiko Okada is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Asia ACTs against Child Trafficking (Asia ACTs), a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working towards the elimination of child trafficking in Southeast Asia, organized the Regional Conference on Enhancing Child Protection through Database Development: Mapping of Existing Database Efforts to Fight Child Trafficking in Southeast Asia on 22-24 October 2007 in Bangkok. This Conference followed the Seminar Workshop on
the Southeast Asian Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims of Trafficking organized also by Asia ACTs in 2006.^[1]

Due to the nature of the issue, accurate data on trafficking in human beings (including its scale) has been lacking. Such data is critical in understanding the situation and trends of the issue, in taking appropriate responses and in developing policies. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) 2006 report, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, is an example of an effort to present the global trends in trafficking in human beings. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, some of the member-organizations of Asia ACTs as well as related organizations have their own data collection initiatives.

Asia ACTs saw the need to develop a regional database to monitor and prevent child trafficking as well as to provide information that would help improve responses to child trafficking. Thus the Bangkok Conference was held to share information on data collection initiatives and to come up with recommendations to complement the existing database initiatives of various organizations. There were around forty participants, both from within and outside of the region, from governments as well as NGOs.

Conference proceedings

A researcher of the UNODC introduced the database initiative currently being planned. She mentioned the criticisms on the 2006 UNODC Report for being based on secondary data, and categorizing countries into "sending" and "receiving" countries. She explained that guidelines for the database framework would be prepared before developing a new database. She hoped that it would be continuously updated to provide information to judges and prosecutors working on trafficking cases, and support public awareness-raising efforts. The new database will focus on government responses to trafficking including court decisions.

The Terre des Hommes Child Relief TACT Project in South-Eastern Europe was another example presented at conference. The project, with database component, provides assistance to children who are victims of trafficking. Social workers who are in contact with the children input the data, and information is accessible online. Data include information on the child victims and the traffickers. Security of information is maintained through multiple passwords and various levels of access. Several comments were raised such as the importance of making users become aware of the risks of information leak, the differences in legal provisions on personal information that create difficulties in sharing information among different countries, and the need to clarify the purpose of the database, the participation of users in developing it, and to keep it simple and easy to use.

Subsequent panel discussions and workshops introduced and discussed other initiatives within and outside of the Mekong region. Existing and planned databases generally focus on information on children who were rescued, returned or came into contact with NGOs or officials in the course of responding to trafficking cases, the cases themselves, and information regarding income, education and other relevant matters which may provide bases for developing policies on anti-trafficking and the welfare of children at risk.

A representative of Save the Children introduced its database for six countries in the Mekong region that helps analyze the situation of children and supports the planning and monitoring of its activities. Children receiving its services provide information using a questionnaire. Personal data are stored in local offices, but information shared among regions and countries are less detailed. The KKSP Foundation in Indonesia has a database on children who are victims of violence including trafficking for its advocacy activities. The Philippine Center on Transnational Crime under the Office of the President operates a database on international crimes including trafficking in human beings. Information of the victims as well as the traffickers (regarding their personal details, information on their cases, and criminal organizations) are collected to facilitate monitoring of illegal activities and assist police operations.

An example of database providing bases for policy- making is the initiative of the Social Development and Human Security Office of Thailand in Chiang Mai and two other northern provinces. The database has information on health, education, migration and other matters of the residents in these areas that the various ministries collect, as well as information on entertainment facilities and areas requiring particular attention. The collected information are used in preparing policies and plans for preventing trafficking, responding swiftly to cases, and promoting cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies. The Subaybay Bata Monitoring System of the Philippine Council for the Welfare of Children, an inter-agency body monitoring and evaluating the implementation of policies and programs for the welfare and protection of children, was another example introduced in the conference. In this scheme, data from the studies and reports from various ministries as well as information collected by the barangay (community) officials provide the basis for formulating policies and decision-making. The data are also used to promote dialogue and sharing of responsibilities among national and local officials.

The discussions centered on the importance of information security in all the initiatives presented, and the measures needed such as passwords, access restrictions, as well as keeping some data off the website. Issues regarding sharing of information between government agencies and NGOs were also pointed out. With initiatives involving information collection directly from the children, many speakers mentioned the necessity of keeping the questionnaires and user manuals short and easy for those taking the information. It was emphasized that the interest of the child should be the priority in all stages of the process.

On the final day of the Conference, the participants discussed and adopted a statement including recommendations towards a regional database.

The participants agreed on the need for a regional database to serve a number of purposes, namely:

1. Provision of evidence for advocacy for the adoption and implementation of the human rights standards for trafficked children
2. Provision of authoritative information about the issue
3. Presentation of the real situation on trafficking of children for policy advocacy
4. Identification of gaps on services being provided to victims
5. Development of coordination among service providers from both government and NGOs and monitoring of governments initiatives
6. Drawing up of regional trends on the work done on the issue.

(See next page for the full text of the conference state- ment and the recommendations regarding the establishment of a regional database system.)The Conference was attended by representatives of NGOs and government agencies in Southeast Asia involved in anti-child-trafficking programs. Terre des Hommes Netherlands, the European Commission and the Japan Foundation provided support.

For further information, please contact: Asia Acts Against Child Trafficking (Asia ACTs), Rms. 322 Philippine Social Science Center, Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, ph (632) 929-0822; fax (632) 929-0820; e-mail: asiaacts@tri-isys.com; www.stopchildtrafficking.info.

Endnotes

1. For more information on this seminar workshop, see "Protecting Children Against Trafficking: Southeast Asian Guidelines" FOCUS Asia-Pacific, Vol. 44, June 2006, HURIGHTS OSAKA, https://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/044/06.html On the Guidelines, see Seminar-Workshop on the Southeast Asian Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims of Trafficking, AsiaACTs against Child Trafficking, 2007.

Conference Statement

We, the participants of the "Regional Conference on Enhancing Child Protection Through Database Development: Mapping of Existing Database Efforts to Fight Child Trafficking in South East Asia" held in Bangkok on 22-24 October 2007 coming from non-government and government organizations from Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, support the initiatives of the Asia Acts Against Children Trafficking protecting the rights and dignity of the trafficked children in South East Asia, and hereby recommend the following:

* Intensify efforts to collect information on trafficked children at the grassroots level and from reliable sources where possible such as reports from the media, social workers, and the police;

* Work towards having a common regional database system on child trafficking that would aid efforts to combat child trafficking by various stakeholders;

* Agree on common objectives, indicators, and definitions based on the ASEAN Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Trafficked Children to guide the development of a national/regional database on child trafficking;

* Develop comprehensive training and users manuals to include detailed technical and ethical guidelines in the collection, collation, and dissemination of information on child trafficking;

* Explore or intensify collaboration with the government at the national and regional levels, where possible, in the development of a centralised database system on child trafficking;

* Intensify lobbying efforts for the adoption and implementation of the ASEAN Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Trafficked Children;

* Contribute information on the situation of child trafficking in South East Asia and undertake parallel activities in preparation for the World Fit for Children session in New York in December 2007, and the 3rd World Congress on Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Brazil in 2008;

* For Asia-ACTS to revisit its position on child trafficking not only as a human rights issue but also as a law and order problem.

The Recommendations of the Conference Regarding a Regional Database

Rationale:
A regional database

1. Provides evidence for advocacy for the adoption and implementation of the human rights standards for trafficked children
2. Provides authoritative information about the issue
3. Presents the real situation on trafficking of children for policy advocacy
4. Identifies gaps on services to victims
5. Develops coordination among service providers from both government and NGOs and monitors what the governments are doing
6. Draws regional trends on work done on the issue.

Results:
After three years, the following results will be generated from the database:

1. Situational analysis of child trafficking in the region
2. Facilitated development of at least one cross-border coordination effort in case intervention; at the country level, identified gaps in service delivery/provision of interventions to victims
3. Adoption of the proposed guidelines on protecting the rights of children-victims of trafficking.

Strategies:

1. Develop the standard documentation format (paper and electronic formats). This includes systems for data entry, pre-testing and hands-on training, identification of fields in the database, determining cases that cannot be covered due to inaccessibility, deciding on information that cannot be shared, updating frequency, and development of controlled vocabulary. At the country level, review and improvement of existing formats
2. Formation of the data management team (including adoption of criteria for identifying the [members of the] team, formulation of the operational structure and defining the roles and functions of the team)
3. Development of users' manual
4. Data collection, data entry, data retrieval, data analysis, packaging and dissemination of results
5. Training on data analysis (regional and country level).

*Koonae Park is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA

HURIGHTS OSAKA held two public symposiums on the human rights of foreign migrant women in Japan and Korea in August and October 2007. These symposiums were co-sponsored by the Asian Center for Women Studies of Ewha University (Seoul), Women's Study Center of Osaka Prefectural University, and Seoul Foundation of Women & Family. The first symposium was held at Ewha University in Seoul on 3 August 2007, focusing on the situation of foreign women who respectively married Japanese and Korean men, and reside in Japan and Korea. The second symposium was held on 27 October 2007 in Osaka at the Dawn Center (Osaka Prefectural Women's Center) with the cooperation of the Osaka Gender Equality Foundation. In both symposiums, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers and researchers in Japan and Korea shared and discussed the issues.

Japan and Korea situations

The two symposiums revealed the similarity of situations of migrant workers in Japan and Korea. The number of migrant workers in Japan started to increase in late 1980s. While Korea was sending a lot of its workers to work abroad as migrant workers till late 1980s, by 1990s it was receiving foreign migrant workers. For every eight married couples in Korea, one is an international marriage. In Japan, the ratio is 16:1. The foreign spouses (mainly women) in Korea are mostly Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Filipinos. While in Japan majority of the foreign spouses (also mainly women) are Chinese, Korean, Filipinos, and Thais (in the order of their number). Korea has more than one hundred thousand foreigners at present while Japan has more than two million.

This situation is becoming a major issue of globalization. The feminization of migration is increasing in Asia. Japan and Korea are similarly experiencing aging societies and decreasing birthrate, while receiving foreign female migrants.

"International Marriage from the Women's Human Rights Perspective" - Seoul symposium

The symposium in Seoul, held on 3 August 2007, focused on "international marriage" because of the rapid increase in the number of international marriages in Korea and the establishment of programs by Korean national and local governments for female spouses from developing countries. The symposium was also part of the HURIGHTS OSAKA's study tour to Korea to learn about issues regarding, and NGO efforts in support of, female migrants.

One hundred fifty people from various sectors including the twenty Japanese participants in the study tour attended the symposium. Professor Kim Young-ok of Ehwa University in her presentation entitled "Female Migrants through International Marriage and Multi-national Family" introduced the recent debates about multiculturalism, and nationality and citizenship in academic community. She also mentioned the limited discussions in Korea about the development of policies for families of international marriages that support the full participation in the society of the foreign spouses, and also gender-equality. Ms. Yoko Yoshida, a Japanese lawyer, presented the Japanese situation on international marriages and some aspects of the human rights violations under Japanese laws and policies.

Ms. Han Kuk-yom of Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center gave a presentation entitled "Human Rights Situation and Issues regarding Female Spouses in International Marriages in Korea." She pointed out cases of trafficking in the guise of international marriages and the discriminatory attitude of Korean husbands and the society as a whole toward the foreign spouses. Ms. Enoi Yukari, a staff of the Toyonaka International Exchange Association in Toyonaka city (Japan), introduced her organization's activities supporting foreign women married to Japanese men, and their children.

Ms. Oh Hyeran of the Seoul Foundation of Women & Family presented the recently launched activities of the foundation to support families of foreign spouses in southern part of Seoul. Ms. Baek Mi-Soon of the National human Rights Commission of Korea discussed the Commission's policy and activities on protecting the human rights of foreign migrants, including its future activities such as research projects in sending countries.

"Securing the Human Rights of Female Foreign Migrant Workers" - Osaka symposium

One hundred participants from various sectors attended the Osaka symposium, which focused on the issue of female foreign migrant workers. As in the Seoul symposium, the program included several presentations.

Professor Ito Ruri gave a presentation entitled "Globalization and Female Migrant Workers: Japanese Situation and Problems." She presented an analysis of the feminization of international migration in Asia in general and Japan in particular. She pointed out the lack of gender perspective in Japanese foreign labor policy, the issues regarding migrant workers (such as care-givers from Southeast Asia) and concrete measures to protect their rights. Ms. Jang Myung-sun of the Seoul Foundation of Women & Family presented the legal status of migrant workers, the foreign labor policy, the human rights violations caused by the employment system for foreign migrants, and the social structure in Korea. She stressed that female foreign migrant workers suffer from harsher conditions than their male counterparts.

Ms. Wang Tong, a graduate student of Osaka Sangyo University and a former trainee from China, spoke about her experience being a trainee at a manufacturing company in Hyogo Prefecture in Japan. She pointed out the wide gap between the provisions of training contracts and the harsh reality of the working place.

Ms. Hayasaki Naomi of the Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK) presented the implementation of the Industrial Training and Technical Internship Program of the Japanese government and the increasing number of female trainees under this program. Ms. Yang Hyewoo of the Korean Migrant Workers Human Rights Center discussed the newly introduced "Employment Permit System" (which replaced the "Industrial Training Program") and the situation of female foreign migrant workers. She also mentioned the entertainer visa system and the government's special policy of accepting people of Korean-descent from China, Russia and Central Asia.

Some notes

While many problems discussed in the two symposiums were similar in the two countries, there were differences in terms of government policies and measures. The Korean parliament passed a law on the rights of foreign migrants, including female foreign migrants, in response to strong recommendations and lobby by the National Human Rights Commission in the country. The law, aimed at integrating the foreign migrants into the Korean society and protecting their rights, started to be implemented from the early part of 2007. Bills related to female foreign migrants, such as measures to support 'multicultural family' and the regulation of the activities of international matchmaking agencies, have been discussed in the Korean parliament.

On the other hand, the Japanese government appears less serious compared to its Korean counterpart in enacting legislations and measures on foreign migrants. It was also noted that there was relatively weaker advocacy of NGOs on these issues. However, several local governments in Japan have enacted ordinances to protect the rights of citizens and foreign residents alike, in addition to taking several measures to support female foreign migrants. The programs of Toyonaka City (such as consultation and interpretation services, free Japanese language class, special class for foreign children to learn their mother tongue) implemented in collaboration with NGOs were examples of local government initiatives for foreign migrants.

The symposiums were the first experiences of collaboration between HURIGHTS OSAKA and universities and other institutions on foreign migrants issue in East Asia. Opportunities for further collaboration on the issue may have to be created. The unexpected high number of participants in both symposiums proved high interest on the issue.

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

Regional inter-governmental structures provide ways of addressing human rights issues within the "community." Instead of international bodies dealing with their human rights issues, the members of the community (States) who are bound by common history, culture and other ties can resolve these issues in their "own way," that is, in effective , efficient and appropriate manner using the international human rights standards.

Intergovernmental human rights mechanisms are likely valuable in addressing cross-border issues such as trafficking in human beings and exploitation of migrant labor, but also national issues that require external pressure to prod governments into action, or provide redress for violations resulting from governments' action or omission.

When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) establishes its human rights body, it has to ensure that it will not be ineffective. It has to prove that it addresses human rights issues by protecting people in the subregion from human rights violations, complementary to the efforts of institutions at the national level.

The human rights problems in Burma/Myanmar are urgent cases waiting for a subregional solution. Will the ASEAN human rights body be able to act on them?/

* Jefferson R. Plantilla is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

An Asia-Pacific human rights mechanism will not see light in the region for many years.

From the discussions in the initial United Nations (UN) regional seminar in 1982 in Colombo^[1] to the 2007 regional workshop in Bali, it is clear that governments in the region and the UN have agreed that this system is not yet due. Agreement on a building- block approach in establishing such system^[2] has evolved into undertaking particular projects under the 1998 Tehran Framework.^[3]

The results of the 14th Annual Workshop of the Framework on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, in the form of Bali Action Points adopted on 12 July 2007, consisted mainly of requests of governments to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to undertake the following:

1. Summarize the recommendations of the regional workshops since the 1991 workshop in Manila
2. Compile a directory of resource materials and resource persons that can support the activities agreed upon in the workshops
3. Compile the outcome documents of the four sub-regional workshops for judges and lawyers on justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights
4. Engage in consultations with Member States, regional organizations, national human rights institutions, civil society and other stakeholders on follow up to activities under the regional framework
5. Hold follow up consultations and dialogue with other United Nations and multilateral development agencies to harness their resources in support of these activities.

The OHCHR, in turn, has identified as regional priorities and strategies under its Human Rights Programme for Asia Pacific (2006-2007) the continuation of its work within the Asia-Pacific Regional Framework, in cooperation with member-states and Country Teams, focusing on the justiciability of economic, social, and cultural rights and establishing and strengthening national institutions. It will also give "focused attention" to several issues: "discrimination against minorities, including indigenous peoples, trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, migrant workers's rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the rule of law."^[4]

Another approach

The discussions in the 1982 Colombo meeting touched on the idea of establishing national and subregional human rights mechanisms before discussing the regional mechanism. From late 1980s several countries in the region began establishing their respective national human rights institutions. And still much later, the subregions of South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific separately adopted subregional initiatives on human rights.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has adopted two instruments that created a basis for cooperation in the field of human rights among the member-states. The South Asian Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (January 2002) and the SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia (January 2002) have now taken effect in South Asia. There is also the Social Charter, adopted in 2004, that has a number of human rights provisions relating to women and children. Its section on principles, goals and objectives states the following:

xii. Promote universal respect for and observance and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, in particular the right to development; promote the effective exercise of rights and the discharge of responsibilities in a balanced manner at all levels of society; promote gender equity; promote the welfare and interest of children and youth; promote social integration and strengthen civil society.

It seems, however, that SAARC has not discussed the idea of a South Asian human rights mechanism, be it for particular human rights issue(s) or for human rights in general.

The Pacific Islands Forum moved towards a subregional system by adopting in 2005 the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (Pacific Plan). The Pacific Plan has provisions on human rights. The vision for the Pacific under the Pacific Plan includes the "defense and promotion of human rights," and a few aspects of its Good Governance section relate to human rights. The regional implementation of the Pacific Plan lies with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat with political oversight and guidance provided by a committee (Pacific Plan Action Committee). The proposal to establish a Pacific human rights mechanism is subject to further study. (See related article for a discussion of the situation in the Pacific.)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted several human rights-related documents and is now at the verge of establishing a subregional human rights body.

These subregional initiatives parallel the regional human rights initiatives of the UN, but there is no indication of link between them.

Southeast Asia

ASEAN member-states believe that they have created

a community of Southeast Asian nations at peace with one another and at peace with the world, rapidly achieving prosperity for [their] peoples and steadily improving their lives. [Their] rich diversity has provided the strength and inspiration to [them] to help one another foster a strong sense of community.^[5]

They have experienced economic integration through smaller initiatives within the region.^[6]

By 2020, ASEAN envisions a much stronger community with the following characteristics:

1. A Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
2. Closer economic integration within ASEAN
3. An ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity.

These characteristics refer to the three components of the ASEAN Vision 2020: peace, economic development and social cohesion.

To realize this vision of an ASEAN Community, it is necessary that the member-states are bound by an ASEAN Charter that will serve "as a firm foundation in achieving one ASEAN Community by providing an enhanced institutional framework as well as conferring a legal personality to ASEAN." It will "codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and values and reaffirm that ASEAN agreements signed and other instruments adopted before the establishment of the ASEAN Charter shall continue to apply and be legally binding where appropriate."

The 2005 ASEAN Summit's Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter declared a long list of principles on the interstate relations within ASEAN including "[P]romotion of democracy, human rights and obligations, transparency and good governance and strengthening democratic institutions."

This declaration established the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter to "examine and provide practical recommendations on the directions and nature of the ASEAN Charter relevant to the ASEAN Community."

The EPG was tasked to recommend a strategy for the ASEAN Charter drafting process including consultations at the national and subregional levels with all relevant stakeholders in ASEAN (especially representatives of the civil society) and public information.

The 2006 ASEAN Summit's Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter endorsed the "Report of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter and agree[d] that the High Level Task Force should commence the drafting of the ASEAN Charter based on our directions given at the 11th and 12th ASEAN Summits, the -relevant ASEAN documents, together with the EPG recommendations, to be completed in time for the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007."

Human rights and ASEAN

ASEAN adopted a number of documents relating to human rights, namely,

• Jakarta Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in ASEAN Region (Jakarta, 13 June 2004)
• ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (Vientiane, 29 November 2004)
• Vientiane Action Programme [VAP] (29 November 2004)
• Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter - 11th ASEAN Summit (December 2005)
• ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (Cebu, 13 January 2007).

The Jakarta Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in ASEAN Region provides that member-states shall

strengthen collaboration between and among countries, through bilateral, regional and international cooperation for resource mobilisation and technical exchange programmes, including sharing of best practices and experience in raising awareness, developing advocacy programmes on preventing and tackling violence against women.

The ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children provides that ASEAN shall

[P]romote regional cooperation for the survival, development, protection and participation of ASEAN children, as an integral part of ASEAN's efforts to improve the lives of peoples in the region.

Under the VAP, ASEAN has identified several areas of human rights work regarding:

• Education and public awareness on human rights
• Network of cooperation among existing human rights mechanisms
• ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers
• ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children.

On 30 July 2007, during the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers announced the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. This is the first human-rights structure established by ASEAN. (See next article on the migrant workers committee.)

During the same meeting, the Foreign Ministers received the report of the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on the first draft ASEAN Charter and agreed on the inclusion of "key provisions, including the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body."^[7]

Establishing an ASEAN Human Rights Body

While the ASEAN Foreign Ministers had agreed to include the creation of an ASEAN human rights body in the draft ASEAN Charter, they arrived at this decision amidst much uncertainty.

During the Eighth Meeting of the High Level Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter (July 2007), there were reports that one issue that had not gained consensus among the HLTF members was the ASEAN human rights mechanism. The HLTF had to finish its draft ASEAN Charter in July 2007 to be able to submit the same to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, who were going to hold a meeting at the latter part of the month. Failing to get a consensus among HLTF members on the ASEAN human rights mechanism, the HLTF referred the matter to the Foreign Ministers for them to resolve the issue.

One report said that some ASEAN countries feared that the issue is "being used as a political instrument. "^[8] But eventually, according to another report, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei "persuaded Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to accept the deal in principle."^[9]

The Foreign Minister of Malaysia was quoted as saying that^[10]

At the end of the day, we must be seen not to be allergic or not supportive of human rights... for any reason, the human rights provision is not in the charter, then people will think ASEAN is not pro-human rights and that is nonsense... We are for human rights, we are for civil liberties, we want to see democracy, we want to see rule of law, we want to see good governance.

In Chapter IV on Organizations in the draft ASEAN Charter the following provision appears:^[11]

In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.

But while the Foreign Ministers feared embarrassment before the international community if they failed to agree on a human rights body, they were not able to agree on the details of such a body.^[12] There was no agreement yet on the "timeframe, scope of work and other details of a regional human rights body."^[13] They had to instruct the HLTF to draft the terms of reference of the body before the next ASEAN Summit in November 2007.

Issues

The terms of reference for the creation of an ASEAN human rights body will determine the extent of willingness of ASEAN to realize its human rights commitment. There are fears about the possibility of member-states who are "uncomfortable with the idea of a human rights body" or not yet ready for it to ask to be exempted from its operation for several years from its establishment.^[14]

A number of questions will hopefully have appropriate answers by November 2007 during the 13th ASEAN Summit:

• Will the ASEAN human rights body be given the independence needed to effectively operate?
• What role will the human rights body play?
• Will it monitor the human rights situation in each of the ASEAN member-states?
• Will it have the power to require member-states to submit reports on their human rights situation?
• Will it receive complaints on human rights violations from member-states?
• Will it cover all human rights, or a particular set of rights?
• Will the international human rights standards be the main reference point, considering that most of the international human rights instruments have not been ratified by ASEAN member-states?^[15]
• If there are findings of human rights violation in particular member-states, will the body have the power to require these member-states to remedy the problems?

There is also a proposal to create an ASEAN Commission on Women's and Child Rights under the VAP. Will this still be created, similar to the creation of a committee to implement the declaration on migrant workers' rights?

Indeed, with the positive development of having an ASEAN human rights body, the challenge lies on the powers and functions that it will assume to effectively address the human rights situation in the subregion.

For further information please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnotes

1. See UN General Assembly resolution 37/171 of 17 December 1982 on the report of the Seminar on National, Local and Regional Arrangements for the Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region, held at Colombo from 21 June to 2 July 1982.

2. See "UN Workshops on Regional Arrangement for Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific," FOCUS Asia-Pacific, issue no. 7

3. Annex II, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission (E/CN.4/1998/50 - 12 March 1998).

4. See OHCHR Human Rights Programme for Asia Pacific (2006-2007) in www.ohchr.org/english/countries/regional/asia/programme.htm

5. ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted by ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur on 15 December 1997.

6. The Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines - East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand-Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore-Growth Triangle (IMS- GT), ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC), Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), and Cambodia-Lao-Vietnam Development Triangle (CLV-DT) are economic integration initiatives existing within Southeast Asia.

7. Statement of H.E. Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the Closing Ceremony of the 40th AMM and the Handing-over of the ASC Chairmanship, Thursday, 2 August 2007, in www.40amm.org.ph/main_showdocuments.asp?category=docs&docid=16

8. "ASEAN's human rights plan hits snag," The Bangkok Post in www.bangkokpost.net/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=120562

9. Manny Mogato, "Myanmar withdraws objections to SE Asia rights body" in www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSP2833120070730

10. See "Philippine HLTF Member Bares ASEAN Human Rights Body in the Draft ASEAN Charter; Consults with Philippine Civil Society Groups and Government Agencies" in Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in www.aseanhrmech.org/news/philippine-HLTF-member-bares-draft.html

11. "ASEAN's human rights plan hits snag," op. cit.

12. "Asean breaks deadlock on human rights," The Straits Times in www.straitstimes.com/Latest%2BNews/Asia/STIStory_143859.html

13. "ASEAN's human rights plan hits snag," op. cit.

14. So far only the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women have been ratified by all the ASEAN member-states.

15. The "ASEAN Minus X Formula," which is supposed to have worked in the ASEAN economic and trade agreements, may be employed in this case. See Obstacles to ASEAN Charter, www.eraconsumer.org/news.php?id=16. ASEAN explains the "ASEAN Minus X Formula" as follows:"Under this approach, two or more countries may proceed with an agreed services sector liberalisation without having to extend the concessions to non-participating countries. Others may join at a later stage or whenever ready." ASEAN Integration in Services, ASEAN Public Information Series (2007) http://www.aseansec.org/20661.pdf

* Ms. Ma. Lorena Macabuag is the Project Coordinator of Migrant Forum in Asia.

Southeast Asia is confronted with many challenges regarding migrant workers. Within the subregion, there are countries of origin and destination, with some countries playing both roles. The migrant workers of Southeast Asia constitute an important component of the social, political and economic conditions of the countries in the subregion. Yet they face serious problems.

Undocumented / Irregular Migration

Undocumented migrant workers suffer from arrest/detention/deportation/punishment, exploitation by employers (including non-payment and underpayment of wages), inability to join or form associations and trade unions, and restricted access to social services (health and reproductive health care, among others).

Malaysia, among the major countries of destination for migrant workers in Southeast Asia, holds regular crackdowns on undocumented migrant workers. It initiated an annual crackdown or deportation of undocumented migrant workers in 2002. In 2005 it announced that it would crack down on around 800,000 undocumented migrant workers^[1] to enable them to return home and register as documented workers.

Thailand, both a country of origin and destination, also holds regular deportation of undocumented migrant workers, who come mostly from other Mekong countries such as Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Deportations and crackdowns on undocumented migrant workers have not proved to be viable solutions to the issue of undocumented migration. The workers being deported are needed in the various countries of destination.

Lack of recognition of domestic workers as workers

Domestic workers constitute one of the bigger sectors of migrant workers in Southeast Asia. In most countries of destination in Southeast Asia, domestic workers are not recognized under the labor laws and thus afforded with little or no rights. In some countries, domestic workers are not given holidays or rest days. There are also cases where the passports of foreign domestic workers are withheld or kept by their employers.

Trafficking

A large number of women migrants are vulnerable to trafficking. Some of them end up being trafficked through a host of deceptive, coercive, violent and exploitative acts. Women are deceived about job type, terms and condition of work, and treated as forced labor, when they are placed in slavery-like work conditions.

Feminization of labor

Due to changes in the demands of the international labor market, there has been an increase in the type of jobs traditionally awarded to women. This is particularly true in the service sector (domestic work, caregiving, nursing and entertainment). This is also identifiable in the increasing number of women seeking work independently outside their country of origin.

ASEAN and Migrant Workers

The 1990 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Family (UNMWC) came into force in July 2003. Among the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), only one country (the Philippines) has ratified UNMWC while two countries (Indonesia and Cambodia) signed it. ASEAN does not yet have a legal instrument on migrant workers in the subregion.

ASEAN undertook through the years several initiatives related to the migrant workers issue including the following:

• ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997)
• ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997) - promotes the evolution of rules of behavior and cooperative measures to deal with problems that can be met only on a regional scale, including trafficking in women and children
• Hanoi Plan of Action (1998) - stresses the use of the ASEAN Foundation to support activities and social development programs aimed at addressing issues of unequal economic development, poverty and socio-economic disparities and the strengthening of ASEAN collaboration in combating the trafficking in women and children
• Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration (1999) - declares that migration, particularly irregular migration, should be addressed in a comprehensive and balanced manner, considering its causes, manifestations and effects, both positive and negative, in the countries of origin, transit and destination
• ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (2004) - establishes, among others, a regional focal network to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, in the ASEAN region
• Bali Concord II (2003) - provides for the full utilization of the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter transnational crime including trafficking in persons
• Vientiane Action Programme (2004) - includes the plan to elaborate an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers.

At the 12th ASEAN summit in Cebu in January 2007 the ASEAN Heads of State adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.^[2] Though non-binding, the Declaration is considered a milestone in the struggle for the rights of migrant workers in the region. The Declaration came after years of struggle and active lobbying by Civil Society Organizations [CSOs] (migrants organizations, grassroots organizations and human rights networks). The Declaration aims to

1. Promote decent, humane, productive, dignified and remunerative employment for migrant workers;
2. Establish and implement human resource development programmes and reintegration programmes for migrant workers in their countries of origin;
3. Take concrete measures to prevent or curb the smuggling and trafficking in persons by, among others, introducing stiffer penalties for those who are involved in these activities;
4. Facilitate data-sharing on matters related to migrant workers, for the purpose of enhancing policies and programmes concerning migrant workers in both sending and receiving states;
5. Promote capacity building by sharing of information, best practices as well as opportunities and challenges encountered by ASEAN Member Countries in relation to protection and promotion of migrant workers' rights and welfare;
6. Extend assistance to migrant workers of ASEAN Member Countries who are caught in conflict or crisis situations outside ASEAN in the event of need and based on the capacities and resources of the Embassies and Consular Offices of the relevant ASEAN Member Countries, based on bilateral consultations and arrangements;
7. Encourage international organisations, ASEAN dialogue partners and other countries to respect the principles and extend support and assistance to the implementation of the measures contained in this Declaration; and
8. Task the relevant ASEAN bodies to follow up on the Declaration and to develop an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, consistent with ASEAN's vision of a caring and sharing Community, and direct the Secretary- General of ASEAN to submit annually a report on the progress of the implementation of the Declaration to the Summit through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

Despite being a non-binding instrument, the civil society in Southeast Asia welcomed the Declaration as it recognizes the responsibilities of both countries of origin and destination in protecting the rights of migrant workers in the region. Furthermore the Declaration calls for clear commitment to protect the rights, dignity and welfare of migrant workers entering countries of destination, by among other things, providing access to services, fair and just employment and conditions of work, access to legal justice, and promoting tolerance between migrant communities and populations of the receiving state.

Migrant CSOs felt that the 2006 ASEAN Declaration on migrant workers is an important first step in terms of achieving the goal of protecting the rights and well-being of migrants in the region. However there is still a need to call on the member-states of ASEAN to put the declaration into action.

During the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Manila, 21 July - 2 August 2007), the ASEAN Ministers adopted the Statement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.^[3] The Committee is tasked to ensure the effective implementation of the commitments made by ASEAN member-states under the Declaration and to facilitate the development of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers. Part of the Committee's functions include the following:

Promote bilateral and regional cooperation and assistance on matters involving the rights of migrant workers;

Facilitate data sharing on matters related to migrant workers, for the purpose of enhancing policies and programmes to protect and promote the rights of migrant workers in both sending and receiving countries;

Encourage international organisations, ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other countries to respect the principles and extend support and assistance to the implementation of the measures contained in the Declaration;

Promote harmonisation of mechanisms between both sending and receiving countries that promote and protect the rights of migrant workers to implement the ASEAN commitment reflected in paragraph 17 of the Declaration.

The setting up of the Committee is a step towards the adoption of a binding ASEAN instrument for the protection of the human rights of migrants, as stated in the VAP and the Declaration. There are reports that despite the agreement to establish the Committee, some ASEAN member-states have reservations on the purposes and functions of the Committee. But the Philippine government asserted that there was strong consensus within ASEAN on the establishment of this very important structure.^[4]

The development of a binding instrument for the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers becomes the major output expected from the Committee. It is thus necessary that the ASEAN member-states and the civil society in the subregion work earnestly to ensure that this instrument has the proper provisions for migrant workers particularly those with irregular or undocumented status and includes fundamental human and labor rights standards based on the seven core international human rights instruments particularly the 1990 UN MWC and the core International Labour Organisation standards.

For further information, please contact: Migrant Forum In Asia, 59-B Malumanay Street, Teachers ' Village West, Quezon City 1104 Metro Manila, Philippines; ph (632) 433-3508; fax (632)433-1292; e-mail: mfa@pacific.net.hk; www.mfasia.org

Endnotes

1. Lawrence Bartlet, Massive crackdown on migrants sparks rights fears. Alliance France Press (AFP) January 31, 2005.

2. For the full text of the declaration please see the fol-lowing link: http://www.12thaseansummit.org.ph/innertemplate3.asp?category=docs&docid=23

3. For the full text of the declaration please see the fo.llowing link: http://www.aseansec.org/20768.htm

4. Please see: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view_article.php?article_id=80085

* Jefferson R. Plantilla is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The thirty-seven-year-old Pacific Islands Forum^[1] has undertaken steps toward regional integration. The Forum is composed of the Cook Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

It adopted in 2004 the following vision for the Pacific:^[2]

Leaders believe the Pacific can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures and traditions are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights. We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to develop our knowledge, to improve our communications and to ensure a sustainable economic existence for all.

This vision can be achieved through, among others, The^[3]

recognition that the Forum has to exist for the practical benefit of Pacific people, and of the importance of cultural identity, regional inclusiveness, sub-regional representation, human rights, women and gender, youth, and civil society and invited the Secretary General, in preparing the Pacific Plan, to consult, assess and make proposals on how cultural identity could be best strengthened through the work of the Forum and [Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific] CROP agencies, in particular the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).

This vision for the Pacific was incorporated in the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration(Pacific Plan), which aims to "... create stronger and deeper links between the sovereign countries of the region and identify the sectors where the region could gain the most from sharing resources of governance and aligning policies." The Pacific Plan was drafted through "broad-based national and regional consultations," and was endorsed initially in the October 2005 meeting of the Leaders at the Pacific Islands Forum, and amended in the Leaders Meeting in the following year.

The goal of the Pacific Plan is to "enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism." It has four main pillars: Economic Growth, Sustainable Development, Good Governance, and Security.

Good Governance is defined as

the transparent, accountable and equitable management of all resources. Good governance is a prerequisite for sustainable development and economic growth.

Under Good Governance, the activities for immediate implementation are the:

• Regional support to the Forum Principles of Good Leadership and Accountability
• Enhancement of governance mechanisms, including in resource management; and in the harmonisation of traditional and modern values and structures
• Where appropriate, ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights conventions, covenants and agreements and support for reporting and other requirements
• Development of a strategy to support participatory democracy and consultative decision-making (including NSAs [Non-State Actors], youth, women and disabled), and electoral processes.^[4]

For the ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights conventions, covenants and agreements and support for reporting and other requirements, the Plan aims to establish by 2007 a regional support mechanism that include the

drafting, harmonisation and promotion of awareness of rights-based domestic legislation within the Pacific, including: CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women] on gender; CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] on children; CERD [International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] on racial discrimination; ILO Convention 169 on rights of indigenous peoples; Article 50 of the Cotonou Agreement on labour rights; 1990 International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families; the Biwako Millennium Framework for people with disabilities; UNSCR1325 involving men and women in conflict resolution; human rights; and reciprocal enforcement.

These efforts are expected to intensify for "full implementation by end of 2008."

It lists as subject to further analysis the establishment of a "regional ombudsman and human rights mechanisms to support [the] implementation of Forum Principles of Good Leadership and Accountability, etc."^[5]

The Task Force,^[6] created to draft the Plan, listed as an identified regional initiative under the Good Governance pillar, the creation of a "Pacific Charter of Human Rights under a regional human rights commissioner, and national human rights mechanisms with associated education and training links."^[7] This suggestion was not completely included in the Pacific Plan since the Forum Leaders decided to do further study on the issue of regional human rights mechanisms.

Under Security (defined as the stable and safe social [or human] and political conditions necessary for, and reflective of, good governance and sustainable development for the achievement of economic growth), there are also human-rights-related activities in relation to the aim to

13.3 Strengthen law enforcement training (e.g. regional policing initiative), coordination and attachments.

This covers "[R]egional training courses, coordination initiatives and attachments [to be] upgraded by the end of 2008" on issues such as

customs; immigration; intelligence; family, domestic, gender and sexual violence; human rights; juvenile justice; drug control; exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrol programmes; accountability mechanisms; and military police.)

The Pacific Plan states that "[P]olitical oversight and guidance to the Secretariat is provided, during the year, by a Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC) , chaired by the Forum Chair and comprising representatives of all Pacific Island Forum Countries and Pacific territories."

Eminent Persons Group

The Pacific Plan was first recommended by an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which was established upon the agreement of the Leaders during their 34th meeting in Auckland. The Forum Leaders wanted the EPG to review the Forum and its Secretariat.

The EPG consisted of former Kiribati President Teburoro Tito, former PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, Samoan Ombudsman Maiava Iulai Toma, University of the South Pacific pro-Chancellor Dr. Langi Kavaliku, and retired Australian diplomat Bob Cotton. A larger Reflection Group, chaired by a Prime Minister and made up of other experts from the Pacific, acted as the sounding board for the EPG in the review process.^[8]

The EPG while acknowledging that the Pacific Islands Forum is "a cohesive regional force and an effective means of projecting the region's concerns to the wider world" observed that "...there are clear signs that the Forum needs re-interpreting and updating to meet changing needs, and a growing array of global and regional challenges."

Of the four major suggestions of the EPG on human rights, three were adopted for immediate implementation (ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights instruments, harmonization of traditional and modern values and structures, and development of strategy for participatory democracy and consultative decision-making), while the fourth one (regional human rights mechanism) was tabled for further analysis.

Relevance to ASEAN

The reinterpretation of the role of existing regional mechanism to meet present challenges provides an opportunity for the establishment of a mechanism for human rights. Both ASEAN and the Forum face the challenge of agreeing to a subregional human rights mechanism.

Both ASEAN and the Forum have agreed on concrete steps related to human rights. ASEAN has its Vientiane Action Programme (VAP). The Forum has a set of activities for immediate implementation during the 2007-2008 period under the Pacific Plan.

The Forum Leaders agreed to accelerate the integration of trade in services, including "temporary movement of labour" in the trade agreements. This is under the Economic Growth pillar.^[9] They are also studying the issue of "labour mobility" under the future regional economic integration scheme.^[10] Under the Good Governance pillar the Forum Leaders urged the ratification and implementation, "where appropriate," several international human rights instruments including that on the migrant workers rights. The ASEAN has agreed to form a committee on migrant workers to implement the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.^[11]

One major issue that has been considered by ASEAN, but not included in the Pacific Plan, is the role of the national human rights institutions. ASEAN has recognized under the VAP human rights section the need to strengthen the networking among the four existing national human rights institutions in Southeast Asia.^[12] With the planned ASEAN human rights body, these national human rights institutions may play a role also.

Finally, it is worth noting that both ASEAN and the Forum employed the services of an Eminent Persons Group to collect suggestions from various sectors of society and draft a set of proposals on a subregional document. ASEAN and the Forum have a special body that drafted the final document - the Task Force for the Forum, and the High Level Task Force for ASEAN. Both task forces, in varying ways, solicited suggestions from civil society in preparing their draft documents.

The July 2007 decision of the foreign ministers of ASEAN member-states to create a human rights body as well as a committee on migrant workers puts ASEAN in a better light than the Pacific Islands Forum in the field human rights. Much is to be seen however on how this headway will translate into an effective ASEAN machinery in the future.

Endnotes

1. This is formerly the South Pacific Forum until 2000.

2. The Auckland Declaration, The Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders Retreat, April 2004, Auckland in www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/A%20Pacific%20Plan.pdf

3. Ibid.

4. The Forum Leaders further narrowed the activities for immediate implementation to encouraging participatory democracy and implementation of international human rights instruments, Nadi Decisions on the Pacific Plan (October 2006) in www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/Nadi%20Decisions%20on%20the%20Pacific%20Plan,%20%20Annex%20A%20to%20the%202006%20Forum%20Communique.pdf

5. The Principles of Good Leadership, defined during the Leaders Meeting, have several human rights provisions:

PRINCIPLE 1

i) Respect for and upholding of democratic processes and institutions, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary and the legislature.

iii) Protection of fundamental human rights.

PRINCIPLE 2

Respect for cultural values, customs, traditions and indigenous rights and observation of traditional protocols in the exercise of power.

PRINCIPLE 3

Respect for religious belief and practice.

6. Pacific Plan Background Papers, October 2005, pages 2-3, for the terms of reference of the Task Force. It was composed of senior officials representatives from all Forum countries and representatives of regional organizations.

7. See Pacific Plan Background Papers, page 14.

8. See Group named to review Pacific Forum issues in www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=18248

9. See Attachment A: Implementation Strategy: Initiatives for the First Three Years (2006-2008), Pacific Plan, page 11.

10. Pacific Plan, page 8. The "labour mobility" is a crucial issue particularly for Australia which is being challenged to show its commitment to "free and open labour markets." Hugh White, "Pacific Plan puts Howard to the test" (October 10, 2005) in www.theage.com.au/news/hugh-white/pacific-plan-puts-howard-to-the-test/2005/10/09/112876408094.html

11. See Statement to Establish the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, 31 of July 2007.

12. They exist in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. In the Pacific, Australia, Fiji and New Zealand have national human rights institutions.

* Nobuki Fujimoto is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The coalition of cities in Asia and the Pacific against discrimination has changed its name in order to attract more cities to become members. In the first meeting of the Interim Steering Committee of the Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific (Coalition), held in Phnom Penh on 5-6 June 2007, the representatives of cities that signed the Statement of Intent^[1] to become members of the Coalition, in addition to representatives from other local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and experts, agreed by consensus to change the name of the Coalition from "Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific" to "Towards an Inclusive Society: Coalition of Cities against Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific."

They noted that the word "racism" was not well understood and in some cases local and national governments officials in several parts of Asia and the Pacific denied the existence of racism. They believed that one of the major reasons why many cities in the region have not yet joined the Coalition is the negative image of the Coalition with the word "racism" in its name.

The Coalition retains its original ten-point Commitment for Asia and the Pacific.

The participants agreed to expand the membership of the Coalition by taking advantage of various opportunities, especially the Second World Congress of United Cities and Local Governments (2nd UCLG World Congress), to be held in Jeju, South Korea in October 2007, where more than two thousand local leaders from one hundred-fifty countries will participate. They will debate on many issues related to local government. The Coalition will be officially launched on this occasion in close cooperation with UCLG-Asia-Pacific Regional Section (UCLG-ASPAC).

Experience sharing

The participants discussed several possibilities for thematic work that could be jointly carried out within the framework of the Coalition. They agreed to share experiences in, and ideas for, creating inclusive urban society.

Mr. Josefa Gavidi, Deputy Mayor of Suva, Mr. Takashi Hashimoto from Sakai City (Japan) and Mr. Trac Thai Sieng, Vice Governor of Phnom Penh, presented the respective experiences and programs of their cities as part of the experience-sharing exercise.

Mr. Gavidi presented a report^[2] on the program of the City of Suva against racial discrimination. He explained that Fiji has 51% Fijians and 43% Indian-descent Fijians. In terms of labor force, Fijians constitute 53%, while Indian-Fijians comprise 40%. The City of Suva faces several challenges regarding housing, discrimination, employment; and involving immigrants, faith minorities, sexual minorities, and people with disabilities. The City of Suva adopted an approach to diversity affecting five key categories: civic leader/policy maker, employer, provider of services, purchaser of goods, grant-giving agency. It adopted a policy requiring City and town divisions to integrate access, equity and diversity in their respective policies, services and programs. For the political leadership, it adopted several policies regarding recipients of City services, human rights and harassment, employment equity, community access, immigration and settlement, accessibility and racial profiling. He also explained how the City government implements its commitment to provide equal opportunity.

The Human Rights Promotion Division of Sakai City presented a report on the human rights measures of the city.^[3] The measures included the 2004 "The Sakai City Human Rights Promotion Basic Policy," the 2005 "Human Rights Promotion Plan" and the 2006 city ordinance entitled "City Development with Respect for Peace and Human Rights." The city ordinance aims

to clarify the responsibilities of the city and the roles of the citizens for the actualization of a city which promotes peace and human rights. This ordinance explicitly states that it is necessary for the city administration and citizens to work together with global perspectives for the realization of human security with regard to the international issues of peace and human rights. In addition, this ordinance requires the city to establish as an external body, a Human Rights Promotion Committee convening researchers to investigate and discuss the human rights policies of the city.

In 2002, Sakai City adopted the "Ordinance for the Promotion of a Gender Equal Society" which resulted in the creation of the Gender Equal Promotion Committee, and the adoption of the Sakai Gender Equal Participation Plan.

Sakai City has approximately 12,000 registered foreign residents with Koreans comprising roughly half of the foreign population. Chinese and Brazilians are the other major groups among them.

The city provides concrete support (such as livelihood, education, welfare projects), awareness (television program and printed materials) and protection (consultation) measures to address human rights problems.

Interim Steering Committee of the Coalition

The Phnom Penh meeting was the first one held by the Interim Steering Committee of the Coalition, ten months after the creation of the Coalition in August 2006 with Bangkok as the Lead City.^[4] UNESCO and the City of Phnom Penh organized the meeting. It was opened by H.E. Kep Chuk Tema, Governor of the City of Phnom Penh.

UNESCO, through its Social and Human Sciences Division, has been pursuing the establishment of an International Coalition of Cities against Racism as a global platform for a common struggle against racism since 2004. The Asia-Pacific Coalition is the fourth regional structure (in addition to European, African, and Latin American and the Caribbean coalitions, the Arab region is under preparation and one national coalition in Canada [Canadian Coalition of Municipalities]) that will comprise the International Coalition in 2008 during the 3rd World Forum on Human Rights to be held in Nantes, France (July 2008).

For more information, please visit UNESCO webpage at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1376 URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTIoN=201.html

Endnotes

1. The following cities and organizations are signatories to the Statement of Intent: Bangkok (Thailand), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Suva (Fiji), Makati (Philippines), Matale and Kurunegala (Sri Lanka), Incheon (Korea), United Cities and Local Governments - Asia Pacific Regional Section (UCLG-ASPAC), League of Municipalities of the Philippines, and All India Association of Local Bodies.

2. See this webpage for the full powerpoint presentation of Mr. Gavidi http://portal.unesco.org/s hs/en/file_down-load.php/48e5c900e8fd854abc376725f0965b14Presentation+on+the+City+of+Suva+Fiji+Islands.pdf

3. See this webpage for the full presentation on Sakai City program at http://portal.unesco.org /s hs/en/file_down-load.php/14ad3d5dd1e1d87a4fd5c8a3389d63cSakai+City+Presentation_EN.pdf

4. See Nobuki Fujimoto,

"Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific," in FOCUS Asia-Pacific 45:2006 for a report on the Bangkok meeting of the Coalition.

* Mr. Lee Kayoung is a staff of the Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute.

The Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute and HURIGHTS OSAKA jointly organized on 30 July 2007 a meeting on the initial report of Japan to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Ms. Aya Kuwayama of the Center for Prisoners' Rights made a report on the matter.

The Convention entered into force on 26 June 1987, but Japan ratified it only in 1999. It also submitted its initial report late, or only in 2005. Moreover, it remains reluctant to ratify the Optional Protocol.^[1] While there have been very little discussion within the country about this Convention, it may help in implementing the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights related to torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, etc.

Japanese Government Report

As required under the Convention, Japan as State Party submitted its initial report to the Committee Against Torture though five years late. Under the "constructive dialogue" scheme of the Committee, the presentation of the report was made on 9 May 2007 and lasted for a total of six hours. The Japanese Government representative gave an oral presentation, followed by questions from the Committee Members. On the following day, the Japanese Government representative responded to the Committee Members' questions, which were followed by further questions and answers from both sides respectively. The Committee had introduced a formal session for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for which they should find ways to fully utilize. Ms. Kuwayama participated in this session, and lobbied the Committee Members as a member of a coalition of Japanese NGOs called the CAT-Network, consisting of the Center for Prisoners' Rights Japan, Immigration Review Task Force, and the Tokyo Center for Mental Health and Human Rights.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a hearing on 20 April 2007 prior to the Committee session, but it was more of a briefing from the NGOs than an exchange of information. The results of the hearing were not reflected in the Government report, which was limited to a presentation of relevant provisions in the domestic laws. During the Committee session, there was a discussion on the complaint procedures in places of detention, but the Japanese Government representative's response did not go beyond what was written in the report.

The results of the NGO lobby could be seen in the Concluding Observations, such as in the reference to victims of trafficking and gender issues. Meanwhile, the issue of the refugee recognition process and that of treatment within immigration facilities were put together under the heading of prohibition of non-refoulement, which is probably problematic. As final recommendations, the Committee requested the Japanese Government to provide follow-up information within a year on issues of particular importance (non-refoulement, substitute prisons, confessions, trafficking in human beings).

Ms. Kuwayama stressed that the Concluding Observations of the Committee must be properly utilized. It can be used as material in legislative deliberations. Using the document to raise questions to the government during Diet sessions, as was done by M r. Nobuto Hosaka of the Social Democratic Party regarding the Concluding Observations and its views on the treaty monitoring process of the UN, is an example.

Lastly, she pointed out that the NGOs emphasize their criticisms on the responses of the Japanese Government to questions about its report. But in order to maximize the effect of the Concluding Observations, they need to be aware that they are also actors in implementing the Convention.

(Translated by Kimiko Okada)
For further information please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Endnote

1. The Optional Protocol is meant to "establish a system of regular visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 1.

Caste-based/caste-like discrimination has been very persistent despite the passage of laws prohibiting it and the implementation of special programs to help the discriminated overcome the problem

The persistence of this form of discrimination is a sign that those who support the discriminatory practice still do not accept its adverse effects on the victims. Some probably still believe that the victims deserve such discriminatory treatment. Hopefully, on the other hand, the victims do not see caste-based/caste-like discrimination as ordained fate

This form of discrimination is also persistent as it mutates into cyberspace hate crime

How can this social problem causing very dire consequences to victims be fully eliminated? How much more must be done to erase it from the societal fabric?

To such a persistent problem, a persistent approach is needed. There is no possibility of eliminating it by mere legal and even socio-economic measures. There must be persistence in finding other ways of addressing the problem, and persistence in implementing old and new measures over time

In the end, the elimination of caste-based/caste-like discrimination is dependent on the whole society's move towards respect for the humanity of the victims as much as recognition of the inhumanity of the discriminatory practice.

* N. Paul Divakar is presently the National Convenor of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR). NCDHR, formed in 1998, is a coalition of civil society organizations and Dalit activists to address the issues of human rights and development concerns of Dalits and strengthen the movement for the elimination of the practice of discrimination and Untouchability and violence against Dalits.

The so-called Scheduled Castes (SCs) of India, erstwhile Untouchable communities and presently termed Dalits by most movements and political bodies in the country, number 167.2 million people (2001 census). In addition, there are at least 42 million Muslim, Sikh and Christian Dalits who in one form or another are vulnerable to discrimination and also to different and particular form of backlash violence

Untouchability a crime

The Constitution of India not only guarantees equality, liberty, fraternity, justice and basic human rights as Fundamental Rights but also prohibits the practice of Untouchability in any form. Through the efforts Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the iconic leader of Dalits, who led the Dalit liberation movement and was the Chairperson of the Constitution Drafting Committee, the Constitution has made Untouchability a crime and provided safeguards against it. Article 17 of the Constitution abolished Untouchability and its practice in any form is forbidden. Article 25(2b) of the Constitution provides that Hindu religious institutions of a public character shall be open to all classes and sections of Hindus. This provision is contrary to the traditions of some sects of Hinduism that prohibits Scheduled Caste members from entering temples. Two important legislations were enacted to give effect to these articles. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 punishes the preaching and practice of Untouchability

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 criminalizes certain acts against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes such as traffic in human beings, 'begar (free labor)' and forced labor in any form. A related law, the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 provides for a special program for identifying bonded laborers, and for their liberation and rehabilitation. While this law does not specifically mention Scheduled Castes, it is especially significant to them because the majority of bonded laborers belong to the Scheduled Castes. Article 24 of this law provides that no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any hazardous employment. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 complements this law. The practice of requiring Dalits to clean/remove human feces by hand continues despite the prohibition of manual scavenging by the Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993

Rampant Untouchability despite law

A recent study on Untouchability in rural India,^[1] covering five hundred sixty five villages in eleven States, found that public health workers refused to visit Dalit homes in 33% of villages, and Dalit children sat separately while eating in 37.8% of government schools. Dalits were prevented from entering police stations in 27.6% of villages, did not get mail delivered to their homes in 23.5% of villages, and were denied access to water sources in 48.4% of villages

Backlash violence against those challenging Untouchability

Police statistics averaged over the past five years show that every week: thirteen Dalits are murdered, five Dalits' homes or possessions are burned, six Dalits are kidnapped or abducted; every day: three Dalit women are raped, eleven Dalits are beaten up; and for every eighteen minutes a crime is committed against a Dalit.^[2] This is despite the fact that many Dalits do not report crimes for fear of reprisals by the dominant castes. Despite twenty-seven officially registered atrocities being committed against Dalits every day, the police often prevents Dalits from entering police stations, neglect their cases and even partake in torture

Impunity and wilful negligence

The state machinery, especially the police, exhibits gross negligence of the plight of Dalits resulting in impunity. In a query raised by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andra Pradesh on a Public Interest Litigation case filed by Sakshi Human Rights Watch to the State Police Department,^[3] it admitted to 14,452 cases with delayed filing of charge sheet beyond the stipulated period of thirty days as per the SC/ST POA Act. This means insurmountable impunity resulting in denial of justice to the victims of violence

Multiple forms of discrimination and Violence

The discrimination against the Dalits takes different forms such as:

a. Dalit Women: They face double discrimination on the basis of caste and gender in all spheres of life and are subjected with impunity to gross violations of their physical integrity, including sexual abuse by dominant castes; they are socially excluded and economically exploited. The practice of 'divine prostitution' (Jogini/Devadasi systems) continues even today despite laws prohibiting this menace affecting the Dalit women

b. Communities involved in manual scavenging: Of the more the 1.2 million manual scavengers, over 95% are Dalits. They are compelled to undertake this inhuman and degrading task under the garb of 'traditional occupation'. The practice of manual scavenging is illegal and unconstitutional and a blot on the face of humanity. But it still continues

c. Exclusion from political participation: Many reports from across the country reveal that Dalits' exercise of their legitimate and rightful claim to representation (namely participation or leadership in the electoral process) is met with violence

d. 'Discrimination by Default': The 2005 Asian Tsunami demonstrated that all levels of authority involved in responding to the tragedy practiced Untouchability. Aid was distributed through caste panchayats, and those who called themselves traditionally as 'fisherfolk by birth' were given priority on receiving aid. These organizations proved efficient in distributing aid in their community, but excluded some people including Dalits regardless of loss or suffering. This was done through coercion as well as simple exclusion. Higher authorities or donors did nothing to ensure equitable distribution

f. Education: Untouchability in schools has contributed to drop-out and illiteracy levels for Dalit children far beyond those of the general population, with the 'literacy gap' continuing between Dalits and non-Dalits and literacy rates for Dalit women remaining as low as 37.8% in rural India (2001 Census). Teachers have been found to maintain discriminatory attitudes and practices that underlie caste relations in society

g. Nutrition: Half of India's Dalit children are undernourished, 21% are 'severely underweight', and 12% die before their 5^th birthday.^[4]

h. Exclusion from budget: The Government of India has a potentially powerful mechanism for the economic empowerment of Dalits known as Special Component Plan (SCP). The spirit of the Plan has been consistently thwarted in its application and implementation by most of the departments at the Central and States levels, by diverting on an average Euro 2,000 million (2.7 billion US dollars) every year^[5] during the past five-year plan period

i. Labor market: Like other sectors Dalits also face discrimination in the labor market. This is clearly exhibited in exclusion of Dalits from employment by 'higher caste'; exclusion of 'low caste' from certain types of jobs/work due to notion of pollution and purity associated with Untouchability; selective inclusion in employment but with unequal treatment reflected (i) in lower wages (lower than wages given to other laborers), (ii) in terms and conditions with respect to hours of work, (iii) different behavior by employers towards low caste laborer /worker in the work place, and (iv) compulsive and forced work governed by traditional caste related obligations.^[6]

j. Economic exclusion and discrimination: Through differential pricing in sale, purchase and hiring activities ranging from raw materials to finished goods Dalits are disadvantaged.^[7] They are also denied the sale or purchase of land for agriculture and non-agricultural use

Persistent denial in the United Nations

While the situation of the Dalits still warrants special and urgent measures and interventions by various bodies of the state and the civil society, the state is still in a dilemma in its commitment to challenge the precipitation of the mindset of Untouchability and the resulting caste-based discrimination. While, at the time of Independence and thereafter, the Indian state did recognize and take constitutional and legislative remedies to correct the injustices caused, gross gaps in their implementation result in impunity. This mindset is also reflected in the actions of India at the United Nations (UN) and its various bodies that could have addressed the situation of discrimination and exclusion. It declined to address the issue in the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Relate Intolerance (WCAR) held in Durban, South Africa from 31 August-8 September 2001

Dalits betrayed

There is a strong comfort level in society and the state that crimes against Dalits do not need to be punished. This attitude of impunity is rooted in social and cultural values and persists in society despite the constitutional provisions against it. Protecting the rights of marginalized and vulnerable people is probably the most overlooked and disregarded area of human rights in India

However there is a clear departure from this denial through a realistic acknowledgment of the situation. Manmohan Singh, the President of India, at an international conference on Dalits and Minorities in New Delhi on the 27 November 2006^[8] drew the parallel between social and caste injustices saying it was modern India's failure that millions of Dalits were still fighting prejudice. He explained:

Even after 60 years of constitutional and legal protection and support, there is still social discrimination against Dalits in many parts of our country. Dalits have faced a unique discrimination in our society that is fundamentally different from the problems of minority groups in general. The only parallel to the practice of untouchability was apartheid.

For further information, please contact: N. Paul Divakar, National Convenor of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), 36/12, 1st Floor, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi - 110 008, Mobile: +91 99100 46813, pdivakar@ncdhr.org;www.dalits.org

Endnotes

1. Shah, Mander, Thorat, Deshpande and Baviskar, Untouchability in Rural India. Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006

2. Based on Crime in India 2005, http://ncrb.nic.in/crime2005/home.htm and http://ncrb.nic.in/crime2005/cii-2005/CHAP7.pdf

3. Writ Petition No. 1019 of 2006, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, filed by Sakshi Human Rights Watch, Response by the State Police Department in Annexure R-2/1

4. National Family Health Survey, commissioned by the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 1998-99 (last survey available), page 11, www.nfhsindia.org/data/india/indch6.pdf

5. Calculated from Expenditure Budget Vol. II (Notes on demands for Grants), Union Budget 2006-07; Statement No. 21, Expenditure Budget Vol. I, Union Budget 2006-07; Outcome Budget 2006-07- for various Ministries of Central Government

6. Sukhadeo Thorat, M. Mahamallik, and Ananth Panth. Caste, Occupation and Labour Market Discrimination: A Study of Forms, Nature and Consequences in Rural India. Report Submitted to International Labour Organization, New Delhi, India, January 2006

7. Ibid

8. The Guardian, 28 December 2006 - reporting the Prime Minister of India's inaugural address on the occasion of the International Conference on Dalits and Minorities in New Delhi, 27-28 December 2006.

In the early summer of 2001, two tragedies struck the Kansai region in western Japan. In June 2001, a man broke into a primary school, stabbed eight young children to death, and injured many more before getting subdued and arrested. In July 2001, people rushing to and from a fireworks display on the beach crushed ten young children and two elderly people to death on an overcrowded pedestrian overpass

Subsequently, vicious messages began to appear on an internet message board called "2 Channel" insinuating that the victims of the incidents were of Buraku origin and praising the perpetrators. These messages are examples of the rising number of discrimination messages on Japanese cyberspace

Discrimination on the internet

Discrimination on the Japanese internet is a serious challenge. A study on the extent of discriminatory postings on the internet in 2002 shows that 75.8% of the messages involved discrimination against people of Buraku origin. What is being aired in cyberspace is a reflection of the actual situation in society, and the figure indicates the extent of discrimination against people of Buraku origin that remains in the minds of the Japanese people

The study shows that postings included messages slandering particular groups of people (those of Buraku origin, Korean residents, people with disabilities and people recovering from Hansen's disease), statements inciting discrimination as well as listing of the locations of Buraku areas

Discriminatory postings, including on the Buraku issue in general, on the internet continue to proliferate in many prefectures in Japan, and recently seem to have become worse. Some use websites set up abroad, or anonymous websites to attack a particular individual or organization. There have been serious cases, in which even the families have come under attack. The worsening situation is confirmed by data from the Ministry of Justice, which indicate an annual increase in the number of human rights violations on the internet from seventeen cases in 1999 to one hundred ninety-nine cases in 2004

A recent trend seems to be postings on sites that can only be accessed by mobile phones. Numerous discriminatory messages on the electronic message boards on such sites are posted. It is very likely that those writing and reading such messages are junior and senior high school students. One site uses an internet provider in the United States

Combating discriminatory messages

The internet messages discriminatory to people of Buraku origin and the Korean residents that came out subsequent to the stabbing of school children and the deaths in a stampede, prompted some members of the Nara Prefectural Liaison Council for the Promotion of Awareness Raising on Human Rights and Dowa Affairs (Keihatsu Renkyo) to create a special unit to combat discrimination on the internet

Keihatsu Renkyo is composed of representatives of departmental sections within the local governments of the municipalities in Nara Prefecture, responsible for public awareness-raising on human rights and Dowa affairs. These awareness-raising programs aim at public opinion that supports an environment that does not allow human rights violations to happen. Keihatsu Renkyo was established in 1988 to make more effective the local governments' efforts at human rights awareness programs. The local governments are duty-bound to provide the social environment that enables the public to participate in learning about human rights and join in actions toward eliminating discrimination

Keihatsu Renkyo became the core organization combating discriminatory postings on the internet in Nara prefecture. It launched in 2002 the Project Conference on Discriminatory Messages on the Internet (Project Conference) to study the issue. Initially conceived as a project team within the Keihatsu Renkyo, the Project Conference includes a broader range of people - local government staff members, representatives of civil society organizations working on human rights education and anti-discrimination, as well as private companies. By the time the Project Conference was set up, there were eighty participants

Project Conference activities

The Project Conference spent its first year mostly increasing the understanding of this form of discrimination, through study meetings. In the second year, it began to study the scope of the problem. An "internet station" was set up within the municipal hall of Nara Prefecture, as the base from which to conduct the studies. It tries to persuade operators of internet sites found to have discriminatory messages to delete such abusive postings, and to raise the issue among relevant people

In one case, it discovered a series of postings on a site targeting a teacher and naming her as well as the school she worked in, and repeatedly emphasizing that she was of Buraku origin. The postings continued persistently for about two months. The team working on it decided that it was necessary to notify the relevant authorities, the Keihatsu Renkyo secretariat and parties, involved in view of the seriousness of the case. The Keihatsu Renkyo secretariat informed the human rights office of the Prefectural Government of Osaka, and also tried to contact the website operator to request deletion of the postings. The site was eventually found to have been set up by an unknown individual, who could not be contacted. The case was documented and the records kept for future use as teaching material

It is seriously monitoring mobile phone sites that host discriminatory messages, as the possibility that young people in Nara accessing it is very high

The Project Conference also organizes annual symposiums, supports educational initiatives (including the development of teaching materials). It started computer classes as part of the efforts to eliminate illiteracy and fill in the "digital divide." It has grown into an organization with fifty teams, and two hundred fifty members

In the 2004 symposium, it adopted the following actions to take on the fight against discriminatory messages:

1. Raise public opinion against discriminatory postings on the internet message boards, and create a nation-wide sentiment and movement.
2. Strongly demand the deletion of postings that violate human rights
3. Initiate judicial proceedings against pernicious postings
4. Call for more effective legislative measures
5. Widen the circle of people who take a stand against discriminatory postings.

Although Keihatsu Renkyo made some progress in its activities, it still faces an uphill struggle in combating the remaining problems. In particular, human rights awareness-raising activities within the information society and remedial measures for the victims of human rights violations in cyberspace remain insufficiently effective. It bears in mind that at the start of its efforts over 70% of the discriminatory postings involved Buraku issues. It needs to confirm once again that the activities it undertakes are a part of efforts to eliminate Buraku discrimination

For further information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

* Heidi Han is a human rights defender based in Bangkok, Thailand.

Thailand has become a transit destination for North Korean asylum seekers. On 22 August 2006, Thai authorities arrested one hundred seventy-five North Koreans in Bangkok. To show that they were keen on enforcing the law against illegal crossing of Thai borders, the Thai authorities immediately brought charges against them in court. Having been found guilty by the court, they were jailed for failing to pay the fines. Despite the threat of imprisonment, North Koreans prefer to cross the porous Thai border. The number of North Korean asylum seekers is expected to increase as the international sanctions against the North Korean government continue to loom

Those who decide to undertake the journey towards Thailand are not certain of their future although they know it is a little more hopeful than the journey towards China. One thing they are sure of is that, for the time being, the Thai government cannot push them back after crossing the border. According to a church-based non-governmental organization (NGO) in Thailand, once the asylum seekers reach the Thai border, they cannot be pushed back since North Korea is more than 7,000 kilometers away. Most North Koreans turn themselves in willingly to the police fully aware that they will be taken cared by humanitarian groups and by the South Korean government. However, the journey to the Thai border is a different story. During the long trail, some are kidnapped by human traffickers, and are forced to pay high costs to be able to slip through the Thai border. Human traffickers profit from the trade, taking an upfront payment (which can be as high as $10,500 per person).^[1]

A North Korean asylum seeker detained in the immigration detention center in Bangkok explained that many chose Thailand not only because of tighter Chinese patrol, but also because Vietnam, Laos, and Burma recently enforced stricter border patrol. She said that until a few years ago, Vietnam was considered to be the most accessible transit country for North Koreans. But this perception has changed

The change of perception and plans led more North Korean asylum seekers to Thailand that put the Thai government in a dilemma. While it still accepts those crossing its border, and allows international organizations to provide assistance to them, the growing number of asylum seekers pouring in will strain Thailand's limited resources and personnel. It may find pushing the North Korean asylum seekers back to Laos and Burma, which will ultimately lead to their deportation, a viable option. The South Korean government and the UNHCR have stepped in, without a concerted international effort, to address the issue and ensure the protection of the North Korean asylum seekers

Problem of detention

At the moment, the Thai government is sensitive to the concern of the international community about the mistreatment of North Koreans. With international attention focused on the actions of the Thai government since the military coup, any harsh response against the asylum seekers will invite condemnation by the United Nations and NGOs. Yet, in April 2007, over four hundred North Korean asylum seekers went on a hunger strike at a detention center in Bangkok. "They are angry at extended delays in bringing them to the South [Korea]," according to Lee Ho-Taeg of the International Campaign to Block the Repatriation of North Korean Refugees.^[2] The North Korean asylum seekers on hunger strike were part of a group that was supposed to leave for South Korea, but held up for three months.^[3] In addition to the one hundred asylum seekers waiting to leave, four hundred more North Korean asylum seekers joined the hunger strike, in hopes of better treatment in the detention center

The hunger strike became a protest not only against the delayed response of the international community to the plight of asylum seekers, but also the harsh living conditions in the detention center. The center, built for one hundred people, holds over four hundred detainees. And three hundred of them are women who are forced to share one toilet

The UNHCR appealed to the Thai government to address the conditions in the detention center. The South Korean government, on the other hand, held closed-door negotiations with the Thai government on the issue. A resolution of the issue was subsequently announced, ending the hunger strike. But both governments failed to elaborate or provide details on their agreement. The South Korean government justified the secret negotiations to avoid NGOs from taking action that would provoke the North Korean government into enforcing stricter control over its citizens, which it believed would not help the asylum seekers

One newspaper^[4] reported that "For whatever the reason, the South Korean government is not bringing these refugees who have been waiting for release even though the procedures have been finalized and the airplane tickets have been obtained." NGOs believed, on the other hand, that about twenty North Korean asylum seekers would be granted passage to a third country per month under the agreement, which they found inadequate since the detention center was a virtual prison. One newspaper said that the asylum seekers were "dying a slow death inside."^[5]

International response and enhanced capacity for protection

With predictions of worsening economic conditions and an upcoming famine, the international community must at least provide assistance to strengthen the capacity of the few facilitators and assistance providers in helping those choosing to cross the Thai border.^[6]

The international community has to deplore the situation in North Korea that caused thousands of North Koreans to flee. At the same time, the international community must also urge the Thai authorities not to repatriate the North Korean refugees, since they and their families will face dire consequences.   Indeed, Thailand, in view of its "long tradition of hospitality towards refugees" and as a "responsible member of the international community" must seek a solution by sending the asylum seekers to a third country of their choice after their 30-day jail sentence expires

Countries willing to take in the North Korean asylum seekers should at the earliest opportunity announce their intention to do so to prevent asylum seekers from being kept in detention longer than necessary

For further information please contact: Heidi Han, heidih@korea.ac.kr.

Endnotes

1. Simon Montlake, "Swell of North Korean refugees could strain Thailand's tolerance," Christian Science Monitor, September 2006

2. "NKorea refugees on hunger strike in Thailand", AFP, April 2007

3. Based on statement of Ms. Kitty McKinsey, spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

4. Kim Song-A, "400 Defectors on a Hunger Strike Requesting Relocation to South Korea", Daily NK, 26 April 2007

5. Quoted from Peter Jung (Seoul-based Humanitarian Worker) of Justice for North Korea and also in " North Korean refugees in Thailand reach asylum deal", Reuters, 27 April 2007

6. Yonhap, a South Korean news agency, amplified the need for coordinated international efforts in response to the hunger strike by reporting that "Activists claim that 622 North Korean defectors were arrested since 2003 at the checkpoint of Mae Sai in northern Thailand. Of those, 367 entered the country illegally last year." " Four hundred N. Korean defectors go on hunger strike in Thailand: activists", Yonhap News Agency, 25 April 2007.

The arbitrary deprivation of life is reprehensible and unjustifiable; killings perpetrated in the guise of "maintaining peace and order in society," or "combating terrorism," or "protecting the stability of the nation," are unacceptable excuses for the killings of suspected criminal offenders, journalists and opponents of the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, now taking place throughout the Philippines. This report contains information relevant to understanding the phenomenon of extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions in the Philippines

Killings of political opponents

The number of political opponents summarily executed remains in dispute. Philippine government bodies tasked to investigate political killings admit there are about 100 or so victims killed between 2001 and 2006. The human rights community, on the other hand, claims there are between 103^[1] to 819^[2] victims for the same period

The disparity between figures cited by government and the human rights community can perhaps be traced to non-cooperation by victims' families and witnesses with government agencies. Victims' families and witnesses fear reprisal; some claim they were warned against providing information on the killings of their loved ones. Others have no faith or have lost trust in the very agencies tasked to investigate the killings, believing, rightly or wrongly, that these agencies-or other agents of government-are responsible for the killings. Hence many witnesses and victims' families have not cooperated with government agencies investigating the killings

The disparity between figures cited by members of the human rights community is perhaps best explained by two factors: first, one group includes those killed during military operations while the other does not; second, each group documents cases of victims within their respective spheres

Women and men who have opposed the present administration have fallen victim to political killings; data from human rights groups indicates more men than women have been killed

Most victims of political killings were shot to death.^[3] The modus operandi of political killings follow similar patterns: victims first receive death threats, sometimes via unsigned letters or through text messages received on their mobile phones. Victims then notice some form of surveillance on their homes, offices or places they frequent, complaining to their families or to their organizations of persons following them. In some cases, leaflets labeling the victim as a "communist-terrorist" are distributed within the community where the victim resides. In other cases, soldiers conduct "public meetings" where they present a version of the power point presentation "Knowing the Enemy" and read aloud the names of "wanted persons" listed in the "Military Order of Battle;" some victims were reportedly among those listed in the "Military Order of Battle." Victims are shot, sometimes in public places, sometimes at home, by assailants in teams of between four to six armed men, in civilian clothing, riding motorcycles with bonnets or bandanas covering their faces

Some victims of political killings belong to-or are affiliated with-organizations identified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as "enemies."

Sometime in 2005, a power point presentation entitled "Knowing the Enemy, " produced by the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, became available to the public. The power point presentation consists of 335 slides; among others, it presents what it calls the "strategic development of the Communist Party of the Philippines;" it also identifies the alleged "echelon of alliances" of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the "role" these "alliances" play in the "protracted people's war."

The power point presentation does not only identify the alleged "echelon of alliances," but names some fifty-four organizations and groups, calling them "legal fronts" or "legal front organizations" of the Communist Party of the Philippines-thus, "enemies" of the state

Also in 2005, the Headquarters of the Northern Luzon Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines released a book entitled "Trinity of War Book III. " The book, like the power point presentation discussed above, presents the history and strategies of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the "Philippine Revolutionary Movement." It also delves into the "echelon of alliances" and describes the facets of work of the Communist Party and its "echelon of alliances." The book contains a series of annexes entitled "Watchlist CPP-NPA-NDF Allied Organizations;" many organizations in the "watch list" are similarly identified in the power point presentation

These so-called "watch lists" contravene the 1987 Constitution, which mandates full respect for the political beliefs and aspirations of all Filipinos;^[4] the Constitution not only upholds the rights of Filipinos to form and join organizations, but also encourages them to do so.^[5] The Constitution even forbids the arrest and detention of persons "solely by reason of [their] political beliefs and aspirations."^[6]

Also, there are no existing laws that authorize the identification of organizations as "enemies." Republic Act 1700,^[7] the Anti-Subversion Law, which, among others, outlawed "subversive organizations," has since been repealed by Republic Act 7636.^[8] No "anti-terrorism" bills, which propose to outlaw "terrorist organizations," have yet been passed by Congress

In addition, it is unclear what standards, if any, were applied to warrant the inclusion of organizations like the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, founded on 15 February 1945 as the Catholic Welfare Organization, primarily to address the aftermath of the Second World War,^[9] or the Free Legal Assistance Group, founded in 1974 to provide free legal services to victims of human rights violations in the martial law era, in the so-called "watch list of enemies of the state."

It is also unclear, who, specifically, included or ordered the inclusion of organizations, and what capacities, if any, such entity or individual possesses. Neither is it clear what process, if any, was followed. The identification of an organization as an "enemy" based solely on the discretion of the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is dangerous, as the killings of political opponents indicate

The identification of organizations as "enemies" appears part of the government's anti-insurgency campaign. The legal amendment that puts the primary responsibility to suppress the insurgency and address serious threats to internal security on the Armed Forces of the Philippines; ^[10] may be inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on supremacy of the civilian authority over the military, and on the goal of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to secure "the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory."

Arguably, this constitutional provision may be interpreted as limiting the role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the defense of the country from threats by external or foreign aggressors. This interpretation was apparently adopted by the Philippine Congress when it enacted, in 1990, Republic Act 6975.^[11] Section 12 of this law assigned the Department of the Interior and Local Government-and the Philippine National Police-the "primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the Armed Forces of the Philippines the primary role of preserving external security."

However, this interpretation was abandoned in 1998, with the enactment of Republic Act 8551 (Annex 7).^[12] Section 3 of this law relieved the Department of the Interior and Local Government-and the Philippine National Police-of primary responsibility over internal security matters and mandated the Philippine National Police to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines through "information gathering and performance of ordinary police functions."

The support role of the Philippine National Police was further strengthened in 2006 by the adoption of Executive Order 546,^[13] which directed it to provide "active support" to the Armed Forces of the Philippines even in combat operations

The National Internal Security Plan, the guiding policy document on "threats to internal security," was written sometime in 2004 and has since been "enhanced;" it is a "classified" document, not available to the public.^[14] FLAG has, however, requested copies of portions of the Plan-or other documents that discuss the Plan-that are not "classified."

The strategic framework of the National Internal Security Plan is what is referred to as the "holistic"^[15] or "whole of government"^[16] approach to internal security. The Accomplishment Report of the Department of National Defense for the period covering January to June 2004 describes the strategy thus:

The strategy of the Holistic Approach is a coordinated, synchronized, interrelated and mutually supporting campaign of the whole government machinery and its resources to uplift the socio-economic condition of the Filipino people, particularly those at the local levels.^[17]

The "holistic" or "whole of government" strategy to internal security has four major components: (a) political, legal, diplomatic; (b) information; (c) socio-economic and psychosocial; and (d) security. It is pursued through Internal Security Operations Plans, employing the operational strategy of "Operations, Intelligence, Civil Military Operations, ... in coordination with civilian government agencies"^[18] that seek to "clear, hold, consolidate and develop insurgent areas." ^[19]

Apparently part of the "political, legal, diplomatic" component of the National Internal Security Plan is the creation of the Inter Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) through Executive Order 493,^[20] tasked "to provide effective and efficient handling and coordination of the investigative and prosecutorial aspects of the fight against threats to national security." FLAG believes the creation of IALAG signals unwarranted intrusion by the military intelligence community into principally civilian functions

The National Security Adviser leads IALAG; its members include representatives from the Departments of Justice, National Defense, Interior and Local Government, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, and such other units tasked by the National Security Adviser

IALAG's principal task is to "coordinate all national security cases." Executive Order 493 classifies the following as "national security cases:" rebellion, sedition and related offenses, and "national interest cases that threaten national security."

It is important to note that no similar body was created to "coordinate" the cases against those responsible for the killings of political opponents, journalists and suspected criminal offenders. No additional funds were appropriated for this purpose

Other activities conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in many parts of the country also seem to be part of the "psycho-social" and "security" components of the National Internal Security Plan. In some parts of the country, residents are required to present their residence certificates upon demand by soldiers; even children and minors are reportedly required to present residence certificates (known in local parlance as cedula), even if the law on residence certificates does not require persons below 18 years of age to secure these certificates.^[21] Failure to present cedulas is perceived by soldiers as tacit admission that the person failing to present a cedula is part of the insurgency, hence said person is often arrested without warrant, or interrogated without the presence of counsel, or placed on a "watch list," or otherwise harassed. Persons placed on a "watch list" or "order of battle" are "invited" to present themselves before the military at a military camp "to clear their names." These persons are then "questioned," "interrogated" or "investigated" by soldiers without the presence of counsel; some are tortured; others who may be released are "required" to report to military camps, sometimes twice a day. In other parts of the country, checkpoints manned by "civilian volunteers," including persons who have been forcibly required to man checkpoints, or by soldiers, are often set up in strategic points throughout the province, to monitor all entries and departures; at these checkpoints, persons are often subjected to "questioning." These actions often take place in areas with the highest numbers of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; as a result, residents, including families of victims and witnesses to the executions, are in a state of constant fear; it is not surprising therefore why victims' families and witnesses refuse to cooperate with government in the investigation of cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

For the full document, please contact: Maria Socorro Diokno, Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), Room 204 Cabrera II Building, 64 Timog Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines; ph (632) 96-54-77; fax (632) 817-5410 Attn.Diokno 14862 SCC BH PS; e-mail: flag@flag.com.ph

Endnotes

1. Data supplied by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines

2. Data supplied by KARAPATAN; KARAPATAN admits that their documentation includes those killed during military operations

3. Data supplied by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines indicates that 102 of 103 victims were shot; 1 victim was stabbed; data supplied by KARAPATAN indicates that 817 of 819 victims were shot to death, while 2 victims were stabbed to death

4. Section 18(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution

5. Section 8, Article III, in relation to Section 23, Article II, 1987 Constitution

6. Section 18(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution

7. As amended by Presidential Decrees Numbers 885, 1736, 1835 and 1975; revived by Executive Order No. 167 and amended by Executive Order No. 276

8. "An Act Repealing Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Seven Hundred, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Anti-Subversion Act," 22 September 1992

9. The Catholic Welfare Organization was later reorganized into the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines on January 31, 2968

10. Section 3, amending Section 12 of Republic Act 6975, 25 February 1998

11. "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes."

12. "An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police and for Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred and Seventy-Five Entitled 'An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes.'"

13. "Directing the Philippine National Police to Undertake Active Support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Internal Security Operations for the Suppression of Insurgency and Other Serious Threats to National Security Amending Certain Provisions of Executive Order No. 110 series of 1999 and for Other Purposes," 14 July 2006

14. Information supplied by Defense Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor, in a telephone conversation with Maria Socorro I. Diokno, on 4 January 2007. During the conversation, Ms. Diokno requested copies or portions of the "enhanced" National Internal Security Plan, as well as copies or portions of Oplan Bantay Laya I and II, that are not classified documents. As of the date of this report, no documents were provided Ms. Diokno

15. Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report January to June 2004, at http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html

16. 4^th Whereas Clause, Executive Order No. 546, "Directing the Philippine National Police to Undertake Active Support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Internal Security Operations for the Suppression of Insurgency and Other Serious Threats to National Security Amending Certain Provisions of Executive Order No. 110 series of 1999 and for Other Purposes," 14 July 2006

17. http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html

18. Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report January to June 2004, at http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/accreport.html

19. General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Knowing the Enemy power point presentation, 2005

20. "Providing for the Creation of the Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) for the Coordination of National Security Cases," 17 January 2006

21. Sections 156 to 164, Article VI of the Local Government Code govern residence certificates, now known as Community Tax Certificates

Section 157 mandates that every inhabitant of the country aged 18 or over, who has been regularly employed on a wage or salary basis for at least 30 consecutive working days during the calendar year, or who is engaged in business or in an occupation, or who owns real property with an aggregate assessed value of PhP 1,000 (21 US dollars) or more or who is required by law to file an income tax return must pay community tax. See Section 157, Article VI, Local Government Code.

* This article is the second of a two-part series on the role of NHRIs in protecting and promoting the ESC rights of women

Typically, NHRIs have a mandate to receive and act upon complaints of human rights violations from civil society. Most NHRIs are also empowered to undertake enquiries on their own initiative (suo moto) into particular human rights situations or issues. Both of these powers can be extremely important in highlighting and addressing the issues women face in the realization of their ESC rights, and reporting on how the Government implements national laws and international instruments which promote these rights of women

Many NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific region are indeed conducting investigations into cases involving violations of women's ESC rights, including the National Human Rights Commission of India which in a 2004 case of a female bonded laborer, ensured the woman received compensation and was rehabilitated.^[1]

Investigating systemic violations

ESC rights issues typically include those that are more systemic in nature, rather than individual complaints. NHRIs are well positioned to raise systemic issues of human rights violations with authorities. For example, NHRIs can conduct general inquiries or undertake research and investigative studies on a particular issue or violation of women's ESC rights

In 1998, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission undertook a National Inquiry into issues relating to pregnancy and workplace discrimination. The inquiry involved extensive research and consultations with employers, employees, unions, health professionals, employer associations, government agencies, community groups and school students in metropolitan, regional and rural areas. The report entitled Pregnant and Productive: It's a right not a privilege to work while pregnant details the findings of the inquiry and makes 46 recommendations. The report evidences the existence of widespread and systemic discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and potential pregnancy in Australian workplaces.^[2]

NHRIs can also develop, in cooperation with academic and research institutions, methodological and practical tools for mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policy areas. The National Human Rights Commission of India has conducted and/or commissioned several research studies in the area of ESC rights as they relate to women. For example, in 2004 the Indian NHRC commissioned a study on the Feminization of Poverty and Impact of Globalization - A Study of Women Construction Labourers in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. This research study was conducted by the Sarojini Naidu Centre for Women's Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, and aimed to project the appalling conditions of women construction labourers and suggest measures for improving them.^[3]

Monitoring the ESC rights of women

A State's performance of its human rights obligations must be monitored to ensure that the obligations are being met. Monitoring performance with regard to obligations relating to the ESC rights of women is especially important, particularly because of the obligation of progressive realization of ESC rights, and the fact that women are typically a disadvantaged group

In July 2005 during the time of the conflict between the Maoists and the State, the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal conducted a month-long monitoring mission on the rights of the children, including the girl child, in armed conflict. In the course of monitoring, the teams of the Commission gathered significant information on various issues related to the rights of children in 11 districts, giving special attention to extra-judicial killings and maiming, use and recruitment of child soldiers, attacks inside schools and use of schools in the conflict, rape and other violent acts against children, abduction and illegal detention of children, and refusal of humanitarian assistance to children. During the monitoring mission, the team also organized several interactions with local people including representatives of civil society and various administrative authorities in the districts, as well as representatives of the Maoists, calling upon them to respect children's rights, and to include schools in the zone of peace while respecting international humanitarian law

In another example, the Monitoring and Review Division of the NHRI of Sri Lanka carried out several surprise visits to State Women's Detention Centers and Children's Homes in 2006. The purpose of these visits was to monitor the conditions within these custodial institutions, and to make recommendations to change policy regarding women's ESC rights, as well as to raise the awareness of Center inmates and staff through a series of workshops. Specific women's rights addressed included the rights to education, health, food and housing. Immediate results from the monitoring activity included an improvement of the quality of food provided to women inmates, the establishment of medical facilities within certain Centers, and the provision of schooling and vocational training for children in Children's Detention Centers

Development of national human rights action plans

An NHRI can make a significant contribution to the development, adoption and implementation of a national human rights action plan and, in particular, can ensure that the plan includes issues relating to the ESC rights of women. NHRIs can ensure the inclusion of a commitment to take legislative and administrative measures to entrench the recognition and observance of ESC rights, the elimination of discrimination in the observance of ESC rights, as well as a commitment to effective means of redress for violations of such rights. An NHRI can also support the integration of a strong gender perspective in the national human rights action plan, and ensure that such plans are informed by and consistent with a comprehensive strategy for gender equality

NHRIs should participate in both the national coordinating committee and in wider consultative activities. NHRIs are also well placed to ensure that a wide array of actors in civil society are consulted, and can facilitate and coordinate dialogue between the government, relevant NGOs, and other civil society organizations and individuals

Where national plans have been developed to date in countries that have NHRIs, these institutions have usually been closely involved in the planning process. For example, in Indonesia, an Inter-Departmental Standing Committee on Human Rights drew up the Indonesian National Plan of Action on Human Rights 1998-2003 in cooperation with the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights. Much of the input for the human rights action plan came from a National Workshop on Human Rights held in 1994, which was attended by some 300 participants from government, civil society and the Indonesian NHRI

In some cases, NHRIs may be called upon to take a leading role in coordinating the implementation of the plan. Where this happens, it should still be clearly recognized that the commitments in the plan impose obligations on governments to take appropriate action and that responsibility for ensuring achievement of the plan's objectives cannot be transferred to non-governmental bodies.^[4] For example, a feature of the Philippines Human Rights Plan 1996 - 2002 was the central role given to the Philippines Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) in coordinating its implementation, as well as overseeing its monitoring and review process. The plan also included a number of issues, including those relating to the ESC rights of women.^[5]

Promotion and human rights education

As the second focus of their mandate, NHRIs are required to undertake programs on human rights education and sensitization. NHRIs can promote public awareness of the issues around the realization of the ESC rights of women by:

• issuing public statements on issues related to women's ESC rights;
• publishing research studies on these issues;
• developing and disseminating publications using the media (radio, television, print, internet) effectively in disseminating information; and
• conducting national workshops and hearings on issues relating to women's ESC rights.

Increased public awareness of the issues encourages victims of such violations to access the NHRI. As well, there is heightened awareness of state obligations around these rights by the government, as well as civil society

Around the issues of sexual harassment in the workplace, for example, numerous Asia-Pacific NHRIs have developed and disseminated publications and materials, including the national institutions from Australia, India, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Fiji

In addition, the National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), in collaboration with the UNDP, organized a High-Level Policy Dialogue on A Human Rights Perspective on MDGs and Beyond in July 2005. This session included a focus on Millennium Development Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women, and Millennium Development Goal 5: Improve maternal health. One of the main objectives of the dialogue was to facilitate the development of country-specific MDG targets and indicators for Malaysia. Among the issues discussed were the poverty level of female-headed households, the low female labor force participation, the lower-level employment of women, and maternal health. From the workshop, a series of recommendations were put to government.^[6]

Training specific target groups

NHRIs can also develop and conduct trainings and workshop on the ESC rights of women for specific target groups. These trainings should include sensitization on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the centrality of women to the promotion and protection of ESC rights. Trainings can also include issues around: general gender sensitivity, state obligations under international covenants, and the development of national level action plans and strategies. Target groups for trainings and sensitizations sessions (at local, provincial/district and national levels) include government officials, NGOs, community-based organizations, police and law enforcement officials, judges and lawyers, and prison officials

In February 2006, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand and other stakeholders organized participatory seminars on ESC rights (including women's ESC rights) in Chiangmai for 150 community leaders, educators, local government officials, and NGOs and minorities. During the workshop, participants discussed regional ESC rights issues affecting women and children. This session was replicated in four other regions of the country later that same year

The Philippines Commission for Human Rights has a wide-ranging program in the area of human rights education, which has won the institution a UNESCO prize for human rights education in 1994. In addition, the President of the Philippines declared 1998-2007 a Human Rights Education Decade. Within this framework, the PCHR has put in place an ambitious program of education and inter-agency cooperation

For further information, please contact: Equitas - International Centre for Human Rights Education, 666 Sherbrooke West, Suite 1100, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1E7; ph (+1-514) 954-0382 ext. 32; fax (+1-514) 954-0659; saurora@equitas.org; www.equitas.org

Endnotes

1. Case of Smt. Thenmozhi, reported in December 2004 Newsletter of the Indian National Human Rights Commission

2. Australia Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission website (1999-2000 Annual Report). http://www.hreoc.gov.au/annrep_99_00/sex.html. Accessed on 30 May 2007

3. National Human Rights Commission of India website (2004-2005 Annual Report. pages179-180). Accessed on 30 May 2007

4. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Handbook on National Human Rights Plans of Action, Professional Training Series No. 10, (New York and Geneva) 29 August 2002

5. Ibid

6. Proceedings of the Dialogue A Human Rights Perspective on MDGs and Beyond. SUHAKAM website: www.suhakam.org.my/docs/document_resource/HR_Perspective_MDG/HR_MDG_Proceedings.pdf. Accessed on December 2006.

The credibility and value of national human rights institutions are determined by their independence from government, and the extent that their work addresses human rights violations effectively.

Many national human rights institutions in Asia and the Pacific are perceived to be lacking in independence from government and suffering from inability to address human rights violations particularly those involving government officials, and members of the national security forces (including the police). Some institutions have to contend with a variety of demands from numerous sectors of society.

How will these institutions be able to meet the expectations of society? Based on the experiences obtained so far (during the last five years at least), what does it take to make these institutions effective?

Granting that maintaining complete independence from government is a big challenge, they must not be perceived as a tool to cover up the human rights situation of the country. Thus, too, while granting that most institutions in the region do not have the necessary wherewithal to resolve the major human rights issues in the country, they must pursue all possible ways and means to address them.

There is a need to go back to the basic requirements of the Paris Principles (though they are probably incomplete) to assess and learn from the experiences in Asia and the Pacific, and continue the pursuit of having credible and valuable national human rights institutions.

* Guteriano Nicolau is a researcher in La'o Hamutuk.

Timor-Leste restored its independence on 20 May 2002. Its 2002 Constitution provides the legal foundation for the establishment of the needed State institutions. Since 1999 until now, the international community has been playing important roles in setting up the country's State institutions in support of good governance and democratic society. But as a young country, Timor-Leste is still in the process of devising and building these institutions. And those that already exist are still weak and fragile, despite international assistance in their establishment.

The 2002 Constitution created the Ombudsman, as part of the chapter on "Fundamental Rights, Duties, Freedoms and Guarantees." A subsequent law established the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice (Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justica) pursuant to this constitutional provision. Other important institutions created by the Constitution do not yet exist.

The one-year journey of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice so far does not constitute a significant period for a proper evaluation of the implementation of its mandate. The institution itself is in the process of designing its strategic mechanism to achieve its mission.

From a broad perspective, several challenges hinder the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice from achieving its mission. The legacy of colonialism and militaristic regime, lack of human right awareness of government officials, weak judicial system, and the agenda of donor countries are the challenges to overcome.

Nature of the institution

The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice is an independent institution that operates outside the government and reports to the National Parliament. Despite the newness of the concept of ombudsman among the Timorese, they expect it to play an important role on issues relating to human rights, good governance, clean government, and the fight against corruption within public institutions.

Its establishment took a long process. The Law No. 7/2004 "Approving the Statute of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice" was enacted by the National Parliament in April 2004, and came into force on 26 May 2004. The National Parliament appointed on 16 June 2005 the first holder of the office (known as the Provedor). Subsequently, the Provedor appointed two deputies (one focusing on Human Rights and Justice, and another on Good Governance and Anti- Corruption) in early July 2005. In March 2006, after nine months of preparation, the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice (Office of the Provedor from hereon) started to operate.

The 2002 Constitution provides that the Office of the Provedor shall be an "independent organ in charge to examine and seek to settle citizens' complaints against public bodies, certify the conformity of the acts with the law, prevent and initiate the whole process to remedy injustice." (Article 27.1) The 2001 National Development Plan, on the other hand, states that the raising of awareness of the citizens about their rights is one of its visions.

The Office of the Provedor is mandated to protect the rights, liberties, and legitimate interests of persons affected by acts of government agencies or private contractors operating a public service or managing public assets on behalf of the government. It is also mandated to provide education on human rights and justice, and promote good practices in government entities. It has three specific areas of concern: human rights, good governance, and anti-corruption.

The law empowers the Office of the Provedor to promote, monitor, investigate cases, and provide advice on human rights and good governance; and to fight corruption and influence peddling. It also has the power to access facilities and premises; secure documents, equipments, goods or information for inspection; and interrogate any person who is related to the complaints before it.

The three main objectives of the Office of the Provedor are therefore the following:

First, increase the awareness of the people about human rights and justice, principles of good governance (including transparency, fairness, justice, discrimination and compliance with the law), human rights protection, and increase the accountability of the government and its agencies in the exercise of their authority.

Second, improve public ownership of the organs of governmental power; improve government performance in respecting and promoting human rights, in implementing good governance practices, and in fulfilling its human right duties and obligations derived from international treaties.

Third, combat corruption and nepotism, bad practices and human rights violations within the public agencies or by public agencies.

Mandate Implementation

During it first year of operations, the Office of the Provedor was assisted by several international institutions such as the World Bank, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The World Bank provided some equipments and funding to support the operations of the office.

Since it started operating in early 2006, the Office of the Provedor received more than one hundred cases related to corruption, human rights violations and good governance. Under the law that created it, the Office of the Provedor recommends (after investigation) to the competent government agencies what measures to take to remedy the problems. But so far the Office of the Provedor has not been able to issue any recommendation on the cases before it. The law also requires the Office of the Provedor to submit a report with recommendations to the National Parliament before the 30th day of June of each year.

Under its human rights education program, the Office of the Provedor held several human rights training activities for the members of the police. These activities are important in raising the human rights awareness of the members of the police, and improve the credibility of the police as an institution. These concerns are significant in the context of the public fear of the police, which cause human right problems.

As part of its public awareness-raising activities, the Office of the Provedor collaborates with the National Radio Station in disseminating across the country its mandate and functions.

During the Crisis that started in 28 April 2006, the Office of the Provedor played the important role of monitoring human rights violations. It also called on the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and others officials to issue their respective statements that would help resolve the crisis.

This monitoring work uncovered human rights violations. However, the Office of the Provedor has not issued any report on the over-all human rights situation until now. In March 2007, with the support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Office of the Provedor issued a statement asking other State institutions to follow up on the recommendations of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste that investigated the 2006 Crisis.

The Office of the Provedor also monitored since May 2006 the plight of the internally displaced people (IDPs) during the Crisis. It collaborated with NGOs on this monitoring work. It subsequently issued a set of recommendations on how to improve the condition of the IDPs. Several of these recommendations were very helpful in improving the condition IDPs regarding shelter, security, sanitation, and other issues.

The Challenges

The Office of the Provedor faces several challenges that affect its capacity to fulfill its mandate as a human rights institution.

Legacy of colonialism and militarism

As a society that has suffered from massive human right violations and corrupted public institutions, Timor-Leste commits to avoid having these experiences again under the era of independence. With assistance from donors, Timor-Leste commits to build a democratic country that respects human rights and supports clean government. Being a new nation, Timor-Leste faces a lot of problems ranging from the public administration legacy of the Portuguese colonization and military occupation, weak judicial system, and other institutional problems. These are the problems that exist in the current situation.

While good objectives and adequate authority accompany the establishment of public administration in the country, human rights protection, good governance, governance free of corruption and nepotism are difficult to realize within the context of Timor-Leste.

The Portuguese legacy of inefficient public administration system along with the corrupt civil service legacy of Indonesia affect the current Timor-Leste public administration. This dire situation further worsened with the destruction of ninety percent of the public infrastructures promoted by the Indonesian military after the 1999 referendum.

At present, public officials in Timor-Leste do not have adequate knowledge or sensitivity to human rights. This provides an opportunity for state-sanctioned human rights violations.

With its history of state-sanctioned human right violations, building a human right culture in Timor-Leste society is a big challenge.

Weak judicial system

The judicial system of Timor-Leste is another big challenge for the Office of the Provedor. The Timorese public knows that limited human resources, language difficulties and other problems result in weak judicial system. This makes the process very slow and sometimes frustrated people who seek justice. It is claimed also that although the judicial system is constitutionally independent, in reality, it suffers from interventions from political leaders. The situation has not improved despite assistance from the international community since 1999. The failure of the international community to help provide justice for the victims of human rights violations during the past twenty-four years also contributed to the problem on rule of law and law enforcement in Timor-Leste.

The Office of the Provedor can only submit recommendations regarding measures to protect human rights. Their recommendations relating to crimes have to be implemented by the General Prosecutor. However, under the current law, the General Prosecutor does not have the legal obligation to execute the recommendations of the Office of the Provedor. The law establishing the Office of the Provedor does not obligate the General Prosecutor to undertake investigation on crimes allegedly committed by officials of public institutions, as may have been recommended by the Office of the Provedor.

And even if the Office of the Provedor establishes sufficient factual and legal bases to charge public institutions with commission of human rights violations, it is skeptical that the legal process will provide justice to the victims with the current judicial system.

Financial Dependence

Although the 2002 Constitution of Timor-Leste and the law establishing it guarantee the independence of the Office of the Provedor, it is not financially independent. The Office of the Provedor depends on the Government, particularly the Ministry of Planning and Finance, for its financial needs.

As an independent institution, with the mandate to oversee public institutions, the Office of the Provedor should be independent structurally, legally and financially. In view of the centralized financial system of the government, the Ministry of Planning and Finance acts as the micro-finance manager of all public institutions including the Office of the Provedor. While the National Parliament approves the national budget, the Ministry of Planning and Finance controls its disbursement, including that of the Office of the Provedor. It has to submit to the Ministry of Planning and Finance the financial requirements for each planned activity in requesting for budget allocation. This system creates difficulties for the work of the Office of the Provedor and raises questions about its independence.

International Assistance

The donor community has been playing important roles in setting up and assisting the State institutions of Timor-Leste either in terms of technical and financial support or provision of human resources. Theoretically, the objective of these forms of assistance is to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and the sovereignty of the country. However, as experienced by other Third World countries or post-conflict countries, the donors have their own agenda behind the assistance.

Timor-Leste, since 1999, has been receiving assistance in establishing State institutions from the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank and other bilateral assistance agencies. From 2002, many international advisors were placed within the State institutions to strengthen them. International advisors also play important roles in setting up the State institutions. While their presence aims to capacitate the State institutions, problems such as language and cultural barriers, and the communication mechanism are challenges to overcome. As a result, most of the State institutions are still fragile and that contributed to the 2006 Crisis.

The experience of the Office of the Provedor reflects this donor-agenda-driven assistance program. Within the Office of the Provedor, there are assistance programs from the World Bank, United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UNHCR, OHCHR, USAID and others. The different assistance programs fragment the Office of the Provedor because most donors prefer to support the Human Rights Section and leave out the Governance Section.

Structurally the Office of the Provedor has two deputies for the Human Rights and Good Governance Sections respectively. But these two sections are integrated, as underlined by the first holder of the Office. It is important that some donors pay attention to human rights. But since the mandate of the Office of the Provedor is a combination of human rights and good governance concerns, the imbalance in the support they respectively receive undermines the institution as a whole.

Conclusion

The Ombudsman is very important as an oversight institution. However, under the current context, to achieve its mission, the collaboration and coordination among stakeholders are important. The judiciary system needs to be strengthened, the human right awareness for the public needs to be increased, and the donor community should review their financial and technical assistance programs.

For further information, please contact Guteriano Nicolau in La'o Hamutuk (Institutu Timor Lorosa'e ba Analiza no Monitor Rekonstrusaun/The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis), P.O. Box 340, Dili, East Timor, mobile: +61(408)811373, 670-7234330; ph: 670-3325013; e-mail: info@laohamutuk.org; www.laohamutuk.org

* Shahindha Ismail works for the Maldivian Detainee Network.

The first National Human Rights Institution in the Maldives was established on 10 December 2003 following the custodial deaths of five prisoners and the consequent outburst of public frustration. A large number of people went out on the streets of the capital Male' on 20 September 2003 to protest the custodial deaths, which eventually led to stone throwing on some government buildings and the burning of the High Court premises.

Establishing the Human Rights Commission

A special decree issued by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in 2003 established the first Human Rights Commission (Commission) of the Maldives. Under this decree, the Commission has "the right to charge and receive charges/allegations."^[1] The President subsequently appointed the nine Members of the newly-established Commission.

By February 2004, a bill was filed before the People's Majlis (Parliament) to become the law creating the Commission. The bill was passed in 2005 as the Human Rights Commission Act (Law No. 1/2005). But the appointment of the members of the Commission was not completed due to questions about the law's compliance with the Paris Principles. Thus the new law had to be amended.

In mid-2006 the Parliament passed a law (Law No: 1/2006)^[2] amending the Human Rights Commission Act of 2005.

The 2006 law provides that the Human Rights Commission has the power to inquire on cases that occurred subsequent to the enactment of the law, and cases that occurred prior to the enactment of the law but not before 1 January 2000 (with exception).^[3] Such cases may involve government officials or private persons. In undertaking investigation, the Commission has the power to summon witnesses and persons related to complaints filed and obtain their statements; instruct persons being questioned in an ongoing inquiry not to leave Maldives except upon its permission, among others.

The Commission, after investigation, may seek amicable settlement of cases, or refer them to courts if no amicable settlement is possible, or send a report of the inquiry on the cases with recommendations to appropriate government agencies.

The new law provides that it is the duty of Maldivian citizens and persons within the jurisdiction of the Maldives to obey the summons issued by the Commission, provide information or submit documents as well as to act or refrain from doing any act as may be required by the Commission. Failure to follow the orders of the Commission may either result in house arrest or dismissal from office in case of public officials.

The Commission also has the power to inspect without prior notice any premises where persons are detained under a judicial decision or a court order.

The 2006 law provides for a Commission with five-members, who are appointed by the People's Majlis (Parliament) based on a list of nominees submitted by the President. In October 2006, the Parliament confirmed the Members of the new Human Rights Commission of the Maldives. In November 2006, it confirmed Mr. Ahmed Saleem as the Chair of the Commission.

It also requires the state treasury to provide the Commission with funds, from the annual budget approved by the People's Majlis, "essential to undertake the responsibilities of the Commission."

Responding to complaints

Following its formation, the first Commission received a number of complaints of human rights violations. However, the general view was that nothing came out of the complaints. Many people claimed that letters to the Commission were never answered.

The case of the detention of protesters in 2004 indicates how far the Commission would go. In August 2004 the police severely beat and arrested over three hundred protesters having a peaceful gathering at the Republic Square in Male'. Among the victims of police brutality were children and women. Some people were in critical medical condition due to the beating.

Those arrested were detained without charge, and without proper medical assistance, in cells on another island where the detention facility was located. Although a few detainees were released within days, many supporters and activists of the political Opposition, including members of the Parliament, were detained for up to five months.

During the more than five months of detention of the protesters, the Commission did not issue any statement regarding the August 2004 incident. However, representatives of the Commission visited the detention facility and met with a number of detainees. No statement or publication followed this visit. Many families were denied access to the detainees and waited desperately for news about their dear ones in detention.

Complaints filed with the Commission by many family members on police brutality to their kin did not receive a reply.

Upon release, many of the detainees filed complaints with the Commission with regard to police brutality and torture. Many of them claimed they did not hear anything from the Commission about their complaints.

Based on the 2003 Presidential Decree, which empowers the Commission to hold independent public enquiry, the Commission decided to hold a public enquiry on the August 2004 protests and arrests. The Commission decided that, since such an enquiry was to be held in the Maldives for the first time, they would consult experts in the field. But on 4 November 2004 the Commission received a letter from the President's Office stating that it could not yet conduct a public enquiry for lack of legal framework to do so since the relevant laws were not yet passed by the Parliament. As a result, the Commission cancelled its planned public enquiry.

The official website of the Commission states that it sent reports and recommendations on prisons and detention facilities to President Gayoom following their visits to these facilities. The website also states that the President's Office merely replied that it sent the recommendations to the Ministry of Home Affairs. ^[4]

Problems encountered

During its first year of existence, the first Commission was obstructed from finalizing its first annual report and stopped from holding a meeting in 2004 on the International Human Rights Day.

The Chair of the first Commission resigned in less than two years out of a five-year term, followed by more resignations until two Commissioners were left. The Commission was literally defunct by this time and could not carry out any of the activities on their mandate due to lack of capacity to do so.

The Maldivian Detainee Network (Network) met with the remaining two Members of the Commission in September 2006 and inquired about its prison and detention facility visitation function. The Network asked whether or not the Commission could engage the Network staff to assist in the visitations in view of its (Commission's) lack of human resources. The Network also explained the importance of these visits by a non-governmental organization (NGO) in order to verify maltreatment reports sent by families of detainees and the detainees themselves. The Members replied that since the first Commission was at a "stand still" situation they had to wait until a full Commission was again established before taking action on the issue.

With the new Commission, the Network requested in January 2007 the present Chair of the Commission, Mr. Ahmed Saleem, to allow the representatives of the Network to join prison and detention facility visits by the NHRC Maldives. The Network has not yet received a response to the request.

Some issues

It is noteworthy that out of over forty individuals who expressed interest on the government's open invitation to apply to become members of the Commission, President Gayoom proposed five names for confirmation to the Parliament. The law allows more than five nominees to be considered for appointment to the Commission if the President wishes to do so. And then out of the five nominees, only two subsequently expressed willingness to serve in the Commission.

All nominees, except Mr. Ahmed Saleem, are known for their quiet disposition and for not being critical of the government. It remains to be seen whether or not they will maintain strong objectivity during their term.

Some of the present Members were members of the ruling party (Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party) at the time they were appointed to the Commission. Hence, with due respect to these Members, the sincerity of the Commission's work remains in doubt.

Although there was never any negative aspect to it, there has been extremely little or no cooperation between the Commission and local NGOs from the time the first human rights commission came into being in the Maldives. Representatives of two local human rights NGOs met with a Commission Member in January 2007 and exchanged views on possible cooperation and joint efforts between the existing informal civil society network in the Maldives and the Commission. But the Commission did not initiate any further meetings or convey any indication of possible work with the existing informal civil society.

A major issue that recently arose was the government proposal for the amendment of the Human Rights Commission Act of 2006 that subjects to dismissal from employment any government official who withholds or distorts information requested by the Commission. The government proposed that the law be changed from terminating the employment of such individuals to simply punishing them with a fine.

This amendment was formally adopted into law after much debate, with Member of Parliament Mr. Ibrahim Ismail opposing it. He argued that, "the main reason we fought so hard to have the law [Human Rights Commission Act of 2006] endorsed in the first place was to prevent people in authority to hide information from the National Human Rights Commission and human rights NGOs". He said that he could not find a justifiable reason for the government desire to amend the law other than to hide information from the National Human Rights Commission. Mr. Ismail has raised many human rights violations issues in Parliament, and continues to propose laws on human rights.

The future and the success of the present Human Rights Commission of the Maldives remains to be seen. It is up to it to show results. Public confidence and trust do not come by default. It has to be obtained, before it gets too late.

For further information, please visit the website of Maldivian Detainee Network: www.maldiviandetainees.net

Endnotes

1. See UNDP, Support to the Human Rights Commission of Maldives Project Document (Male: UNDP, 2004) page 3.

2. The complete text of the law is available in this webpage: http://www.hrcm.org.mv/downloads/HRCM Act English translation.pdf

3. Under paragraph c of Article 33, Human Rights Commission Act of 2006, the Commission is not restricted from inquiring on a complaint involving events that occurred prior to 1 January 2000, or on events that occurred after the law was enacted but more than one-year having lapsed before the filing of the complaint, if it "deems such as a complaint is necessary to be investigated based on its nature and severity."

4. See www.hrcm.org.mv

* Dr. Eltayeb is a human rights lawyer, scholar and consultant and holds a Ph.D. in international human rights law from Utrecht University (The Netherlands). He has published several works on human rights in Muslim countries. He is currently working as a legal expert for the Bureau of Human Rights of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The views expressed in this article are a strictly of personal nature and are not necessarily shared by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author wishes to thank the Secretary-General and the Head of Legal Department of the Qatari National Human Rights Committee for their valuable information and materials and Abdullatif A.O. Elhag and Mekki Abbass Medani for their valuable comments on earlier drafts.

The World Conference on Human Rights encourages the establishment and strengthening of national institutions, having regard to the "Principles relating to the status of national institution" and recognizing that it is the right of each State to choose the framework which is best suited to its particular needs at the national level.

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Part 1, para. 36)

The formation of the Qatari National Human Rights Committee (QNHRC) should be considered in light of the comprehensive reform policy including constitutional, political, economic, educational, social and cultural reforms, which the State of Qatar has embarked upon under the leadership of His Highness the Emir Sheikh Hamad Ben Khalifa Al-Thani as well as in light of the gradual approach that characterizes this reform process. The question of the promotion and protection of human rights is very central to the policy of the comprehensive reform. Thus, unlike national human rights institutions in the Arab world which have been established in the last two decades either in response to internal human rights crises or in response to external pressures,^[1] the establishment of the QNHRC in 2002 came mainly as an integral part of a national comprehensive reform policy adopted in the country since 1995. Consequently the establishment of the QNHRC paved the way for further developments both at the legislative and institutional levels, which in turn contributed to the strengthening of the human rights infrastructure in the country.^[2]

Law establishing the QNHRC

The QNHRC was established in 2002 by the Amiri Decree Law No. 38,^[3] which provides for its role and objectives. Thus, in accordance with the Paris Principles,^[4] the law established the QNHRC as a permanent body with a separate legal personality and an independent budget.^[5] Under Article 2 of Law No. 38, the QNHRC aims to:

• Achieve the objectives embodied in international conventions and treaties on human rights to which the State of Qatar is party.
• Advise concerned bodies in the State on matters related to human rights and freedoms.
• Investigate violations of human rights and freedoms, if any, and suggest suitable means to deal with such violations and avoid their occurrence.
• Monitor reports by international organizations and NGOs on human rights situation in the State, and coordinate with concerned bodies to address them.
• Take part in the preparation of reports submitted by the State on human rights and freedoms.
• Cooperate with international and regional organizations concerned with human rights and freedoms.
• Raise awareness and enrich education on human rights and freedoms.

Article 2 of Law No. 38 provides also for the broad mandate and responsibility of the QNHRC to promote and protect human rights that comprise, inter alia, of advisory, investigative and promotional powers. These powers generally subscribe to the Paris Principles, which provides that a national human rights institution should have as broad a mandate as possible and its statement of functions provides a rather specific list that could be incorporated as a whole in legislation.^[6]

While Article 2 empowers the QNHRC to take part in the preparation of the State reports to treaty bodies, it does not elaborate on how it can contribute to the reporting process.^[7] The most noticeable omissions in Article 2 include:

• The power to examine and report on the legislation and administrative provisions in force, draft laws and proposals and make such recommendations as it deems appropriate to ensure that these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights;
• The power to recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and the adoption or amendment of administrative measures;
• The power to promote and ensure harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation;
• The mandate to encourage ratification of international human rights instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their effective implementation;
• The power to prepare reports on the national situation with regard to human rights in general, and on more specific matters.

However, the QNHRC addressed most of these shortcomings through its work and institutional development.

Article 3 of Law No. 38 concerning the composition of QNHRC manifests the most obvious deviation from the Paris Principles. Article 3 provides that the composition of QNHRC includes five members representing the civil society and seven members representing seven governmental entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Wakfs and Islamic Affairs, and the Supreme Council for Family Affairs. Following the Paris Principles provision that "appointment shall be effected by an official act which shall establish the specific duration of the mandate", the Amiri Decree No. 15 of 2003 named the members of QNHRC.^[8] Article 4 of Law No. 38 provides for a renewable three-year appointment for QNHRC members.

This composition of the QNHRC clearly indicates the dominance of the government representatives. The Paris Principles provides that the composition of the members of a human rights institution should "ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in the promotion and protection of human rights". Moreover, the Paris Principles expressly provides that representatives of government departments if they are included in the composition of the QNHRC should participate in the deliberations only in an advisory capacity. While recognizing the deviation from Paris Principles, the founders of QNHRC thought that it would be more practical and viable to have such composition considering the fact that the country at that time was lacking the basic human rights infrastructure and had no strong and organized civil society because it was only beginning to emerge. Moreover, it was thought that a gradual approach would suit the political, social and cultural contexts existing at the time of the establishment of the QNHRC. In light of this gradual approach, which in fact characterizes the comprehensive reform process that the State of Qatar has embarked on since 1995, the Law No. 25 of 2006 amended Article 3 of Law No. 38 of 2002 and the new article provides that the QNHRC "is to be formed with at least seven members representing the civil society to be selected from among human rights activists, and a representative from the following bodies - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, Ministry of Justice, and the Supreme Council for Family Affairs".^[9] The impact of the new composition on the QNHRC's work and activities is still to be seen, since the Royal Decree stating the names of the members of the QNHRC with its new composition has not yet been issued. It must be noted, however, that the article is silent with regard to the procedures for appointment and dismissal. The article only indicates that an Amiri Decree should determine the composition of the QNHRC.

According to Article 10 of Law No. 38, the QNHRC's resources include subsidies, donations, grants and wills. It seems, however, that the government provides most of the QNHRC's funding. Article 10 is silent with regard to the source and nature of funding and does not specify the role of the QNHRC and its responsibility for drafting its own annual budget, which should be submitted to the Shura Council and the Council of Ministers for approval. Although it seems that the QNHRC has adequate funding, the inclusion of such provision would indeed secure the financial autonomy of the QNHRC in conformity with the Paris Principles.^[10]

In addition to the explicit powers of the QNHRC and its Members under Law No. 38, its Article 11 obligates ministries, governmental bodies, institutions, and public corporations to co-ordinate with the QNHRC and to provide it with information and data necessary to perform its task. It has rightly been pointed out that:

The powers that a human rights commission has to undertake its work is a critical part of the mandate in facilitating its ability to pursue protection activities. This does not mean that a human rights commission must be endowed with legislative, law enforcement, or judicial functions. The role of a human rights commission is not to replace or duplicate other state institutions with enforcement powers, such as the legislature, police, or the judiciary. Its role, rather, is to push other state bodies to uphold their responsibilities with regard to human rights promotion and protection. In terms of enforcement capacity, it is important to consider the relationship of the human rights commission to other government agencies or commissions and to the justice system. As part of the government's overall institutional framework, human rights commissions should ideally work in conjunction with other government bodies. Other government agencies should not be permitted to disregard the recommendations of the human rights commission".^[11]

With regard to the question of transparency in the work of QNHRC, Article 6 of Law No. 38 mandates it to submit every three months or whenever required to the Council of Ministers a report on its activities together with its suggestions. As will be indicated below, the QNHRC has interpreted this mandate in broad terms and made its annual reports public, including its recommendations.

QNHRC at work

Since its establishment, the QNHRC has published the 2005 and 2006 annual reports respectively covering the situation of human rights in Qatar, the activities and findings undertaken by it during the years 2004 and 2005, together with proposals and recommendations deemed appropriate by it for enhancing human rights in the country. These reports offer appropriate materials for evaluating the QNHRC on the basis of its performance and impact.

The two annual reports were divided into four parts. The first part deals with the latest developments in law and legislation. The second part concerns human rights and freedoms in Qatar. The third part specifies the QNHRC's activities. The fourth part contains recommendations and proposals made by the QNHRC to improve the human rights conditions in Qatar. The 2005 report,^[12] after stating the positive developments achieved by the government to improve and strengthen the human rights situation in the country, noted however that several laws that were not in conformity with Shari'a and international human rights standards. These laws include: Law No. 17 of 2002 on the Protection of the Community, Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism, Law No. 14 of 2004 on Labour Law, Law No. 21 of 1989 for the Regulation of Marriage to Foreigners, Law No. 3 of 1963 on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Law No. 3 of 1984 on Sponsorship of Foreign Workers. Furthermore, the report enumerated several violations, including, inter alia, revocation of nationality (citizenship), violation of workers' rights (this include the continuation of the sponsorship system for foreign workers and mandatory exit permit to depart the country or to change sponsorship, and restriction on the right to choose or change a job), large number of detainees both men and women at the deportation center, long delay in the investigation of some cases by local authorities, and preventive custody.

In fact, the major part of the activities of the QNHRC has been devoted to complaints handling. During the year 2005, the QNHRC received five hundred eighty-five complaints/referrals. The table below classifies these complaints as follows:

Additionally, the QNHRC has received many complaints regarding revocation of nationality (citizenship), which it has documented separately. The actions undertaken by the QNHRC ranged from seeking amicable settlements, to addressing/referring complaints to the competent authorities, and to providing legal advice. It should be noted in this regard that the QNHRC has developed its own strategy on complaints handling, which is basically derived from the United Nations Handbook on National Human Rights Institutions.^[13]

At the promotional level, the QNHRC organized several conferences, seminars, lectures and training courses throughout the year 2005 addressing different human rights themes such as spreading human rights culture, incorporation of human rights norms in school curriculum, norms and mechanisms of international human rights law, and its mandate and responsibilities. These lectures and training courses covered different segments of the society including members of law enforcement agencies, teachers, journalists, medical personnel and students. Moreover, QNHRC made several visits to the Deportation Centre, the Qatari House for Shelter and Human Care, Capital Police and Central Prison.

In the final part of the 2005 report, the QNHRC provides its recommendations and proposals for improving the human rights situation in the State of Qatar. These recommendations and proposals include, inter alia, ratification of principal human rights treaties to which the State is not a party, review of the general reservations made by the State to human rights conventions, review of the laws identified by QNHRC as not in conformity with international human rights standards, improvement in the condition of State prisons, encouragement on the establishment of civil society human rights organizations, and encouragement on the adoption of a national comprehensive plan for the promotion and protection of human rights.

Assessing the effectiveness of the QNHRC

The question of assessing the effectiveness of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) is a complex one. NHRIs tend to undertake and perform a variety of objectives and activities as well as cover a great number of issues, and each of these activities may require specific evaluation methods.^[14] Moreover, NHRIs are just one of many actors that influence the human rights situation. The effectiveness of a national human rights commission is crucially dependent on and determined by a conjuncture of interrelated factors that should be analyzed against the background of the specific political and cultural context of each country. These factors include benchmarks and indicators. ^[15] The list of benchmarks includes those that concern (i) the character of the institution, (ii) its mandate, and (iii) its accountability. ^[16] Indicators include both quantitative and qualitative indicators.^[17]

Having said that and taking into account the formative phase that the QNHRC has gone through, one might indicate the following points that bear on the assessment of its effectiveness:

• There exists a conducive environment for the QNHRC to effectively carry out its broad mandate regarding the promotion and protection of human rights. This is manifested in the overall commitment of the Government to the question of the promotion and protection of human rights; the Government's moral and financial support to the QNHRC; and the co-ordination of different governmental bodies with the QNHRC.
• Despite the progressive and broad interpretation by the QNHRC of its mandate during the formative phase, the necessity for making the QNHRC's mandate conform to the Paris Principles is recognized.
• For the purpose of strengthening the institutional structure of the QNHRC, there is utmost importance for it to adopt its own internal rules and regulations.
• The best practices adopted by QNHRC during its formative phase including, inter alia, reinforcing the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, public outreach through media, enrooting and strengthening the human rights culture, and incorporation of human rights norms into school curriculum, should be continued.
• The QNHRC recognizes the need to develop performance and impact indicators that can clarify planning processes and help set targets for future work.

Concluding remarks

Considering the experience of QNHRC, there are two lessons that should be considered. First, the formal structure of a national human rights commission does not necessarily determine its performance on the ground. ^[18] It has rightly been pointed out that "many national human rights institutions (NHRIs) that formally respected the Paris Principles were not particularly effective in guaranteeing human rights. Others, less numerous, failed to comply with the Paris Principles but still achieved reasonable results".^[19] Secondly, the creation of a national human rights commission does not automatically lead to a greater respect for human rights. Whether the national human rights commission is the most effective means to promote human rights should be considered and analyzed against the background of the specific political and cultural contexts of each country.^[20]

For further information please contact: National Human Rights Committee of Qatar, Salwa Road, Souor Al-Rawda Doha, QATAR. Postal Address: PO Box 24104 Doha, QATAR. Ph (974) 444 4012 / 431 6542; fax: (974) 444 4013 / 431 6687: e-mail: nhrc@qatar.org.qa; www.nhrc-qa.org

Endnotes

1. See Muhsin Awad and Abdalla Khalil (eds.), The Development of National Human Rights Institutions in the Arab World (in Arabic), Egyptian National Human Rights Council and UNDP, 2005.

2. These developments both at the legislative and institutional levels include, inter alia, the adoption of the new Constitution, which was approved by a popular referendum in 2003 and ratified by His Highness the Emir in 2004, and entered into force in June 2005. The new Constitution puts a great emphasis on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and hence Part Three (Articles 34 - 58) of the new Constitution guarantees most of the internationally acknowledged fundamental rights and freedoms. The new Constitution endorses the principle of indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and hence secures the three generations of rights, including economic, social, cultural, civil, political and collective rights. The constitutional protection of human rights has been strengthened and consolidated by the adoption of a number of laws, including, inter alia, the Penal Code, Labour Law and Law on Societies and Private Institutions. Furthermore, this legal framework has been re-strengthened and re-enforced by the adoption of new laws enhancing the independence of the judiciary and public prosecutors as well as by establishing the Cassation Court. At the institutional level, a number of institutions that are entrusted with human rights mandates at both governmental and civil society levels have been established. In this regard, reference can be made, by way of example, to the establishment of the Bureau of Human Rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Human Rights Department at the Ministry of Interior, and the Supreme Council for Family Affairs. The last years also witnessed an increase in the establishment of civil society organizations working on the promotion and protection of human rights as well as on development issues.

3. For the text of the law, see The State of Qatar Official Gazette, issue No. 2 (30^th January 2003), pages 305-307.

4. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 (20 December 1993). For a general discussion of the Paris Principles see Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions: The Role of the United Nations (Danish Centre for Human Rights, 2006) and Brigit Lindsnaes, Lone Lindholt and Kristine Yigen, editors, National Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working Papers (Danish Centre for Human Rights, 2000).

5. See Article 1 of Law No. 38.

6. See the Paris Principles, Supra note 4.

7. According to the Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions the contribution of a national human rights commission to the reporting process may take any of the following:

• Providing information to the government department charged with preparing the report.
• Review draft reports to ensure that they are accurate, detailed and properly drafted.
• Preparing the draft country report.

8. In accordance with Article 3 of Law No. 38, Decree No. 15 (2003) was issued by the Emir on 5 May 2005 constituting the QNHRC and stating the names of its members, which includes ten men and three women.

9. For the amendment of Article 3, see Law No. 25 (2006), The State of Qatar Official Gazette, issue No. 9 (October 10^th, 2006), pages 38-39.

10. See The Handbook on National Human Rights Institutions, Supra note no. 6, pages 11 and 15.

11. See Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa (New York, 2001).

12. For the text of the 2005 Report, see the WebPages of the Qatari National Human Rights Committee at: www.nhrc-qa.org

13. See The Handbook on National Human Rights Institutions Supra note no. 6, pages 28-35.

14. See Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions, The International Council on Human Rights Policy and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva, 2005), page 39.

15. Benchmarks set out minimum conditions that need to be in place if a national institution is to achieve its objective, whereas indicators provide information about progress, i.e., whether a national institution is making ground towards its objectives or continues to respect its benchmarks. In other words, benchmarks have a normative content; they identify minimum standards that should be achieved. Indicators, by contrast, are precisely what the word implies: they signal changes in direction or illuminate trends. It follows that indicators can be used to help national human rights institutions judge whether their objectives and benchmarks are being achieved (see Ibid., pages 9-10).

16. Ibid., page 11.

17. Ibid., pages 25-26.

18. Ibid., page 7.

19. Ibid.

20. See Human Rights Watch, supra note no. 11.

* Sneh Aurora is National Institutions Program Officer at Equitas - International Centre for Human Rights Education based in Montreal, Canada.

As independent institutions with a mandate to combat discrimination and promote and protect universal human rights, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have great potential to address challenges to the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights by women.

The Beijing Platform for Action (1995), referring to the World Conference on Human Rights, called for the creation or strengthening of national institutions, the strengthening of human rights of women, as well as for the development of programs to protect the human rights of women by such institutions.^[1]

The United Nations' Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its General Comment No. 10 (December 1998) which noted that "national institutions have a potentially crucial role to play in promoting and ensuring the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights" and that "it is therefore essential that full attention be given to economic, social and cultural rights in all of the relevant activities of these institutions."

A number of other international documents and statements address specifically the role of NHRIs as it relates both to economic, social and cultural rights and to the rights of women.

The Regional Workshop on the Role of NHRIs in Advancing the International Human Rights of Women held from 5-7 May 2000 in the Fiji Islands, urged NHRIs to pay greater attention to the economic, social and cultural rights of women, including shelter, food, water, primary education and primary health care as fundamental rights, as well as sexual and reproductive rights. This should include the active monitoring of government reporting obligations under CEDAW and other international human rights instruments, the collation and consideration of gender-disaggregated statistics, and the recommendation to governments of suitable programs that are achievable, cost-effective and within a set time frame.

In 2001, the Commonwealth Secretariat issued National Human Rights Institutions: Best Practice, which stresses that "regardless of a country's formal recognition of economic, social and cultural rights, NHRIs should be well versed with those rights. NHRIs should develop and conduct educational programmes to promote rights awareness in this category of rights."^[2] The Best Practice Guidelines also suggest that NHRIs should:

• employ all available means to respond to inquiries related to the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights, whether or not its enabling statue or national constitution recognize economic, social and cultural rights as justiciable.
• advise the government on the development and implementation of economic policies to ensure that the economic, social and cultural rights of people are not adversely affected by economic policies, e.g. structural adjustment programmes and other aspects of economic management.
• work towards facilitating public awareness of government policies relating to economic, social and cultural rights and encourage the involvement of various sectors of society in the formulation, implementation and review of relevant policies.

The Best Practice Guidelines also stress that NHRIs must be prepared to address human rights violations committed because of a victim's gender or sex. The Guidelines state that NHRIs should assume responsibility in responding to human rights violations suffered on account of sex or gender, and that NHRI staff should be properly trained so as to respond sensitively to human rights issues or violations related to sex or gender.

From 11-13 July 2001, the Asia-Pacific Forum for NHRIs together with the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission, hosted a regional workshop on the Role of National Human Rights Institutions and Other Mechanisms in Promoting and Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The workshop highlighted the importance of addressing discrimination in the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights and of developing national institution expertise with regard to such rights. Affirming the importance of international standards in the area of economic, social and cultural rights (and in particular the ICESCR), the workshop stated that "Governments and NHRIs have a responsibility to ensure that no peoples are discriminated against in their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights."

From 15-19 November 2004, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Division for the Advancement of Women/Department of Economic and Social Affairs held a Round Table of NHRIs and National Machineries for the Advancement of Women in Ouarzazate, Morocco. The meeting recommended that NHRIs should consistently ensure that the protection and promotion of women's rights are an integral part of the work of NHRIs and that they should use CEDAW as a framework for their work.

In 2005, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its Human Rights Resolution 2005/74, affirmed the important role of NHRIs, in cooperation with other human rights mechanisms, in the protection and promotion of the human rights of women.

The Montreal Principles on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted at a meeting of experts held 7-10 December 2002 in Montreal, Canada. These principles are a guide to the interpretation and implementation of the guarantees of non-discrimination and equal exercise and enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The Montreal Principles require States to ensure that there is a national system of institutions and mechanisms, including NHRIs, which will support the development of strategies, plans and policies specifically designed to guarantee women's equal exercise and enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights.

The development of a normative framework in regard to economic, social and cultural rights through international conventions, as well as decisions, declarations and statements from global, regional and national bodies, contributes to the general recognition of the role that NHRIs must play in the protection and promotion of economic, social and cultural rights as well as the rights of women. This means that NHRIs should have as part of their mandate, explicitly or implicitly, the protection and promotion of these rights.

Interpreting and Implementing the Mandate of NHRIs

Although the Paris Principles,^[3] which provide international minimum standards on the status and role of NHRIs, have no specific reference to economic, social and cultural rights, the Principles do state that an "NHRI shall be vested with competence to promote and protect human rights".^[4] It goes on to say that the NHRI shall be given "as broad a mandate possible" and this should be "clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text", which shall specify "its sphere of competence".

The mandate of a national human rights institution is typically expressed in very general terms. The constitution, legislation, or other source of an NHRI's mandate may, however, refer specifically to certain rights or certain groups of rights that fall within the institution's jurisdiction.

For example, the functions of the Fiji Human Rights Commission are outlined in the country's Constitution and the Human Rights Act 1999 and include:

• educating the public about the nature and content of the Bill of Rights, including its origins in international conventions and other international instruments, and
• making recommendations to the Government about matters affecting compliance with human rights.

Fiji's constitutional Bill of Rights contains provisions that address economic, social and cultural rights, among them labor rights, the right to be free from discrimination on several enumerated grounds, including gender and economic status, and the right to education. Under the Human Rights Commission Act 1999, the Fiji Commission also has the mandate to addresEs issues involving unfair discrimination based on the ground of gender as it relates to employment, housing, education, and access to goods, services and facilities.

The Human Rights Commission of Mongolia is a statutory body established to increase public awareness about laws and/or international human rights treaties, and to promote human rights education activities. The functions of the Commission are outlined in the country's Constitution and the The National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia Act of 2000, which includes issues relating to discrimination based on grounds of sex. The Constitution of Mongolia includes as guaranteed rights and freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, including those relating to property, employment, social security (including for childbirth), health and medical care, education, engagement in creative and artistic fields, and participation in Government.

However its mandate is expressed, an NHRI must interpret its mandate as it undertakes its work. Interpreting its mandate gives the national institution the opportunity to elaborate its jurisdiction and responsibilities and its understanding of its role and functions.^[5]

The National Human Rights Commission of India was created under The Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. Its mandate is to protect and promote rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution or embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ICESCR and enforceable in Indian courts. The Indian Constitution includes as fundamental rights, the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex, as well as prohibitions against trafficking in human beings and forced labor. The enumerated fundamental rights also go beyond conventional civil liberties in protecting cultural and educational rights of minorities by ensuring that minorities may preserve their distinctive languages and establish and administer their own education institutions. The Indian Commission has undertaken many inquiries into issues of economic, social and cultural rights, including those relating to degrading labour, education and mental health facilities. In April 2000, the Commission held a Regional Consultation on Public Health and Human Rights in New Delhi.

An NHRI should interpret its mandate as widely and comprehensively as possible, subject to its governing legal framework, as well as to domestic and international law. In some instances, an NHRI must creatively interpret its mandate in order to ensure the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights of women. To the extent that the words of the establishing law permit, references to 'human rights' should be interpreted as including all human rights-civil, cultural, economic, political and social.

Economic, social and cultural rights may also fall within the mandate of an NHRI through the principle of indivisibility and interdependence of all rights. Human rights law is integrated and holistic. Rights relate to each other. The right to life, for example, has implications for the right to health and the right to education, and the right to freedom of movement has implications for the right to livelihood. Even though the mandate of an NHRI may refer only to civil and political rights, it will have jurisdiction to deal with many issues of economic, social and cultural rights through the rights to life, equality and non-discrimination.^[6]

The Philippine Commission on Human Rights has been able to broadly (and creatively) interpret its mandate in order to ensure that investigations of violations of economic, social and cultural rights are within its jurisdiction. The Philippines Constitution of 1987 stipulates that the Philippine Commission shall function "to investigate ... all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" and shall "monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights". In a 1994 ruling, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Philippine Commission could only investigate violations of civil and political rights. This decision led the Commission to look for other ways to include economic, social and cultural rights within the framework and limits of its jurisdiction. To address the large number of complaints received by the Commission concerning alleged violations of economic, social and cultural rights, the Commission developed a system of "investigative monitoring" of economic, social and cultural rights based on the constitutional requirement that it monitor government compliance with international treaty obligations. The Philippines had ratified the ICESCR in 1974 and therefore obligations under that treaty were included in the Commission's constitutional mandate. The Commission has implemented its investigative monitoring function in the area of forced evictions and the violations of human rights resulting from that practice.

The explicit mandate of NHRIs can vary. Some NHRIs are limited to dealing with only specific human rights issues; while others have mandates that are wide in scope to address all issues covered in international human rights instruments. The ideal is for each NHRI to have the mandate and the capacity to deal with the protection and promotion of all rights recognized by international law as human rights. NHRIs should interpret their mandates broadly to ensure that they are able to effectively address the major issues and challenges to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights by women.

This article is the first of a two-part series on the role of national human rights institutions in protecting and promoting the economic, social and cultural rights of women. This part examines the mandate of NHRIs vis-a-vis the protection and promotion of such rights. The second part (published in the June 2007 issue of this newsletter) examines specific strategies and actions undertaken by Asia-Pacific NHRIs to protect and promote the economic, social and cultural rights of women

For further information, please contact: Equitas - International Centre for Human Rights Education, 666 Sherbrooke West, Suite 1100 Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1E7; ph (1) (514) 954-0382 ext. 32; fax (1) (514) 954-0659; e-mail: saurora@equitas.org; www.equitas.org

____________________

1. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, 15 September 1995, paras. 230 (e) and 232 (e).

2. Commonwealth Secretariat, (2001), pages 33-34, 36.

3. Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions, Adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993.

4. Paris Principles, Principle No. 1.

5. United Nations, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions, Professional Training Series No. 12 (2005), page 34.

6. Ibid, pages 34-36.

In 2001, Member-States of the United Nations met to discuss actions needed to counter the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At that time, they raised the alarm that if the epidemic was not stopped soon, it might be too late to minimize its disastrous effects. In their 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, one commitment they assumed was the following:

58. By 2003, enact, strengthen or enforce as appropriate legislation, regulations and other measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against, and to ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by people living with HIV/AIDS and members of vulnerable groups; in particular to ensure their access to, inter alia education, inheritance, employment, health care, social and health services, prevention, support, treatment, information and legal pro- tection, while respecting their privacy and confidentiality; and develop strategies to combat stigma and social exclusion connected with the epidemic...

Recent studies show that there is much to be done in terms of government measures needed to eliminate the stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS (PHAs) and their family members. The human rights of PHAs and their family members are still violated, particularly by the health professionals.

While health professionals already carry the heavy burden of treating PHAs, their respect for human rights constitutes an important component in protecting the human rights of PHAs as a whole.

* Susan Paxton is a woman living with HIV and an advisor to the APN+.

AIDS-related discrimination is common throughout Asia. Many overseas immigrants lose employment when they test HIV-positive; women diagnosed positive during pregnancy are denied treatment and care and often face subsequent abuse from spouses and in-laws; children of positive parents are denied access to education.

The Asia Pacific Network of People Living with HIV (APN+) carried out the first regional documentation of AIDS-related discrimination in Asia in 2003. The project was peer-led and is the largest study designed and implemented by people living with HIV. The objectives of the research were:

• to measure the nature, pattern and extent of AIDS-related discrimination in several Asian countries
• to identify issues to be addressed and programs to be implemented to counter discrimination
• to increase the capacity of HIV-positive people to respond to future violations.

HIV-positive people developed the 133-item questionnaire, based on eight dimensions of discrimination described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In total, 46 positive data collectors were trained to carry out the research in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Countries were selected to participate based on the availability and commitment of HIV-positive activists and local support to carry out the project at the time of the study.

APN+ consulted with 82 key stakeholders - HIV-positive activists, lawyers, academics, ethicists, government officials, workers in non-governmental AIDS organizations and UNAIDS staff to develop the ethical protocol, which was approved by UNAIDS and ethics review committees in all collaborating countries: Pune University (India), Udayana University (Indonesia), HAIN (the Philippines) and Mahidol University (Thailand). The questionnaire, research protocol, informed consent and information sheets were translated into local languages. And legal, medical and social referral services were identified prior to data collection.

Data was collected from 753 positive people (Thailand 338, India 291, the Philippines 82, Indonesia 42). The respondents gave their oral informed consent to the interviews. They did not receive any monetary remuneration. Response rate to the questionnaire was over 95%.

Of the 753 respondents, 348 (46% of sample) were female, 394 (52%) male, 6 (1%) transgender and 5 (1%) sex not recorded; 50% of females and 8% of males were widowed; 10% of females and 46% of males were single; 38% of sample was married/de facto relationship.

The age range of respondents was from 16 to 60 years. (Mean 32.1 years, females 30.6 yrs; males 33.3 yrs; transgender 37.0 yrs).

Time since diagnosis was from a few months to 20 years (mean 4 years). Overall, 69% of respondents said they were diagnosed within the past 5 years.

Context of HIV testing

Many violations of human rights happen within the context of HIV testing. Most people who have an HIV test are inadequately prepared for it and do not receive pre-test counseling. This is particularly so for pregnant women and people who test for employment reasons. Women are more likely than men to face coerced HIV testing (14% v 10%). Those who report coerced testing are significantly more likely than others to face subsequent AIDS-related discrimination. Only 52% of respondents surveyed said that they received post-test counseling.

Discrimination in health-care setting

The majority of discrimination occurs within the health sector. Over half of the sample (54%) experienced some form of discrimination within the health sector due to their HIV-positive status, including discrimination by health care worker (26%), refusal of treatment (15%), delay in provision of health care (17%).

Breaches of confidentiality by health-care workers are common. One in three respondents said somebody else was told of their HIV status without their consent. Almost half of all women, but barely one in five men said they were advised not to have children after diagnosis. In Thailand, 17% of women were coerced into an abortion after diagnosis; in India 10% of women were coerced into an abortion or sterilization.

Discrimination in the community

Women are significantly most likely to bear the brunt of AIDS-related discrimination compared to men. Women were more than twice as likely as men to have been physically assaulted because of their status (7% v 2%). The most frequent form of discrimination is facing ridicule, insult or harassment. This happened to 31% of women and 20% of men.

Married women were significantly less likely than unmarried women to experience ridicule or harassment (22% v 36%). Respondents who reported testing because they "just wanted to know" their HIV status were least likely to report ridicule or harassment due to their HIV status (13% v 28%).

Of the one in ten people forced to change their place of residence because their HIV status became known, many moved residence more than once (up to nine times). Women were twice more likely than men to have changed their residence due to HIV (12% v 6%). In total, 6 % of the sample (30 women, 11 men, 1 transgender) were refused entry to or removed from a public establishment, such as a shop, bar or place of religious worship, due to their HIV status.

The sex of respondents was the strongest indicator of whether a person experienced HIV-related discrimination; women face more discrimination in the community than men do, despite the fact that the majority of women contract HIV from their spouse. Age and education level have no impact on the level of discrimination that people experience.

Discrimination from family

After diagnosis, 16% of the sample experienced discrimination from family members (India 20%; Thailand 10%) including exclusion from usual household activities - cooking, sharing food or eating implements, sleeping in the same room as others, engaging in family functions. Women were more likely to experience discrimination from family than men were (18% v 11%), often from in-laws. Women were also more likely than men to have lost financial support from their spouse (35% v 12%) or other family members (11% v 5%). In total, 18 respondents said their children were involuntarily taken away from them due to their HIV status. Respondents who reported coerced testing experienced significantly more discrimination in the family (27% v 13%).

Discrimination in Employment

One in five people reported some discrimination within a workplace setting. In total, 16 women and 48 men were tested for HIV in connection with employment; 23 women and 29 men (7% of total) lost their jobs because of their HIV status.

The Philippines cohort experienced the highest proportion of workplace discrimination: people lost their job (33%), their job description or duties changed (44%) or they lost prospects for promotion (21%).

Recommendations

This research highlights shortcomings within the public health sector, including testing that violates normal procedures, and the more severe discrimination that women face. If men choose, of their own volition, to be tested, they subsequently suffer less discrimination. The number of people coerced into testing or are tested without pre- or post-test counseling is disturbing, particularly in light of the current push in most countries to test all pregnant women for HIV. Women are increasingly coerced into testing during a vulnerable period of their lives and then refused treatment or abused. Breaches of confidentiality often have severe consequences such as extreme violations of people's personal security. HIV testing should be done only if and when a person is motivated to find out their HIV status.

Suitably trained HIV-positive people have an obvious role as public educators, particularly among health-care staff. Meeting HIV-positive people breaks down discrimination and significantly alters people's attitudes. We need to harness the unique expertise of HIV-positive people in addressing HIV and AIDS.

Based on this study the following recommendations are offered:

• Prevention programs must consider the context of women's lives
• All HIV testing must be accompanied by voluntary informed consent and adequate counseling, requiring governments to prioritize greater resources for training of professional counselors
• Eliminate policies of mandatory testing in relation to employment and pregnancy
• Monitor implementation of anti-discrimination legislation and invoke legal sanctions against organizations that breach people's privacy and security
• Develop in-country strategies to change attitudes, particularly in the health sector
• Train and employ HIV-positive people as counselors and educators
• Educate HIV-positive people about their human rights
• Educate community about the consequences of AIDS-related discrimination
• Create a climate that stimulates people's desire to learn their HIV status.

For further information, please contact: Shiba Phurailatpam, Regional Coordinator APN+, 170/71, 22nd floor, Ocean Tower, Sukhumvit 16, Ratchadapisek Road, Klongtoey Bangkok, 1011 0 THAILAND; ph (662) 259 1908-9; fax. (662) 259 1910; e-mail: shiba@apnplus.org or info@apnplus.org; www.apnplus.org

The APN+ report "AIDS discrimination in Asia" is available from: www. gnpplus.net/regions/files/AIDS-asia.pdf

About APN+

APN+, the Asia Pacific Network of People Living With HIV/AIDS, is committed to improving the quality of life of PHAs and to overcoming their isolation in Asia and the Pacific by extending the Network into all countries in the region.

APN+ Aims

• To provide a strong, proactive voice and advocate on behalf of PHAs in the region
• To lobby for equal representation of PHAs on all relevant decision making bodies
• To facilitate communication and the exchange of information between PHAs on a range of issues including medical and social support
• To provide opportunities for PHAs to develop a range of skills in order to respond to the needs of PHAs within their own countries
• To give visibility to PHAs in order to overcome the fear, ignorance and prejudice they face and to counter all forms of discrimination against PHAs
• To lobby for improved access of PHAs to treatment, care and support.

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) profiled the stigma and discrimination faced by people living with HIV/AIDS (PHAs) and their family members in Sri Lanka. It interviewed a limited number of people for the study. The Asia Pacific Leadership Forum (APLF) commissioned the 2005 report. Below is an edited excerpt of the report.

Health Care

The findings indicate that many cases of discrimination have occurred in the health sector. However, despite this, many interviewees still had faith in the public health care system. They believed that the services in the Infectious Diseases Hospital (IDH) and Ward 33 of the General Hospital were good, and that they were treated well. A few agreed that free health care provided by government hospitals gave people who could not afford private health care access to treatment they would otherwise be denied. However, there was much consensus that awareness among health staff, in public and private hospitals, must be addressed. They brought up several instances where health staff (including doctors, nurses, attendants and minor staff) had discriminated against people living with HIV/AIDS and their families.

Breach of Confidentiality

According to the interviewees, there were several cases in which confidentiality regarding a patient's HIV status was not respected. A few interviewees mentioned that they lost their jobs as a result of their status being made public. In one case, the lab technician was shocked by test results, it being the first time that such a test turned out positive for HIV. He shared the information with his colleagues at the lab and the rest of the hospital. In the case of a patient who has since passed away due to complications resulting from AIDS, the interviewee was diagnosed with HIV at the General Hospital. A person working in the hospital found out his HIV status and spread this information around their village. This resulted in the stigmatization of both the patient and the family by members of the community.

Unprofessional/Unkind Treatment by Health Staff

Health staff should be educated on, and sensitized towards HIV/AIDS so that they will be able to take proper precautions and treat the patients in a non-discriminatory manner. It is also important that health staff is knowledgeable about the disease, so that they can educate the public and give them accurate information, thereby dispelling fear and misconceptions. At a government hospital, hospital staff operated a patient on without any testing or consultation with the patient's family. After the operation, the patient's mother informed the doctor that the patient was HIV+. Though the doctor behaved respectfully towards the patient and family, the attendants and minor staff treated both the patient and family badly. The mother of the HIV+ person, when interviewed, stated that the health staff was ignorant of HIV/AIDS and this resulted in stigmatization and discrimination. She went on to mention that the hospital staff had even refused to touch the sheets on the patient's bed.

Lack of Informed Consent/Counseling

The majority of the people interviewed stated that they consented to being tested. At the same time, nobody informed them about HIV/AIDS. Many had very little knowledge on what HIV/AIDS is, and some had misconceptions on how it could be transmitted. The majority of interviewees claimed that the doctor present explained HIV/AIDS only after the results came back positive. The doctors then directed the people to institutions such as Salvation Army and Lanka+ to get assistance and support. There were no cases in the study where pre-test counseling was conducted.

For further information, please contact: Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), 24/2, 28th Lane, Off Flower Road, Colombo 7, Sri Lanka; ph(94-11 ) 2301634 / 2565304-6,5552746/8, ext. 102; fax: 4714460; e-mail:cpa_sara@sri.lanka.net, sara@cpalanka.org; www.cpalanka.org

* Jose Narciso Melchor C. Sescon, MD FPOGS is the Executive Director of Remedios AIDS Foundation, Incorporated.

While the Philippines is considered a "low prevalence" country for HIV and AIDS, the presence of risks and vulnerabilities among Filipinos (due to low condom use, liberal view on sexual practices leading to multiple partners, lower sexual debut among youth) made the Philippine civil society and partners more vigilant against a "hidden and growing" HIV epidemic that lurks behind this stark reality.

HIV prevalence among Filipino adults (15-49 years old) was 0.03% in 2005.^[1] What is important to note here is that high risk groups (injecting drug users, men having sex with men, female sex workers (FSWs), male clients of FSWs) only account for 26% of the total HIV prevalence.^[2] Table 2 provides the existing HIV prevalence among them.

Such "low and slow" characterization of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the Philippines has pushed the issue way down in the development agenda. The Philippines enacted Republic Act 8504 otherwise known as "AIDS Law" in 1998, one of the first countries in Asia to do so. But the eight years that passed since then did not show much achievement in terms of enforcement. "Low" HIV prevalence notwithstanding, persistence of stigma and discriminatory practices against persons living with HIV and AIDS (PHAs) and their affected families remains.

A response

Remedios AIDS Foundation, Incorporated (RAF) was founded in 1991 as a pioneer non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) that provides quality information and services on sexual and reproductive health (SRH) primarily to the "most at risk" (sex workers, men having sex with men, drug users) and "vulnerable" (youth, migrant workers, and family members of PHAs) populations. RAF developed various programs over a decade in pursuit of its mission.

The RAF programs adhere to all international guidelines provided by the 1994 Cairo Consensus of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS of the United Nations General Assembly Twenty-sixth Special Session (UNGASS), and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Furthermore, RAF applies rights-based, gender-responsive, and culturally-appropriate principles to its programs, and ensures meaningful participation of PHAs and the civil society at all times.

RAF's capacity-building initiatives among PHAs and affected families involve several stages. At the first stage they are provided basic information about HIV and AIDS and the impact of the virus on them and society. PHAs are sensitized to these crucial issues until they eventually recognize that the issues relate to their human rights. As one PHA said,

Just like anyone, I am also a human being who experi ences pain, and with heart and mind. I don't need sympathy from anyone...As HIV positive, what we ask is your understanding and acceptance...What we were in the past and what we are now have no difference... Being accepted by society is what matters most...Having only a few more years to live in this world, we hope to experience the love and care from anyone...who is always there to support us. Cynthia a 26 year-old HIV positive.

The next stage includes provision of information about agencies/networks that provide services for their needs. This proved to be an effective and vital way in advocating for PHAs' needs.

These stages are employed in HIV Counseling, HIV Care and Support, and HIV Treatment Literacy workshops. PHAs and their family members learn about the basic principles of treating HIV/AIDS, clarify what their needs are, and get to know where to go for HIV services in these workshops. Most PHAs and their family members have been empowered and honed to become advocates of their rights through various workshops and experiences gained locally and abroad. Having been empowered, Filipino PHAs realized the need to further strengthen their advocacy efforts and thus formed the Pinoy Plus Association, Incorporated. It is the only national organization of PHAs in the Philippines.

RAF has another program on "follow through" counseling for PHAs and their family members. Counseling has various forms: partner/ couple counseling (how to cope and live productively with HIV), counseling on how to handle HIV status disclosure to their partners, family members and relatives, family counseling (to settle disputes), anti-retroviral (ARV ) adherence counseling for PHAs on ARV treatment, and grief, loss and bereavement counseling (for cases involving late stages of the disease).

Counseling sessions alleviate fears, guilt, and shame and help resolve unfinished businesses among PHAs.

Under the HIV care support treatment program, RAF provides voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), home based/ community care and support services, access to ARV, and Opportunistic Illnesses (OI) services.

Research on stigma and discrimination against PHAs

RAF, in partnership with Pinoy Plus Association and Deakin University in Australia, published in 2003 a report on the situational analysis of HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination in the Philippines. The report focused on institutional forms of discriminatory practices in Metro Manila. One significant finding shows that most of the discriminatory practices occur in the health care setting as compared to incidents in other areas of social life (housing, welfare, justice system, finance and insurance, livelihood, prison, reproductive health and family, and public accommodation). This is probably due to the fact that most of the PHAs access the health services more often than the other areas. The research was very enriching and needed to be followed up to ensure that stigma and discrimination issues related to HIV are addressed accordingly.

In summary, the current RAF programs are geared toward the empowerment of PHAs and their family members as well as service provision. These programs will continue to evolve and expand according to the current PHA needs. RAF has paved the way towards ensuring that a more enabling and supportive environment for PHAs and their families is realizable. Hopefully, other stakeholders - local governments for example - will be able emulate these programs and ensure that they are implemented. RAF remains determined in pursuing the tasks at hand as it continues with the journey!

For further information, please contact: Remedios AIDS Foundation, Inc., 1066 Remedios Street corner Singalong Street, Malate, Manila Philippines 1004; ph (632) 52409-24 (63 2) 524-48-3; fax no (63 2) 522 -34-31; e-mail: reme1066@pldtdlsl.net; www.reme- dios.com.ph

Endnotes

1. 2005 HIV Estimates in the Philippines, Department of Health.

2. Ibid.

The interface between custom and human rights has frequently been raised within New Zealand and in the wider Pacific. In particular, there have been calls for an in-depth study to enhance understanding of the interaction between traditional and cultural practices and human rights, and how the two can inform each other.^[1] An understanding of how custom and human rights relate to Maori and Pacific communities in New Zealand requires a broader understanding of how these issues arise elsewhere in the Pacific and how they are affected by national laws and international conventions. This will in turn inform New Zealand's role in this area within the Pacific region.

In this context, the New Zealand Law Commission aims to contribute its legal expertise by articulating some of the issues arising from the interaction between custom and human rights in the Pacific, and exploring ways in which the two can work together. Ultimately, the Commission aims to make a New Zealand contribution to a regional understanding of human rights grounded in Pacific values. It hopes that its study paper will be of practical assistance to lawyers and judges applying existing laws, and to government policy makers and other agencies involved in the development of human rights mechanisms. However, it will be for individual Pacific Islands communities and states to decide for themselves how best to move forward.

Consultation process

The Commission produced a summary document setting out some preliminary ideas as to ways in which custom and human rights might be better harmonized in the Pacific. This document was circulated widely and was available on the Commission's website, and the Commission received a number of submissions on the ideas put forward in the document. The Commission held a regional workshop on custom and human rights in Fiji (May 2006), attended by people from a range of backgrounds from across the Pacific, and held two consultation workshops in Wellington and Auckland (June 2006). The Commission also established an External Reference Group of Pacific people and others with expertise in this area, and benefited greatly from their input.

The study paper

The New Zealand Law Commission study paper Converging Currents: Custom and Human Rights in the Pacific deals with a perceived conflict that lies at the heart of Pacific legal systems. Custom is recognized as a source of law in most Pacific countries, and human rights are also protected in most Pacific constitutions as well as through ratification of international treaties by Pacific states.

This raises the question of whether custom and human rights can live comfortably together. It is often assumed that they cannot. Some see human rights, with their perceived individualist bias, as a threat to custom. Others see custom as undermining individual rights, particularly those of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups such as women and young people.

The central thesis of Converging Currents is that, despite apparent areas of tension and conflict, custom and human rights can be harmonized in many cases by looking at the underlying values of each.

The study paper provides an overview of issues arising from the interface between custom and human rights in the Pacific region, including the Pacific Island countries, New Zealand and Australia. This is an area of tremendous cultural diversity, but there are also significant commonalities across the region.

Not least among these commonalities is the important place of custom law in most Pacific societies. In many places, custom predominates in resolving disputes at the local level. Certain values are also common to Pacific cultures, and it is these values that form the basis of custom. Respect for the individual dignity of all persons is perhaps the primary value underlying Pacific custom. From this flow other values such as the demonstration of love and care for others, consensus-based decision-making, and the maintenance of balance in relationships.

Such values are generally consistent with the values underlying human rights, which are also based on respect for individual human dignity. However, customary practices - what people actually do- do not always reflect customary values, or underlying beliefs about what is right. The Commission believes that much of the apparent conflict between custom and human rights is due not to the underlying values but to customary practices, and to resistance to calls for change to such practices by those in power within Pacific societies.

Conflicts between customary practices and human rights are particularly apparent in relation to certain issues examined in the study paper: the rights of women, children and minorities, and freedom of religion, speech and movement. For example, custom plays a part in restricting women from taking on leadership roles, perpetuating violence and sexual offences against women, and denying women equality in marriage and other family law matters.

However, there are also traditions of respect for women in Pacific custom. Some customary practices need to change to accommodate human rights, and to bring practice more into line with underlying customary values, but this does not require the wholesale repudiation of custom. Indeed, by looking for common ground between custom and human rights, both may be enhanced. Human rights will be strengthened in the Pacific if they can be expressed in terms of local culture and customary values.

This approach is reinforced by the Commission's suggestion that courts in Pacific states should develop an indigenous common law or a "Pacific jurisprudence" rooted in the values underlying custom law and human rights, as well as in the legal traditions inherited through colonization.

When confronted with cases involving an apparent conflict between custom and human rights, judges are able to consider the values underlying the custom, and whether these are consistent with or could be made to align with human rights. Equally, they may consider how human rights or other general legal principles could be explained in terms of customary values. For example, a judge who finds that mismanagement of community or state funds is inconsistent with fiduciary obligations might go on to observe that this is also inconsistent with customary notions of stewardship of resources and the responsibilities of leaders to their communities.

The Commission sees an important role for both higher-level courts and community-level justice bodies such as village courts and councils in harmonizing custom and human rights. Courts and community justice bodies should work more closely together, as in many respects their roles are complementary.

Community justice bodies resolve the majority of disputes in most Pacific countries. They are accessible, and usually seek solutions aimed at restoring relationships disrupted by conflict. However, they are also frequently male-dominated, often depart from principles of natural justice, and may be unfair to women, young people and other vulnerable groups. They are generally familiar with local custom, but often require assistance with understanding and applying human rights.

On the other hand, judges and magistrates are likely to be more aware of human rights but often need assistance with understanding and accessing local custom law. The Commission therefore suggests that the development of custom law commentaries, rather than prescriptive codes, should be a priority for Pacific states. Such commentaries would assist judges, officials and others to understand local custom and to better integrate it both with human rights and with the state legal system.

Courts can help to harmonize custom and human rights by applying human rights in ways that take account of the local context. The Commission prefers an approach that looks for common ground between custom and human rights to one in which either human rights or custom "trumps" the other.

As a summary, the following are some of the suggestions offered by the Commission:

• Make community justice bodies and courts more accessible to women and more responsive to their views and rights.
• Give women a genuine choice about whether crimes of violence against them are dealt with through customary processes, courts, or both.
• Give greater recognition to community justice bodies, while also providing them with appropriate training, particularly in human rights.
• Build stronger relations between community justice bodies and courts.
• Develop an indigenous common law rooted in the values underlying custom, human rights and the legal traditions inherited from colonization. In cases involving an apparent conflict between custom and human rights, judges could consider the values underlying the custom and how these might align with human rights.
• Apply human rights in the courts in ways that take account of the local cultural and customary context.
• Develop custom law commentaries to assist judges, officials and others to understand the nature and content of local custom law. Other forms of specialist assistance to the courts, such as expert witnesses, and relaxation of some procedural and evidentiary requirements may also help in cases involving custom.

Issues of the interface between custom and human rights are likely to remain of concern in Pacific states for some time to come, and may have to be addressed at a regional level if there were to be any move towards a regional human rights mechanism. The Law Commission study paper does not attempt to provide definitive answers to the questions it raises, and the Commission hopes that the paper will stimulate further research and discussion on these issues by Pacific people.

For further information, please contact: Ewan Morris, The Law Commission, PO Box 2590, Wellington, New Zealand, ph (64-4-)914-4821; fax (64-4-)471-0959; e-mail: EMorris@lawcom.govt.nz. The report can be downloaded from the Law Commission website www.lawcom.govt.nz, or hard copies are available for NZ$20 from publications@lawcom.govt.nz

Endnote

1. See for example the Concluding Statement and Recommendations from the Pacific Islands Human Rights Consultation (Suva, Fiji) June 2004 at para. 29.

The New Zealand Law Commission

The Law Commission is an independent, government-funded organization, which reviews areas of the law that need updating, reforming or developing. It makes recommendations to Parliament, and these recommendations are published in our report series. The Law Commission helps ensure that the law provides effectively for the current and future needs of our rapidly changing society. Its goal is to achieve laws that are just, principled, accessible, and that reflect the heritage and aspirations of the peoples of New Zealand.

It investigates and reports to Parliament on how New Zealand laws can be improved. It reviews the law and processes in specific areas selected by it or referred to it by the Minister Responsible for the Law Commission. The Commission also assists government departments and Crown entities in reviews of the law and is regularly called on to assist Parliamentary select committees.

The objectives of the Law Commission are to improve:

• the content of the law
• the law-making process
• the administration of the law
• access to justice
• dispute resolution between individuals
• dispute resolution between individuals and the State.

All Reports published by the Commission are tabled in Parliament. Within six months after tabling, the Government provides its response to the recommendations in the report. (source: www.lawcom.govt.nz)

The 2nd Regional Human Rights Defenders' Forum (HRDF) with the United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders (SRSG on HRDs) was held in Bangkok on 28-29 November 2006. Human rights defenders (HRDs) from a number of Asian countries attended the forum along with representatives of governments and national human rights institutions in Asia, regional and international human rights organizations, and UN agencies.

The forum, organized by FORUM Asia and the Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), had the theme "Towards Full Implementation of the UN Declaration on HRDs in Asia - Strengthening the Role of HRDs."

Main speakers

The wives of prominent HRDs who either disappeared or died in Thailand (Ms. Angkana Neelaphaijit) and Indonesia (Ms. Suciwati) respectively spoke at the forum.

Ms. Hina Jilani, the current SRSG on HRDs, in addressing the forum said that every work being done by HRDs directly and indirectly constitutes a tribute to those who died working for human rights. She said that leadership, which could bring about a reconciliation of ideologies and could organize the work of the different HRDs, is needed. She stressed that diversity in the work of HRDs must and would exist - and must be sup- ported not eliminated. She also called for the creation of strong national and regional networks of HRDs as proposed by many HRDs themselves. These networks could facilitate discussions and debates at regional level on concrete ideas toward global thinking.

She emphasized that the legitimacy of the human rights community comes from its rootedness in social movements. She urged mutual reinforcement between social movements and human rights work.

She stressed the need to broaden the conception of HRDs to include all those who work for human rights - be they civil and political, or economic, social and cultural rights. She lamented that people who work among indigenous peoples, peasant and rural poor, lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders are still largely not recognized as part of the human rights community.

She also pointed out that the UN Declaration on HRDs is fast becoming a "soft law" which contains universal principles. She argued that the role of the civil society to protect human rights cannot be derogated or suspended even in cases of emergency. Civil society must also be recognized as member of the international community, in addition to states. Its exclusion weakens human rights, and the human rights instruments and standards.

Others speakers (Ms. Sunila Abeysekera of INFORM in Sri Lanka, Mr. Kieren Fitzpatrick of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Mr. Park Kyeong Seoh, Korean Ambassador for Human Rights, and Mr. Guillaume Pfeiffle of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) spoke on women HRDs, and the role of governments, national human rights institutions and the UN respectively.

Working groups

The participants broke into working groups to discuss the role of national human rights institutions, governments and the international agencies in protecting HRDs, as well as the practical experiences of protecting HRDs within and outside the country.

FORUM Asia facilitated the adoption of the Bangkok Commitment which states the concerns and ideas for the promotion and protection of HRDs in Asia.

The final activity of the forum was the launching of the first International Women Human Rights Defenders Day in Asia. APWLD organized the presentation of a documentary on Asian women HRDs. Several women HRDs gave testimonies on their experiences. The special program also paid tribute to the work of Ms. Jilani.

For further information, please contact: FORUM-ASIA Secretariat, Baan Vichien, Apartment 3B, 220 Soi Sukhumvit 49/12, Klongton Nua, Wattana, Bangkok 1 0 110, Thailand; ph (662) 391 8801(ext. 502); fax (662) 391 8764; e-mail: anselmo@foru m - asia.org; www.forum-asia.org

A regional workshop on cooperation between national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Asia was held on 30 November to 1 December 2006 in Bangkok.
Organized by FORUM Asia, the workshop was attended by representatives of national and regional NGOs, NHRIs and United Nations (UN) agencies.

The workshop started with a session on the "Challenges, Limitations and Opportunities of NHRIs in Asia" and "Updates on the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF), the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) of the NHRIs and the 8th International Conference for NHRIs (Bolivia, 24-27 October 2006): Platform for NGO engagement." Mr. Brian Burdekin of Raoul Wallenberg Institute (RWI) was the main speaker on the first topic, while Ms. Suraina Pasha, Training Manager of APF, spoke on the second topic.

This session was followed by the launching of FORUM Asia's Assessment of the NHRIs Performance including their Cooperation with NGOs Report 2006. Participants from India, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor Leste, Mongolia, and South Korea presented experiences on NGO-NHRI cooperation in their respective countries, as well as assessment of their own NHRIs. Participants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan reported on the lack of progress on the plan to establish NHRIs.

The second day sessions were devoted to presentations on particular issues affecting NGO-NHRI cooperation. Mr. Jefferson Plantilla of HURIGHTS OSAKA spoke about human rights education, Mr. Ruki Fernando of FORUM-ASIA spoke about protection for human rights defenders by NHRIs, and Ms. Sneh Aurora of Equitas (formerly Canadian Human Rights Foundation) spoke about women's issues and NHRIs.

Some issues

The discussions dwelt on a number of important issues affecting the cooperation between NGOs and the NHRIs, and the performance of the NHRIs.

It was clarified that APF has a membership review process that determines whether or not the member-NHRIs continue to subscribe to the Paris Principles particularly on independence and capacity to respond to human rights violations cases. A member-NHRI found unable to maintain subscription to the Paris Principles may be downgraded to an associate member status. Many participants viewed the NHRIs as lacking in political will to pursue significant cases involving government officials, and members of the police and the military. They were criticized for slow, if not insufficient, investigation of complaints.

The participants conceded however that the NHRIs suffer from weak cooperation of government agencies including the police and the military in investigating cases. The participants also noted that NHRIs had no choice but to wait for the government to act on their recommendations on the prosecution of cases - a result of their lack of prosecutory power. They also noted that a number of NHRIs are suffering from inadequate financial resources as well as insufficiently trained staff.

The participants noted the problem of non-transparent process of appointing members of NHRIs, and the appointment of people who were considered lacking in human rights work experience. This probably explains the presence of inactive NHRI members.

Many participants thought that NHRIs are generally weak in cooperating with NGOs especially in relation to the investigation of cases. Their cooperation seemed to be hindered by suspicion of each other's motives. There is better cooperation, however, between them in human rights promotion activities.

The workshop ended with a discussion on how to improve the process of assessing NHRIs as well as the effective use of the assessment reports. APF was identified as a significant institution to lobby for more effective NHRIs. In view of this, a network was formed tentatively named Asian Network on NHRIs or ANNI.

For the full report on the workshop, please contact: FORUM-ASIA Secretariat, Baan Vichien, Apartment 3B, 220 Soi Sukhumvit 49/12, Klongton Nua, Wattana, Bangkok 10110, Thailand; ph (662) 391 8801(ext. 502); fax (662) 391 8764; e-mail: rashid@foru m - asia.org; anselmo@foru m - asia.org; www.forum-asia.org

One hundred fifty educators, local government officials and graduate students gathered in the 2006 Osaka Conference on Human Rights Education held on 18 November 2006 in Osaka city. The conference was organized by HURIGHTS OSAKA in line with its objective of promoting human rights in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. There were participants from Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, South Korea Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, and a keynote speaker from Australia.

The conference was preceded by school visits held on 17 November 2006 for the foreign participants. The school visits covered primary and secondary schools in the cities of Izumi, Matsubara and Osaka, one non- governmental organization, and the Osaka Education Center (a teacher training center of Osaka prefecture). The visits included class observation, interaction with students, and dialogue with school officials.

The conference proper formally started with the opening remarks by Mr. Osamu Shiraishi, Director of HURIGHTS OSAKA. A speech by Mr. Kenzo Tomonaga, Director of Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute, followed. He highlighted the international human rights education frameworks (the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education, and the World Programme for Human Rights Education). Mr. John Pace of the Australian Human Rights Centre, and an international advisor of HURIGHTS OSAKA, delivered the keynote speech. He gave a short presentation on the situation in Iraq where he worked for some time under the United Nations program. He emphasized the necessity of human rights education even in difficult situations such as Iraq's.

Panel discussion

A panel discussion followed the speeches. Panel speakers stressed the current contexts of the school system and the developments on human rights education. The panelists from Malaysia (Ms. Chiam Heng Keng, Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia) and South Korea (Ms. Kwak Sookhee, Training Division Chief of the Asia-Pacific Center of Education for International Understanding) pointed out the problem of competitive education, which adversely affects the development of children. The panelist from Pakistan (Mr. Aurangzeb Rehman of the Pakistani Ministry of Education) presented the experience in implementing a national action plan on human rights education. The two Japanese panelists (Mr. Yasumasa Hirasawa of Osaka University, and Mr. Hideaki Koji of the Osaka Prefectural Education Board) spoke about the recent developments in human rights education in Japanese schools. Mr. Hirasawa explained the recent report of a national advisory body on education, which incorpo- rated the experiences of the Dowa educators. Mr. Koji explained the whole education system concept in human rights education that is being implemented in the Osaka prefecture.

Due to lack of time, a brief question-and-answer por- tion followed the panel presentations. A few questions were raised. One participant questioned the focus of human rights education efforts on schools. Another participant raised the situation of teachers and the need for "democracy" within the school system.

Small discussion groups
The dialogue between the foreign participants and their Japanese counterparts technically begun in small discussion groups.The whole afternoon of 18 November 2006 was devoted to discussion among the participants. They discussed several issues, categorized into the following: Curriculum for human rights education, Human rights education materials, Teacher training, and the Role of the community (civil society).

Teacher training meeting
The third day (19 November 2006) was devoted to a small meeting on teacher training. The meeting started with a review of the regional program of HURIGHTS OSAKA over the last ten years, and the presentation of a proposed framework on a teacher training on human rights education, which was drawn from the results of HURIGHTS OSAKA'S past activities.

The meeting included the discussion among participants from South Asia on the contents of a planned South Asian material on teacher training on human rights education.

Some issues

 1. Globalization and competitive education system
It is ironic that some children who are already enjoying education are suffering from human rights violations. It is frightening to know that the current problems in schools such as truancy, bullying, and suicide may have been caused by bad experiences at home or in school. The presentations from Malaysia and South Korea, which dealt with these problems in relation to competitive education and the problems it brings are relevant to other Asian countries including Japan.

Education is considered an important part of the growth of children in every society, and it is not expected to lead to the stifling of the children's creativity and initiative - or the loss of interest in life itself. While knowledge-based, exam-oriented, stressful education might provide good examination results, it might also affect the development of social and other skills of the students. If not given attention, they may become violent later in life, withdraw from society, or suffer mental disorder. This is what the "culture of fear of losing out" (known as kiasu in Singapore and Malaysia) is all about.

What then should be done to protect the children? What can human rights education do to help?

 2. Child rights
The panel discussions referred to child rights and related them to the problems that children at present face. The discussions raised the point that children's issues (be they minor or serious) have human rights implications.

This is the role that human rights education plays. The presentation of human rights (or child rights) must be in the context of its audience. For schools, it must relate to the actual situation of children.

In the context of competitive education, it is important to be reminded that children have the right to rest and recreation, and that there are many other interests the children should pay attention to other than academic activities to help them develop holistically.

In light of the renewed public concern about bullying and suicide among students in Japan, the right of students to personal safety has become a major concern.

The effort to find alternative channels for students to express their problems, as shown by an experience in Vietnam, provides the means to protect human rights (especially right to life or personal security) within the school premises. The idea is that the school must be sensitive to the situation of the students by giving them as many channels as possible, such as having a place or box to put messages about the problems they face or getting a network of social workers outside the school who can be trusted by students to communicate their problems to.

Human rights education in schools, as presented in the conference, does not mean learning about international documents. Rather, it is looking at ordinary life from the perspective of child rights and development.

 3. Role of the teachers
While human rights education is the responsibility of many institutions and people in society (starting with the parents), teachers play a very crucial role in it. They generally need training to effectively facilitate the learning of human rights.

The teacher training being done in Nepal that focuses on child rights is a good example of direct involvement of the Ministry of Education in human rights education. It is also a good example of collaboration between the government and the non-government sector. As part of the project, the Ministry of Education officials, university professors, and members of the Teachers Union jointly developed a teacher- training manual on child-friendly school. This collaboration brought different perspectives (especially those of the teachers) into the development of the material.

Some Japanese teachers considered the government- supported teacher-training program for human rights education in Osaka inadequate. This is probably due to the non-compulsory nature of the available training program, leading to the small number of teachers getting involved.

For more information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA

Three materials from Japan won the HURIGHTS OSAKA Award 2006 on International Human Rights Education Materials. The materials were selected among twenty materials from Japan and several other countries. As in the past, the submitted materials were in varied forms - textbooks, work- sheets, picture story books, training materials, documentaries and reports. The documentaries and reports were in video/vcd/dvd formats.

Each winning entry was awarded with 200,000 Yen and an award certificate in a ceremony held on 8 December 2006 in Osaka.

The winning materials

Following are short descriptions of the winning materials.

 1. SAFE Program (Survival and Fairness through Empowerment)
This is a collection of drawings aimed at enabling children in the lower grades of primary schools gain skills to protect themselves. The drawings present various rights provided in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This 60-page publication includes a users' guide.

ECPAT Japan Kansai (Osaka, Japan) produced this material.

 2. Ganbare! Hwangsaewool (Hurray ! Hwangsaewool)
This is a short documentary on the struggle of Korean villagers and their peace-activistsupporters against the forced expropriation of farmlands and a former primary school for the expansion of the U. S. military base in Pyeontaek, Gyonggi-do, South Korea.

Shinsuke Nakai, a video journalist who is affiliated with the Paenseong Residents Committee in Pyeontaek, Gyonggi-do produced this documentary. It runs for eight minutes in dvd format.

 3. Osaka hatsu Manabisuto Sengen (From Osaka, a Declaration of Learners)
This is a collection of human rights education materials for integrated studies in senior secondary schools. The materials consist of several topics named "multi-cultural education team," "night school, long-distance school education team," "Buraku issue team" and "disabled people's education team."

The Osaka Prefectural Human Rights Education Study Group (Osaka, Japan) prepared this material. It has 118 pages.

The three materials are in Japanese language.

For more information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Defending the so-called "human rights defenders" was highlighted in the 1998 United Nations' declaration which provides that everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be protected effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means, activities and acts, including those by omission, attributable to States that result in violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Unfortunately for a number of human rights defenders in Asia and the Pacific, they suffer restrictions in their work due to rules and regulations of States, illegal acts of private entities, and values, practices and traditions of society. Quite a number of them have been killed, and those responsible for their deaths have not been made accountable.

It is worth repeating that the same declaration recognizes the human rights defenders (be they individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations) for having "an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes."

At ground level they help educate people about their rights, protect them as much as possible, and facilitate their realization despite restrictions. Human rights defenders can be ordinary people devoting their own little efforts to human rights.

* Imrana Jalal is the Human Rights Adviser at RRRT, as well as a commissioner with the International Commission of Jurists and board member of the International Council of Human Rights Policy. This article is a condensed version of a speech she gave at Amnesty International Australia's inaugural conference, Human Rights: A Pacific Agenda - Partnerships & Perspectives, in September 2004.

The Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team (RRRT) engages local Pacific Island communities through our Community Paralegal Training (CPT) program-building and supporting a network of community-level human rights activists and advocates across the region - from the urban hub of Suva to some of the remotest islands of Kiribati and Vanuatu. In partnership with locally based organizations, we have now trained an extensive, 300-strong network of community paralegals (CPs) from the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

These CPs are frontline human rights defenders at the local level. We do not call them human rights advocates for strategic reasons. Each country has an informal network of CPs and in the Solomons they have formed into a cohesive network through an association.

Training

CP training lasts between 6-8 weeks spread over two years and our partner organizations in Pacific Island countries try to select participants on the basis that they will be in strategic positions to mobilize and monitor around human rights issues. We believe in ongoing technical and other support. We prefer potential CPs to be working in organizations which are already viable so that their human rights knowledge and skills enhance their ability to be agents of positive change. We are exploring ways to further strengthen their capacity to enable them to work more effectively in their communities by empowering ordinary people to demand their rights from those in positions of power, to assert their rights and to address the many human rights issues and violations that occur at all levels in Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

During the human rights CP Training the participants cover topics and issues including gender, equality and discrimination, Bills of Rights, fundamental rights and freedoms, the legal system, constitutions, democracy, government, good governance, the coup cycle phenomena, family law, development, poverty and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the links between them. They study the "Big Seven" international human rights conventions (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention Against Torture, Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families, and Optional Protocols) and learn how to report to the various United Nations human rights monitoring committees.

They learn skills in lobbying, advocacy and strategies for change. They learn how to run national campaigns, but also micro skills to bring about community change and provide human rights support to individuals. The women and youth CPs from East Honiara Constituency in Solomon Islands have used these strategies for change to actually get their Member of Parliament to provide more than $20,000 to assist them in human rights awareness in their constituencies. The bulk of RRRT programme funds and human resources are spent on CP Training. For us at RRRT, we learn from them the key issues in the islands and they help us to work in several different contexts. I say this because it should not be assumed that the strategies that work well in Fiji can necessarily be applied in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu or Kiribati.

What is significant about the training is that CPs learn not just to use human rights to make gains in the law or in civil and political rights (which is perhaps the traditional use of human rights), but to assert economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights and to gain access to goods, services and delivery. They play a dual role in not only raising issues about human rights but are also monitors of human rights violations at local level.

We work at this level because this is where the most human rights violations occur in the PICs. In very real ways the CPs use human rights to help those who are poor and/or marginalized in their communities. Sometimes the changes are at a micro community level and sometimes the changes are at a structural macro level.

Work at the community level

Some of the diverse changes that have been brought about by CPs (working with partners at individual, agency and macro levels) include:

• Assisting in the successful passing of the Fiji Family Law Act which will give unprecedented rights to women and children;
• Mobilizing against a strict discriminatory dress code for women in Solomon Islands;
• Helping poor women gain custody of their children, enforce maintenance payments and in getting domestic violence orders in several PICs;
• Mobilizing against the dumping of toxic waste by a Taiwanese company in Makira province in Solomon Islands;
• Negotiating speaking rights for women in local village decision-making bodies in Guadalcanal in the Solomons and in the Nakamal in Vanuatu;
• Establishing a new kindergarten in Malaita (Solomon Islands) after many years of waiting for the State to do so;
• Mobilizing against a village decree which sought to deny women rights to access land in Malekula in Vanuatu;
• Enforcing the proper counting of ballot boxes in a remote village in Guadalcanal;
• Helping obtain the provision of cement toilets to 28 households in Tebero village, Abaigang in Kiribati;
• Using knowledge of governance processes in an outer island in Vanuatu to mobilize a (the CP's) village to begin its own education center instead of relying on the State, when the State had not been responsive to demands for access to education.
• Using their knowledge to assist in the constitutional reform process in Solomon Islands by helping in the full participation of citizens.

I share with you these diverse examples as an illustration of how human rights capacity building in the PICs has created different types of change, not just in the arena of civil and political rights but from the household to the community levels. It is also appropriate to share with you the words of a couple of our CPs, who have felt the impact of the CPT program at both the personal and structural levels. According to a CP police officer from Luganville in Vanuatu, becoming a CP has made him change as an individual:

I used to beat my wife and kids heavily because I thought that was a good way of teaching. Now whenever I get frustrated I deal with my frustrations verbally. Mistakes will always occur in everyday activities. But for me, after having knowledge about CEDAW and CRC, I did change a lot (honestly speaking). I now know that beating is a crime and is totally against human rights - especially CEDAW and the CRC - and also our mama law, the Constitution. Now if there is anything wrong in our home, I think twice before taking any action because any action taken might lead to an offence, which contradicts our internal and international laws. It also helps me to respect my wife and kids the same as required by them. This has reduced the great fear that my children have been experiencing.

Meanwhile, for a CP Primary School Principal in Tonga, the program empowered her to challenge the status quo:

In July 2005, public servants were informed of a new salary structure a mere week prior to it being implemented. Many weren't happy with it as it basically ignored seniority and qualifications. I was elected to an interim committee to write a petition to the Public Service Commission and was among a group of four public servants who delivered the letter to the Prime Minister's Office. We gave the Commission three working days and informed them that we would go on strike if there was no satisfactory response to our concerns. At the end of the third day we received a response, however it didn't address any of the 11 main concerns we had raised. We called another meeting on the fourth day, where it was decided that we would go on strike the following day.

Thanks to the Community Paralegal Training, I had the confidence to speak to the other public servants about our constitutional rights to withhold our service - especially if we're not being paid enough - and that our rights to a better standard of living, to health, education and fair treatment were being violated by government, via the Public Service Commission. I felt I was the first to kick the ball of public expression in this first ever industrial action by the public servants and support came in day after day for six and a half weeks until government decided to grant us every recommendation we made - the best of all being the 60, 70 and 80 per cent salary increases which had been withheld from us for nearly 20 years. We've now all learnt the advantages of standing up for what we believe in.

None of this may be earth shattering stuff in the vein of Asia and Africa, or traditional human rights interventions, but these are the contexts of community-level frontline human rights defenders.

The question might well be asked, how do we know that these changes were brought about by CPs? In bringing to you some of these vignettes we have tried honestly to apply the "but for" test - i.e. would these changes have happened "but for" the intervention? In many cases it is difficult to say. These changes were sometimes brought about by CPs acting solely and sometimes in concert with other actors, but in all cases they were strategic agents of change. Their knowledge and skills at mobilizing, advocating and lobbying were crucial factors in being either the initial catalyst for change or crucial in an important strategic step which ultimately brought about the change.

These changes illustrate the diverse ways in which human rights capacity building can assist the plight of the marginalized and excluded.

Problems

But what of their difficulties? There are many.

Many of them stem from being advocates in small PIC communities. Here are some examples. Unlike many parts of Africa and Asia, defenders do not face immediate threats to their physical security. Exceptions to this include the coups of 1987 and 2000 in Fiji and Solomon Islands. However, they face social isolation, alienation, hostility and structural and financial obstacles in doing human rights work.

The small size of island populations makes it socially difficult for CPs to take an unpopular position against the State, the status quo or chiefs in villages or settlements. Often they are related to or are wantok(belong to the same clans) to human rights violators. Openly taking a different position is seen as going against the culture or a betrayal of one's culture. To criticize one's community or province is seen as letting down the side, especially in relation to how foreigners might view them. Social exclusion can often result.

In bigger countries advocates have enough social net- works to mitigate against the loss of familial or social ties. In small PICs they often only have one social network. So advocacy can often mean loss of familial and social ties. When a defender in Tonga mobilized her women's group to fight against a new law that limited free speech she was ostracized by a social group very important to her.

When island defenders take a strong human rights position they are often accused of "not speaking on behalf of us" or of imposing Western values or of being used to impose donor agendas. There are not enough human rights defenders to support each other so defenders often work in isolation in their communities. There is not a sufficient critical mass of human rights defenders in most PICs (with perhaps the exception of Fiji). A related problem is that there are so few defenders that they are overburdened with human rights work.

A defender in the Solomons says that:

We are seen as culture/religion destroyers promoting a Western culture and usually this creates blockages in advocating for human rights. We are seen as people who are promoting marriage break downs, or who are promoting children under the CRC to rebel against parents or taking away parents rights. Equality is resisted so much because it is seen as against culture and religion ... People only run for human rights when they are in a problem and this is most irritating because then their expectations are so high about changes to be done over night. Most of our (Solomon Islands) CPs are volunteers so they face financial, transportation and communication problems in doing human rights work.

But there are some advantages and opportunities to working in small island communities too. The small populations offer protection and assistance to defenders as well. Human rights defenders are highly visible and well known. It would be almost impossible, for example, to arrest a defender and for it not to be known and for the community or family not to do any- thing about it. Personal links also open doors for defenders in lobbying. It would be unthinkable for instance for a Minister of State to refuse to see a defender who is his or her wantok.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the vast majority of Pacific Islanders regard human rights as promoting individual rights over collective or group rights. For islanders, the group should always take precedence over the individual. In fact it is considered unseemly even for an individual to insist on rights in the face of open opposition from the group or the leaders of the village, clan or community. It is considered against customary protocol, as having bad manners, and even considered downright selfish. It is also seen as asserting one's individuality and not just one's human rights. The notion of individualism is not one that is necessarily prized in PIC cultures.

Because culture and human rights are seen as directly opposing values, this alienates island communities for whom their culture provides identity, solace, nourishment and hope in a world that is changing rapidly and is overwhelming and bewildering. The aggressive traditional and/or blaming approach of many human rights organizations internationally and locally does not work in the Pacific. We have found that out the hard way.

RRRT and our partners have tried to find innovative ways to make the same gains but within a Pacific context, accepting, for example, the deeply religious culture of island societies. Because of this we tend to work "with" rather than "against". If we work "against" very few actually know it!! And because of this we work also with pastors, ministers and chiefs, some of whom are excellent paralegals.

This approach in no way takes away from our belief that human rights are universal, inalienable, indivisible and interconnected, or that our Pacific cultures should not be examined or not found wanting. Far from it. The challenge is to build an island human rights culture, but one that allows islanders to believe in both their culture and in human rights and to find the appropriate balances and compromises. With this knowledge we hope that where and when there are direct conflicts, island citizens will make the correct human rights choices but with full knowledge (from well informed perspectives) and not out of ignorance and imposition.

The life affirming and inspirational work of these frontline human rights defenders gives me and others at RRRT the strength to carry on with our own human rights capacity building work by continuing to teach, assist and provide them with our support but also to learn from them.

For further information, please contact: Hannah Harborow, Communications Coordinator, Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team (RRRT), 2nd Floor, Pacific House, Butt St., Suva, Fiji. Mailing address : Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fiji; ph (679) 330 5582; fax (679) 330 6582 ; e-mail: hannah@rrrt.org. fj ; www.rrrt.org

The Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team (RRRT)

RRRT was set up in Suva in 1995 by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) as a regional legal literacy project to enhance the legal and social status of women with a focus in eight Pacific Island countries: Fiji, Cook Islands, Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. Since then RRRT has undertaken new and more challenging projects in these islands in response to both evolving global themes as well as local, including; fighting gender discrimination, increasing access to justice, building the capacity of civil society to participate in and monitor democracy and enhancing the capacity of Pacific Island leaders in the areas of law and justice

RRRT is a technical advisory and training organization that focuses on building the capacity of national and regional partners to alleviate poverty through increasing awareness of rights and responsibilities at all levels from grassroots community groups to Ministers of Parliament. RRRT believes that in order to address the current situation in the Pacific of deteriorating services and resultant increasing levels of poverty, training of key policymakers and implementers, including judiciary, magistrates and other purveyors of justice as well as community-based organizations will enhance the capacity of governments to provide services, as well as enhance civil societies ability to both demand for, and monitor those services. RRRT strongly believes that working with all levels will assist in both state and civil society to enhance their knowledge and capacity in accessing justice and seeking solutions through democratic means.

Currently administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with funds fro m the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) and Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), RRRT is working towards becoming the first Pacific indigenous technical advisory and training institution in the area of good governance and democracy.

* Mr. Ruki Fernando is the Coordinator of the Human Rights Defenders Program of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA).

While human rights defenders (HRDs) continue frontline work to promote and protect human rights, they themselves suffer repression by state and non-state actors. HRDs continue to become victims of serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial killing, enforced and involuntary disappearance, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, etc.

Restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, expression and movement impede human rights work. Laws and activities related to anti-terrorism, national security and emergency measures by many Asian governments severely affect them. "NGO laws" adversely affect the legal status, organizational management, and access to funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Particular targets and risks

Women HRDs as well as their lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender counterparts face greater and different risks because of their gender and the fact that they challenge social stereotypes, social structures, vested economic interests, traditional practices, and interpretations of religious precepts. They are targeted by religious groups, tribal elders, community members, family members and even members of the human rights community that uphold these patriarchal practices. The risks and vulnerabilities which women HRDs face take gender-specific forms ranging from verbal abuse directed exclusively at them, to sexual harassment and rape. They face prejudice, social ostracism and public repudiation from both state and non-state actors HRDs representing disadvantaged communities such as Dalits, indigenous peoples, migrant workers etc., also face specific challenges due to their identity as members of disadvantaged groups and the issues they work on. Those working on issues related to economic, social and cultural rights face increasing challenges at the hands of states as well as business enterprises, transnational corporations and international financial institutions. Those working in situations of armed conflict, particularly intra-state, identity-based conflicts are subjected to threats and violations by state and non-state armed groups and find themselves severely restricted and often labeled unpatriotic and traitors.

Even members and staff of National Human Rights Commissions in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand have come under threats and attacks in the recent past.

Impunity for violations against defenders

Impunity for violations against HRDs continues unabated. Campaigns by the families of the defenders and the local and international human rights groups, and promises by national leaders in Thailand and Indonesia have failed so far to bring the people behind the violations to justice even in prominent cases such as those of Somchai Neelaphaijit and Munir Said Thalib. No one has been held responsible for the hundreds of extrajudicial killing of HRDs in the Philippines. There has been no justice for the series of attacks on journalists, peace activists and humanitarian workers in Sri Lanka, including the execution-style slaying of seventeen aid workers in August 2006.

Impunity for such serious and prominent cases sends a chilling message that those who threaten or commit serious atrocities against HRDs can escape accountability and hence given a license to continue their violations.

Some prominent cases

In December 2005, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) held its 6th ministerial meeting in Hong Kong S.A.R., thousands of activists were restricted to an open space on a cold winter night. This was followed by the arrest of more than 600 activists, who were detained and subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment. Fourteen activists were subjected to prolonged detention and charged with illegal assembly. The Hong Kong courts subsequently dismissed the cases due to lack of evidence.

Just before the annual International Monetary Fund- World Bank (IMF-WB) meeting was held in September 2006, the Singaporean government black- listed almost thirty activists despite their official accreditation by WB and IMF. Peaceful gatherings to express ideas and opinions were also limited to a small area. Twenty-two activists were belatedly taken off the list due to international pressure including from the IMF-WB, but thirteen activists had already been deported. And activists passing through Singapore were harassed on their way to their meeting in nearby Batam island in Indonesia.

Somchai Neelaphaijit, a well-known Muslim human rights lawyer in Thailand, disappeared on 12 March 2004. He fearlessly handled the sensitive cases of Muslim youths charged with involvement in violence in Southern Thailand. These youths were found to have been tortured by the police. Two years later, a Thai Criminal Court convicted a senior police officer of illegal detention of Neelaphaijit. But despite campaigns by his wife, support from NGOs (national, regional and international), and report to a United Nations (UN) human rights body, the masterminds behind Neelaphaijit's disappearance have yet to be brought to justice.

The case of Munir Said Thalib, a prominent Indonesian defender who was poisoned to death in September 2004 on a Garuda Airlines flight to the Netherlands, has remained a mystery. An Indonesian court found a certain Pollycarpus Priyanto guilty of premeditated murder and imposed a 14-year prison sentence. The media has reported that a fact-finding team of the government has earlier submitted to the President of Indonesia a report stating the supposed involvement of the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency (BIN - Badan Inteligen Nasional). But this report has not been made public, and the master- minds behind the murder have yet to be made accountable.

Humanitarian workers and peace activists in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka have become victims of violence. In May 2006, three NGO offices in Sri Lanka were attacked with grenades. In August 2006, seventeen humanitarian workers (belonging to Action Contre la Faim) were murdered. NGO staff and their vehicles, including ambulances, were attacked several times. Several humanitarian workers died or were injured by claymore mine explosions, while the fate of several others remains unknown several months after their abduction. Their access to displaced persons have been restricted, and they suffered harassment and threats of arrest from government security forces who demanded permits from the Ministry of Defence(MOD), which the latter does not require. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for foreign aid workers to obtain work permits and visas. Away from the main theater of war, the northern and eastern regions, several public events on peace organized by peace activists were violently attacked and the Deputy Secretary-General of the government's Peace Secretariat was assassinated. No one has been held accountable or brought to justice in any of these incidents.

The international standards

HRDs can simply be defined as those who individually or in association with others promote and protect human rights, in a peaceful manner. They can be communities struggling for their rights, students, workers, journalists, lawyers, NGO workers, community paralegals, etc.

Their human rights deserve protection like everyone else, but they accept the risk of suffering extreme forms of violation of their human rights, for the cause of victims of human rights violations and often consider these violations and repression as "occupational hazards."

HRDs gained more visibility and recognition during the last decade. The most significant development came in the form of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms^[1] (Declaration) adopted by the UN in 1998, on the eve of a most auspicious event - the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Declaration gathers the rights of HRDs found in various UN human rights instruments, including legally binding treaties and conventions, into one document; highlights the rights of the HRDs and the duties of the states; is addressed to "everyone" not just to states; and recognizes and legalizes the important role of HRDs.

Despite the unanimous adoption of this Declaration by the UN General Assembly and the passing of more than seven years, no government in Asia has attempted to explicitly incorporate the provisions of the Declaration into domestic laws.

Mechanisms to protect HRDs

HRDs have no recourse at the Asian regional or sub- regional levels for the protection of their human rights, unlike in Africa, Europe and the Americas.^[2]

The appointment in 2000 of Ms. Hina Jilani as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General tasked to look into the situation of HRDs was a ray of hope. She has the mandate to seek, receive, examine and respond to information on the situation of HRDs; dialogue and cooperate with governments and other actors to implement the Declaration; and recommend and follow up strategies to protect HRDs.

Ms. Jilani, a well-known Pakistani human rights defender, submitted "Urgent action letters" and "Allegation letters" regarding individual cases; and reported on the general situation of HRDs the world over. Despite lukewarm cooperation by many states, including Asian states, Ms. Jilani tirelessly advocated better protection, support and recognition of HRDs at national, regional and international levels.

European Union Guidelines

The second and more recent development at the international level was the adoption of the European Union (EU) guidelines on HRDs in 2004. They spell out the commitment of the EU to protect and support the work of HRDs all over the world and have particular relevance to Asian situation.

Based on the guidelines, EU embassies should:

1. Maintain contacts with HRDs - welcome them to the embassies, visit their areas of work and appoint liaison officers
2. Provide visible recognition to defenders - provide appropriate publicity, visit them or extend invitations to them
3. Attend and observe trials of HRDs
4. Arrange meetings with HRDs during visits of high-level EU officials and raise their individual cases
5. Promote the use of UN thematic mechanisms by HRDs - facilitate contacts with, and exchange information between, thematic mechanisms and them
6. Assist in the establishment of networks of HRDs at international level, including support for meetings of HRDs
7. Help HRDs gain access to resources, including financial, from abroad.

Way forward

For the protection and continued work of HRDs, there is a need to maximize whatever mechanisms are available. HRDs in Asia should make every effort to engage the UN Special Representative.

Likewise, the UN Country Teams, field officers and advisors of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights play an important role and need to proactively engage the HRDs, particularly to ensure better protection for them.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, through its Regional Office for Southeast Asia, can explore ways of playing a more dynamic and proactive role with regards to HRDs.

The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) can also explore measures such as having a focal point or special desk on HRDs at the APF secretariat, having a permanent agenda item on HRDs at the annual APF meetings, and proactively advocating for, and helping the adoption of, guidelines by the International Coordination Committee of National Human Rights Institutions on HRDs and the national human rights institutions.

EU missions in Asia, as well as the embassies of EU countries, should act proactively to implement the EU guidelines on HRDs.

National Human Rights Commissions can use their mandates to investigate cases of violations against HRDs and ensure accountability for the violators, advise governments to work for the incorporation of the provisions of the Declaration into national laws or the repeal of laws that violate them, and advocate the cooperation of governments with the UN Special Representative. Awareness-raising about the possibilities of these mechanisms is an important first step.

States have the primary responsibility of ensuring the protection of HRDs and creating a safe and conducive atmosphere for their work. But solidarity and networking among the HRDs sustain and strengthen them.

The tenth anniversary of the Declaration in 2008 provides a good opportunity to create new and strengthened momentum towards the full implementation of the Declaration in Asia.

For further information, please contact: FORUM-ASIA Secretariat, Baan Vichien, Apartment 3B, 220 Soi Sukhumvit 49/12, Klongton Nua, Wattana , Bangkok 10110, Thailand; ph (662) 391 8801(ext. 502); fax (662) 391 8764; e-mail: ruki @ forum-asia.org; anselmo@forum-asia.org; www.forum-asia.org

Endnotes

1. UNGA - A/RES/53/144, 8 March 1999.

2. There is a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders in the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the Human Rights Defenders Unit in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Press freedom and access to information face uneven and inconsistent realities across Southeast Asia. From Burma to the Philippines, and from Brunei and Singapore to Thailand and Indonesia, the region represents a full spectrum of experiments or repudiations of the value and virtues of free expression and accessible information.

At one end, free, independent journalism and unfettered access to any kind of public document are virtually nonexistent in Burma, where a military junta jails and tortures journalists, stifles dissent, and refuses to release any public document for review or questioning. On the other end, eager but vulnerable democracies in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are putting unbridled press freedom up for public disillusionment and scorn. Between these two sets of examples are countries like Cambodia and East Timor which are trying to open up their press to more liberty, and the ironic situations of Malaysia and Singapore, where evident economic strength stands starkly against highly restrictive environments for free expression.

From an alarming rash of assassinations of media practitioners in the Philippines and the media ownership patterns that render the free press vulnerable to intertwined business and political interests in Indonesia and Thailand, to the improbably worsening military conditions in Burma, Southeast Asian nations experience in one region the various trends and means by which journalists and societies in general are being forced to surrender their rights to information, and the free dissemination of news and opinions. Across the region then, there is as much an appreciation for the need for more freedom, as clear lessons that also raise the demand not only for a free press, but also responsible journalism. Put another way, the different and uneven realities spell different needs, demands, and capabilities among the region's media groups, practitioners, and advocates.

Before the mid-1980s, all the countries of Southeast Asia were run by autocratic rulers who suppressed civil and political rights, including freedom of the press and the right to information. Draconian laws ranging from those that justify detention without trial to those that outlaw and severely punish "rumour mongering" were the norm across the region that is now home to about 530 million people.

Today the conditions in the authoritarian states of Southeast Asia - Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Brunei - remain as rigid as ever and reforms from within appear unlikely without a change of regime. But there has been a dramatic sea change elsewhere in the region, with dictatorships tumbling down and democratic reforms being introduced in the biggest countries: the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. In addition, advances in technology and the integration of regional economies into global trade and finance have helped loosen restrictions in the semi-democracies of the region (Singapore, Cambodia and Malaysia) - albeit slowly and in small measures, and with the danger of reversals rather real. Certainly, Southeast Asia has more democratic states than it had two decades ago, and citizens in these countries enjoy more freedoms than ever before.

The changes in the media and information landscape in these countries have been dramatic. Media controls were dismantled, leading to the removal of state censors and the cancellation of licensing requirements for both the print and broadcast media. Ownership of the media fell increasingly into the hands of the private sector. The resulting media boom fostered competition among journalists and led to a more inquisitive press.

Today, the free press in Southeast Asia is a powerful institution. Policies have been changed, reforms initiated and corrupt officials - including presidents - ousted partly because of media exposes. An adversarial press is part of the political process and it is hard to imagine how governments in the region's freewheeling democracies would function without it.

That is the good news. The bad news is that the free press in Southeast Asia is under threat. Journalism is a dangerous profession in the region's democracies. In the Philippines, which has enjoyed a free press far longer than its neighbors, nearly 60 journalists have been murdered since 1986, the year strongman Ferdinand Marcos fell. Most of the killings took place outside Manila as there is less tolerance for critical reporting in the provinces, particularly in areas where political bosses or clans have ruled for decades. A similar situation prevails in Thailand, where local political bosses are prickly about critical reports. Things are not much different in Indonesia, where journalists on the outlying islands of this vast country say that death threats and intimidation are a fact of life, especially when their newspapers tackle corruption and criticize local authorities unaccustomed to the free media that has emerged after 32 years of dictatorship.

The lesson from Southeast Asia's new democracies is that even if constitutions and laws guarantee press freedom, reversals can take place. In Thailand, which has enjoyed a free press since 1992, (then) Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has used advertising withdrawals and threats on press proprietors to silence critical sections of the media since he assumed power in 2001. In Indonesia, angry mobs have attacked the offices of media agencies that have reported adversely on them.

This year, a Mafia lord sued a major newspaper for libel and managed to get a court ruling seizing the assets of the newspaper and its publisher. In Indonesia as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the judicial and law-enforcement system is weak and prone to pressure from the wealthy and powerful, providing little protection for risk-taking journalists. For this reason, those who muzzle the press and silence journalists can operate with impunity.

The situation is much worse in the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in the region. In Malaysia and Singapore, authorities have used onerous laws and the threat of legal action to clamp down on reporting on politics and politicians. In Singapore, the courts have imposed stiff fines on Western news organizations that report critically of the government. Singapore's leaders are notorious for filing defamation suits under a regime where the independence of courts especially in politically charged media cases are debatable at best. All Singaporeans, from academics to writers, journalists, politicians, and plain citizens, are then left to risk raising questions and issues in a city-state where all of mainstream media is state-owned, and where the political and judicial processes have demonstrated capacity to systematically ridicule, demonize, isolate, and finally bankrupt government critics.

Cambodia remains partly free but suffers from a chaotic, politically manipulated press and a tenuous commitment to the rule of law. Elsewhere, Burma, Laos and Vietnam remain harshly authoritarian, restricting the press to a severe degree. In East Timor, the promise of freedom is there but the reality may be painful as political transition is underway and close monitoring and support is needed. In addition, in many countries in Southeast Asia, authorities have taken advantage of the post-11 September hysteria to put restrictions on reporting. While the most blatant cases have taken place in Singapore and Malaysia, similar tendencies are apparent in the democracies of the region.

Throughout the region, meanwhile, there are from both the side of media and the State-simultaneous recognition of the power of new media. Consequently, there are now also new battles being waged in cyberspace: to exploit its powerful new and alternative medium for free, borderless expression on the one hand, and to keep it under a lid on the other. Even as Southeast Asia now sees an explosion in the phenomenon of blogging, podcasting, and online news in general, the same notorious tactics long applied against traditional media from the wielding of Internal Security Acts to threats of criminal defamation - are being transported to cyberspace.

For further information, please contact: Mr. Roby Alampay, Executive Director,Southeast Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) Headquarters, 538/1 Sam-Sen Rd. Dusit Bangkok Thailand 10300; ph/fax 66-2-243-5579 e-mail: seapa@seapabkk.or; www.seapabkk.org

Endnote

* The following article is excerpted from the introduction to a strategy paper for promoting and protecting press freedom in Southeast Asia, as prepared by the Bangkok-based Southeast Asian Press Alliance. SEAPA Executive Director Roby Alampay has authorized its publication.

The 11th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions discussed the role of national human rights institutions in Asia-Pacific regarding human rights defenders, right to education and subregional human rights mechanisms, among other issues. The 17 member-institutions of the forum likewise reviewed the activities undertaken during the past year including training workshops for members of the staff of the member-institutions. The 2006 meeting was held on 31 July - 3 August 2006 in Suva, Fiji.

Membership

The meeting deferred deliberation on the application for membership in the APF^[1] by the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) of Saudi Arabia pending finalization of the accreditation guidelines of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions. In the meantime, APF offers to extend technical assistance to NSHR regarding compliance with the Paris Principles. The NSHR was established in 2004 through a Royal Decree 24/2 issued by King Rahad bin Abdul Aziz.

The Human Rights Commission of Maldives (HRCM), established in 2003, has expressed interest in applying as a member of APF. It attended the meeting as an observer. The Pakistan government announced its plan to establish a national human rights institution, which is likely to apply for membership in APF.

The APF has the policy of accepting members those national institutions that comply with the requirements of the Paris Principles. It welcomed the plan of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a meeting in 2006 of Asian States "to encourage the establishment and strengthening of national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles."

Human rights mechanism

The meeting took note of the efforts to establish human rights mechanisms in the Pacific and Southeast Asia respectively. The initiatives are being led by the member-institutions in Fiji and New Zealand for the Pacific, and by the member-institutions in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand for Southeast Asia. These member-institutions have been lobbying the governments in the Pacific and Southeast Asia to take concrete steps in establishing such mechanisms in the context of the latter's forthcoming Pacific Plan for Human Rights and ASEAN Charter respectively.

Draft Strategic Plan

The meeting considered the draft strategic plan for the period 2007 to 2009, which envisions APF to become the pre-eminent regional human rights organisation in the Asia Pacific.^[2] The draft strategic plan incorporates and builds upon the following lessons learned during the past ten years of operation of APF:

1. Links between NHRIs in different countries are crucial for the implementation of cooperative efforts in the field of human rights.
2. Specialized technical assistance and cooperation is a priority for the development and strengthening of NHRIs.
3. The cooperative framework of the APF provides a non-confrontational and practical environment in which NHRIs can address human rights issues.
4. Diversified and secure funding is necessary in order for the APF to meet its mission and vision.

For further information, please contact: Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Forum Secretariat, GPO Box 5218 Sydney NSW 1042 Australia; ph (612) 9284 9845; fax (612) 9284 9825; e-mail: apf@asiapacificforum.net; www.asiapacificforum.net

Endnotes

1. There are currently 15 member-institutions, one candidate member (Provedor for Human Rights and Justice of Timor Leste) and one associate member (National Human Rights Committee of Qatar).

2. Annual Business Meeting Report, Eleventh Annual Meeting 31st July 2006, Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Sydney, Australia, page 67. Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions HURIGHTS OSAKA

* Nobuki Fujimoto is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

UNESCO and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) presided over the formal establishment of the Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific. The Coalition has six member-cities, namely, Phnom Penh, Suva, Makati, Kurunegala, Matale, and Bangkok. Bangkok is the Coalition's Lead City. The Coalition was inaugurated during the Regional Conference of Cities for an Inclusive Society in Asia and the Pacific, jointly organized by UNESCO and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) on 3-4 August 2006 in Bangkok.

The Conference was attended by representatives from the cities, in addition to the six member-cities, of Sakai (Japan), Kathmandu (Nepal), Kanchanaburi, Lamphun, Mae Hong Son, Nong Khai, Prachin Buri, Ratchaburi, Sa Kaeo, Tak, Trat (Thailand) together with researchers, and representatives of Thai provincial governments, the United Cities and Local Governments-Asia Pacific Regional Section (UCLG- ASPAC), Thai government ministries, the Thai National Human Commission, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Thailand National Commission for UNESCO and the Permanent Delegation of Thailand to UNESCO.

The Coalition remains open for signature by cities and municipalities in the region wishing to join the network.

Why cities?

UNESCO believes that cities are the places where the everyday meeting of differences sparks competition, clashing of interests and fears that feed the development of the ideologies and practices of discrimination. At the same time, cities are laboratories for learning to live together, a place for an exchange of beliefs, attitudes and styles of life, which can contribute to new forms of democratic citizenship. It also addresses the fact that cities have the ideal space within which to conduct a struggle against racism and discrimination that facilitates effective implementation of the various instruments enacted by States.

Commitment of the cities

The international coalition of cities project (Project) was launched by UNESCO in March 2004 to establish a network of cities interested in sharing experiences on improving policies to fight racism, as a follow-up to the United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).

The Project aims to bring together cities around the world through the Ten-Point Commitment defined to combat racism, discrimination and exclusion at the local level. The Project calls for the establishment of "Regional Coalitions" in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Africa, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Arab region. Each Regional Coalition is to be coordinated by a "lead city", and will be guided by its own regional Ten-Point Commitment. The member-cities in turn are expected to integrate the Commitment into their municipal policies as much as possible.

The European Coalition of Cities against Racism was launched on 10 December in 2004 with Nuremberg as Lead City. The European Coalition already has 70 member-cities. UNESCO plans to establish the International Coalition in 2007. During the Bangkok conference, the draft regional Ten-Point Commitment, prepared during an expert meeting held also in Bangkok in 2005, was discussed and adopted.

The representatives of the six member-cities signed the Declaration of Intent conveying the strong interest of their cities to become members of the Coalition and its Ten-Point Commitment.

In cooperation with UNESCO and its Bangkok Office, a steering committee will be organized to be composed of representatives of the signatory cities, regional institutions and experts, in order to provide the necessary support to and guidance for the Coalition member-cities. The Coalition of Cities in the Asia and the Pacific has to increase its membership beyond the pioneering six member-cities.

For further information, please visit the website of UNESCO http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1376&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

Commitment no. 1:Assessing Racism and Discrimination and Monitoring Municipal Policies
To initiate, or develop further, in collaboration with NGOs, National Human Rights Commissions and institutions and UN systems (e.g. CERD, UN Special Rapporteurs, Human Rights Council), the collection of data on racism and discrimination, establish achievable objectives and set common indicators in order to assess the impact of municipal policies; and to act as "Clearing House" in order to contribute to the national and international reporting systems from the local viewpoint.

Commitment no. 2:Providing political leadership at the city and community levels to address issues of Discrimination and Exclusion
To raise awareness of the existence of racism and discrimination among local policy makers and city dwellers.

Commitment No. 3: Promoting an Inclusive Society
To develop and/or strengthen a network of people and organizations to share visions and concerns for harmonious relationships in a diverse and inclusive society.

Commitment no. 4:Strengthening Support for the Victims of Racism and Discrimination
To identify the victims and target groups of racism and discrimination and to support them and contribute to strengthening their capacity to defend themselves against racism and discrimination.

Commitment no. 5:Facilitating Greater Participation and the Empowerment of City Dwellers Through Access to Information
To ensure better information for city dwellers on their rights and obligations, on protection and legal options, and on the penalties for racist and discriminatory acts or behaviour, by using a participatory approach, notably through consultations with service users and service providers.

Commitment no. 6:Promoting The City As An Equal Opportunities Employer and Service Provider
The city commits itself to be an equal opportunities employer and equitable service provider, and to engage in considering the needs of people from culturally diverse communities in planning, monitoring, training and development to achieve this objective.

Commitment no. 7:Promoting The City As An Active Supporter of Equal Opportunity Practices
Where required, to facilitate and monitor equal opportunity employment practices and support for diversity in the labour market through proactive exercise of powers of the city authority.

Commitment no. 8:Challenging Racism and Discrimination Through Education
To strengthen measures against discrimination in access to, and enjoyment of, all forms of education; and to promote the provision of education in mutual respect, tolerance and understanding, and intercultural dialogue.

Commitment no.9:Promoting Cultural Diversity
To respect the culture of diverse communities including the set of attitudes, beliefs, practices, values, shared identities, rituals, customs, etc.; to ensure fair representation and promotion of the diverse cultural expression and heritage of city dwellers in the cultural programmes, collective memory and public space of the city authority; and to promote interculturality in the community life consistent with international human rights standards.

Commitment no. 10:Preventing and overcoming racist incitement and related violence
To support or establish mechanisms in dealing with racist incitement and related violence leading to reconciliation.

Declaration

The Cities participating in Regional Conference of Cities for an Inclusive Urban Society (3-4 August 2006, Bangkok, Thailand), Being Aware of the responsibility incumbent upon city authorities to provide for all city residents and visitors, without discrimination or through exclusion on the grounds of "race", colour, descent or national, ethnic or religious identity, economic status, disabilities, sexual orientation and/or other origins/status, the conditions in which they can flourish, while acknowledging and respecting the freedom, equality, dignity and rights of all;

Acknowledging that a commitment to address issues of racism and discrimination in the city is among the duties of city authorities, with a view towards engendering a citizenship that respects the diversity from which springs the wealth of societies;

Realising that only with the active participation of all city dwellers in policy development, implementation and evaluation, can action against racism and discrimination attain the scope and effectiveness it demands;

Resolving to draw lessons from past experience in action against racism, and to exchange expertise and good practices with a view to improving policies;

Recognizing that in the increasingly diverse and multiethnic cities, promoting equality and counteracting discrimination is a cornerstone in the sustainable development of cohesive democratic values;

Recalling past commitments made by Mayors of different regions of the world promoting respect and cultural diversity in their cities, as well as the creation of legal frameworks favourable to the expansion of fundamental rights to all city dwellers;

Emphasizing that the growing ethnic diversity of cities is a source of cultural dynamism, economic prosperity and social cohesion;

Have agreed to adopt this Ten-Point Commitment in order to give practical expression to their commitment to combat racism and discrimination in the spirit of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and its global Programme of Action (2001, Durban, South Africa).

This Ten-Point Commitment will make it possible for partner cities among others, to set priorities in their struggle against racism and discrimination, to rationalise and optimise policies and to reinforce cooperation in this area.

The Ten-Point Commitment is an instrument comprising ten points covering various areas of competence of city authorities and suggests some examples of actions that city authorities might consider with a view to fulfilling each of the points.

The signatory cities or other local government authorities undertake to integrate this Commitment in municipal strategies and policies and to involve in its implementation various actors from civil society, especially those who are the targets of discrimination.

The Ten Points and possible actions proposed in this Commitment make up a minimum programme requiring effective and expeditious implementation within a realistic time frame, and in no way preclude other actions in this area by city authorities.

The Commitment may be amended and expanded as appropriate in light of assessment of its implementation through the mechanisms provided for in this respect.

In addition, the Cities adhering to the Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination in Asia and the Pacific will inform the Secretariat (to be established), other Coalition members, and UNESCO of their first actions to be undertaken in order to meet their commitments. The Cities will, through appropriate means and as soon as possible, indicate the concrete actions within the relevant time frame for implementation to be carried out for each Commitment made.

* Teruo Yoneda is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

HURIGHTS OSAKA held the 2006 Citizens' Forum on 22 September 2006 in Piloti Hall, Osaka City. The Forum is an annual activity aimed at raising human rights awareness among the public. It is held in cooperation with the Osaka city and prefectural governments. This year's Forum had the theme "Aiming for the Goal of Human Rights."

The Forum began with a short concert by Ms. Nataliya Gudziy, a victim of radiation exposure in the Chernobyl Reactor accident in Ukraine when she was 6 years old. She is now involved in helping the other victims of the accident. Her lovely songs and the plaintive tone of the bandura, an ethnic Ukrainian instrument, fascinated the audience.

The Director of HURIGHTS OSAKA, Mr. Osamu Shiraishi then gave the opening address. Ms. Yoriko Suzuki, Principal Deputy Director of the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a presentation on the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, how it was created, the discussions in the first session, as well as Japan's policy as a member of the Council.

The main part of the Forum was a three-person discussion with Mr. Yoshikazu Hiroshima, a teacher at Nagano Senior High School in Osaka, Ms. Miki Ebara, international correspondent of NHK, and Mr. Shiraishi. Mr. Hiroshima is also an international football referee, who took part in the recent football World Cup in Germany as a deputy referee. He told the audience about the joy he felt in being part of the World Cup and discussed Zinedine Zidane's head-butting incident. He also mentioned how fair plays would elicit applause even from the supporters of the opposing teams, how praising the losing side would promote respect for human rights, as well as his aspiration to train not first-class players, but players who would enjoy engaging in sports for life.

Ms. Ebara, aside from presiding over the discussion, spoke of her experience in reporting on the tsunami disaster off the Indonesian coast, and sharing the sorrow with the victims.

Mr. Shiraishi told Ms. Ebara that "staying away from journalists" was like a password among United Nations staff. He spoke of the harsh realities of working on cases of mass killings that do not allow room for emotions, and how he was attacked by armed bandits in Afghanistan.

For more information, please contact HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The United Nations (UN) World Programme for Human Rights Education provides a "collective framework for action based on human rights education principles agreed upon by the international community." The expectation is that Member-States will continue implementing or developing human rights education programs at the national level, this time under a new international program

The first phase plan of the World Programme (2005-2007), which focuses on the formal education system, identifies the Ministry of Education as the main implementing agency at the national level. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNESCO have called on the Ministers of Education of the Member- States to indicate to them which department or unit within their Ministries would coordinate activities related to the implementation of the first phase plan

The core task under the first phase plan of the World Programme is the four- stage national process - analysis of the situation, planning, implementation and evaluation of national implementation strategy. It is expected that by the year 2007, initial steps would have been taken under the national implementation strategy

National process constitutes the key element of effective implementation of any international program. It is to the best interest of the Member-States that their national players (governmental and non-governmental institutions) are fully involved, as they should be being stakeholders

The UNESCO Charter reminds us that the foundations for peace must be constructed in the human mind. This is a major challenge facing Asia and the Pacific, where a culture of equality, participation, and justice remains fragile in large parts of the region. At the same time, tremendous progress being made in the field of education is creating opportunities for new generations to become conscious of societal prejudices, to be empowered through knowledge about human rights, and to experience participation and inclusiveness

During the Decade on Human Rights Education (1995-2004), the international community placed human rights education high on the international agenda. The Decade created an occasion for the collection of valuable information on how countries around the world implement this important component of their education systems, including information on human rights curriculums, teaching methods, and teacher training. On 10 December 2004, in its resolution A/RES/59/113, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed a World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) which focuses in its first phase (2005-2007) on the primary and secondary school systems

The World Programme supports countries in the implementation of international commitments contained in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 26), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 13), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 29), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (article 10), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (article 7) and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Part I, paras. 33-34 and Part II, paras. 78-82), as well as the Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001 (Declaration, paras. 95-97 and Programme of Action, paras. 129- 139). It builds upon a number of initiatives of States in this area, including the World Public Information Campaign on Human Rights (1988-ongoing), the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004) and its Plan of Action, and the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010)

Drawing on the principles set by those instruments and frameworks, the plan of action (A/59/525/Rev.1) of the first phase (2005-2007) of the WPHRE supports the development of human rights education in the school system as a complex process which entails various courses of action, equally important and mutually reinforcing:

1. Developing and adopting coherent educational policies, legislation and strategies that reflect human rights principles, as well as of appropriate organizational measures to implement those policies, with the involvement of all stakeholders;
2. Ensuring that all teaching and learning processes and tools- including for instance the content and objectives of the curriculum, teaching practices and methodologies as well as materials, including text-books - are based on and incorporate human rights principles;
3. Promoting learning environments in which human rights are respected and upheld. All school actors (students, teachers, staff and administrators and parents) should practice human rights and solidarity through real-life examples and activities, and children should be able to participate fully in school life;
4. Providing the teaching profession and school leadership, through pre-service and in-service training, with the necessary knowledge, understanding, skills and competencies to facilitate the learning and practice of human rights in schools, as well as with appropriate working conditions and status.

The plan of action of the WPHRE proposes a national implementation strategy to address those areas, in four stages:

• Analysis of the current situation of human rights education in the school system;
• Setting priorities and developing a national implementation strategy;
• Implementing and monitoring;
• Evaluating.

The plan of action also provides that an "objective of international cooperation and support will be the strengthening of national and local capacities for human rights education in the primary and secondary school systems"

Asia-Pacific context

In Asia and the Pacific, Governments agreed on strengthening human rights education as a pillar of human rights protection in 1998, when they identified it as one of the four pillars of the Framework for Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Its importance reaffirmed on numerous occasions, human rights education has been an area of vibrant activity but this dynamism has not been consistent across the region. While innovative approaches are taken by some countries, communities, schools and organizations, elsewhere the lessons are not being examined or applied. In few countries there has been a systematic review of the extent, quality and access to human rights education and of the national support system for its development. Very few Asian countries have developed a comprehensive national plan of action for human rights education. Regional support for human rights education in the schools has been largely localized, disparate, or intermittent. Thus, the opportunities for cross-fertilization of good practices and ideas, although growing, remain limited

Considering this context, UNESCO and OHCHR jointly developed a project that supports WPHRE in Asia

The project aims at helping countries to systematically address three key aspects of human rights education. First, the content of human rights education will be critically examined in the light of national and international human rights norms and standards. As stated by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 1, "the education to which each child has a right is one designed to provide the child with life skills, to strengthen the child's capacity to enjoy the full range of human rights and to promote a culture which is infused by appropriate human rights values" (para. 2). The extent to which these aims of education are reflected in school curriculums and materials will be assessed

Second, the message of human rights can be undermined if not supported by pedagogical methodology. The use of corporal punishment, punishment by humiliation, reinforcement of societal prejudices against certain minority groups or against one gender, often girls, must be eliminated in the schools if a culture peace, tolerance and respect for human rights is to be transmitted through the schools. The project will therefore examine, along with the curriculums of participating countries, the methodologies used to deliver them. The proposal will thus support the implementation of the Dakar Framework for Action, adopted at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal in 2000, which specifically calls upon countries to improve on the quality of education, so that recognised and measurable learning outcomes are achieved. These would include outcomes on the well-being of the learners, the relevance of the contents and outcomes, the quality of the teaching/learning processes and the suitability of learning environments

Third, critical aspect of human rights education is the question of access. Non-discriminatory access to free and compulsory primary education is not only required for the delivery of human rights education, it is a basic human right provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties. The Dakar Framework sets a goal of ensuring that by 2015, all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, can access and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality. Despite international commitments, however, many countries in the region have not introduced national legislation to guarantee free and compulsory education. Where it is provided for in a legal framework, the laws are often not consistently enforced. The imposition of formal or informal fees makes primary education for children of poor and marginalized families virtually inaccessible. In a number of Asian countries, problems of access are linked to direct or indirect discrimination. Such obstacles to education and their devastating impact on the most marginalized sectors of society are amply proven in the literature.^[1]

The project aims to take stock of the progress made to date in the region and to contribute to the systematization of human rights education in the school system, with priority given to countries in South and Southeast Asia. In accordance with the WPHRE, the proposal is dedicated to primary and secondary school education. The project proposes a range of activities to be undertaken over three years, but aims at initiating a professional exchange of experience, lessons, and practical information that, it is hoped, will endure long beyond its own lifespan

Overall goal and specific objectives

The overall goal of this project is contribute to the implementation of the plan of action of Phase I of the WPHRE in Asia:

(a)To promote the inclusion and practice of human rights in the primary and secondary school systems;

(b)To support the development, adoption and implementation of comprehensive, effective and sustainable national human rights education strategies in school systems, and/or the review and improvement of existing initiatives;

(c)To provide guidelines on key components of human rights education in the school system;

(d)To facilitate the provision of support to Member States by international, regional, national and local organizations;

(e)To support networking and cooperation among local, national, regional and international institutions.^[2]

The project aims at achieving these goals in Asia through three specific objectives:

1. To identify and analyze achievements, weaknesses, and areas for improvement on human rights education in schools for each participating country, including by identifying and analyzing elements in the education system that would support human rights education, and across the region;
2. To widely disseminate information and experiences about existing programmes, projects and other initiatives on human rights education in schools in Asian countries;

Implementation Scheme

The project will involve a high level of consultation among the stakeholders through a highly participatory process. The consultations will be led by a working-level national team on human rights education (NTHRE), composed of members of key institutions in each country, including professional organizations, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions and Ministries of education

The NTHRE of each country will be expected to undertake the following:

1. Coordinate country-level activities under this proposal especially data and material gathering;
2. Network with other institutions involved in human rights education such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), higher education institutions (teacher colleges and universities), media, international agencies (including those of the UN) on the documentation of human rights education in school system initiatives, and analysis of their current state;
3. Together with members of the regional project　team^[3], prepare the national report on the state of human rights education in school system initiatives.

The selection of countries to be covered under this project will be made by an Advisory Panel, the functions of which are set out below, based on, inter alia:

(a) formal expression of interest of the concerned Government, (b) willingness to establish a NTHRE that would undertake the functions set out in this proposal, and (c) interest of the UN Country Team in the concerned country to support the country-level activities of the project

The sub-regional and regional consultations will be held involving educators (school teachers and NGO educators); education officials (including school administrators) and researchers; teacher educators; members of academia (especially those involved in university-based human rights centers); representatives of the human rights organizations, national human rights institutions, sub-regional and regional inter-governmental institutions related to education, and international organisations and United Nations agencies and offices (country by country)

Endnotes

2. WPHRE, para. 21

3. The regional project team is being coordinated by HURIGHTS　OSAKA

Human rights education is not only for educators. By incorporating human rights education into the different functions of a national human rights institution, every activity of the institution would support the goal of promoting human rights. Staff members doing tasks such as investigation of human rights violations complaints or review of laws based on human rights standards are therefore enabled to contribute to the human rights education function of their institution

This is the gist of the recent training workshop for the staff of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal. Equitas^[1] and the NHRC launched a three-year capacity-building project for the NHRC staff in 2003. While the first part of this program focused on capacity building in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, the project began its focus on human rights education capacity-building in 2005. They held the first workshop under this part of the project in March of that year to help increase the capacity of senior NHRC staff to conduct effective human rights education activities. In May 2006, they held the second workshop. The project was developed in the context of the NHRC's human rights education priorities as set out in its Strategic Plan (2004-2008)

NHRC Strategic Plan

The NHRC adopted in December 2003 the Strategic Plan (2004-2008) to guide the implementation of its mandated functions. As the NHRC Chairperson puts it, the Strategic Plan (2004-2008)

is a powerful instrument to guide the NHRC in executing its duties and responsibilities in accordance with the aspirations of its statute and the stakeholders. Hence, the multiyear and annual work plan of the NHRC in the future will be prepared on the basis of this document and their implementation will be jointly reviewed by the Members and the staff.

The mission of the NHRC is stated as follows:

Our mission is to develop a culture of human rights in the country by taking a leading role as an independent and impartial national institution for the protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with universally recognized human rights principles.

The six core values are equality, impartiality, accessibility, accountability, transparency, and independence and autonomy. To ensure that these values are properly applied, the Strategic Plan provides that

A five-member-committee comprising of one of the members and four staff members representing different ethnic background[s] will review the progress on implementation of the above values every six months. They will report to the Commission with specific recommendations in the areas needing improvements, if any. An external audit of the values will be conducted annually to examine the level of implementation of the values by the Commission and to suggest ways and means of institutionalising the values.

The Strategic Plan includes an analysis of the major human rights issues in Nepal and the response of the NHRC to the situation through eight strategic objectives (complete with key priority areas and expected results).^[2]

Under Strategic Objective 7 on human rights education, the key priorities are the:

• Inclusion of human rights education in school curriculum and in non-formal education packages
• Inclusion of human rights education as core subject in the staff-training program of the Ministry of General Administration, or of the appropriate ministry in-charge of staff training
• Facilitating the proper preparation of government officers with quasi-judicial responsibilities to enable them to undertake their tasks in accordance with the international human rights standards
• Education and awareness-raising of activities for key policymakers, Regional Administrators and Chief District Officers
• Dissemination of human rights information to public officials and professional groups
• Facilitating the proper training of security and army personnel before deployment to active duty, and follow-up training to reinforce the knowledge and behavioral changes
• Application of international human rights standards in handling cases
• Undertaking high impact promotional work on selected cases and on emerging human rights issues.^[3]

In addition, other Strategic Objectives of the Strategic Plan contain human rights education and training activities

To be able to effectively implement the human rights education components of the Strategic Plan, training would be needed. Thus the Equitas-NHRC project has an important role to play. The project is complemen- tary to other capacity-building projects implemented with other partner institutions.^[4]

Training of Trainers II Workshop

The Training of Trainers II Workshop was held on 17- 21 May 2006 in Nepal. The workshop aimed to build the capacity of the NHRC staff to undertake effectively and with confidence the human rights education activities under the Strategic Plan. The workshop focused on skills that "are not only necessary for staff of the Commission's Promotions Division and the NHRC Training Coordinator, but also for key persons in other divisions of the NHRC who will be involved in human rights education activities and workshop development where the topic of the workshop relates to his/her area of work."^[5]

Workshop objectives^[6]

The workshop activities placed emphasis on designing and implementing practical human rights education activities and programs within the context of the NHRC's mandate, Strategic Plan, and divisional work- plans. It was expected that by the end of this workshop, participants should be able to:

1. Identify the components of effective human rights education programs and activities and how to incorporate them in their work
2. Plan and design effective human rights education activities for specific target groups
3. Facilitate human rights education programs more effectively by drawing on methods, techniques, skills and attitudes developed and practiced during the workshop
4. Apply effective techniques for reflecting on their practice as human rights educators
5. Use a variety of methods for evaluating human rights education programs.

A specific outcome of the workshop was the development of human rights education activities by the participants for specific target groups

Another outcome of the workshop was the creation of an inter-divisional core group of NHRC staff with the capacity to plan, design and conduct human rights education activities within a collaborative environment

Workshop Outline

Several senior NHRC staff who were in the March 2005 Training of Trainers Workshop on human rights education attended the May 2006 workshop along with many other NHRC staff who regularly work with them. Most of the participants thus had an understanding of the steps for designing effective human rights education. The workshop activities, therefore, served as a "refresher" for some participants and yet offered something new for everyone. Participants from the March 2005 workshop were actively engaged as co-facilitators to reinforce their skills as human rights educators

Resource persons were also brought in to provide views and information at different segments of the workshop.^[7] They provided comments to the presentations of the participants, as well as offered insight in regard to relevant human rights education programs and activities undertaken by other organizations and institutions in the region

For further information please contact: Ms. Sneh Aurora, Program Officer, National Institutions, EQUITAS, 1425 Rene Levesque West, Suite 407, Montreal CANADA H3G 1T7; ph (1- 514) 954-0382, ext. 32; fax (1- 514) 954-0659; e-mail: saurora@equitas.org; www.equitas.org/index_en.php

Endnotes

1. Equitas is the new name of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation. Its full name is Equitas - International Centre for Human Rights Education

2. See full text of the Strategic Plan (2004-2008) in www.nhrcnepal.org

3. Based on Strategic Plan (2004-2008), page 28

4. See for example the capacity development project for the 2002-2007 period with the support of the United Nations Development Programme and several countries as partners. See webpage www.nhrcnepal.org/project1.php?ProjNo=1 for further information

5. Human Rights Education and Promotion - Training of Trainers II - Workshop Manual, Equitas and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal, 2006

6. Ibid., page 4

7. There were 2 resource persons - Jefferson R. Plantilla of HURIGHTS OSAKA, and Felicia Yeban of the Philippine Normal University.

* Jefferson R. Plantilla is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

The 1948 exhortation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that "every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedom..." finds support in the "International Conference on Human Rights Education in a Diverse and Changing Asia" held in Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan on 22-24 May 2006

Presentations in the conference confirm the broad realm of human rights education, and thus support the participation of educators from various fields in the task. Education initiatives ranging from Graduation Pledge (for university students), creation of human rights cities, peace education, citizenship education, Dowa education,^[1] and gender education provide avenues for human rights learning

Graduation Pledge, for example, helps create consciousness among graduating students about the need to apply human rights principles (among other principles) in their respective future fields of work. Citizenship/civic education may provide a broader definition of citizenship by considering the human rights of minorities who should be properly considered as active members of society. The establishment of human rights cities provides the opportunity for the incorporation of human rights in local government policies and programs, and thus facilitate local level education activities

The conference likewise reviewed some experiences at the national and regional levels. The socio-political contexts and human rights education experiences in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Afghanistan and the Philippines were discussed. The regional experiences of HURIGHTS OSAKA and the Asia-Pacific Regional Resource Center for Human Rights Education (ARRC) were presented

On the panel discussion on China, one panellist pointed out the problem of North Korean refugees. The worsening economic situation in North Korea provides a major reason for North Koreans to flee to China, particularly in areas where Chinese of Korean descent live. It was noted that when famine hit China in the early 1960s, Korean-Chinese sought refuge in North Korea. Now it is the other way around. This situation puts China in a dilemma. Any response could give rise to the ire of either North Korea or the international community. It is noted however that China should allow full operation of international humanitarian programs (mainly through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) to help alleviate the plight of North Korean refugees

The presentations on the activities of Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) and the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (HKHRM) discussed concrete problems in implementing human rights education programs. Aside from the lack of institutionalized human rights education program for the police in India, training the majority of the members of the police force is not an easy task considering their situation. Many of them, as constabulary and other subordinate officers, are underpaid and have bad working conditions. Getting non-governmental organization (NGO) programs into Hong Kong schools faces the challenge of overcoming negative views among teachers and parents about human rights and NGOs. Both CHRI and HKHRM however are fully aware of these problems. They are determined to maintain their programs despite the difficulties

Other presentations stressed the need for networking at national and regional levels. A new network among Indian educators to promote human rights education was started recently in India by the Mumbai -based Peace and Justice Commission. HURIGHTS OSAKA, on the other hand, relies on its network of institutions to be able to implement its regional program

Conference context

Professor Mab Huang, in his opening remarks, noted the absence of a regional human rights mechanism in Asia-Pacific. In view of this situation, cooperation between the academic community and non-governmental organizations in the region becomes more important and compensates for the lack of regional mechanism

The keynote speech of Professor James Seymour^[2], on the other hand, took issue with the international human rights system and its failure to address many problems. He asserted that

State sovereignty precluded (or at least made difficult) the ascendancy of transnational values and institutions that might have protected human rights. Eventually, inter-governmental organizations were created to deal with the problem, but so far these have proven inadequate.

He also lamented the inadequate teaching of human rights in schools, while in "too many countries, children were taught values of nationalism and political discipline, rather than genuine citizenship and human rights." He observed that some

people were led to believe that "human rights" were part of a conspiracy to undermine Asian values. Thus, at least with regard to Asia, there was the myth abroad that the East did not care.

But he also noted positive developments such as the weakening of absolute sovereign states that facilitated the establishment of regional mechanisms such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, the more democratic world compared to a generation ago, the growing rejection among Christians and Muslims of religious extremism, the new Human Rights Council of the United Nations (UN), and the increased human rights consciousness among people resulting from efforts under the UN Decade for Human Rights Education

Regional meeting

Alongside the international conference was a regional meeting to discuss the program of the International Human Rights Education Consortium (IHREC). The meeting introduced IHREC to the Asian human rights education community. Professor Theodore Orlin of Utica College in New York State, and current President of IHREC, explained its history and activities. He emphasized that the IHREC is a loose network of institutions and individuals that are involved in human rights education. He presented the activities held in North America and Europe since its establishment in 2002

The mission statement of IHREC states that it "promotes education, collaboration, and research on human rights at the national, regional, and global levels." It has two Vice-presidents from Asia (Allwyn D'Silva of India and Mab Huang of Taiwan). IHREC intends to develop a regional network for Asia and thus invites the participating institutions to join the network

The participants agreed on the need for human rights educators in the region to meet in order to exchange experiences and ideas, and to closely collaborate on particular activities. Thus they agreed to hold a regional conference in Asia in 2008. The specific issues to be discussed in the conference are still to be agreed upon, while the Philippines has been identified as a possible venue. Prof. Huang's remark about the need for more cooperation between the academic community and NGOs in Asia in view of the absence of regional human rights mechanism provides another rationale for the planned conference

IHREC, with its strong link with people in the academe as well as colleges and universities, points to the role that the academe in general should play in human rights education (both formal and non-formal forms). These roles can be research and documentation, training, development of teaching and learning materials, and provision of resource persons. Human rights education programs of schools and NGOs will benefit much from the support that the academe can provide

For further information, please contact: Mab Huang, Chang Fo-Chuan Center for the Study of Human Rights, 70, Linshi Road, Shihlin, Taipei, Taiwan 111; ph (8862) 2881-9471 ex. 6279 or 6110; fax (8862) 2881- 2437; e-mail: hrer@mail.scu.edu.tw; www.scu.edu.tw/hr; or, Theodore S. Orlin, J.D, P resident, IHREC, Utica College, 1600 Burrstone Road, Utica, NY 13502, USA; ph (315) 792-3267; fax: (315) 792-3381; e-mail: ihrec@utica.edu; www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ihrec

Endnotes

1. This is an anti-discrimination education started in Japan in late 1960s to address the discrimination suffered by a section of Japanese society called Burakumin

2. He is a professor in Columbia University (New York) and Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) is a vision of education that seeks to empower people to assume responsibility for creating a sustainable future. In recognition of the importance of ESD, the United Nations (UN) has declared 2005-2014 as the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (DESD). UNESCO was requested to lead the Decade. The goals of DESD are to: (i) facilitate networking linkages, exchanges and interaction among stakeholders in ESD; (ii) foster an increased quality of teaching and learning in ESD; (iii) help countries make progress towards and attain the Millennium Development Goals through ESD efforts; and (iv) provide countries with new opportunities to incorporate ESD into education reform efforts

Two of the major tasks to begin the work of ESD are to improve basic education and to reorient existing education to address sustainable development. However, the concept of ESD is very complex and may mean different things to different groups of people. It is recognized that understandings of and visions for sustainability will be different for different individuals. Therefore, it is essential to deconstruct and analyze this complex concept from different perspectives before it can be operationalized in different cultural contexts. As mentioned earlier, there are many different stakeholders in sustainable development, and each group has a different vision for and role in sustainable development. Some are interested in environmental preservation and protection, others are interested in promoting intercultural and international understanding and yet another group may be more interested in pursuing economic development. All these groups will have to work together to negotiate the process of achieving sustainability

Although ESD carries with it the inherent idea of implementing programs that are locally relevant and culturally appropriate, it is imperative that the complex concept of ESD be fully understood before effective implementation can take place. In reorienting education to address sustainability, it should be noted that many topics inherent in ESD are already part of the formal education curriculum. However, these topics or content areas need to be identified or seen to contribute to the larger concept of sustainability

Expert meeting

On 1-3 May 2006, the UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education, Bangkok held in Kanchanaburi, Thailand an Expert Meeting on ESD. The main purpose of this expert meeting was to identify and recognize the key components of ESD so that educators from different disciplines can examine the curriculum and school activities for existing contributions to ESD. In addition, educators can identify potential areas of the existing school curriculum in which to insert examples that illustrate sustainability and additional knowledge, issues, perspectives, skills and values related to sustainability

The meeting also aimed to discuss the relationship of ESD with other education initiatives such as Environmental Education (EE), Education for International Understanding (EIU), Education for All (EFA), UN Literacy Decade (UNLD), and Millennium Development Goals (MDG); recommend guidelines for reorienting existing education to address sustainable development; and plan the organization of the workshop on "Reorienting Teacher Education to Address Sustainability" in 22-25 August 2006.^[1]

Experts working on environmental education, peace education, values education, education for social justice, indigenous culture education and human rights education attended the meeting. There were also representatives from the UNESCO ESD partners in the region, namely, Institute for Advanced Studies of the United Nations University, the Asia/Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO (ACCU), and the Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding (APCEIU)

The participants presented and discussed what would be the appropriate contents of ESD in terms of issues on the environment, social justice, peace and human rights. There were also presentations on existing ESD projects such as the IAS-UNU regional centers of expertise project, and ACCU's project to fund education programs and institutions that will work on ESD

Discussion highlights

From the point of view of human rights education, the meeting is significant for the following issues:

1. Networking among institutions (including universities) that have programs related to ESD. The networking experience presented in the meeting (International Network of Institutions of Teacher Education) provides a good example of sustainable effort of information and experience sharing among concerned institutions. As experienced in human rights education, there is a need for educators to link up in order to maximize existing resources (expertise, materials, programs) which support the development of ESD.
2. Teacher education as a primary focus for promoting ESD. It has been observed that education programs introduced into the school curriculum have less prospect of success if the teachers are not properly trained to undertake them considering their already heavy teaching duties. Aside from training those already in service, teacher-students should be given proper understanding of ESD, and training on how it can best be implemented. Thus teacher education institutions should be properly engaged in ESD, reorienting its curriculum if necessary. This perspective applies to human rights education.
3. Link among international programs on education. ESD aims to promote Education for All (EFA), UN Literacy Decade (UNLD), and Millennium Development Goals (MDG). But it should also support equally important initiatives such as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010) and the World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE). It has been observed that existing UN literature on ESD do not include these initiatives which form a constituent part of the concept of ESD.
4. Conceptual linkages and confusion. ESD has been misunderstood as equivalent to environment education, and has not been clearly promoted as conceptually linked to education for international understanding, human rights education, peace education, values education and other "educations." Human rights principles, for example, have been defined in relation to development, environment, peace, culture and social justice concerns. But these principles have not yet been given much attention in ESD literature, as they should be.
5. Reorienting education toward ESD. This is an important effort that can help mainstream ESD into the education systems (by improving on existing programs on international understanding, human rights education, peace education, values education and other "educations."). The task of reorienting education towards ESD is not without problems in view of the difficulty in changing education policies and curriculums.

The meeting provided the opportunity for these issues to be discussed, or at least noted, for future ESD activities of UNESCO and national institutions

The first phase plan of the WPHRE, which focuses on the formal education system, provides for the creation of "synergies with the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014), coupling efforts to address issues of common concern." The synergies between WPHRE and DESD will not be difficult to obtain in light of existing collaboration among networks and institutions in the Asia-Pacific on human rights, development and environmental concerns

For further information, please contact: APEID-ESD, UNESCO Asia-Pacific Regional Bureau for Education, Bangkok, Thailand; ph (662) 391-0577 ext: 203; fax (662) 391-0866; e-mail: s.tinsiri@unescobkk.org
You may also visit www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=4223 (Expert Meeting webpage) and www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=71 (UNESCO ESD website).

Endnote

1. This workshp is being organized jointly by the Asia-Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development (APEID) and APCEIU.

* Nobuki Fujimoto is a staff of HURIGHTS OSAKA.

Combating the trafficking of children within Southeast Asia requires a systematic inter-country approach. Governments and their partners (non-governmental organizations and international institutions) in this subregion have to maintain a common framework of action that draws both from international human rights instruments and national anti-trafficking experiences. The development of such framework provides an opportunity for government and non-governmental institutions to mutually learn from their respective experiences

Southeast Asian context

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEN) adopted in November 2004 in Vientiane the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children.^[1] The Declaration recognizes "the urgent need for a comprehensive regional approach to prevent and to combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children." It also recognizes that "a successful campaign against the scourge of trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, requires continuing dialogue, exchange of information and cooperation among ASEAN." The Declaration therefore declared to undertake the following measures:

1. To establish a regional focal network to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, in the ASEAN region;
2. To adopt measures to protect the integrity of their respective passports, official travel documents, identity and other official travel documents from fraud;
3. To undertake regular exchange of views, information sharing on relevant migratory flows, trends and pattern, strengthening of border controls and monitoring mechanisms, and the enactment of applicable and necessary legislations;
4. To intensify cooperation among our respective immigration and other law enforcement authorities;
5. To distinguish victims of trafficking in persons from the perpetrators, and identify the countries of origin and nationalities of such victims and thereafter ensure that such victims are treated humanely and provided with such essential medical and other forms of assistance deemed appropriate by the respective receiving/recipient country, including prompt repatriation to their respective countries of origin;
6. To undertake actions to respect and safeguard the dignity and human rights of genuine victims of trafficking in persons;
7. To undertake coercive actions/measures against individual and/or syndicate engaged in trafficking in persons and shall offer one another the widest possible assistance to punish such activities; and
8. To take measures to strengthen regional and international cooperation to prevent and combat trafficking in persons.

To be able to undertake these measures, however, the governments in Southeast Asia need practical guidelines

NGO Initiative

Asia ACTs against Child Trafficking (Asia ACTs),^[2] a regional campaign network to fight child trafficking in Southeast Asia, facilitated the drafting of Proposed Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Trafficked Children, also known as the Bohol Document in a workshop in 2004.^[3]

Asia ACTs followed this up with the Regional Seminar-Workshop on the Southeast Asian Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims of Trafficking in Bangkok on 20-24 March 2006

Fifty-five NGO (mostly Asia ACTs members) and government representatives from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Burma/Myanmar attended the seminar- workshop. There were also observers from Bangladesh, Nepal, Japan, and the Netherlands

They reviewed a number of relevant international human rights documents including the United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and the Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Trafficking (2000) of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. They also reviewed 'The Stockholm Declaration and Agenda for Action',^[4] adopted during the First World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 1996 and The Yokohama Global Commitment 2001,^[5] adopted during the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 2001.^[6]

The review extended to ASEAN documents such as The ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children.^[7]

NGO representatives presented country experiences on combating the trafficking of children. The participants from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia also explained the process of developing country-level guidelines

Developing common guidelines

The participants referred to UNICEF's guidelines for Southeastern Europe (May 2003) and the Bohol Declaration in developing guidelines. This resulted in 'The Proposed Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Trafficked Children in Southeast Asia' (Proposed Guidelines). The Proposed Guidelines comprehensively provide the steps that states, in particular, should take to solve the problems of trafficked children, in addition to the role of NGO service providers

The Proposed Guidelines defines child trafficking as follows:

recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation, within or outside a country, which shall include but not be limited to child prostitution, child pornography and other forms of sexual exploitation, child labour, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, removal and sale of organs, use in illicit/illegal activities and participation in armed conflict. For the purposes of these guidelines, the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child by means of adoption or marriage for the purpose of exploitation shall be likewise considered child trafficking.

The Proposed Guidelines also stress that the consent of the child or the person exercising custody over the child to trafficking or any of its elements is irrelevant and does not exempt the offender from, or lessen his/her, liability for committing acts that constitute or promote child trafficking

The general principles, which should be considered at all stages of care and protection of trafficked children, include the rights of the child against discrimination based on status, nationality, race, color, sex, language, faith, religion, ethnic or social origin, disability, etc, and to information and confidentiality; the best interest of the child; respect for the views of the child; and state responsibility

The Proposed Guidelines provide concrete measures on detection and identification of child-victims, initial contact with them, system of referral, coordination and cooperation, interim care and protection, social case management of trafficked children, access to justice, care and protection for social welfare service providers, and capacity building of communities and persons working with trafficked children

The Proposed Guidelines also provide that the State should give "legal protection and/or free legal assistance" to a " social welfare service provider for an act done in good faith as part of his/her function to provide assistance to a trafficked child" in case the former is sued by a trafficker. Such legal support may include legal counselling, preparation of legal documents, filing of action in courts, and legal representation in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. This measure is meant to protect service providers from being harassed by traffickers

In the system of referral, coordination and cooperation, there is a regional mechanism component to be based on a regional agreement that defines a system of referral and specific areas for coordination and cooperation, including designating their own liaison officer/office who shall be responsible for cross-border linkage and referral to the appropriate office for immediate response to cases of cross-border trafficking. It also mentions that as a component of national mechanism, states should develop a national arrangement that will define the roles and functions of each government agency in relation to child trafficking and a system of referral and areas for coordination and cooperation

Challenge to address

While the Proposed Guidelines contain many important elements in protecting the rights of trafficked children in Southeast Asia, they still need further development. The main issue should be on their implementation at the national and regional levels once adopted by governments

Part of the process of developing the Proposed Guidelines should be the dissemination of information and lobby of state actors by ASIA ACTs and member-NGOs. They may collaborate with the Working Group for the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in this regard. The latter has also started working on human rights education with the holding of the Roundtable Discussion on "Engaging ASEAN Governments on Human Rights Education" on 23-25 March 2006 in Bangkok, in coordination with the Asia-Pacific Regional Resource Center for Human Rights Education (ARRC). This meeting was held in response to the request by ASEAN senior officials for help in implementing the human rights education component of the Vientiane Action Program.^[8]

For further information, please contact: Ms. Ma. Amihan V. Abueva, Asia Acts Against Child Trafficking (Asia ACTs), Rm. 322 Philippine Social Science Center, Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City. Metro Manila, Philippines; ph (632) 929-0822; fax (632) 929-0820; e- mail: asiaacts@tri-isys.com www.stopchildtrafficking.info

Endnotes

1. See www.aseansec.org/16794.htm

2. See www.stopchildtrafficking.info/

3. The workshop was held in Bohol, Philippines in August 2004

4. See www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat_inter/projects/monitor-ing/agenda_for_action.pdf

5. See www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat_inter/projects/

6. Ms. Anjanette Saguisag, Project Officer, UNICEF Philippines introduced the documents

7. Mr. Robert Larga, Senior State Counsel, Department of Justice, Philippines presented the documents

8. For more details, visit www.aseanmech.org and also FOCUS Asia-Pacific Newsletter, No. 43 (arch 2006) at www.hurights.or.g.jp/asia-pacific/043/08.hmtl

The Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center (HURIGHTS OSAKA) is now accepting entries for the "HURIGHTS OSAKA Award 2006" from the Asia-Pacific region. The deadline for submission of entries is 31 August 2006

Three outstanding entries will be selected for the Award. Each awardee will receive an award certificate and 200,000 Japanese Yen in a ceremony in Osaka in September 2006

Entries

Entries must be original and creative materials and programs for teaching and learning international human rights standards. They may deal with rights of children, women, people with disabilities, minorities, etc.; right to development, sustainable development, or human security. There is no specification on type of materials and programs or their form. They may be training manuals, lesson plans, workbooks, etc. They may be in the form of printed (or published) material, CD, powerpoint, calendars, other audio-visuals, etc

In selecting the awardees for the Awards 2004 and 2005, importance was placed on the level of teaching/learning function of the entries. Activity reports and translations of United Nations and other documents may be valuable material in themselves, but will have lower priority for the purpose of this Award. The teaching/learning materials can be for school education (primary, secondary or tertiary) as well as for adult, home or community education. Another important factor will be the integration of two aspects; raising the children's and adults' sensitivity regarding human rights, and understanding human rights issues in the contemporary world

The material may also be in any language. However, for materials or programs in languages other than Japanese or English please attach a description/commentary in English (200 words)

The materials/programs must have been produced from January 2003, regardless of whether they have been published or marketed. Materials/programs received for the Awards 2004 and 2005 cannot be resubmitted for Award 2006

For information about the previous awardees, please visit the following webpages:

1. Award 2004:
   www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_37/07.htm
   www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_37/06.htm
2. Award 2005:
   www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/041/07.htm

Applicants

Any individual, group or organization from the Asia- Pacific region (including Japan) may apply till 31 August 2006

To submit entries, please send the materials/programs with completed application form. The application form is available in HURIGHTS OSAKA website (www.hurights.or.jp/event/award_form_e.html)

Please send entries to:

  HURIGHTS OSAKA Award 2006 for Human Rights Education
  Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center
  1-2-1-1500 Bentencho, Minato-ku, Osaka 552-0007 Japan

Postage and other costs of sending materials are borne by the applicants. Materials received for the award will not be returned

Selection of awardees

The winning entries will be selected by a jury

The award winners will be announced in September 2006. Award winners will be directly notified

For more information contact:

  Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center
  ph (81-6) 6577-3578   fax (81-6) 6577-3583   [e-mail]

Osamu Shiraishi
Director
Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center
(HURIGHTS OSAKA)

While upholding the universality of human rights, it is important that human rights become a reality in local communities with diverse backgrounds. Human rights after all should be enjoyed by all members of the community, that is, every person and group within it. How is it possible to address two seemingly contradictory demands, namely, upholding the universality of human rights and addressing the diverse needs of communities?

HURIGHTS OSAKA takes this challenge in pursuit of its goals. Its mission statement provides that HURIGHTS OSAKA aims to promote human rights in the Asia-Pacific region and to convey Asia-Pacific perspectives on human rights to the international community.

Having worked for 24 years in the United Nations secretariat in the area of human rights and having been raised in Japan, I understand and share this challenge. And anyone who has been involved in human rights activities in the Asia-Pacific region would see that this is not an easy challenge to face.

In order to enrich the universal nature of human rights the contribution of the Asia-Pacific region is essential. Such contribution can come from the process of firmly rooting human rights within local communities with diverse social, cultural and religious backgrounds. The universality of human rights stands on the basic concept that each person is equal in dignity with everyone else, regardless of who and where he/she may be.

I would be pleased if I could make even a small contribution to the work of HURIGHTS OSAKA in the years to come. I look forward to working together with all the partners and collaborators of HURIGHTS OSAKA and would appreciate their closer cooperation and unchanging support.

Distinctions between peoples are sometimes dictated by myths and biases. Be they in remote places or in the midst of towns and cities, those designated as different constitute the minorities. The minorities' histories are likely little understood, much less appreciated by the rest of the "non-minorities"

It is unfortunate that the minorities suffer from discrimination and other human rights violations. In times of crisis, they even get murdered or otherwise physically harmed

The riots that occurred in Southeast and South Asia during the last decade are reminders of the seriousness of the problems faced by minorities. While the situation of minorities in some countries in the region, where various forms of discrimination occur, reminds us of the persistence of the problems despite economic development

The existence of people who are considered different is not an aberration in society - it is a normal feature of a society that is vibrant and appreciative of diversity. Some societies refuse however to accept diversity, regardless of its reality. Distinctions among peoples, be they apparent or hidden, are sources of ideas better used for the benefit of society as a whole

The issue of "minorities" is best resolved by understanding their histories and role in society, in the process redefining the character of society itself. Respecting their human rights will not harm anyone. Violating their rights is simply oppression. Is it not appropriate to see minorities not as "them" but as part of "us"?

Chinese-Indonesians comprise 3% of the total population of Indonesia, or approximately 7 million. As a minority group, they still suffer from discrimination.
It is a fact that most Indonesians consider the Chinese-Indonesians as a separate group from the majority indigenous Indonesians due to different "ethnicity". The Chinese-Indonesians are not considered part of the nation in violation of the principle of equality before the law enshrined in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution

Arrival of the Chinese

Long before the arrival of the Dutch colonialists the Chinese had been an integral part of what was then Indonesia. They integrated into the then Indonesian society in the same way that the Chinese in other parts of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam) did. While the first Chinese are believed to have arrived in Indonesia in the fifth century, people from southern China came much earlier (prehistoric era) to the then Southeast Asian region to comprise the so-called Malays. The latter Chinese and the Malays are thus considered to belong to, or share, the same racial genealogy.^[1]

Admiral Cheng Ho, a Chinese, introduced and spread Islam in Java island and some parts of Southeast Asia more than 600 years ago. He arrived in Semarang, Central Java from China with his followers and taught Islam to the indigenous Indonesians. He used the traditional gamelan music to support his teaching of Islam. Java was at that time a Hindu-Buddhist kingdom. The nine respected Islamic saints (Wali Songo) in Indonesia^[2] are considered followers of Admiral Cheng Ho. They are considered the pioneer missionaries in teaching Islam in Java island and believed to have Chinese blood
Despite the fact that Java was a Hindu-Buddhist kingdom, the mission was considered successful, with 80% of the population having been converted into Islamic religion. Gujarati traders, on the other hand, introduced Islam in other parts of Indonesia such as Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi

The integration of the Chinese into the society was disrupted when the Dutch colonialists came to Indonesia in the seventeenth century for trading purposes. They eventually colonized Indonesia for political reason, and ruled for about 350 years. To maintain its existence, the Dutch colonial government employed the divide and rule strategy (divide et impera) and divided the people in Netherlands Indisch (the Dutch colonial name of Indonesia) into several categories. Under State Regulation/Indische Staatsregeling No. 163 IS/1854, the population was divided into 3 categories:

1. Europeans or Westerners
2. Foreign Easterners (Chinese-, Indian-, and Arabdescent)
3. Indigenous people.

The division of the population caused tension among the groups particularly between the Foreign Easterners and the Indigenous groups due to their socio-economic differences. Religious and cultural backgrounds were highlighted in the Dutch colonial legal system by having a dual legal system, i.e., Western law mainly for the Europeans or Westerners and Customary Law for the indigenous people. The indigenous Indonesians were further segregated into Moslems who were bound by Islamic legal system, and the non-Moslems who were bound to the Western legal system. The ethnic Chinese were caught in between the two legal systems, each having a different court

At the beginning of the Dutch colonial rule, the political rights of the ethnic Chinese were recognized. But the 1740 Chinese rebellion (with 10,000 Chinese getting massacred, killed and slaughtered in Batavia [Jakarta]) changed the situation. Since that incident the Dutch colonial government denied political rights to the Chinese. They were only allowed to engage in trade and business. The Dutch controlled agricultural plantations, mining, oil, finance, banking and other activities. Most indigenous people were marginalized as peasants and lower rank government officials. This structure of society and the legal system under the Dutch colonial rule was maintained and continued by the Indonesian government

Independent Indonesia

When Indonesia declared independence on 17 August 1945 the two-part legal system was maintained, but the political rights of Chinese-Indonesians were acknowledged. Some Chinese-Indonesians were involved in the drafting of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution and in the preparation for the birth of an independent Republic of Indonesia. Some became legislators, politicians and ministers during the Soekarno administration (1945-1966). But this changed during the Soeharto era

The 1965 failed communist coup d'etat heightened the anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia. The military and the "New Order" government of Soeharto accused the People's Republic of China of supporting the failed communist coup. The anti-Communist sentiment linked the negative view of the People's Republic of China to the sentiment towards the Chinese-Indonesians

Most of the Chinese-Indonesians are Indonesian citizens. The people and the government do not distinguish between ethnic Chinese-Indonesians who are mostly Indonesian citizens and Chinese of non- Indonesian citizenship. This is due to the segregation policy during the Dutch colonial rule that Soeharto continued even more severely with the issuance of more than 60 anti-Chinese laws and regulations. Presidential Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, Cabinet circular letters and the People's Assembly Decrees were all issued based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious discrimination. They, among others limited the Chinese Lunar New Year celebration and Tao worship activities, prohibited the use of Chinese language and writing system, and the establishment of schools. All of these are considered discrimination by the state against individuals or citizens

Only after the fall of the Soeharto government in 1998 that the Chinese-Indonesians were able to again celebrate the Lunar new year, teach the Chinese language, use again Chinese characters in public, etc. This change was pioneered by President Habibie, and maintained by Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid , Megawati Sukarnoputri and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who are supportive of human rights

The Chinese-Indonesians

The Chinese-Indonesians are mostly economically better off compared to most Indonesians although in some regions they are also poor and mainly peasants. Three decades ago they were required to obtain a certificate of citizenship (SBKRI), a discriminatory requirement. They have to pay an unofficial price ranging from US$ 200 to US$ 700 to obtain the document. Most Indonesians do not have this kind of document. It is only applied to the Chinese-Indonesians. The obligation to possess SKBRI has provided an avenue for blackmailing Chinese-Indonesians. This system remains at present

Human rights treaty obligations

Indonesia recently ratified a number of United Nations human rights instruments in response to national and international pressures. The following instruments were ratified:

1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR)
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

As a state party to ICESCR, ICCPR and CERD, Indonesia must faithfully report to the respective treaty monitoring bodies in the United Nations on the state of human rights in Indonesia.^[3]

For further information, please contact: Indonesian Legal Studies Foundation, Jl. Gading Kirana Barat IX, Blo C 10/21 (Rukan Nusa Kirana) Kelapa Gading Permai, Jakarta 14240 Indonesia; ph (6221) 4587-4046; 7091-1743; fax (6221) 4587-4047; email: yphi05@dnet.net.id

Endnotes

1. Christian Drake, National Integration in Indonesia - Patterns and Policies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), page 17

2. See Slamet Muljana, Runtuhnya Keradjaan Hindu-Djawa Dan Timbulnja Negara-negara Islam Di Nusantara (The Fall of the Hindu-Jawa State and the Occurrence of Islamic States in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1968), pages 102-107 and Sagimun M. D., Peninggalan Sejarah Masa Perkembangan Agamaagama di Indonesia (The Heritage of the History of Development of Religious States in Indonesia) (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), pages 62-65

3. Wiwiek Setyawati Firman, "Arti Ratifikasi Dua Konvensi HAM (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights dan International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights) Bagi Penegakan Hukum Di Indonesia", paper presented in a seminar organized by National Law Commission of Indonesia, (Jakarta, 9 March 2006), pages 3-4